



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THE
ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA
IN 1862

BY

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FIRST NAPOLEON," ETC.



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AN ACKNOWLEDGMENT.

THE concluding chapter of this book was the author's last work on earth, and it cheered his dying hours to know that his task was accomplished. There remained, however, much to be done, to prepare the manuscript for publication, and I wish to record, within these covers, my gratitude to Colonel Allan's friend and successor, Mr. Duncan C. Lyle, of McDonogh, Maryland, without whose generous and painstaking help it could hardly have been done; and to Mr. John C. Ropes, of Boston, who, amid the pressing activities of a busy life, gave such kind and valuable assistance.

ELIZABETH P. ALLAN.

INTRODUCTION.

IT is a matter for sincere congratulation that this contribution to the history of our Civil War is to become the property of the American public. Colonel Allan was a man of rare gifts, and his abilities as a military critic were of a high order. His opportunities of observing the events of which he treats were also exceptionally good. He was from the beginning of the war almost constantly at the headquarters of Lieutenant-General Jackson ; and in January, 1863, he received the commission of Chief of Ordnance of the Second Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia, which that distinguished officer commanded. He participated in the brilliant achievements in the Shenandoah Valley in the spring of 1862 ; he took part in the engagements which initiated the successful movement against McClellan's communications in the early summer of that year ; he shared in the daring and skillful operations which Jackson conducted against General Pope in the month of August ; he witnessed the capture of Harper's Ferry ; he was in the thick of the fight on the bloody day of Antietam ; he was present at the successful maintenance of the lines of Fredericksburg. It would not be possible to imagine a position in the Confederate army which would have given to an officer a more varied experience, or have familiarized him with more important and decisive actions. And all these opportunities for acquaintance with the great operations of war were improved to the full, for Colonel Allan was possessed of a

remarkably sound judgment on military matters, a cool and clear head, and a tenacious memory. When we add to these gifts that of a singularly strong love of truth, it is plain that we have attributed to him the principal qualities that go to make a sound and impartial historian. That we have not exaggerated Colonel Allan's qualifications as a writer on the civil war is sufficiently evident from the favor with which his two previous works—that on the campaign of Chancellorsville,¹ and that on Stonewall Jackson's campaign in the Shenandoah Valley²—were received by the public,—North as well as South.

Colonel Allan, as is well known, undertook to write the entire history of the Army of Northern Virginia, but, unfortunately, he did not live to carry his narrative beyond the close of the year 1862. It is this portion of his projected work which is now placed before us. It bears on its face the marks of the great labor and conscientious research which the author lavished upon it. The period treated is one of the most interesting in the whole war,—so far as the operations in the east are concerned. The year 1862 has begun. The North,

¹ *The Battle-Fields of Virginia: Chancellorsville: Embracing the Operations of the Army of Northern Virginia from the First Battle of Fredericksburg to the Death of Lieutenant-General Jackson.* By Jed. Hotchkiss, late Captain and Topographical Engineer, Second Corps, A. N. V., and William Allan, late Lieutenant-Colonel and Chief of Ordnance, Second Corps, A. N. V. Illustrated by five maps and a full length portrait of Lieutenant-General T. J. Jackson. New York: D. Van Nostrand, 192 Broadway. London: Trübner & Co. 1867.

² *History of the Campaign of General T. J. (Stonewall) Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia, from November 4, 1861, to June 17, 1862.* by William Allan, formerly Lieutenant-Colonel and Chief Ordnance Officer, Second Corps, A. N. V. With full maps of the region and of the battlefields, by Jed. Hotchkiss, formerly Captain and Topographical Engineer, Second Corps, A. N. V. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1880.

amazed and aroused by the defeat of Bull Run, has exerted its strength in earnest. Powerful armies, well equipped and commanded, are placed at the disposal of the National government. Adequate arrangements are made to transport these forces by water to the immediate neighborhood of the Confederate capital. Nothing is wanting in the way of preparation, — the Northern army is fully supplied with everything that can be required in the field. On the other side but little has been done to meet the impending blow. The Confederate forces in Virginia, greatly inferior in numbers and equipment, are utterly unable to cope with their adversaries, if the latter use their superiority with the skill and determination that may reasonably be expected.

But the Confederate authorities and people were at last awakened to the sense of their unprotected situation; the formidable forces which the Federals had collected were frittered away by misdirection and inefficiency; and the year 1862 closed not only without disaster to the Confederate cause in the East, but with a victory, — that of Fredericksburg, — which raised the confidence of the South to the highest pitch, and filled the Northern people with discouragement and mortification. To relate this story, doing justice to both parties, is the task attempted by Colonel Allan in the volume now before us. It will not be expected that all his statements will be accepted by the Northern public; allowance must always be made, even when considering the views of the most judicial minds, for the bias which inevitably results from adopting heartily and earnestly one side in a great conflict of opinion and of arms. But the Northern reader will find in the pages before us an impartial spirit, and a love of the exact truth, characterizing the entire performance of the work.

To the military reader especially, these chapters will be of value. Colonel Allan, it is true, was not a graduate of West Point, but he had confessedly a great natural aptitude for mil-

itary operations ; and he was placed for four years in the best of schools, — that of the actual practice of war, performed under the eye and direction of able, educated, and accomplished officers. The observations with which the author sums up his views of the various campaigns described in this volume possess great weight, and deserve the most careful consideration.

Colonel Allan had many friends and admirers in the North. For some years before his death he had been an active member of the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts. He had made several visits to Boston for the purpose, among other things, of reading papers before the society. Three of these essays were on the battles — or, rather, I should say, on the campaigns and battles — of Sharpsburg, Fredericksburg, and Gettysburg ; and they were among the most valuable papers that the society has received. Probably the volume before us contains the substance of the first two papers, but it is likely that they will all appear at some future time among the publications of the society. In these essays, as also in a lecture which he delivered in Boston in 1886 before the Lowell Institute, at the request of the Military Historical Society, his fairness, as well as his ability, was universally recognized and commended.

It is, therefore, not without reason that we welcome this book. Written as it is by an officer whose opportunities of observation were so extensive, whose capacity for military criticism has been so long attested and admired, and whose impartiality has received such abundant recognition, we cannot doubt that this narrative of the operations in Virginia during the year 1862 will be cordially received as an important and permanent addition to the best histories of the Civil War.

JOHN C. ROPES.

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THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA.

CHAPTER I.

THE SITUATION IN VIRGINIA IN 1861.

THE operations of the Federal and Confederate armies in Virginia in 1862 were the most considerable and important that had up to that time been witnessed in America. The year was filled with active movements, and crowded with notable events.

The desultory operations of the summer and fall of 1861 had been but preliminary to the great contest of the succeeding year. They had accomplished little except in Virginia. In Missouri the successes of Price had been neutralized by the strong force which the Federal administration threw into the State; in Kentucky nothing of importance had been done; but in Virginia the great victory of the Confederates at Manassas, July 21, 1861, had paralyzed the Union forces there for the remainder of the year, and given the Richmond government an opportunity to consolidate its strength and organize its resources. Without this respite it is difficult to see how the South could have maintained itself through another year.

The hostile sections had a common border of one thousand miles, stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the western limit of Missouri; and all along this line preparations were making for war. This border is separated into three natural divisions: 1. That extending from the Atlantic to the Alleghanies. 2. That from the Alleghanies to the Mississippi. 3. That west of

the latter river. In each of these divisions vast invading armies were gathering on the part of the North, and flotillas of gunboats were building on the great rivers to coöperate. The main energies of the Union government were absorbed in these preparations along the border for a simultaneous advance in overwhelming force upon Confederate territory; but at the same time measures to enforce the blockade of Southern ports were actively pushed, and formidable expeditions against points on the Southern coast were prepared. The most important of these were: that against the coast of North Carolina; that against the coasts of South Carolina and Georgia; and that against New Orleans.

Our concern, however, is with the chief scene of military operations, which was in Virginia, on the eastern division of the border. Here, about the capitals of the two contending sections, situated but little more than one hundred miles apart, was the heart and centre of the struggle. Here the greatest efforts of the two belligerents were put forth. Here the largest and best equipped armies were set in the field. To this point were the ablest leaders drawn. Here, as chief prizes, were Richmond and Washington, the possession of either of which by the hostile party, it was believed, would give a decisive advantage in the contest.

For many months the Federal and Confederate armies in Virginia had been preparing for a life and death struggle. The complete rout of the Federal army at Manassas July 21, 1861, had caused the government at Washington to put forth its best efforts to create and equip a force that should be able to crush all opposition. General McClellan, whose successful campaign against the Confederates in West Virginia, as well as his previous standing, had made him, for the time, the most prominent of the Federal officers, was called to Washington and put in command. Men and supplies were gathered without stint. McClellan devoted all his talents and energies to the conversion of his mob of raw recruits into a great army, thoroughly organized, drilled, and equipped. Cautious, even to an extreme, he steadily refused to risk any important operations until this work should be accomplished. Six months of arduous

labor placed him at the head of a finely supplied and disciplined army of about 200,000 men present for duty.¹

Nor were the Confederates less busy during the long period of comparative quiet that followed the first battle of Manassas. With them, too, a mass of untrained volunteers had to be turned into steady and disciplined soldiers. A work of greater difficulty was to equip and supply the army thus formed. The Confederates had not merely to obtain supplies of all kinds, but to create the establishments needed to manufacture them; they had to organize not merely an army, but a government. An immense territory, exposed both on the land and on the water side, had to be defended at many points. The subdivision of men and means thus necessitated rendered the Confederates everywhere too weak to assume the aggressive. General J. E. Johnston at the close of the year 1861 had but 57,337 men with which to oppose McClellan.² This able officer, during the fall and winter, maintained so bold an attitude with his inferior force as to prevent McClellan from advancing. The firmness with which Johnston held on to the blockade of the lower Potomac by means of shore batteries, the formidable front he showed at Centreville, and the interruption of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, kept up in the breasts of the Federal administration the feeling of being on the defensive long after the necessity for such a state of things had ceased.

¹ McClellan's force present for duty March 1 was by his official return 193,142. (McClellan's report.) In the spring of 1862, according to General Webb, he had 158,000 for field operations, besides some 55,000 in detachments, guarding Washington, Manassas, Warrenton, the Shenandoah Valley, and the line of the Potomac. See Webb's *Peninsula Campaign*, p. 8.

² Johnston's *Narrative*, p. 84. Johnston's force present for duty at the end of February was 47,306. (Webb, p. 26.)

CHAPTER II.

MCCLELLAN'S PLANS FOR 1862.

WITH the new year the plans and preparations for the campaign of 1862 were urged forward with increased activity. The Federal government soon became impatient for the forward movement of its vast armaments. Public opinion in the North demanded a prompt use of the great accumulations of men and material that had been made for the purpose of "crushing the rebellion."¹ The Federal commander-in-chief began to be criticised as too slow and cautious. This officer, charged with the direction of military operations over a vast field, found it impossible to move his armies as fast as the populace required. Preparations were hastened in the West more rapidly than in the East, and in January the expeditions were set forward which in the succeeding month at Forts Henry and Donelson wrested the control of the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers from the Confederates, and thus brought about the loss of Kentucky and a large part of Tennessee, with the fall of Columbus, Nashville, and Island No. 10.

Meantime the Army of the Potomac, commanded by General McClellan in person, lay along the Potomac in front of Washington, hindered from a forward movement by the weather, the roads, and by McClellan's unwillingness to adopt that line of advance, and prevented from selecting a new scene of operations by the hesitancy with which President

¹ President Lincoln, on January 27, issued the following order: "That the twenty-second day of February, 1862, be the day for a general movement of the land and naval forces of the United States against the insurgent forces. That especially the army at and about Fortress Monroe, the army of the Potomac, the army of Western Virginia, the army near Munfordsville, Kentucky, the army and flotilla at Cairo, and a naval force in the Gulf of Mexico be ready to move on that day." . . .

Lincoln yielded assent to the commander's plan of campaign. The objective point of the Federal campaign in the East was the capture of Richmond, the capital of the Confederacy and seat of the most important arsenal and manufactories for the supply of the Southern armies. General McClellan deemed an advance directly against the army in front of him unadvisable, because it would yield his opponent all the advantages of defensive positions of his own selection, and would draw the Federal army into the interior of Virginia, away from its base and the reach of water transportation, and render it dependent upon a single line of railroad for supplies. This was the longest, and McClellan thought it the most difficult, way of attacking Richmond. He proposed, instead, a transfer of the Army of the Potomac to the waters of the lower Chesapeake, and an advance thence against the Confederate capital. By means of the rivers of that region, all of which could be controlled by the Federal navy, he could place his army within a few miles of Richmond, and establish a base of supplies near at hand and on deep water. The plan he first suggested was to move his army to Urbana on the Rappahannock, and to advance thence by way of West Point to Richmond. In this way he would turn the Confederate position at Manassas completely, and by rapid movements might place his army between the Confederates and their capital. The unexpected withdrawal of Johnston from Manassas to the line of the Rappahannock checkmated this plan and finally caused its abandonment. McClellan's second plan was to transfer his army to Fortress Monroe, and march thence up the Peninsula, between the York and the James, while the Federal gunboats controlled the rivers and protected his flanks. The Federal Cabinet hesitated for a time to approve these plans. To them they seemed to uncover Washington. The vivid impression made upon the minds of President Lincoln and his advisers by the first battle of Manassas had not been effaced, and they were unwilling to place the great Federal army where it would not be directly in the path of a Confederate force advancing from the interior of Virginia. They yielded, at last, to McClellan's urgent representations, but in doing so required as conditions: 1. That

Washington should be garrisoned and covered by sufficient forces to make it perfectly secure ; 2. That the lower Potomac should be freed from Confederate batteries ; and 3. That the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad should be reopened and protected.¹ McClellan undertook to comply with these conditions, and prepared to transfer his army to the lower Chesapeake.

Meantime General Johnston was preparing to retire behind the Rappahannock as soon as the Federal army gave signs of a forward movement. His bold front, with less than 50,000 men, had given him control of Northern Virginia for supplies ; had kept the Federal army, three times as numerous, on the defensive ; and had so imposed upon McClellan, that the latter estimated the Confederate numbers at over 100,000 men in his front, at a time when they were really about 40,000. It was necessary that the Confederates should be ready to meet McClellan, whether he advanced from Washington towards Gordonsville, or by way of Fredericksburg, or by the lower Chesapeake. Johnston expected him to move by the Fredericksburg route.² Behind the Rappahannock the Confederates would be in position for any contingency. At the first signs of activity, therefore, among the Federal troops on his right, General Johnston began to retreat, and by the 11th of March had reached his new line. This retreat caused McClellan to give up his design of landing at Urbana. The Confederates in their new position were too near at hand to permit the Federal army to establish itself without opposition on the lower Rappahannock, and the passing of Johnston's flank by a rapid move from Urbana on Richmond was no longer practicable. Hence McClellan turned to his alternative line of operations by way of the Peninsula between the York and James rivers.

¹ See McClellan's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. v. p. 50.

² See Johnston's *Narrative*, pp. 101, 102.

CHAPTER III.

SIEGE OF YORKTOWN.

AFTER the retreat of the Confederates, McClellan's plans were pushed with more vigor, and by the end of March the mass of the Federal troops had been transferred to Fortress Monroe. As the Federal plans were gradually revealed to the Confederates, dispositions were made to meet them. General Johnston retired first behind the Rapidan, and when, early in April, there was no longer room to doubt the destination of the Federal forces, the mass of his army was ordered to the Peninsula, where General Magruder with 11,000 men¹ was meanwhile delaying, with admirable energy and skill, the advance of McClellan.

Magruder, finding that his most advanced line, extending across the Peninsula from the mouth of the Warwick by Young's Mill to Harwood's Mill and Ship Point, required more force than he had at command, had selected, as a second position, a line extending from Yorktown by way of the Warwick River to Minor's farm and thence to Mulberry Island Point. He garrisoned Gloucester Point on the north bank of the York, and thus disputed the passage of that river at its narrowest part. Magruder thus describes his position: ² "Warwick River rises very near York River and about one and a half miles to the right of Yorktown. Yorktown and redoubts Nos. 4 and 5, united by long curtains and flanked by rifle-pits, form the left of the line, until at the commencement of the military road it reaches Warwick River, here a sluggish and boggy stream, twenty or thirty yards wide, and running through a dense wood fringed by swamps. Along this river

¹ *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 405.

² *Ib.* p. 406.

are five dams — one at Wynne's Mill, one at Lee's Mill, and three constructed by myself. The effect of these dams is to back up the water along the course of the river, so that for nearly three fourths of its distance its passage is impracticable for either artillery or infantry. Each of these dams is protected by artillery and extensive earthworks for infantry." He says: "Keeping only small bodies of troops at Harwood's and Young's Mills and at Ship Point, I distributed my remaining forces along the Warwick line, embracing a front, from Yorktown to Minor's farm, of twelve miles, and from the latter place to Mulberry Island Point of one and a half miles. I was compelled to place at Gloucester Point, Yorktown, and Mulberry Island fixed garrisons amounting to 6000 men, my whole force being 11,000, so that it will be seen that the balance of the line, embracing a length of thirteen miles, was defended by about 5000 men."¹

With such thoroughness and skill did Magruder avail himself of the means placed by nature and art within his reach, that he completely checked the advance of the Federal army. General McClellan, preceded by a large part of his army, reached Fortress Monroe April 2, and on the 3d ordered such of his troops as were ready to move toward Yorktown next day. He states that the force thus set forward was "in all about 58,000 men, and 100 guns beside the division artillery."² The Federal army moved forward in two columns, the right one, under Heintzelman, to Harwood's Mill, the left under Keyes to Young's Mill, which positions were occupied without serious opposition. On the 5th of May Keyes was ordered forward by way of Warwick Court House to the Halfway House between Williamsburg and Yorktown,³ while Heintzelman was to move directly on the latter place. Keyes advanced but a short distance from Warwick Court House, when he found himself in front of the

¹ *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 405.

² McClellan's report, *Ib.* p. 7.

³ McClellan seems to have been ignorant of the Confederate position across the Peninsula, and to have expected serious resistance only at the Yorktown end of Magruder's line.

Warwick River and Magruder's works at Lee's Mill. He attempted to make an attack, but was easily checked, finding the position "unapproachable by reason of the Warwick River and incapable of being carried by assault."¹ Heintzelman was also brought to a halt by the works at the Yorktown end of the line.² Thus, on April 6, the Federal army of over 80,000 men at hand or hastening to join it³ was brought to a complete standstill by Magruder with his 11,000 men behind the Warwick. McClellan says: "I made on the 6th and 7th close personal reconnoissances of the right and left of the enemy's positions, which with information acquired already convinced me that it was best to prepare for an assault by the preliminary employment of heavy guns and some siege operations. Instant assault would have been simple folly."⁴

Time was all important to the Confederates for the transfer of Johnston's army from the Rapidan and Rappahannock to the Peninsula: Magruder had gained it. The Confederates could not leave their position on the upper rivers until sure that no attack was to be made upon them there, and this gave the Federals the opportunity to concentrate on the Peninsula and advance against Magruder before he could be reinforced. Had McClellan's penetration and determination been equal to his adversary's boldness and skill, the Confederate position at Yorktown must have been quietly turned or carried, and the Federal army would have reached the Chickahominy without serious opposition. But for ten days McClellan remained in

¹ McClellan's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 10.

² Magruder says: "He attacked us with a furious cannonading and musketry, which was responded to with effect by our batteries and troops of the line. His skirmishers were also well thrown forward on this and the succeeding day and energetically felt our whole line, but were everywhere repulsed by the steadiness of our troops. . . . Every preparation was made in anticipation of another attack by the enemy; the men slept in the trenches under arms, but to my utter surprise he permitted day after day to elapse without an assault." (Magruder's report, *Ib.* p. 406.)

³ McClellan says on April 7 that his entire force for duty was 85,000, of which 53,000 had joined him. See his telegram of that date to President Lincoln in McClellan's report, *Ib.* p. 11.

⁴ McClellan's report, *Ib.* p. 11. McClellan has been severely criticised for his course on this occasion, and certainly with reason.

front of Magruder, without making any serious demonstration, engaged in bringing up troops and guns and in preparing his siege works. The Federal commander's hesitation was increased by the fact that McDowell's corps had been detached from his army, April 4, and kept in front of Washington.¹

The naval force, too, intended to coöperate with him, was so fully occupied in blockading the mouth of the James River against the formidable Confederate ironclad, the Virginia (or Merrimac),² as not to be able to undertake the reduction of

¹ McDowell's corps consisted of 33,548 men (McClellan's return April 1), and at the last moment it was detained in front of Washington because of the apprehension of the Federal administration that the capital was not sufficiently defended by the troops left by McClellan. See reply of General Hitchcock to President Lincoln's inquiry as to whether the forces left to guard Washington were sufficient. (*Report on Conduct of War*, vol. i. pp. 16, 17.) Franklin's division of McDowell's corps was subsequently (April 22) sent to McClellan.

² The story of the Virginia, if brief, is brilliant. When the Federal authorities evacuated Norfolk in 1861, they burned and sank the U. S. frigate Merrimac. It was proposed to the Confederate Navy Department by Lieutenant J. M. Brooke that this ship be raised and converted into an ironclad. In the absence of facilities for building and equipping suitable ironclads, this suggestion was adopted. The sunken vessel was raised, cut down, covered with four inches of iron plates, and renamed the Virginia. Even the old engines had to be used, though wretchedly inefficient. After much effort this makeshift was gotten ready, and on March 8 steamed out of Norfolk under Admiral Buchanan to attack the Federal fleet lying in Hampton Roads. The Virginia ran into and sank the Cumberland, and captured and destroyed with hot shot the Congress after a gallant fight. The falling tide and approaching night now took the unwieldy ironclad (which drew twenty-two feet of water) back to Norfolk. In this afternoon, however, she had revolutionized naval warfare, and closed the era of wooden battle-ships. Next day came the renowned fight between the Virginia and the Monitor. This last was the first of the ironclads of the Federal navy built by Captain John Ericsson. She was much smaller and more active than the Virginia, drew but twelve feet of water, and was armed with more powerful though fewer guns. She had arrived at Fortress Monroe just in time to meet the Virginia, when the latter steamed out into the Roads on March 9 to complete the destruction of the Federal wooden fleet. The second day's conflict was between these two ironclads, which fought each other for hours, but with no decisive results. The Monitor was able to protect her wooden consorts, but could do little damage to the Virginia, while the latter was in turn unable to penetrate the armor of her

the Confederate batteries which closed the York at Gloucester Point and Yorktown.¹ Still, McClellan had reached Yorktown with an army eight or ten times as numerous as Magruder's forces, and his superiority in material was not less great. However admirable, therefore, the latter's defensive arrangements and the bold front with which he imposed upon his adversary, it is impossible to defend McClellan from the charge of excessive caution.² The result of Magruder's efforts was

rival. The ease of motion and lighter draught of the smaller ship enabled her to circulate about her cumbersome adversary, and to keep out of the way when the Virginia tried to run her down or to get near enough to board. Finally the Monitor drew off into shallower water, and the Virginia, unable to follow, returned to Norfolk.

The action of this day showed plainly the superiority of the Monitor in design and construction. No subsequent engagement took place between these ships. The Virginia was too clumsy and unseaworthy to venture away from a deep channel and calm water; and the Monitor was properly regarded as the only available defense of the great fleet of transports in York River belonging to McClellan's army. Hence, when the Virginia came out and offered battle, the Monitor kept to shallow water and declined. When the Confederates evacuated Norfolk in consequence of their retreat from Yorktown, it was decided to take the Virginia up the James River, and she was lightened for this purpose. But at the last moment the pilots declared she could not be gotten over the bars, and she was then abandoned and burnt at Craney Island, May 11. Her crew was sent to Drewry's Bluff on James River, a few miles below Richmond, where five days later they gave an admirable account of themselves when the Federal fleet attacked that point.

¹ The chief naval officers deny that McClellan had any right to expect this service of them. See testimony of Assistant Secretary Fox and of Admiral Goldsborough before Committee on Conduct of War, vol. i. pp. 630, 632. See, also, letter from Colonel J. G. Barnard to General McClellan, March 20, 1862, in McClellan's *Own Story*, pp. 246, 247.

² McClellan was a fine organizer, but he was strangely unfortunate in the organization of what he calls his "Secret Service Force." He seems never to have obtained from them information as to the strength of his enemies which was other than worthless, and in many cases the estimates thus gotten were such absurd exaggerations that it is marvelous how an officer so able and well informed could have been imposed upon by them. In the present case, for instance, McClellan telegraphs President Lincoln, April 7, that "all the prisoners state that General J. E. Johnston arrived at Yorktown yesterday with strong reinforcements. It seems clear that I shall have the whole force of the enemy on my hands, probably not less than

most important. General J. E. Johnston says: "This resolute and judicious course on the part of General Magruder was of incalculable value. It saved Richmond and gave the Confederate government time to swell that officer's handful to an army."¹

On the 16th of April, McClellan made an attempt on what he conceived to be the weakest part of Magruder's lines at Dam No. 1, between Lee's and Wynne's Mills. General W. F. Smith, with the 2d division of the 4th corps, was directed to make a reconnoissance in force at this point, to be converted into a formidable attack if found advisable. This part of the Confederate line was held by Cobb's brigade,² which occupied rifle-pits along the west side of the Warwick. There were also three pieces of artillery in position, but only one of them so placed as to be really available in the fight.³ Magruder had constructed a dam at this point to increase the obstruction offered by the stream, but below this dam the Warwick was found to be fordable. On the morning of the 16th, Smith's division was moved towards this point, with Brooks's brigade

100,000 men, and probably more." At this time Magruder had 11,000 effectives, and about this time Wilcox's brigade and some troops from south of James River joined him, adding 5000 to his numbers. The advance section of D. H. Hill's division joined him on the 9th and two other divisions by the middle of the month, raising his force to 35,000. Towards the end of the month, by the arrival of Smith's and Longstreet's divisions, the Confederate army on the Peninsula was swelled to about 53,000, including 3000 sick. (Johnston's *Narrative*, pp. 111, 112, 117.) General Johnston assumed command of all the forces opposing McClellan on April 17.

¹ Johnston's *Narrative*, p. 111.

² Cobb's brigade consisted of the 2d Louisiana, 15th North Carolina, 16th and 11th Georgia, and Cobb's Legion. These were thrown into line in the order named, the 2d Louisiana being on the left and Cobb's Legion on the right. (Cobb's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 416, *et seq.*)

³ The guns in position at Dam No. 1 were "one twelve-pounder howitzer, Captain Jordan's battery, at the work near the dam, and one twelve-pounder howitzer and one six-pounder of the Troup Artillery (Captain Stanley) of Cobb's Legion." (Cobb's report, *Ib.* p. 417.) One of the guns was placed low and commanded only the dam, and another was so badly placed as to be useless, or nearly so.

and Mott's six-gun battery in front. After severe cannonading from Mott, who was reinforced after midday by other batteries until twenty guns were at work, Brooks sent forward a part of the 3d Vermont regiment to cross below the dam, and made ready to support it, if a lodgment could be effected. The Vermonters waded the stream, which was waist deep, and made so sudden an attack that in a few moments they occupied the rifle-pits of the 15th North Carolina, before this regiment, which was engaged in digging another line of intrenchments a short distance in the rear, could be recalled to the assistance of their skirmishers, who alone were at hand to resist the Federals. The 15th North Carolina, supported by the other regiments of Cobb's brigade, and subsequently by a part of G. T. Anderson's brigade,¹ was promptly moved forward, and though the fall of its commander, Colonel McKinney, caused some slight confusion, the Vermonters were soon driven back across the stream with the loss of largely over one third of their number.²

Later in the afternoon another effort was made. After a severe shelling by the Federal batteries, to which only one of Captain Stanley's guns could reply, part of the 4th Vermont was ordered to cross on the breast of the dam, and part of the 6th Vermont was sent to the point at which the former crossing had been made. But so severe was the Confederate musketry fire that these parties were driven back before they reached the western side of the stream, and further efforts were abandoned. The Federal loss in this affair was 173, the Confederate 75.³ General McClellan, by this failure, was confirmed in his conviction of the inexpediency of a direct assault upon Magruder's lines, and thenceforward devoted all his efforts to his regular siege operations before Yorktown.

General J. E. Johnston assumed command on the Penin-

¹ The 7th and 8th Georgia were the two regiments of Anderson's brigade employed.

² Captain Harrington, commanding the four companies which crossed, says his force numbered 192 and his loss amounted to 82. See his official report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 376.

³ The Federal losses are taken from the *Medical and Surgical History of the War*, the Confederate from General Magruder's official report.

sula on April 17. He found McClellan pushing his siege operations and making preparations to open on the Confederates with heavy batteries.¹ The Confederate commander, when all his available force was collected, could muster but little over 50,000 men, with which to oppose the double numbers² in his front, and his armament was entirely inadequate to cope with the heavy siege train of his adversary. A more serious weakness was that the Confederate control of York River depended upon the detached works at Gloucester Point held by a small body of troops. These works once in Federal possession, the river would have been open to McClellan, and the Confederate position turned. General Johnston therefore favored a retreat towards Richmond, with the design of concentrating the Confederate strength and giving battle to the Federal army when it should have been drawn some distance from its depots.³ But the Confederate administration desired to keep McClellan back as long as possible, to gain time for preparation, and General Johnston was instructed accordingly. He therefore determined to hold his position until McClellan was ready to attack, but then to fall back without waiting to have his works demolished or his troops driven from them by the Federal batteries. By the 1st of May the Federal works approached completion. General Johnston learned on April 27 that the opposing batteries would be ready in five or six days,⁴ and he therefore made his dispositions for retreat. On the night of May 3, leaving his heavy guns be-

¹ General Barry (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 339) says the Federal siege train consisted of 101 pieces, as follows, viz.: "Two 200-pounder Parrott rifled guns, eleven 100-pounder Parrott rifled guns, thirteen 30-pounder Parrott rifled guns, twenty-two 20-pounder Parrott rifled guns, ten 4 $\frac{1}{4}$ -inch rifled siege guns, ten 13-inch sea-coast mortars, ten 10-inch sea-coast mortars, fifteen 10-inch siege mortars, five 8-inch siege mortars, and three 8-inch siege howitzers. Three field batteries of 12-pounders were likewise made use of as guns of position."

² McClellan's return for April 30 shows his "present for duty" (exclusive of those sick, on special duty, and in arrest) to have been 115,102. (*Report on Conduct of War*, part i. p. 337.)

³ See *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, vol. ii. p. 203.

⁴ McClellan says they would have been ready by May 6 at latest. See his report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 18.

hind, he evacuated Yorktown, and fell back to Williamsburg on the way to Richmond.

Thus ended the so-called siege of Yorktown and the first month of the Peninsula campaign. So far, the advantage was entirely with the Confederates. With a handful of men they had checked McClellan's advance, and for thirty days thereafter had held him at bay while their forces were gathering to oppose him. Had McClellan, early in April, broken or turned them by throwing forward a force on the Gloucester side through Magruder's lines, as he might have done, and made a prompt advance on Richmond, it is difficult to see how the fall of that city could have been prevented.

CHAPTER IV.

WILLIAMSBURG AND ELTHAM'S LANDING.

FINDING his enemy gone on the morning of May 4, General McClellan threw forward a large force in pursuit. Stoneman, with his brigade of cavalry and four batteries of horse artillery, moved in advance on the direct road from Yorktown to Williamsburg, followed by Hooker's and Kearny's divisions of infantry, while Smith's, Couch's, and Casey's divisions were ordered forward by the road from Lee's Mill to Williamsburg. Stuart's cavalry covered the Confederate rear, and skirmished with the Federal advance as it pressed on toward Williamsburg. A mile or so to the east of this place was a line of detached earthworks, extending from the waters of Queen's Creek on the north to those of College Creek on the south, constructed some time before by General Magruder as a precautionary measure.¹ The largest of these works, called Fort Magruder, was at the centre of the line, and in front of it, at the distance of half a mile, the roads from Yorktown and Lee's Mill came together. The Confederate army reached Williamsburg by midday, and General Johnston directed the head of his column to continue the retreat. Early in the afternoon, finding that his cavalry was being forced back on the Yorktown road, he ordered McLaws with two brigades to support it. The latter officer, placing his troops in some of the earthworks above mentioned, checked the advance of Stoneman, and soon after, sending forward two infantry regiments on the Yorktown road, he forced the Federal cavalry to retire, and

¹ This constituted the third line of works across the Peninsula constructed by Magruder. The first was the line extending from Ship Point to the mouth of the Warwick by way of Harwood's and Young's Mills, — which he never attempted to hold for want of sufficient force. The second was the line from Yorktown along the Warwick.

captured one gun which they had been unable to get off. General Sumner, whom, as his second in rank, McClellan had sent to command, arrived on the field not long after, and with Smith's division of infantry attempted to renew the fight. But the hour was late, and he was prevented from effecting his design by the tangled forest and the rapid approach of night.

During the night McLaws followed Magruder's division, which was already on the road to Barhamsville, and the defense of the rear was left to Longstreet, who placed the brigades of R. H. Anderson and Pryor with light pieces of artillery in the works that had been held by McLaws.¹

The next day, May 5, dawned in the midst of a heavy rain, which increased the already deep mud, and made the movements of troops and especially of artillery difficult. General Sumner, who had bivouacked with Smith's division in the woods in front of Fort Magruder, deferred his attack in order to ration some of the men and to reconnoitre the left of the Confederate position. But meantime Hooker, who had passed to the left of Smith in the march of the day before and was advancing by the Lee's Mill road, reached the vicinity of the Confederate right and without delay ordered an attack. Grover's brigade was sent forward before eight o'clock A. M. against Fort Magruder and the Confederate line to the right of it, and eleven guns were boldly placed in battery at a distance of 700 or 800 yards. The Confederate skirmishers were twice driven in, and active firing was kept up while Patterson's New Jersey brigade was taking position to the left of Grover, and Taylor's brigade was being placed in support of the others. General Longstreet, who commanded the Confederates, seeing the increasing display of force in his front, ordered first Wilcox's brigade and then A. P. Hill's brigade to reinforce Anderson. Somewhat later (about ten A. M.) he sent forward Pickett's brigade also. Wilcox and A. P. Hill took position on the right of Anderson's brigade, and assuming the aggressive moved against the left flank of Hooker's division, which they gradually pressed back.

¹ Longstreet says, "Macon's battery under Lieutenant Clopton, two guns under Captain Garrett, and two under Captain McCarthy." (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. i. part i. p. 564.)

A stubborn conflict took place, mainly in the woods on the Federal left flank, in which the Confederates steadily gained ground. By eleven o'clock Hooker, hard pressed, was anxiously seeking reinforcements and looking for a diversion in his favor by the Federal troops on his right.¹ Sumner had ordered Kearny's division to his assistance, but the latter was still floundering through the mud and rain some miles in the rear. Smith's division was near at hand, and Hooker had already discovered that the way was clear from his position to that occupied by Smith. He therefore hoped for speedy relief. But General Sumner was intent upon another plan of operations, and seems not to have realized Hooker's situation. Information had been brought to Sumner that the Confederate left flank was so placed as to invite attack. The two redoubts immediately to the north of Fort Magruder were occupied by the Confederates, but their line did not extend farther, and there were two important redoubts still further to their left, which were reported unoccupied,² the extreme one of which commanded the passage over Cub Creek at a milldam, one of the few avenues of approach to this part of the Confederate line. A reconnaissance confirmed this report, and between ten and eleven

¹ Hooker dispatched Heintzelman, his corps commander, whom he supposed to be at the time with Sumner, as follows at 11.20 A. M. : "I have had a hard contest all the morning, but do not despair of success. My men are hard at work, but a good deal exhausted. It is reported to me that my communication with you by the Yorktown road is clear of the enemy. Batteries, cavalry, and infantry can take post by the side of mine to whip the enemy." (Hooker's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 467.)

² These redoubts had no doubt been left unoccupied in the morning because Anderson's and Pryor's brigades, which then constituted the Confederate rear-guard, were not numerous enough to hold so long a line. When Longstreet sent forward his other brigades, they were of course sent to the point attacked, — the opposite flank to that on which these redoubts were, — and until D. H. Hill's division reached the field there were really no troops available for occupying them. But it is difficult to say why nothing was then done, except that Hill, Longstreet, and Johnston all seem to have been ignorant of their existence. (Johnston's *Narrative*, p. 124.) General Johnston's explanation (*Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, vol. ii. p. 205) does not fully meet the case.

A. M. Hancock, with five regiments and a battery,¹ was ordered to make a *détour*, in order to assail the Confederate left and rear by way of these unoccupied redoubts. Meantime General Sumner kept the remainder of Smith's division (two brigades) opposite the Confederate centre, ready to assist Hancock or to resist an attack from Fort Magruder, but sent none of it, where it was most needed, to help Hooker. Couch and Casey had not yet reached the field.

So far Longstreet's object had been simply defensive, to cover the retreat of the Confederate army. He says: "At twelve o'clock it became evident that the trains would not be out of my way before night, and that I could therefore make battle without delaying the movement of our army. Orders were therefore given to General Anderson to organize columns of attack upon the enemy's position and batteries, using the brigades of Wilcox and A. P. Hill, and such of his forces as could be spared from the redoubts, the attack to be supported by Pickett's brigade."²

Anderson soon led forward his columns of attack, and a vigorous assault was made on the Union troops. It was met with determination, and a strenuous effort was made to hold the ground until reinforcements could arrive. Hooker ordered up the last of his reserves to support his wavering lines. But his efforts were in vain. His left flank (part of Patterson's brigade) gave way, and Taylor was not able to stay the tide of defeat. The Confederates now assailed from the flank and front the artillery which had been so annoying to them all day. A brave effort was made to carry the position occupied by the Federal guns. It was successful. The Confederates, headed by the 9th Alabama and 19th Mississippi of Wilcox's brigade, drove off the gunners and their supports, and captured nine of the pieces. Four of these were hauled off at once; the other five were so badly mired that it was found impossible to get them out of the mud.

¹ Hancock had with him the 5th Wisconsin, the 49th Pennsylvania, and the 6th Maine, of his own brigade, the 7th Maine and the 33d New York of Davidson's brigade, and Cowan's New York six-gun battery.

² Longstreet's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 564.

Meantime General Heintzelman, who had reached the field, was making energetic efforts to rally his broken troops, and the most urgent messages were sent to hasten Kearny forward. Another Federal battery (Smith's) was brought up to a point a short distance in the rear to resist the further advance of the victorious troops. The Confederates pressed on in spite of the canister with which this battery received them, and the battery was saved and the Confederate progress was stayed at this critical moment by the arrival of Kearny's division.

It was near three P. M. when Kearny arrived ; his troops were promptly deployed and sent into the fight. Peck's brigade of Couch's division had also come up on the Yorktown road, and was at once placed on Hooker's right. This timely aid restored the battle and saved Hooker from rout. Longstreet had already ordered up his last brigade (Colston's) and one of General D. H. Hill's, who, though on his march to Richmond, was still within easy reach. Colston's brigade and two of D. H. Hill's regiments under Colonel Ward of the 2d Florida were sent in on the Confederate right to strengthen A. P. Hill, and the remainder of D. H. Hill's division was sent to protect the Confederate left from the Federal forces (Hancock's) now threatening it.¹ Longstreet refrained from further aggressive movements in front and to the right of Fort Magruder, but continued to hold the positions he had gained until nightfall, repulsing several attempts to retake them.

Hancock had begun his movement about eleven A. M., and by midday his advance had crossed Cub Creek at the milldam and occupied the abandoned redoubt which commanded the crossing. He now sent back for reinforcements, and meantime cautiously advanced to a second empty redoubt. This brought him within reach of the Confederates who occupied the two redoubts between him and Fort Magruder.

¹ It was three o'clock, or after, when the mass of D. H. Hill's division was ordered back to meet Hancock. See Longstreet's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 565, and General Johnston's *Narrative*, pp. 120, 121.

The 6th South Carolina regiment of R. H. Anderson's brigade held the extreme Confederate left, and active skirmishing with heavy artillery firing took place¹ while Hancock waited for the reinforcements he had again asked for, without which he did not deem it prudent to attempt a further advance.² Some artillery joined him, but the infantry reinforcements were not sent. The vigorous attack made by Longstreet at midday, which had resulted in the defeat of Hooker's division, prevented it. Twice did Sumner order the remainder of Smith's division to Hancock's assistance, and twice was the order countermanded.³ Peck's brigade, which had taken position as soon as it reached the field in front of Fort Magruder, was forced back by the Confederate onset. Sumner deemed it too hazardous to weaken his centre, and instead of reinforcements sent Hancock repeated orders to return.

Meantime, on the Confederate side, D. H. Hill's division had countermarched to the field, and, excepting the two regiments sent to assist Longstreet's right, was placed on the left of the Confederate line. Early's brigade constituted Hill's front, his other brigades being near at hand.⁴ Though Hancock had ceased from aggressive movements, the fire of his artillery was annoying Anderson's troops near and to the left of Fort Magruder, and about five P. M. General Early asked and obtained permission to attack the Federal battery. A dense wood intervened between Hill's troops and the cleared space in which Hancock was, and concealed the latter, nor does any adequate reconnoissance appear to have been made by Hill or Early to discover Hancock's position and the best approaches to it. Early's brigade was formed with the 5th North Carolina regiment on the right, and the 23d North Carolina, 38th Virginia, and 24th Virginia in order towards the left. D. H. Hill took charge in person of the two regiments on the right,

¹ Colonel Jenkins says that Dearing's and Stribling's batteries and three pieces of the Donelsonville Artillery under Lieutenant Fortier were actively engaged. (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 583.)

² Hancock's report, *Ib.* p. 537.

³ Sumner's report, *Ib.* p. 452.

⁴ Hill's division contained the brigades of Early, Rains, Featherstone, and Rhodes, besides the two regiments under Colonel Ward.

while Early led those on the left. It was just at this time that Hancock, seeing indications of attack, and under reiterated orders to retreat, had determined to withdraw his troops and batteries from their most advanced positions to the crest of the hill on which was the first redoubt he had taken overlooking the milldam. Early's brigade was formed on a line oblique to Hancock's front, the left regiment, 24th Virginia, being nearest the Federal position and consequently with flank exposed as it came under fire. The brigade became more or less separated in passing through the dense woods, and when it emerged therefrom under fire the efforts to change front and attack in concert failed. The 24th Virginia charged directly upon the Federals, forcing them back to the redoubt on the top of the hill, while the 5th North Carolina, under Colonel McRae, gallantly moved up to their assistance on the right. Early fell, desperately wounded, at the head of the 24th Virginia, but these two regiments continued to advance until within thirty yards of the redoubt. The Federal regiments had been steadily forced back. The guns had been hurriedly withdrawn to the crest, and Hancock, finding it impossible promptly to get them into position there, had ordered them still further to the rear, while he relied on his infantry, now massed, to check the progress of the Confederates. Had the other two regiments of Early's brigade at this moment seconded the 24th Virginia and the 5th North Carolina, the crest might have been carried, but they were far behind, as was the 6th South Carolina, which had started forward from the nearest redoubt in Confederate hands to assist in the attack. The woods and the Federal fire had disordered them, and General Hill found it impossible to get them forward in time to be of service. A momentary halt of the advance regiments gave Hancock time to gather his force and hurl it with fearful effect on his opponents. Two withering volleys at close quarters staggered the Confederates, already tired with their long advance through rain and mud, and a prompt charge forced them broken and with heavy loss from the open field. General D. H. Hill says that Early's brigade, after this repulse, was not in condition to renew the attack, and that the

hour was too late for him to bring forward the other troops for this purpose. Hancock was too weak to follow up his advantage, and so was content with repulsing the assault and holding his position. Late in the afternoon McClellan (who had reached the field) ordered troops to Hancock's assistance, but the battle was over before they reached him.

The inclement day was fast giving place to a cold, rainy night, and the chilled and weary soldiers on both sides were glad to cease from the bloody strife. Longstreet reports the Confederate losses, including those of D. H. Hill's division, as 1560.¹ The number of Confederates engaged was probably about 12,000.² McClellan reports the Federal loss at 2283.³ The Federal troops engaged probably numbered 15,000⁴ or more.

The advantageous results of the battle of Williamsburg, partial and in some respects indecisive as it was, lay with the Confederates. While it was in progress, G. W. Smith's and Magruder's divisions, followed by the trains of the army, had continued their retreat without molestation.⁵ General John-

¹ Longstreet's report (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 568) is :

Officers.		Non-Com. Officers and Privates.	Total.
Killed	24	264	288
Wounded	75	900	975
Missing	3	294	297
	<hr/> 102	<hr/> 1458	<hr/> 1560

² General Johnston says there were 9000 of Longstreet's division engaged. (*Johnston's Narrative*, p. 123.) The six regiments of D. H. Hill (four with Early and two with Ward) probably added 3000 more.

³ The Federal reports show, killed 468, wounded 1442, missing 373, total 2283. (*Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, vol. ii. p. 200.)

⁴ The Federal troops engaged were Hooker's division, Peck's brigade of Couch's division, five regiments of Kearny's division (two of Birney's brigade and three of Berry's), and six regiments of Smith's division (four of Hancock's brigade and two of Davidson's). See *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, vol. ii. p. 206, note.

⁵ On the night of the 5th, G. W. Smith camped at Barhamsville, eighteen miles from Williamsburg, and Magruder at the bridge over Diascund Creek. (*Johnston's Narrative*, p. 125.)

ston had fought to secure a safe retreat, and this object was completely attained. The fact that the Federal force thrown against him on the 5th was evidently but a small part of their army convinced Johnston that McClellan was moving up the York River to strike his line of retreat, and therefore Longstreet and D. H. Hill were ordered on the morning of the 6th to follow the other divisions. D. H. Hill brought up the rear. No attempt was made at pursuit, except that a small cavalry force followed the retreating army a few miles, picking up stragglers. Longstreet and Hill halted for the night at the Burnt Ordinary, twelve miles from Williamsburg, and the next morning (7th) the Confederate army was concentrated near Barhamsville. The check of the Federals had been so severe that they were in no haste to renew the pursuit,¹ and when they did so some days later it was with a circumspection approaching feebleness.

But McClellan's operations, as Johnston had suspected, were not confined to following in the wake of the retiring army. As soon as the Confederates had evacuated Yorktown and thus left the York River open above that point, the Federal commander ordered Franklin's division² by water to the head of the river, with instructions to disembark on the right bank of the Pamunkey opposite West Point. Porter's, Sedgwick's, and Richardson's divisions were sent by transports to the same point. McClellan hoped thus to throw a large force on the flank and rear of the retreating army, as it slowly made its way through the miry roads toward New Kent Court House. Franklin reached Eltham's Landing at three P. M. on the 6th of May, and before daylight next morning had completed his disembarkation. The place selected was a good one for

¹ Heintzelman, at 9.30 P. M. on the 5th, dispatched: "We have been hard pressed by the enemy all day, and nothing but the opportune arrival of General Kearny's division saved us from the loss of some of our artillery, and defeat." (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 455.) McClellan says in his report: "General Hooker's division had suffered so severely that it was in no condition to follow the enemy even if the roads had been good." (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 23.)

² Franklin's division had but recently been sent down from McDowell's corps. It joined McClellan April 22.

his purpose. A plain extending back from the river to a bluff was protected on both flanks by streams, and was completely covered by the fire of his gunboats. A thick forest stood on the high ground beyond the plain, and this wood General Franklin soon occupied. The road through Barhamsville toward New Kent Court House, on which part of the Confederate army was moving, is but a short distance from the river, and was in danger of being seized.

General G. W. Smith, under direction of General Johnston, had placed Whiting with his own and Hampton's brigades in position to protect this road, and on the morning of the 7th these troops were ordered to advance and drive back the enemy to their landing place, so as to prevent interference with the march of the Confederate column. Meantime General Franklin had made his dispositions to hold the wood and the road from Eltham's to New Kent Court House, by placing Newton's brigade on both sides of the road and in the wood. On Newton's left were part of Taylor's and Slocum's brigades. In his rear were two batteries supported by part of the 16th New York, while two regiments of Taylor's brigade were in reserve. Dana's brigade of Sedgwick's division, which had just landed, continued the left of the Federal line back to the river. Whiting, on the Confederate side, sent forward on the road leading through Newton's position Hood's Texas brigade and Balthis's battery, supported on the right by Hampton with two regiments. They drove in the Federal skirmishers and followed them up through the dense wood. Newton threw forward two regiments to reinforce his skirmishers, but these were also driven back, and the Confederates continued to push their adversaries until the edge of the wood next the river was reached. Meantime S. R. Anderson's Tennessee brigade had been sent up on Hood's left, while Whiting's brigade had been so placed as to protect the right flank, if necessary. By mid-day Franklin's troops had been driven under cover of their gunboats. Whiting then attempted to shell the transports in the river, the bluff protecting the troops already landed from his fire, but he soon found the range too great, and his guns no match for those on the gunboats. General Smith,

finding that nothing more could be effected, withdrew his troops to the position from which they had advanced.¹ In this affair the Confederate loss was 48, the Federal 194.²

¹ General Smith says: "After quite a sharp contest the enemy were driven back through the woods for a mile or more, when it was found that from the position attained the range was too great for our fire to reach the transports, and that the troops and material already landed were completely covered from view by a bluff bank near the edge of the river. I then directed the troops to be withdrawn out of reach of the fire of the gunboats and to resume their position near Barhamsville. The enemy remained close under cover, protected by their gunboats." (G. W. Smith's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 627.)

² See Smith's (*Ib.* p. 627) and McClellan's (*Ib.* p. 24) reports. *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, vol. ii. p. 222, note, makes the Federal loss 186, as does also *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 618.

CHAPTER V.

MCCLELLAN'S ADVANCE TOWARDS RICHMOND.

WITH this slight demonstration of Franklin ended the efforts of the Federal army to harass or damage General Johnston in his retreat. The latter says: "The way being thus cleared, the march was resumed. Smith's and Magruder's divisions followed the road by New Kent Court House, and Longstreet's and Hill's that by the Long Bridges. In these marches the right column reached the Baltimore Cross Roads, nineteen miles from Barhamsville, and the left the Long Bridges. The army remained five days in this position, in line facing to the east, Longstreet's right covering the Long Bridges, and Magruder's left the York River Railroad; it was easily and regularly supplied by the railroad, and could no longer be turned by water."¹ The retreat of the Confederates from Yorktown caused the abandonment of Norfolk, and led to the destruction of the ironclad Virginia. Upon the evacuation of Yorktown, General Johnston had ordered General Huger to leave Norfolk and march to Richmond, and had informed the naval officers of the state of affairs. Huger sent off his troops and all the material that could be moved, and on May 8 destroyed what was left in the navy yard. He evacuated Norfolk on the 9th, and the next day it was occupied by the troops of General Wool. The destruction of the Virginia quickly followed. The victory of this ship on March 8 in Hampton Roads had inaugurated a new era in naval warfare, and had created the keenest interest and expectation as to her future in the Confederacy. The news of her destruction therefore caused great regret. It was determined upon the evacuation of Nor-

¹ Johnston's *Narrative*, p. 126. The Confederates reached the Baltimore Cross Roads on May 9, and remained there until the 15th.

folk to take her up the James River and use her for blockading it. The vessel, armed, was of too deep draught to be taken up the river, and was therefore lightened of her guns and material in order to get her over the sand-bars. After this had been done the pilots declared that it was still impossible, because of the unfavorable conditions of wind and tide, to get her over the bars. Her commander, Commodore Tatnall, in consequence of this, blew her up on May 11, to prevent her falling into the hands of the enemy.¹ This event opened the James to the Federal gunboats, which met with no obstruction sufficient to stop their advance until they reached Drewry's Bluff, seven or eight miles below Richmond, on May 15. The attempt to pass the Confederate battery at this point was repulsed with severe loss on that day, and Drewry's Bluff continued to the end of the war an insuperable obstacle to the further advance of the Federal gunboats up the James. When General Johnston received news of the destruction of the ironclad Virginia and the consequent advance up the James River of the Federal gunboats, he decided to fall back across the Chickahominy. This he did on May 15, and on the 17th encamped three miles from Richmond, in front of the line of redoubts constructed in 1861.²

¹ This action of Commodore Tatnall was condemned by a court of inquiry called to examine into the case. The court thought the ship should have been taken as far up the river as possible and then used to blockade it. (*Rebellion Record*, vol. v. p. 47.) The commodore then demanded a court martial, and this honorably acquitted him.

² Johnston's *Narrative*, p. 128. The greatest danger to the Confederate capital at this moment did not arise from the Federal army, but from the gunboats in James River. Trusting to the Virginia, the Confederates had prepared no formidable defenses of the James, and when the destruction of the great ironclad left the river open, hurried preparations had to be made at Drewry's Bluff to resist the advance of the Federal fleet. Here the crews of the Virginia and of some of the other Confederate ships from Norfolk were placed, and a battery of five heavy guns was mounted in such a position as to give a close and plunging fire upon the advancing gunboats. Some vessels were also sunk in the channel to obstruct the navigation. On May 15, Commodore John Rodgers, with the Galena, the Monitor, and three other Federal gunboats, came up the river and attempted to pass the battery. A severe fight of four hours' duration

For the next week comparative quiet existed between the two armies. McClellan moved forward very slowly and with great caution. The season was excessively rainy, the roads were bad, the country was unknown and difficult, the Confederates wherever pressed had struck back vigorously and effectively. To these real obstacles the Federal commander added a greater, though an imaginary one, in vastly exaggerating the strength of his foe. The fight at Williamsburg and the affair at Eltham's Landing seem to have confirmed his opinion that he had to deal with an enemy superior in numbers. It was not until the 8th of May, three days after the battle of Williamsburg, that the Federal advance under Stoneman was sent forward to open communication by land with Franklin, and it was not until the 10th that the mass of the Federal army reached the vicinity of Barhamsville.¹ Five days more were consumed in carrying the head of the Federal army to New Kent Court House and Cumberland.² On the 16th, White House was occupied, and by the 19th the advance of the Federal army, following the York River Railroad, had reached the Chickahominy. These movements were made without opposition.

General Johnston, on the other hand, was carefully watching the gathering storm and preparing to meet it. He drew nearer to him the troops at Fredericksburg and Gordonsville; he asked for all the reinforcements the government could give; he instructed General Jackson to advance against General Banks in the Valley of Virginia. Upon learning of the advance of McDowell with 40,000 men from Fredericksburg³ to reinforce

ensued, at the end of which the Federal fleet retired discomfited. The Confederate battery was so elevated that the gunboats could not reply effectively to its fire, while a body of sharpshooters on the bank annoyed the Federal gunners greatly. The Galena suffered most.

¹ Headquarters were at Ropers or Rogers Church.

² McClellan says that on the 15th, Franklin, Porter, Sykes, and Smith reached Cumberland, and that Couch and Casey were then near New Kent Court House, Hooker and Kearny near Ropers Church, and Richardson and Sedgwick near Eltham's. (McClellan's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 24.)

³ See McDowell's testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. i. p. 263. On May 17, McDowell was ordered to move to

McClellan, he decided to fight the latter at once before the junction. But McDowell did not come on. Jackson's brilliant operations against Banks, by which the latter was driven pell-mell across the Potomac on May 25, caused the withdrawal of McDowell from Fredericksburg. He was recalled in order to cut off and crush Jackson, and went for this purpose to the Shenandoah Valley, to be first eluded and then beaten by his skillful adversary. Learning that McDowell had retraced his steps, General Johnston postponed his attack a few days for more favorable circumstances.

McClellan's assistance as soon as Shields's division should join him. He was to have moved forward from Fredericksburg with the main body of his troops on May 26. His advance had been thrown forward a day or two before.

CHAPTER VI.

THE ACTION AT HANOVER COURT HOUSE.

McClellan had reached the Chickahominy on May 19. On May 20, he threw a force across Bottom's Bridge to the south side of that stream, and in a day or two established all of Keyes's and Heintzelman's corps (two fifths of his infantry) on the same side in the vicinity of Seven Pines. The Federal right was extended along the north side of the Chickahominy to Mechanicsville, which was seized on the 24th. On the way from the Pamunkey to the Chickahominy, General McClellan had taken steps to extend his right flank with the triple purpose of securing that flank by destroying the bridges on the Pamunkey and South Anna; of opening communications at the earliest moment with McDowell, who was to advance along the Fredericksburg Railroad; and of seizing the two railroads which connected Richmond with Northern Virginia.¹ For this purpose Colonel Warren with a brigade of mixed troops was sent up the Pamunkey and posted at Old Church, from which point he destroyed the means of communication on that stream for some distance towards Hanover Court House. To this latter point Branch's Confederate brigade had been ordered from Gordonsville, while J. R. Anderson's brigade had been recalled from Fredericksburg to Ashland. General Johnston had thus brought these two brigades within his reach, and so placed them as to protect the Virginia Central and Richmond and Fredericksburg railroads. Federal scouting parties having reached the Virginia Central road below Hanover Court House, Branch was ordered on May 26 to Slash Church, the better to protect the railroad. In this vicinity the next day

¹ The Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad, and the Virginia Central (now Chesapeake and Ohio).

occurred an engagement between his troops and those of Fitz-John Porter. Aware of Branch's presence with a considerable force near Hanover Court House, General McClellan ordered Porter to move towards that place from New Bridge at four A. M. on May 27, with Morell's division of fourteen regiments and three batteries and preceded by two regiments of cavalry and a light battery under Emory.¹ Warren was to move with four regiments and six guns² from Old Church in the same direction, it being designed that the two commands should fall upon and crush Branch.

The latter, with seven regiments and Latham's battery,³ was at Slash Church on the morning of the 27th, and, unconscious of the approach of Porter, was preparing to prevent the further depredations of Warren's troopers along the railroad. For this purpose he sent the 28th North Carolina (Colonel Lane), with a section of Latham's battery, to Taliaferro's Mill to repel a Federal party reported to be advancing in that direction; while the 45th Georgia (Colonel Hardeman) was sent to repair the railroad near Peake's Station, where it had been damaged the day before. Lane had hardly reached his destination when a rumor of the enemy's (Warren's) approach from the north caused him to retrace his steps. In doing so he unexpectedly ran into the head of Porter's column, which, advancing from

¹ Emory's command consisted of the 5th and 6th United States cavalry and Benson's light battery. Morell's division contained three brigades, and was organized as follows: Martindale's brigade — 25th New York, 22d Massachusetts, 2d Maine, 18th Massachusetts, Martin's battery; Morell's brigade — 14th New York, 9th Massachusetts, 62d Pennsylvania, 4th Michigan, Allen's battery; Butterfield's brigade — 44th New York, 17th New York, 12th New York, 83d Pennsylvania, 16th Michigan, Griffin's battery, Berdan's sharpshooters. The 18th Massachusetts was on picket the night before, and did not reach the field until the battle was over.

² Warren's command consisted of 6th Pennsylvania cavalry, 1st Connecticut (infantry), 785 strong, 5th New York (infantry), 725 strong, and 13th New York, 475 strong, and Weeden's six-gun battery.

³ Branch's brigade consisted of the 7th, 18th, 28th, 33d, and 37th North Carolina regiments. At this time the 45th Georgia and 12th North Carolina were also with him. He says the strength of the seven regiments was about 4000 at Slash Church. (*Southern Historical Papers*, vol. viii. p. 103.)

the south, had already reached the cross-roads near Dr. Kenney's, and thus interposed itself between him and the remainder of Branch's brigade. Lane, making a prompt effort to clear the way, charged and scattered the 25th New York, which was supporting the Federal cavalry in advance, and captured two of the companies. He then found himself in the presence of a larger force, consisting of a regiment of sharpshooters, a battery, and Butterfield's brigade. Placing his regiment¹ in position to face these new foes, he maintained a spirited fight for some hours. But he was overmatched and without succor. One of his guns was dismounted, and his right was turned by the enemy pushing forward between him and the railroad, thus completely cutting him off from Branch. His command finally gave way and was forced in rout from the field. A large number of his men were captured, and the remainder were driven through Hanover Court House to Taylorsville. At the same time that Porter had thrown his advance northward at the cross-roads to engage Lane, he had sent Martindale with two regiments and a battery westward towards Peake's Station, to support the cavalry which had been sent in that direction. At this point Martindale met Branch, who had moved out with his whole force to protect the railroad and to succor Lane. Some skirmishing took place, but Martindale, too weak to attack, halted and sent for aid. It was now about the time of Lane's defeat, and Porter, believing he had beaten the main part of the Confederates, instead of reinforcing, withdrew Martindale, and ordered his whole column (which Warren had now joined) in pursuit towards Hanover Court House. Martindale, unable to convince his superiors of their error,² was permitted to remain with a single regiment at the cross-roads to protect the rear. Finding the Confederates advancing, he laid hold on the 44th and 25th New York regiments, which were within reach, as

¹ Lane says he had 890 men of his own regiment and two companies from Colonel Lee's (37th North Carolina). See *Southern Historical Papers*, vol. vii. p. 518.

² Martindale earnestly represented to Porter and Morell that there was a large Confederate force at Peake's Station.

was also a section of Martin's battery, and tried to check Branch. The latter, following up the retreating enemy from Peake's, made dispositions to attack Martindale as soon as he found him in position. Cowan, with the 18th North Carolina, was sent eastward along the road against the Federal centre. Lee, with the 37th North Carolina, was sent through the woods on the north side of the road against Martindale's right flank, while Hoke and Wade, with the 33d and 12th North Carolina regiments, were to turn the Federal left by a sweep through the woods in that direction. The latter movement did not result in much,¹ but Branch pressed forward his centre and left vigorously. The Federal gunners were driven from their battery, and the centre of their line broke and fled. Martindale, however, managed to keep his two wings, which rested in the timber, steady for the time, until Porter, who had been urgently recalled from the pursuit of Lane, could return to his assistance. At the very crisis, when a vigorous charge by the Confederates would have carried the day, Porter's troops began to return. They first reached, of course, Martindale's right, where the 2d Maine was staggering under the attack of the 37th and 33d North Carolina. The 14th New York was quickly sent in to the support of the 2d Maine, while the remainder of Morell's brigade was thrown against the flank of the attacking Confederates. Butterfield's and Warren's brigades hurried forward and attacked nearer the railroad. This soon turned the scale, and Branch was compelled to retreat under cover of the two regiments² he had kept as a reserve. He fell back to Ashland, in order to unite with J. R. Anderson's brigade. The Federals did not pursue far at the time, but next day Porter advanced to Ashland, scouring the country for stragglers, and sending cavalry parties to break the railroads and destroy the bridges over the South Anna. On the 29th, Porter returned to his camp on the Chickahominy. Branch reports his loss, exclusive of Lane's, at 66 killed and 177 wounded; total 243. It is probable that Lane's loss

¹ Hoke was subsequently sent to the other flank to Lee's assistance.

² 7th North Carolina and 45th Georgia.

exceeded this,¹ as Porter claims 730 prisoners, wounded and unwounded. The total Confederate loss was probably about 800 men, with one howitzer and much of their camp equipage. Porter's loss was 62 killed, 210 wounded, and 75 prisoners ;² total 347.

¹ Lane reports seven killed and fifteen wounded, but does not report the "missing."

² These were brought off by Lane. *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, vol. ii. p. 323, note, gives Porter's loss as 62 killed, 223 wounded, and 70 missing ; total 355.

CHAPTER VII.

SEVEN PINES: THE FIRST DAY.

AT the end of May the situation of affairs was as follows:—

McClellan, with over 100,000 men,¹ was encamped on the Chickahominy, his lines having the shape of a letter V with unequal arms. The apex or point of the V was at Bottom's Bridge, while the left, or short, arm extended along the York River Railroad and Williamsburg road towards Richmond, as far as Seven Pines and Fair Oaks, and the right or long arm lay along the north bank of the river extending to Meadow Bridge. Two fifths of the Federal infantry, the corps of Keyes and Heintzelman, constituted the left arm, and were placed *en échelon* by divisions between Bottom's Bridge and a point a short distance in advance of Seven Pines. Casey's division of Keyes's corps² was in front. It occupied a line perpendicular to the Williamsburg road, and stretched from a point several hundred yards south of that road to and beyond Fair Oaks, on the railroad, whence a picket line was extended to the south bank of the Chickahominy. The corps of Sumner, Franklin, and Porter constituted the right arm of the V on the north side of the river, and were busily occupied in making bridges, so as to establish easy communications with the other wing. Sumner's corps was the first above Bottom's Bridge, and one of his bridges was so nearly completed as to be available for the passage of troops. The other bridges were not ready. That the Federal lines on the north of the Chickahominy were pushed so far westward

¹ McClellan's returns for April 30 (*Report on Conduct of War*, part i. p. 323) give his "present for duty" as 112,392.

² Keyes's corps comprised the divisions of Casey and Couch; Heintzelman's corps, those of Kearny and Hooker.

was due (says General McClellan) to the expected arrival of McDowell from Fredericksburg. In response to McClellan's appeals for reinforcements, McDowell's force had been raised to 40,000 men, and ordered to move along the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad to unite with McClellan's right. The overthrow of Banks by Stonewall Jackson (May 23-25) at the moment when McDowell was about setting forward changed all this, and caused McDowell to be sent to the Shenandoah Valley after Jackson. But as this diversion was deemed temporary, McClellan made no change in his dispositions.

General Johnston, to oppose McClellan, had, including Huger's and A. P. Hill's divisions, about 63,000 men.¹ These troops were holding all the north and east approaches to Richmond, and their commander was now watching anxiously for an opportunity to neutralize his disparity of force by concentrating against and defeating one part of the Federal army before the others could go to its assistance. The delay of McDowell and the separation of McClellan's army into two wings by the Chickahominy seemed to offer the desired opportunity. When the Federals had advanced as far as the Seven Pines, on the south side of the river, this wing was several miles from Bottom's Bridge, and though much nearer to support by way of the bridges above Bottom's, these latter were as yet incomplete, and at best afforded long and narrow and uncertain defiles for the rapid concentration of McClellan's right wing on the south side of the treacherous and marsh-bordered Chickahominy. The time to strike seemed at hand. Johnston concentrated the mass of his army in the neighborhood of the Federal left wing, and having developed the posi-

¹ Colonel Taylor (*Four Years with General Lee*, p. 164) gives the strength of Johnston on May 21, from the returns, as 53,688 of all arms. To this should be added Huger's three brigades (which numbered 5008 just before the seven days' fight) and Branch's and Anderson's two brigades. Branch says (*Southern Historical Papers*, vol. viii. p. 104), that his brigade rarely reached 3000 for duty, and this must have been before the Slash Church battle. We put it at 2300, a full estimate after the battle with Porter. Anderson's strength was 2200 (see Taylor, p. 50). A. P. Hill had recently been assigned to the command of these troops.

tion of the Union troops by reconnoissances on the 29th and 30th of May, he issued orders for a vigorous attack upon Keyes and Heintzelman early on the 31st.

Keyes had three lines of works, the front line of which, half a mile west of Seven Pines, was occupied by Casey's division, whose pickets were thrown forward a thousand yards farther, while the second, at Seven Pines, was held by Couch. These two lines had been constructed in the past few days, and were not entirely finished. They were nearly perpendicular to the Williamsburg road, and extended from points a few hundred yards south of that road to the York River Railroad. The second line followed the direction of the Nine Mile road. The most important part of the front line was a pentangular redoubt on the south side of the Williamsburg road, in which were placed six pieces of artillery. Behind these lines, a mile or more in rear of Seven Pines, was a stronger line which Keyes had constructed more carefully, and from which he had advanced on May 28. This line was unoccupied on the morning of the 31st, but was the position to which the Federal troops were driven before the night of that day.¹

Behind Keyes, in the direction of Bottom's Bridge, was Kearny's division of Heintzelman's corps, near Savage Station, while Hooker was on Kearny's left, guarding the approaches from White Oak swamp.

"A considerable space about the forks of the road at Seven Pines was open, cultivated ground, and there was a clear space a short distance in front of Casey's redoubt at the woodpile. Between the two openings we found a curtain of trees, which were cut down to form an abattis. That line of abattis was continued on a curve to the right and rear and across the Nine Mile road.

"When the battle commenced, Casey's division was in front

¹ Keyes's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 872. He says of his two front lines: "Both divisions set to work with the few intrenching tools at hand to slash the forests and to dig a few rifle-pits. . . . The country is mostly wooded and intersected with marshes." Casey's line crossed the Williamsburg road at a large woodpile near Mr. Barker's house.

of the abattis ; Naglee's brigade on the right, having two regiments beyond the railroad ; Palmer's brigade on the left, and Wessells's brigade in the centre. Couch's division was on the right and left of the Williamsburg road near the forks and along the Nine Mile road,¹ Peck's brigade was on the left,² Devens's brigade in the centre, and Abererombie's on the right, having two regiments, and Brady's battery across the railroad near Fair Oaks." Thus Keyes's corps was formed in two lines of battle.

A rain-storm of unusual violence set in on the afternoon of the 30th, and continued all night.³ Next day the roads and fields were a mass of mud, and the swamps and low grounds which constitute so large a portion of this region were covered with water. Especially was this the case along the course of White Oak swamp, which covered the left flank of the Federals, and along the Chickahominy, which divided their army. This latter stream was in flood on May 31, and swept away many of McClellan's unfinished bridges and the material that had been gathered for them. The storm of the 30th greatly increased the difficulty of movement next day, but the Confederate commander rightly conceived that it would prove a still greater disadvantage to his adversary, in that the rise of the Chickahominy would interrupt communication between the two parts of the Federal army. General Johnston therefore adhered to his design. His plan was to send forward D. H. Hill's and Longstreet's divisions under the latter officer on the Williamsburg road, while Huger was ordered along the Charles City road to attack the enemy on his left flank. "General Smith was to engage any troops that might cross the Chickahominy to assist Heintzelman's and Keyes's corps,

¹ "Seven Pines" is the name applied to the forks of the Nine Mile and Williamsburg roads. "Fair Oaks" is the point where the Nine Mile road crosses the York River Railroad.

² Left of Couch's division.

³ General Keyes says, "Through all the night of the 30th of May there was raging a storm the like of which I cannot remember. Torrents of rain drenched the earth, the thunderbolts rolled and fell without intermission, and the heavens flashed with a perpetual blaze of lightning." (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 873.)

or, if none came, he was to fall upon the right flank of those troops engaged with Longstreet.”¹ Magruder was in reserve behind Smith, and the remaining Confederate forces were guarding the upper course of the river. Half of the day was wasted in getting into place. The attack was to have been made early, but the troops did not move promptly, and then they got in each other’s way. Longstreet’s division took the Williamsburg road instead of the Nine Mile road. Huger seems to have been behind in starting, and finding his way blocked by Longstreet was delayed some hours. The storm had so flooded the roads and country, swelling mere rivulets into formidable obstacles, that it was difficult to move troops, especially between the main roads. Huger, who had been ordered down the Charles City road to turn and strike the Union left, found the low country between that road and Seven Pines an insuperable barrier to his troops, untrained as they were to marching. He spent the day in waiting, or in marching and countermarching, and effected nothing.²

When it was found that the roads and the water were impediments which Huger could not overcome, Longstreet ordered forward the troops at hand, and between one and two p. m.³ the onset was made by D. H. Hill’s division. This division, consisting of four brigades and numbering near 9000 men,⁴ moved forward in a line perpendicular to the Williamsburg road, and in the following order: Garland’s brigade

¹ Johnston’s *Narrative*, p. 133.

² Longstreet says, “The division of Major-General Huger was intended to make a strong flank movement around the left flank of the enemy’s position and attack him in rear of that flank. This division did not get into position, however, in time for any such attack, and I was obliged to send three of my small brigades on the Charles City road to support the one of Major-General Huger’s, which had been ordered to protect my right flank. After waiting some six hours for these troops to get into position, I determined to move forward without regard to them, and gave orders to that effect to Major-General D. H. Hill.” (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 940.) General G. W. Smith gives a very different account, and shows that much of the delay was chargeable to General Longstreet himself. (*Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, vol. ii. p. 220.)

³ Hill says at one o’clock, Longstreet says at two.

⁴ D. H. Hill’s report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 946.

supported by Featherstone's brigade (now under Colonel G. B. Anderson) on the north of the road, and Rodes's brigade supported by Rains's brigade on the south. The difficulties of the ground over which the attack had to be made were very great. "The recent rains had formed ponds of water throughout the woods, with mud at the bottom, through which the men waded forward knee deep, and occasionally sinking to the hips in boggy places, almost beyond the point of extrication. The forest was so thick and the undergrowth so tangled that it was impracticable to see the heads of the several regiments as they moved forward, and the deploying intervals were in consequence very imperfectly preserved."¹ Rodes had to surmount even greater obstacles. His brigade, to reach the position assigned to it, had to move over from the Charles City road, and thus had to cross the head-waters of White Oak swamp. He says: "The progress of the brigade was considerably delayed by the washing away of a bridge near the head of White Oak swamp, by reason of which the men had to wade in water waist deep, and a large number were entirely submerged. At this point the character of the crossing was such that it was absolutely necessary to proceed with great caution to prevent the loss of both ammunition and life."²

Rodes being thus delayed, Garland's attack on the north side of the Williamsburg road was made first. Opposed to him was Naglee's brigade and part of Wessells's, with Spratt's battery. The picket fighting had been brisk and with varied success for some time, but when Garland moved forward in force with his brigade and Bondurant's battery, the Federal pickets were driven back, and the 103d Pennsylvania regiment, sent to their support, was put to flight. When the Confederates approached the Federal line of battle, however, they were received with a destructive fire, all the more severe because of the delay and disorder caused by the impracticable nature of the forest through which they had to move. But in spite of heavy loss, Garland pushed on. Unable to flank the enemy's line, he advanced through the abattis directly in front. G. B.

¹ Garland's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 961.

² Rodes's report, *Ib.* p. 971.

Anderson came forward to Garland's assistance. The Federal line yielded and fell back in confusion, leaving one piece of Spratt's battery in the hands of the Confederates.

Meantime D. H. Hill had been hurrying Rodes forward on the south side of the Williamsburg road. Here Casey had the mass of his artillery,¹ six pieces being in the redoubt which constituted the principal defense of his position on that side of the road. Here, too, were Palmer's brigade, and, in support of it, part of Wessells's. At the beginning of the fight Casey had sent for reinforcements, and Peck's brigade of Couch's division had been sent up and placed on this part of the field. Rodes hastened forward his regiments as they came up, and formed his line of battle under fire in front of the abattis which covered the enemy's line. Rains's brigade moved to Rodes's right, and, turning the Federal left, opened fire on their rear, while Carter's guns,² moving down the Williamsburg road, poured a most effective fire into the Federal batteries. Palmer's brigade of new troops quickly gave way under this attack, and soon the whole of Casey's left was driven in confusion and rout to the rear, leaving the redoubt and rifle-pits and seven pieces of artillery in the hands of Hill's troops. A portion of Naglee's brigade (56th New York, 52d Pennsylvania, and part of the 11th Maine), though driven back, still held a position north of the Williamsburg road, and the 55th New York of Peck's brigade had been pushed forward between these troops and that road. Rodes opened on this force an enfilading fire from the redoubt and rifle-pits he had taken, reinforcing some of Carter's pieces with the captured guns, and this, in conjunction with Garland's attack in front, soon drove the enemy from the field.

At this time (about four P. M.) Casey's division was virtually routed, a large part of it streaming in disorder and confusion to the rear. The entire line held by it, with its camp and

¹ Casey's artillery consisted of Regan's 7th New York battery of six guns; Fitch's 8th New York battery of six guns; Bates's "A" 1st New York artillery of six guns; Spratt's "H" 1st New York artillery of four guns — twenty-two guns in all.

² King William Artillery, Captain Thomas H. Carter.

stores and eight pieces of artillery, was in possession of the Confederates. General Keyes had formed his reserve of Couch's division in his second line at Seven Pines. Here such of the broken troops as could be rallied were stopped, and Kearny's troops of Heintzelman's corps had begun to arrive. Berry's brigade of this division was sent to the Federal left. Jameson supported it, while Birney's brigade was ordered to advance along the railroad on the right.

Longstreet and D. H. Hill were prompt to follow up their victory. The latter led his troops against this second position, while Longstreet ordered forward along the Williamsburg road R. H. Anderson's brigade, and Kemper's, and then Wilcox's as reinforcements, and directed Colston and Pryor to turn the Federal left. R. H. Anderson's brigade, under Colonel Jenkins, was in front, and it was promptly led into action in support of Garland and G. B. Anderson, a part of it being sent toward the railroad to strike the enemy's right. This attack fell upon Devens's brigade and the left of Abercrombie's. The conflict for a little while was fierce, but the Confederates, with the momentum added by Jenkins's troops, bore down all opposition. The positions in front were carried. Abercrombie's line extended across and to the north of the railroad, so that Jenkins did not strike his right, but in reality broke his left flank. The Confederates in thus getting possession of the Nine Mile road cut off the portion of Abercrombie's brigade (and some regiments which had been sent to his support) which was north of the railroad, and these troops,¹ together with Generals Couch and Abercrombie, who were with them, were compelled to fall back towards the Grape Vine Bridge on the Chickahominy and the Federal supports advancing from that direction. The remainder of the Federal line north of Seven Pines and along the Nine Mile road was driven in confusion to the rear, with the loss of two more guns, and all attempts at a stand were ineffectual, until at

¹ These troops consisted of the 65th New York (1st U. S. Chasseurs) and 31st Pennsylvania of Abercrombie's brigade, 7th Massachusetts of Devens's brigade, 62d New York of Peck's brigade, and Brady's battery.

nightfall the troops reached the strong line of works, nearly a mile and a half in the rear, from which Keyes had advanced on May 28.

While this was taking place north of the Williamsburg road, a most determined and bloody struggle was going on to the south of it. Here Berry's brigade and half of Jameson's of Kearny's division had been sent to hold the line which stretched southward from Seven Pines. On these troops, a part of Peck's brigade and some remnants of Casey's division had formed. Kearny's men, unheeding the disorder and the mass of fugitives they met, went bravely to work and checked for a time the tide of defeat. Rodes's and Rains's brigades moved up against them. Rodes attacked in front, and it was intended that Rains should repeat his flanking operation, which had aided so materially the attack on the first line. But the ground, covered in many places two or three feet deep with water, was a most serious impediment,¹ and Rains did not push fast nor far enough to accomplish the end designed.² Rodes made a most gallant and long sustained effort to carry the lines in front, but was unable to do so. Berry made a counter attack on Rodes's two right regiments, the 6th and 12th Alabama, and after fearful loss these regiments were compelled to fall back to the first line taken from the enemy.³ It was at this time that Kemper's brigade came up to Rodes's assistance, and soon after a part of Wilcox's brigade was also sent in. Longstreet's other troops did not reach the field in time to be of use. When Kemper arrived, the battle was renewed, but the Federal troops held their ground this time until nightfall. Meantime the complete overthrow of the Federal line to the north of the Williamsburg road exposed the right flank of Kearny's troops, and, near night, the Confederates from that side, especially Jenkins's brigade, by seizing the Williamsburg road in their rear, threatened to cut them off entirely. In this condition of things Kearny was compelled to retreat without delay, and, by making a circuit to the south by way of

¹ See Rodes's (*ubi supra*) and Colonel Gordon's (p. 980) reports.

² See D. H. Hill's report, also that of Rodes, *ubi supra*.

³ See D. H. Hill's report, also that of Rodes and Garland, *ubi supra*.

Anderson's sawmill, he, after dark, joined the other Federal troops at the third line of works, one and a half miles in the rear of Seven Pines.¹ Hooker had reached this point, and the beaten troops, supported by his fresh division, lay down behind these works for the night. Longstreet and Hill, having swept all before them for over two miles, halted, and bivouacked before the works they had captured.

It is time now to turn to important events on another part of the field. When Longstreet, Hill, and Huger had been ordered to the positions on the Williamsburg and Charles City roads, from which they were to move forward to the attack, General G. W. Smith with five brigades² had been ordered to the junction of the Nine Mile and New Bridge roads, to be in readiness, either to fall on Keyes's right flank or to cover Longstreet's left.³ Magruder's division was placed in the same vicinity in reserve. Smith was in position by eight A. M. on the 31st, but General Johnston, who had taken his post on this part of the field, awaited the opening of the battle on Longstreet's front before moving Smith forward. As already seen, Longstreet had waited until midday for Huger, and, the latter failing to come up, had ordered forward

¹ General Kearny says (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 840) : "This was perhaps near six o'clock, when our centre and right, defended by troops of the other divisions, with all their willingness, could no longer resist the enemy's right central flank attacks pushed on with determined discipline and with the impulsion of numerous concentrated masses. Once broken, our troops fled incontinently, and a dense body of the enemy, pursuing rapidly yet in order, occupied the Williamsburg road, the entire open ground, and penetrating deep into the woods on either side soon interposed between my division and my line of retreat. It was on this occasion that seeing myself cut off, and relying on the high discipline and determined valor of the 37th New York Volunteers, I forced them to the rear against the enemy and held the ground. . . . This enabled the advanced regiments . . . to return from their hitherto victorious career, and to retire by a remaining woodpath known to our scouts (the Saw Mill road) until they once more arrived at and remained in the impregnable position we had left at noon at our own fortified division-camp."

² These were the brigades of Hampton, Hatton, Pettigrew, Hood, and Whiting (now under Law). The last three were placed under command of General Whiting.

³ Johnston's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 933.

Hill's division, supported by his own. General Johnston unfortunately relied upon the sound of the musketry for his information as to the time of Longstreet's attack. But though he was not more than three miles away, the condition of the wind and atmosphere was so unfavorable that Longstreet had been hotly engaged for two hours before General Johnston was aware of it.¹ The latter then ordered Smith's division (at about four P. M.) to move quickly forward along the Nine Mile road, and to fall upon the troops engaged with Longstreet's left.

The loss of these two hours was to cost the Confederates more dearly even than the delay of Huger's division in the forenoon. When the attack on Keyes had first become known to McClellan, whose headquarters were on the north side of the Chickahominy, he had ordered Sumner's corps to get ready to march, and at 2.30 P. M. Sumner was ordered to cross to the assistance of the hard-pressed corps on the south side. On the receipt of the first order Sumner had thrown forward his two divisions to the two bridges he had constructed over the Chickahominy, and was ready to cross without a moment's delay when ordered to do so. These bridges were not entirely completed, and were now not much more than floating rafts on the rapidly rising river. At the upper bridge² Sedgwick's infantry succeeded in crossing with one of his batteries (Kirby's). Richardson got one of his brigades (French's) over at the lower

¹ "Owing to some peculiar condition of the atmosphere, the sound of musketry did not reach us. I consequently deferred giving the signal for General Smith's advance until about four o'clock, at which time Major Jasper S. Whiting of General Smith's staff, whom I had sent to learn the state of affairs with General Longstreet's column, returned, reporting that it was pressing on with vigor." (Johnston's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 934.)

² Sumner had two bridges opposite his corps, known as the upper and lower bridges. Sumner's corps comprised the divisions of Sedgwick and Richardson. Sedgwick had Gorman's, Dana's, and Burns's brigades. Richardson had French's, Meagher's, and Howard's. The batteries were: In Sedgwick's division, Kirby's, Tompkins's, Bartlett's, and Owen's; in Richardson's division, Clark's, Frank's, Pettit's, and Hogan's. All these were six-gun batteries.

bridge, but was compelled by the deep water to send the other two to follow Sedgwick. Sumner, without waiting for Richardson, moved Sedgwick's division at once toward the battlefield.

Thus, at the very time that General Johnston was moving Smith's division down the Nine Mile road to give the *coup de grâce* to Keyes and Heintzelman, Sumner was hastening towards Fair Oaks. Couch and Abercrombie, with four regiments and Brady's battery, had been cut off at this point when the Confederates had carried the Federal lines along the Nine Mile road between Fair Oaks and Seven Pines. After ineffectual efforts to rejoin the remainder of Keyes's corps, finding themselves in danger of being swallowed up, they had retired on the road from Fair Oaks towards Trent's on the Chickahominy. Learning that Sumner was approaching from that direction, they halted in the vicinity of Courtney's house, and took up a position facing Fair Oaks, which placed them on the flank of the Confederates moving down the Nine Mile road. This they hoped to hold until Sumner could arrive.

Up to this time no reinforcements had reached the Federals from the north side of the Chickahominy, and the approach of Sumner was unknown to and unsuspected by General Johnston. The latter, seeing the camp of but a small force at Fair Oaks, and also the rear of Abercrombie's troops as they retreated, correctly estimated this force at but a few regiments, and continued the movement of his three leading brigades (Law's, Hood's, and Pettigrew's) under Whiting toward Longstreet. A few minutes later Brady's battery opened fire from near Courtney's house. Smith, with Hampton's and Hatton's brigades, was following Whiting. Not wishing to stop the head of the column, Smith directed Hampton and Hatton to move to the left from the Nine Mile road, and attack the force. But meantime General Johnston had sent a regiment to drive off the battery. This was received with a severe fire and compelled to recoil. He had then halted Law's brigade, and directed it to move against the enemy. Subsequently Pettigrew was moved in the same direction, while Hood continued his march towards Longstreet. Before the advance of this strong body, Couch's regiments were forced back a short dis-

tance. But availing themselves of a fence and ditch, they seized a strong position a few hundred yards in the rear, and held on, while Sumner's troops, which were now at hand, formed on both their flanks.

Sumner had arrived at the critical moment. Had he been an hour later, or Smith an hour earlier, the corps of Keyes and Heintzelman would probably have been completely overwhelmed. As it was, Sumner's appearance on the scene relieved them of all pressure from Smith. Sumner threw the troops of Sedgwick's division into action as fast as they came up. One regiment of Gorman's brigade was sent to Couch's right, the remaining ones to his left. Dana, with two regiments, extended Gorman's line on the left, while Burns, with his brigade, strengthened the other wing. These troops became at once engaged with the Confederate brigades of Hampton, Law, and Pettigrew, which were advancing to clear away the batteries that had interrupted their march towards Longstreet.¹ Hampton was on the Confederate left, and he and the others pressed vigorously through the tangled, boggy woods under a severe fire, to find themselves no longer confronted by a few regiments, but by the whole of Sedgwick's division. Brave efforts were made to force the Federal position, but in vain. Hatton's brigade was brought up to Hampton's assistance, and a sanguinary contest at close quarters² was maintained until dark. The Federals repulsed all the efforts to carry their position, making late in the day a countercharge on their left, which drove back the Confederates a short distance, but which in turn was soon checked. General Hatton was killed, Hampton was wounded, and Pettigrew fell in a charge, seriously wounded, and was taken prisoner. Just before darkness put an end to the

¹ Smith says (report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 990): "The force of the enemy was not known, but it was confidently believed that we would soon capture or drive off the batteries and resume our march in support of Longstreet."

² Smith says the firing on Hampton's line was at fifteen or twenty yards. (*Ib.* p. 991.) Colonel Williams, 31st Pennsylvania, says (*Ib.* p. 903) the Confederates "repeatedly charged to within twenty yards of our line, but no valor or impetuosity could withstand the steady and well-directed fire of our men." See also General Gorman's report, *Ib.* p. 798, *et seq.*

conflict, General Johnston himself was wounded, first by a musket-shot in the shoulder, and then, more seriously, by a fragment of shell, and was borne from the field. Night found the contestants each holding his own ground, and both sides bivouacked where they were, ready to renew the battle in the morning. Hood's brigade had been recalled, and Magruder's division had been brought near, but General Johnston kept them in reserve.¹

Thus ended the battle of the 31st of May. Keyes's corps had suffered a severe disaster, and Kearny's division had been involved in its defeat. But, owing to the delay of the Confederates, Sumner had been able to throw one of his divisions into the fight in such a way as to neutralize completely General Johnston's left wing and prevent its union with Longstreet. Had Smith been sent forward earlier, or had Magruder's strong division as well as Smith's been thrown upon Sumner when he was found to be in the way, the latter might have been overwhelmed by superior numbers, and Longstreet's brilliant success duplicated upon the Confederate left.

Richardson's division of Sumner's corps reached the field after the battle had ceased. These troops, with reference to the morrow's operations, were ordered to connect Sedgwick's left with the right of Heintzelman. This placed them along the railroad facing to the south. Finding at daylight that there was still a gap between his left and Birney's brigade on Heintzelman's right, Richardson filled it up with French's brigade, and disposed the remainder of his division so as to connect with Sedgwick. During the night strenuous efforts had been made, and with success, to get up the artillery that had been left behind in the mud.

On the side of the Confederates, after the battle had ceased, Longstreet relieved such of his troops as had been heavily engaged by fresh ones. Huger's division and the brigades

¹ General Johnston, like General Smith, was slow to realize the extent of the force in his front. He says: "The firing at Fair Oaks soon increased, and I rode back to that field, still unconvinced, however, that General Smith was fighting more than a brigade, and thinking it injudicious to engage Magruder's division yet, as it was the only reserve." (*Johnston's Narrative*, p. 138.)

of Pickett, Pryor, Wilcox, and Colston of Longstreet's division were thus moved up to the front. Smith's division remained where it had fought, with Hood's brigade on its right on the railroad, and Magruder's division near at hand in the rear.

CHAPTER VIII.

SEVEN PINES: THE SECOND DAY.

THE Confederate operations on the next morning (Sunday, June 1) showed the uncertainty and hesitation that are apt to follow a change of commanders in the progress of a battle. The fall of General Johnston left Major-General G. W. Smith, the officer next in rank, in command of the army. The left wing was to remain in position and be ready to oppose any movement of fresh Federal troops from New Bridge or above on the Chickahominy, while Longstreet was directed to push his successes of the day before as far as practicable, pivoting his movement upon the position of General Whiting on his left. The latter was ordered to make a diversion in favor of General Longstreet's real attack.¹

In the morning, Confederate reconnoitring parties soon discovered Richardson's division in position along the railroad, and the discovery of this strong reinforcement induced D. H. Hill (who as on the day before commanded the advance lines under Longstreet), instead of attacking, to order a withdrawal of the brigades in advance to the positions from which Casey had been driven the previous day.² Before these orders had

¹ Smith's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 992. Longstreet says little or nothing of Sunday's fight. Of the thirteen brigades under Longstreet's orders, only six (four of Hill's and two of his own division) had been engaged the previous day.

² Hill says (report, *Ib.* p. 945), "I therefore resolved to concentrate my troops around the captured works, in the hope that the Yankees would attempt to retake them. Orders were accordingly given to the advanced brigades, commanded by Pickett, Pryor, and Wilcox, to draw in their extended line and form near the late headquarters of General Casey.

"Before these orders were received, a furious attack was made upon Generals Armistead, Mahone, Pickett, Pryor, and Wilcox and their brigades on the left of the road. Armistead's men fled early in the action,

been delivered, an advance of some of Richardson's troops brought on an engagement. To check the enemy, Hill ordered Pickett to attack.¹ At this moment the Confederate brigades in front were arranged as follows: Armistead on the left connecting with Hood on the railroad not far from Fair Oaks; then, to the right, Mahone, Pickett, and Wilcox, with Colston supporting Pickett, and Pryor supporting Wilcox. The line held by these troops was not a straight one. Wilcox extended north from the Williamsburg road in front of the right wing of Heintzelman, now held by Hooker's division, with his left bent back parallel to the railroad. Pryor's brigade when brought up continued Wilcox's line parallel to the railroad. Then came Pickett, oblique to the railroad, and Armistead continuing Pickett's line to the left. Pickett, with Armistead on his left, advanced through the woods, and driving back the Federals through the abattis came upon Richardson's division in full force, and a severe struggle ensued. The Federal advance which had precipitated Pickett's attack was the movement of French's brigade to the Federal left to close up with Birney. This brigade took that part of Richardson's line to the south side of the railroad.² The Federal line had just got into position when the Confederate attack was made. For an hour

with the exception of a few heroic companies, with which that gallant officer maintained his ground against an entire brigade. Mahone withdrew his brigade without any orders. I sent up Colston's to replace him, but he did not engage the Yankees as I expected him to do. Pickett, Pryor, and Wilcox received their orders to fall back after the firing began, and wisely resolved not to do so until the assault was repulsed. As soon as that was done Wilcox and Pryor withdrew, but Pickett held his ground . . . for several hours longer, and only retired when the Yankees had ceased to annoy him. The Yankees were too prudent to attack us in position, and contented themselves for the balance of the day in a desultory fire of artillery which hurt no one, and was only attended with the gratifying result of stampeding the amateur fighters and the camp plunderers from Richmond."

¹ Pickett's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 982.

² Richardson says (report, *Ib.* p. 765), "This flank movement at the same time involved the necessity of the first line crossing the railroad, and this line then stood some fifty yards in front of it, in a swampy piece of ground covered with a thick growth of timber."

and a half, says General Richardson, the fighting was most severe.¹ Howard's brigade was sent to reinforce French, and now on the Confederate side Armistead's brigade suddenly gave way and retreated in great disorder. Mahone had previously withdrawn without orders,² and so was not at hand when needed. Thus the brunt of the battle at this point fell on Pickett, who, though thrown on the defensive by the giving way of Armistead's brigade, maintained his ground stubbornly and successfully.³ The Federals seemed content with repelling the attack, and a lull succeeded.

Meantime, Wilcox and Pryor, who were on Pickett's right, though hidden from his view by the intervening forest, were actively engaged with the troops of Hooker's division and Birney's brigade.⁴ Wilcox, who, with his own brigade and Pryor's, had relieved Hill's division in the night, and knew nothing of the ground or the enemy in front, had disposed his troops with part fronting eastward and part fronting northward,

¹ Richardson says (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 795), "Our men returned the fire with vivacity and spirit, and it soon became the heaviest musketry firing that I have ever experienced during an hour and a half. The action had continued in this way about an hour. I now ordered in General Howard to reinforce the first line. Soon after this the whole line of the enemy fell back for the first time, unable to stand our fire, and for half an hour the firing ceased on both sides. During the cessation of the fire I ordered forward the 5th New Hampshire and the 69th and the 88th New York to relieve the 52d New York, 53d Pennsylvania, and 61st New York. As soon as these arrangements had been made, the enemy, having apparently been reinforced, now returned to the attack. The whole of my division on the field was very warmly engaged. The action lasted about one hour longer. Our line towards the last poured in its fire and repulsed the enemy with a general charge."

² Hill's report, *Ib.* p. 945.

³ Pickett says (report, *Ib.* p. 983), "As a matter of course, having been the attacking party, I now had to act on the defensive. Fortunately the enemy seemed determined on attacking and carrying my front and driving me out of the abattis, which our men succeeded in preventing, though with considerable loss."

⁴ General Birney had been arrested early in the morning, charged with misconduct for not putting his brigade into the fight the day before. Colonel Ward succeeded him in command. Birney was subsequently acquitted by a court martial.

and waited for the enemy to take the initiative. As soon as the firing was heard on Richardson's line, Hooker advanced. One of his brigades, under Sickles, moved on both sides of the Williamsburg road. To the north of Sickles, Hooker himself, with part of another brigade and supported by Ward with Birney's brigade, attacked the centre and left (Confederate) of the position held by Wilcox and Pryor.¹ The Federals pushed into the woods held by the Confederates, and the contest soon became animated. It was while this engagement was in progress that Wilcox received Hill's order to retire to the line in rear. Wilcox began to withdraw his troops without delay.² Hooker, satisfied with having gained the field, did not attempt to pursue; on the contrary he withdrew to his own camps.³ By this movement of Wilcox, Pickett was left alone on the line occupied by the Confederates in the early morning. He did not wish to withdraw, and urged General Hill to support him. The latter sent up part of Colston's brigade on his left, and placed Mahone's brigade on his right. The roar of battle, which had entirely lulled, was again heard as Pickett and his supports once more became engaged with Richardson's division. A severe fight continued for another hour, without material advantage to either side, when both parties ceased from the bloody strife. Pickett then proceeded

¹ Pryor's and Wilcox's regiments were in the following order from left to right: Pryor's brigade on the left, his right regiment being the 8th Alabama; then 9th Alabama under Wilcox,—all of which troops faced the railroad; then came 11th Alabama and 19th Mississippi, and lastly 10th Alabama facing eastward.

² Wilcox says (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 988), "The 19th Mississippi had already repulsed the enemy in its front, the other troops were doing well, and the engagement, now waging furiously, was going on as well as could be desired; but just at this time an order in writing was sent to me to withdraw my command, which was instantly done, my brigade retiring by the right flank and keeping in the woods, and Pryor's brigade following back, directly across the open field and rear, being pursued by the enemy to the field and experiencing some loss as it entered it. The enemy did not cross the field, and soon ceased firing."

³ Hooker says (*Ib.* p. 819), "This being ended and no other fire heard on any part of the field, the troops were ordered to return to their respective camps."

to remove his wounded, and about one P. M. retired unmolested and in good order.¹

During this desultory and unorganized fighting² on Longstreet's wing no movement of importance was attempted on the other wing of the Confederate army. After the unsuccessful effort of the preceding afternoon to drive Sumner from his position, the Confederate commander (General Smith) hesitated to attack, now that he deemed his adversary strongly reinforced. A Federal success at this point would endanger Longstreet's rear and line of retreat, and it was not known at what hour McClellan might be able to pour fresh troops over the Chickahominy to the south side. McClellan was in fact entirely cut off for many hours from the three corps on the south side, and a vigorous assault on those corps by the whole Confederate force on the morning of June 1 promised favorable results, but the opportunity was lost by hesitation and disjointed action. The Confederates spent most of the day in collecting arms and removing their wounded.³

The Federal commanders on the south side, cut off from their supports and in the presence of superior and victorious forces, were well satisfied to hold their ground and check effectually any further advance of the Confederates.

General McClellan reported the Federal loss in the battles

¹ Richardson's report, already quoted in note. Pickett says (report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 984), "Just then Colston's regiments came up on the left and Mahone's on the right. The enemy retreated to their bushy cover, and their fire immediately slackened. No other attempt was made by them to advance, and about one P. M., I judge, by General Hill's order I withdrew the whole of our front line, Pryor and Wilcox, and some other troops I don't remember, being in position some 400 yards in our rear. We withdrew in perfect order, not a gun was fired at us, and bringing off all our wounded. This was the conclusion of the battle of Seven Pines. No shot was fired afterwards."

² General Johnston is certainly mistaken in thinking there was little or no severe fighting on Sunday morning. (Johnston's *Narrative*, p. 139.) General Richardson states the Federal loss in his division alone, on Sunday morning, at 900.

³ Hill says (report, *Ib.* p. 945), "The day was spent in removing 6700 muskets and rifles in fine condition, ordnance, and commissary and medical stores."

of May 31 and June 1, in a telegram to Secretary Stanton, at 7000. In his official report he puts it at 5737. General Johnston states his captures to have been "350 prisoners, 10 pieces of artillery, 6700 muskets and rifles in excellent condition, a garrison flag and four regimental colors, medical, commissary, quartermaster and ordnance stores, tents and sutlers' stores."¹ The Confederate loss by the official report was 6134.²

The Confederate forces engaged on May 31 were four brigades of D. H. Hill, the strength of which on the field was less than 9000,³ and three brigades of Longstreet (including Wilcox, who was but very slightly engaged). These latter numbered some 6000 to 7000. So Longstreet had from 15,000 to 16,000 in the fight. The other six brigades (three of Longstreet's division and three constituting Huger's division) were not engaged on that day.

Heintzelman places his strength on the field, of the divisions of Casey, Couch, and Kearny engaged with Longstreet and Hill, at 18,500, less Birney's brigade of 2300, which did not get into the fight that day, thus making the Federal force about 16,000.

Four brigades of Smith's division were engaged with Sumner. They numbered about 8000.⁴ Only Sedgwick's division of Sumner's corps was engaged on the 31st. It numbered probably about 7000.⁵

At different times during the next morning the brigades of Wilcox, Pryor, Pickett, and Colston, and those of Armistead

¹ Johnston's *Narrative*, p. 140.

² Longstreet's losses were 4851 on right wing. (*War Records*, Ser. i. vol. xi. part i. p. 942.) Smith's loss on left wing was 1283; in part ii. p. 506, it is stated at 1273.

³ Hill's report, *Ib.* p. 946.

⁴ Smith's official report, May 21, gives the aggregate of these brigades as 8670 in camp. They probably had less than 8000 effective.

⁵ This is the number Richardson gives as his strength engaged next morning, and Sedgwick's was about the same. Four regiments with Couch belonging to Heintzelman fought with Sumner against Smith. Estimating these at 2000, Longstreet fought about 14,000 and Smith about 9000 Union troops.

and Mahone were engaged — possibly some 10,000 or 12,000 men.¹ On the Federal side were Richardson's division, numbering 7000, Birney's brigade of 2300, and two brigades of Hooker's division, numbering possibly 4000 more, — making a total of about 13,000. A few other troops on both sides were slightly engaged this day.

Thus the total fighting forces were about 32,000 Confederates and about 36,000 Federals. But the Federals had in action all their available force, except one of Hooker's brigades left to guard White Oak swamp. On the Confederate side, the brigades of Hood and Blanchard, besides the six brigades of Magruder's division, — a force of from 15,000 to 20,000 men, — were unengaged.

¹ Pryor's and Colston's brigades were small.

CHAPTER IX.

GENERAL LEE IN COMMAND.

ANOTHER event makes the 1st of June, 1862, a notable one in the annals of the Confederate army. Soon after midday¹ President Davis relieved Major-General G. W. Smith, and assigned General R. E. Lee to the chief command of the Confederate army in Virginia. General Lee continued to hold this command until the surrender at Appomattox, April 9, 1865, nearly three years after. Entering at once upon his duties, General Lee directed the withdrawal of the Confederate troops. Longstreet and Hill returned to their former camps near the city, while Huger's and Smith's divisions were placed in advance. This was effected during the night of the 1st and the morning of the 2d. The Federal forces did not follow.²

The problem presented to General R. E. Lee upon his assumption of the command of the Army of Northern Virginia was not an easy one. McClellan's army stretched around the city of Richmond from the north to the east, and was within sight of its spires. The Chickahominy separated the wings of the Federal army; but after the events of the last two days it was to be expected that the bridges over this stream would be rapidly completed. This army was not two days' march from its base of supplies on the Pamunkey and the York rivers, and had the benefit of a railroad from deep water to its camps. These rivers, as well as the James up to Drewry's Bluff, were under the complete control of the Federal navy. McClellan on the Chickahominy had more than 100,000 men for duty,³ and

¹ General Smith says about two P. M.

² For organization, strength, and loss of the two armies at Seven Pines, see *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, vol. ii. p. 218.

³ McClellan's report for April 30 gives "his present for duty" as 109,335. (*Report on Conduct of War*, vol. i. p. 323, puts it at 112,392.) He lost at Seven Pines say 6000 men, and this left him over 100,000.

his army was splendidly equipped and in fine condition. He could be easily reinforced by the Federal government. But a week before, 41,000 men,¹ under McDowell, had been on the point of marching from Fredericksburg (sixty miles north of Richmond) to unite with him. The dispersion of Banks's force near Winchester by Jackson had caused the sudden recall of three fourths of McDowell's troops to coöperate with Fremont in annihilating Jackson. On the very day that Lee assumed command Jackson was outgeneraling his adversaries and rapidly slipping between them at Strasburg. This diversion of McDowell, however, could not be other than temporary. It was to be expected that McDowell would be ordered back to McClellan as soon as Jackson was disposed of. In that event not less than 140,000 men would assail the Confederate capital, nor was it in the power of the Confederate government to meet, with adequate forces, so mighty an armament. On the 1st of June, General Lee found himself at the head of 57,000 men,² whose equipment compared no better with that of the enemy than did their numbers. Though the honors of the battle just ended remained with the Confederates, no advantages had been gained commensurate with the loss of life. Severe damage had been inflicted on the enemy, his advance had for the time been checked, and his subsequent movements made even more cautious than before. But this was all. No permanent advantage had been gained. The enemy's position was as threatening as ever, and it was plain that, if he was not dislodged, he might in a short time beleaguer the city in such overwhelming force as to render its fall certain.

General Lee decided to gather all the troops the government could give, and, if possible, attack McClellan before McDowell's forces could be recalled from the Shenandoah.³ Some new troops were brought from the south, and all that could be spared from North Carolina were ordered to Rich-

¹ McDowell's testimony before the Committee on Conduct of the War. (*Report on Conduct of War*, vol. i. p. 267.)

² The losses at Seven Pines (6134) left this number.

³ This had been General Johnston's idea too. (*Johnston's Narrative*, p. 132.)

mond. In this way five brigades were added to his army.¹ He determined to enable Jackson first to dispose of his enemies in the Valley, and then bring down his troops to Richmond if it could be done without their being followed by the large bodies which had been gathered there against him. For this purpose Lee sent to Jackson troops from the army at Richmond as well as Lawton's brigade, which was on its way from the south to Richmond. He wrote to Jackson on the 8th: "Should there be nothing requiring your attention in the Valley, so as to prevent your leaving it a few days, and you can make arrangements to deceive the enemy and impress him with the idea of your presence, please let me know, that you may unite at the decisive moment with the army near Richmond. Make your arrangements accordingly; but should an opportunity occur for striking the enemy a successful blow, do not let it escape you." On the day this letter was written, Jackson was already striking the blow that General Lee wished, for on June 8 he defeated Fremont at Cross Keys, and the next day beat thoroughly the advanced brigades of Shields at Port Republic. These generals retreated without delay down the Valley. Hence, by the time the letter reached its destination the blow had been struck. The troops on their way to reinforce Jackson were still sent forward by way of Lynchburg and Gordonsville in an ostentatious manner, in order to render the diversion of McDowell from Fredericksburg more decided, and effectually to mask Jackson's withdrawal from the Valley at the right time.² The Federal prisoners sent from Port Republic to Richmond passed these troops on the way,

¹ These brigades were: Ripley's from the south (which had arrived about the time of Seven Pines), containing 2366 men; Ransom's, of about 3700; J. G. Walker's, of about 3600; Daniel's, of 1570, with 130 cavalry and 296 artillerymen, — these last three constituting the part of Holmes's command brought up from North Carolina; Lawton's brigade from the south, numbering about 3500 or 3600 men. To these may be added Wise's brigade, which had been at Drewry's Bluff, but which was added to Holmes's division during the battles. It contained but two infantry regiments, and numbered 961 including artillery. The force thus added was 15,162 without Wise — and with him 16,123.

² Lee's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part ii. p. 490.

and soon carried the news to Washington. Information as to their coming was purposely allowed to pass through Jackson's lines. General Lee writes to Jackson on the 11th of June: . . . "Brigadier-General Lawton with six regiments from Georgia is on the way to you, and Brigadier-General Whiting with eight veteran regiments leaves here to-day. The object is to enable you to crush the forces opposed to you. Leave your enfeebled troops to watch the country and guard the passes covered by your cavalry and artillery, and with your main body, including Ewell's division, Lawton's and Whiting's commands, move rapidly to Ashland by rail or otherwise, as you may find more advantageous, sweep down between the Chickahominy and Pamunkey rivers, cutting up the enemy's communications, etc., while this army attacks General McClellan in front." Again on the 16th General Lee writes: "I hope you will be able to recruit and refresh your troops sufficiently for the movement proposed in my letter of the 11th. From your account of the position of the enemy, I think it would be difficult for you to engage him in time to reunite with this army in the battle for Richmond. Fremont and Shields are apparently retrograding, their troops shaken and disorganized; some time will be required to set them in the field. If this be so, the sooner you unite with this army the better. In moving your troops you could let it be understood that it was to pursue the enemy in your front. Dispose those to hold the Valley so as to deceive the enemy." At midday on the 17th Jackson marched to Waynesborough and moved rapidly along the Virginia Central Railroad towards Richmond. He made use of the railroad for transportation as far as its very limited resources permitted.

While General Lee was thus bringing what reinforcements he could from the south, and arranging to deceive and hold in place the large bodies of troops gathered in Northern Virginia to oppose Jackson, while he called the latter to his assistance at Richmond, he sent the flower of his cavalry, under J. E. B. Stuart, to "ascertain the position and movements of the Federal army"¹ in his front. Stuart converted the reconnoissance

¹ General Lee's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part ii. p. 490.

into the first of those bold and dashing raids for which this great cavalryman became afterward so famous. The force under him consisted of about 1200 cavalry and a section of horse artillery. The cavalry comprised portions of the 1st, 4th, and 9th Virginia regiments under Colonels Fitz Lee and W. H. F. Lee, and two squadrons of the Jeff Davis Legion under Lieutenant-Colonel W. T. Martin, and the artillery was under Lieutenant James Breathed.¹ This force was quietly concentrated during the 12th of June north of the Chickahominy near Kelly's Station on the Fredericksburg Railroad, and on the morning of the 13th marched northward along the Fredericksburg Railroad, and to the left of it. Stuart camped the first night at the Fredericksburg Railroad bridge over the South Anna, twenty-two miles from Richmond, and the next day turned towards Hanover Court House. Here was found a small body of Federal cavalry,² which retired rapidly towards Mechanicsville. The Confederates did not follow, but pushed on towards Hawes's Shop and Old Church. At the first named place they drove off the Federal videttes, capturing some of them, and followed briskly the retreating enemy across Tolo-potomoy Creek. At last, near Old Church, the Federal cavalry, consisting of two squadrons of the 5th regular cavalry,³ made a stand. Stuart ordered a charge. Captain Latané led it, followed by a squadron of the 9th cavalry. The contest was short. The Federal commander, Captain Royall, was cut down, and in a few moments his command was dispersed. A number were killed and wounded, and some prisoners were taken. The only Confederate that suffered was the gallant Latané, who fell dead at the head of his men. The Confederates pushed on, and captured and destroyed the camp of the troopers they had just defeated. Stuart had now fulfilled the purpose of his expedition. He had passed entirely around McClellan's right flank and was in the rear of his army. He had

¹ Stuart's report, *Rebellion Record*, vol. v. Doc. p. 192 ; *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 1036.

² Stuart says, 150 from the 6th Regular U. S. Cavalry. See his report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 1036.

³ McClellan's report, *Ib.* p. 47.

gained sufficient information to satisfy his chief of the practicability of turning the flank of McClellan's army. But Stuart thought a still bolder enterprise possible. Instead of returning by the same flank, he promptly decided to move forward, to cut the Federal communications, and passing entirely around McClellan, to recross the Chickahominy and reach Richmond by way of Forge Bridge, which was beyond the Federal extreme left. At this place, though the bridge was gone, his guides informed him that the Chickahominy was fordable. While not fully approving of this bold scheme, Stuart's subordinates promised him hearty support, and he headed his column at once for Tunstall's Station on the York River Railroad. A squadron of the 9th Virginia and one of the 1st Virginia were sent to the left to Garlick's Landing on the Pamunkey, where they destroyed two loaded transports and a long train of wagons, and took some prisoners and horses. Meantime the main body moved rapidly towards Tunstall's, where they surprised and captured the guard, and overhauled a number of wagons. A loaded train going towards the White House passed by before the railroad could be effectually obstructed. A volley fired into it did some havoc and produced great consternation. The railroad bridge near by was fired, as were the wagons and stores, and the Confederates moved on by moonlight with such captures as they could take with them. At Talleyville they halted for some hours for the column to close up, and at midnight resumed their march for Forge Bridge, which they reached without molestation at daylight on the morning of the 15th. Here a formidable and unexpected obstacle presented itself. The Chickahominy was far too high for fording, and the bridge was gone. Had pursuit been energetic and in force, disaster could hardly have been averted. Stuart lost no time, however, in making his way through the difficulty. Some crossed by swimming, but this was a slow process. Soon it was found that the débris of the old bridge might be utilized. A large warehouse near by offered additional materials. Lieutenant Redmond Burke was set to work with a party to construct a bridge. "A foot bridge was soon improvised, and the horses were crossed over as rapidly as possible by swimming.

Burke's work progressed like magic; in three hours it was ready to bear artillery and cavalry, and as half the latter had not yet crossed, the bridge enabled the whole to reach the other bank by ten P. M. Another branch of the Chickahominy still further on was with difficulty forded, and the march was continued without interruption towards Richmond."¹ Besides the property destroyed, Stuart brought back with him 165 prisoners, 260 mules and horses, and harness, arms, etc. His only loss was Captain Latané. A gun broke down and was abandoned after he had recrossed the Chickahominy.

This brilliant feat of Stuart inspired the Confederates. It produced a great commotion for the time in the Federal camps, mortified McClellan, and lessened his waning influence with his government. It confirmed General Lee in his plan of bringing Jackson down on McClellan's right flank. After Seven Pines the Federal left had been carefully fortified. General Lee thought its strength "rendered a direct assault injudicious, if not impracticable." He had therefore looked to the other flank as a point of attack, and the cavalry had been sent to discover the obstacles that might be in the way. On the day after Stuart's return, Jackson was ordered to come, "the sooner the better." The Confederate works in front of Richmond and on the south side of the Chickahominy were rapidly extended and strengthened. It was Lee's purpose to make these works so complete that a small part of his army could hold them against a Federal advance, while the mass of his troops crossed to the north side of the Chickahominy to unite with Jackson in attacking McClellan's right.²

¹ Stuart's report. (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 1039.)

² See report, *Ib.* part ii. p. 490. Lee says: "It was therefore determined to construct defensive lines so as to enable a part of the army to defend the city, and leave the other part free to cross the Chickahominy and operate on the north bank. By sweeping down the river on that side and threatening his communications with the York River, it was thought that the enemy would be compelled to retreat or to give battle out of his intrenchments."

CHAPTER X.

MCCLELLAN ON THE CHICKAHOMINY.

WHILE General Lee was thus hastening forward his plans for attack, General McClellan lay quiet on the Chickahominy, busily employed in building bridges and making roads to improve his communications, and in extending and fortifying his lines. A variety of causes contributed to his inactivity. Though the battle of Seven Pines had given no decided advantage to the Confederates, it was marked by severe loss both of men and *morale* to two corps of the Federal army. McDowell's corps of 41,000 men had been diverted and was still kept away by Jackson's movements, and McClellan hoped for the reunion by this large force with his army. The season continued very rainy, greatly increasing the difficulty of securely bridging the Chickahominy, and converting much of the country in which he was operating into a bog impassable for artillery. But more potent than these causes was the hallucination under which the Federal commander labored as to the strength of the army in his front. He more than doubled General Lee's actual numbers in his estimates,¹ and acted with the caution of a man leading an army to attack largely superior numbers occupying a chosen and strongly fortified position. It is difficult to realize the process of reasoning by which General McClellan was led into so serious a mistake. The Confederate arms had everywhere else during the spring been unsuccessful. The opening of the campaign in the west and south had quickly demonstrated the unequal character of the contest. At no point had the Confederacy with its great

¹ McClellan estimates the Confederate forces at the time of the evacuation of Yorktown at 100,000 to 120,000, and on the 26th of June, including Jackson, at 180,000. The actual numbers at those periods were respectively 53,000 and 80,000.

territory and comparatively meagre resources been able to make headway against the vast armaments which the North had set forward. Nay, at but few points had it been able to hold its own. In the West, whole States had been overrun by the Federal arms. Driven out of Kentucky and the larger part of Tennessee, Albert Sidney Johnston had gathered all his forces, and, by hurling them at Shiloh on one of the Federal armies opposed to him while the other was still separated from it, hoped to turn the tide of disaster. At the supreme moment, when a great victory had been all but won, he fell at the head of his legions, and as his life ebbed, so did the tide of Confederate success. Next day Buell and Grant united were able to force the Confederates from the field,¹ the opportunity was lost, and Tennessee was virtually conquered. New Orleans, the principal city of the Confederacy, had been taken; ² a successful descent had been made on the coasts of both North ³ and South Carolina; ⁴ and it was only at such strongly fortified points as Charleston and Mobile that the Federal arms had not made headway. Engaged thus everywhere else as the Confederates were in a desperate and unequal struggle, General McClellan yet thought it possible for them to concentrate in his front an army nearly twice as numerous as his own!

The Federal President and Secretary of War were urgently appealed to for reinforcements, and efforts were made to meet McClellan's views. On June 1 General Wool was transferred to Baltimore, and General Dix assigned to his corps at Fort Monroe, which was now placed under McClellan's orders. On the 6th four regiments were sent from Baltimore, and one from Washington, and the next day two more were added.⁵ On the same day McCall's division of McDowell's corps, contain-

¹ The battle of Shiloh was fought on April 6, 1862.

² New Orleans fell on April 25, 1862.

³ Burnside, January, 1862.

⁴ T. W. Sherman, November, 1861.

⁵ Stanton's telegram on June 7 is as follows (*Report on Conduct of War*, part i. p. 334): "Four regiments were embarked yesterday from Baltimore and one from here. One more goes to-day from Baltimore and one from here, making seven in all. McCall is ready to move as soon as transportation arrives at Fredericksburg."

ing over 9000 men, was ordered from Fredericksburg by water to the Peninsula.¹ On the 8th, McDowell was once more ordered to move with his main body by land to Richmond "as speedily as possible."² McCall's division reached McClellan on the 12th and 13th, but the defeat of Fremont at Cross Keys on the 8th, and of Shields, commanding one of McDowell's divisions, at Port Republic on the 9th by Jackson, again paralyzed the remainder of McDowell's forces, and resulted finally in the withdrawal of his divisions (Ricketts's and Shields's) toward Manassas, and the retention of King at Fredericksburg. The correspondence of McClellan with his government affords the best view of the Federal councils at this time. On June 2, Secretary Stanton telegraphs to General McClellan his congratulations on account of Seven Pines. On the 4th, McClellan says to the secretary, "Please inform me at once what reinforcements, if any, I can count on having at Fortress Monroe or White House within the next three days. The losses in the battle of the 31st and 1st will amount to 7000." On the 5th, Secretary Stanton telegraphs, "I intend sending you part of McDowell's force as soon as it can return from its trip to Front Royal, probably as many as you want." On the 6th and 7th, Secretary Stanton notifies McClellan of the embarkation of McCall's division and the other reinforcements, and says, "Please state whether you will feel sufficiently strong for your final movement when McCall reaches you." McClellan replies on the 7th that the Chickahominy has risen greatly, but that he is pushing the construction of his bridges by night and day; and says, "I shall be in perfect readiness to move forward to take Richmond the moment that McCall reaches here, and the ground will admit the passage of artillery." On the 10th, he says, "I wish it to be distinctly understood that whenever the weather permits I will attack with whatever force I may have, although a large force would enable me to gain much more decisive results;"

¹ McCall had remained at Fredericksburg, while McDowell, with his other three divisions, had gone after Jackson. McDowell replaced McCall's division by King's.

² *Report on Conduct of War*, part i. p. 275.

on the 14th, "I hope two more days will make the ground practicable. I shall advance as soon as the bridges are completed, and the ground fit for artillery to move." On the 18th, General McClellan discovers that Whiting, with a force he estimates at 10,000, has left Richmond to reinforce Jackson; on the same day President Lincoln replies that this information is corroborated by a dispatch from General King at Fredericksburg, and adds, "If this be true, it is as good as a reinforcement to you of an equal force. I could better dispose things if I could know about what day you can attack Richmond, and would be glad to be informed, if you think you can inform me with safety." McClellan replies, "A general engagement may take place at any hour. An advance by us involves a battle, more or less decisive. The enemy exhibit at every point a readiness to meet us. . . . If 10,000 or 15,000 men have left Richmond to reinforce Jackson, it illustrates their strength and confidence. After to-morrow we shall fight the rebel army as soon as Providence will permit." On the 20th, President Lincoln sends a dispatch from General Sigel¹ corroborating the information that Jackson had been reinforced, and adds, "This may be reality and yet may be only contrivance for deception, and to determine which, is perplexing. If we knew it was not true, we could send you some more force, but as the case stands, we do not think we safely can." On this day (20th), General McClellan's morning report shows that he had (exclusive of Dix's command at Fort Monroe) 105,825 men present for duty.² A dispatch a few days later from President Lincoln states the Federal force in the Shenandoah Valley and about Washington at 60,000.³

¹ General Sigel was with Banks at Middletown, five miles north of Strasburg in the Valley.

² *Report on Conduct of War*, part i. p. 337. The troops sent McClellan after Seven Pines thus appear to have hardly made up his losses after that battle and his subsequent losses from sickness. His strength April 30 was 109,335.

³ President Lincoln's dispatch of July 2 to General McClellan says: . . . "All of General Fremont's in the Valley, all of General Banks's, all of General McDowell's not with you, and all in Washington, taken together, do not exceed, if they reach, 60,000. With General Wool and

General Lee had at Richmond and Petersburg at this time (June 20) but 64,000 men, about 8000 having been sent under Whiting and Lawton to Jackson.¹ The latter was moving with these commands and the mass of his own troops (in all about 16,000) towards Richmond, but was still nearly one hundred miles away. This was McClellan's time, if ever, to strike. True, the 60,000 men covering Washington were paralyzed for the time by Jackson's movements, but the Union army on the Chickahominy was more than fifty per cent. greater than the Confederate, and McClellan knew Lee's strength had been diminished by the detachment of the force sent to Jackson. But McClellan did not strike. He put off from day to day. He wanted more troops. The bridges were not finished, or the ground was not fit for the movement of artillery; there was always something not ready.

General Dix added to those mentioned, I have not, outside of your army, 75,000 men east of the mountains." (*Report on Conduct of War*, part 1. p. 341.)

¹ See General Early's exhaustive analysis of the Confederate numbers at the Seven Days' Battles. (*Southern Historical Papers*, vol. i. p. 415.)

CHAPTER XI.

JACKSON JOINS LEE.

THE long June days, however, sped on. While feints were made in other directions, Jackson was hastening quickly, with the mass of his troops, from the mountains to the Chickahominy. So rapid were his movements, and so well concealed their object, that he was within a day's march of the enemy before his coming was suspected. He had passed Gordonsville on June 21, and on Sunday, June 22, he rested at Frederickshall. As soon as the Sabbath had closed, he left orders for the continuing of the march in the morning, and himself set out at midnight, attended by a single courier, to Richmond, to confer with General Lee as to the details of his operations.¹ On the 25th, he reached Ashland. It was on the 24th that McClellan received the first intimation of his approach. McClellan's dispatch at midday on the 24th is as follows: "A very peculiar case of desertion has just occurred from the enemy. The party states that he left Jackson, Whiting, and Ewell (fifteen brigades) at Gordonsville on the 21st, that they were moving to Frederickshall, and that it was intended to attack my rear on the 28th. I would be glad to learn at your earliest convenience the most exact information you have as to the position and movements of Jackson, as well as the sources from which your information is derived, that I may the better compare it with what I have."

The secretary replied on the 25th: "We have no definite information as to the numbers or position of Jackson's force. General King yesterday reported a deserter's statement that

¹ General Jackson took precautions to conceal the fact of his presence in Richmond, and it was known to but few persons. He returned in the afternoon to his command.

Jackson's force was, nine days ago, 40,000 men. Some reports place 10,000 rebels under Jackson, at Gordonsville; others that his force is at Port Republic, Harrisonburg, and Luray. Fremont yesterday reported rumors that Western Virginia was threatened, and General Kelly that Ewell was advancing to New Creek, where Fremont had his depots. The last telegram from Fremont contradicts this rumor. The last telegram from Banks says the enemy's pickets are strong in advance at Luray; the people decline to give any information of his whereabouts. Within the last two days the evidence is strong that for some purpose the enemy is circulating rumors of Jackson's advance in various directions, with a view to conceal the real point of attack. Neither McDowell, who is at Manassas, nor Banks and Fremont, who are at Middletown, appear to have any accurate knowledge of the subject."¹

The first three weeks of his command had been busy and anxious ones to the Confederate commander-in-chief. What could be done in that time towards mastering the difficult problem before him had been accomplished; the army under him, the field of operations, and the enemy in front had all been carefully estimated. He had quickly seen that the only hope of delivering Richmond was to defeat the army in his front in the field. To maintain a strictly defensive attitude behind elaborate works was to permit the enemy to pursue the plan which he seemed to prefer of converting the operations into a siege, and though a siege might be protracted, the success of besieging with resources practically unlimited would in the end be certain. General Lee saw that his army was composed in large part of new troops; but so was that of the enemy. He was inferior in equipment and especially in artillery; the meagre stores of the Confederacy were drained to correct this as far as possible, and in a pitched battle it was hoped the inequality still remaining might be neutralized by celerity and secrecy of movement. Lee had but four fifths as many men when he had gathered all within reach as his opponent, but he felt that inequality of numbers was a necessary concomitant of the struggle of five millions of people against twenty mil-

¹ *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 49.

lions. The scene of operations was in a tangled and difficult country where it was not easy to manœuvre large bodies of troops. In such a country the attacking party would have no advantage, but the *morale* of the Confederates was good. They were about to fight on their own soil and for their own capital. It was with anxiety that Lee had detached for a time Whiting and Lawton, and sent them to cover the withdrawal of Jackson from the Valley. The enemy might have attacked when 16,000 of his best troops were out of the way. The advantage to be gained had justified the risk. The danger was met by strengthening his lines in front of McClellan by a bold display of force whenever the enemy appeared, and by the vigorous demonstration of his cavalry on the Federal flank and rear. He had succeeded. McClellan had not attacked; and now the troops detached, and Jackson, too, were at hand.

As the time for attack was now near, General Lee brought up Ransom's brigade of Holmes's division from Petersburg. It arrived in Richmond on the night of the 24th and was sent out next morning on the Williamsburg road to reinforce Huger. The other two brigades of Holmes's division (J. G. Walker's and Daniel's) were at Drewry's Bluff ready to cross the James when ordered, while Wise's small brigade was on the north side of the river at Chaffin's Bluff. On the morning of the 25th the remaining divisions of the Confederate army were thus posted: Huger held the right; his lines extended from the Charles City road at Pond's House northward across the Williamsburg road to the York River Railroad. Next came Magruder, who held the Confederate front from Huger's left to the Chickahominy. These two divisions held the line of works which covered the approaches to Richmond from the east, and confronted the mass of McClellan's army. The divisions of Longstreet and D. H. Hill were encamped within supporting distance in the rear of Magruder and Huger. A. P. Hill's division extended along the south bank of the Chickahominy from Magruder's left to Meadow Bridge, and was opposed to Fitz-John Porter, who, with the three divisions of McCall, Morell, and Sykes, held the north side of the Chickahominy from Cold Harbor to Mechanicsville. Jackson's advance was at Ashland.

McClellan's forces on the 25th were in the positions they had held for some days past. Fitz-John Porter held the right, north of the Chickahominy, while the corps of Franklin, Sumner, and Heintzelman, in the order named, occupied the strong and recently constructed line of works which extended southward from the right bank of the Chickahominy, at Golding's, across the railroad and the Williamsburg road to White Oak swamp. Keyes was in reserve between Bottom's Bridge and the Federal lines. The raid of Stuart upon his rear ten days before had awakened McClellan to the exposed condition of his communications with the York, and to provide against accident a few transports and some supplies had been ordered up the James River, but no decided steps had been taken either to change his base from the York to the James, or to strengthen his right flank against the renewal of Stuart's movement with stronger force. The Federal general had long been preparing to assume the offensive. At last everything was ready, and on the 25th he determined to extend and push forward his left against the opposing lines, and, if the results were satisfactory, to follow up on the succeeding days with an attack in full force on the Confederate position.¹ As will appear, he had postponed too long, and those days were to be occupied not in a struggle for the capture of Richmond, but in one for the safety of his own army.

A forward movement of Hooker's division of Heintzelman's corps, on both sides of the Williamsburg road, was made on the morning of the 25th. Here a mile or more separated the Federal from the Confederate works. In front of the Confederate works lay an open space, extending from a point some distance south of the Williamsburg road as far north as the York River Railroad and even beyond it. A similar cleared space existed in front of the Federal works, but these two openings were separated by a belt of low timber land, some 800 yards in width, which lay midway between the two armies,

¹ General McClellan says in his report: "On the 25th, our bridges and intrenchments being at last completed, an advance of our picket line of the left was ordered preparatory to a general forward movement." (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 49.)

and which had been for some time past the scene of constant picket skirmishing. Heintzelman was ordered to advance his line to these woods, and Hooker was sent forward for that purpose, supported by Kearny on the left and Richardson of Sumner's corps on the right. Hooker advanced with Sickles's brigade on the north side of the Williamsburg road, and with Grover's on the south side. Opposed to them were Armistead's brigade of Huger's division on the north of the Williamsburg road, and Wright's brigade of the same division on the south side. The Confederate pickets were driven in, but their supports checked the Federal advance, until the remainder of Wright's and Armistead's brigades, as well as part of Ransom's brigade, which had just reached the battlefield from Petersburg, could be brought up. A stubborn contest now took place. Hooker's advance was reinforced on the Federal side, and a determined effort was made to drive back the Confederates. They were yielding at points to this pressure when their firm resistance at other points caused the Federals to retire, and the whole Union line was ordered back to its original position.¹ The extreme Federal left held, however, a part of the ground it had won. General McClellan soon after arrived on the field, and seeing the condition of affairs ordered a new advance of the Federal troops, in which Kearny participated as well as Hooker, while the latter was reinforced by one of Couch's brigades. A severe fight ensued. Mahone's brigade and the part of Ransom's not already engaged reinforced the Confederates. The struggle lasted until nightfall. No material advantage was gained by the Federals, who were finally repulsed, and during the night resumed their old positions.² The Federal loss in this affair was 516, according to General McClellan. The Confederate loss was over 400.³

¹ Federal writers say that this order was due to some misconception on the part of General McClellan, who was not present at the morning fight.

² McClellan claimed an important advantage in his dispatch from the field, but Generals Huger, Armistead, and Wright all state explicitly that they occupied their original lines at the close of the fight.

³ See official report of General McClellan (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 50); also those of Generals Armistead (*Ib.* vol. xi. part ii. p. 817), Wright (*Ib.* p. 804), and Ransom (*Ib.* p. 791).

CHAPTER XII.

THE SEVEN DAYS' BATTLES : MECHANICSVILLE.

WITH the affair just narrated, which amounted to nothing more than a reconnoissance in force, ended the day, and, as night closed in, McClellan's opportunity of delivering battle on his own terms passed away. During the 25th Lee had kept Longstreet's and D. H. Hill's divisions where they had been for some time, in rear of Huger and Magruder and ready to support them in case of need. At night they were ordered to march to the vicinity of Mechanicsville, to be at hand for the next day's movements. The Confederate commander's plan of operation is most clearly set forth in the confidential order dated June 24, which had been already communicated to his division commanders. It is as follows :¹ —

“I. General Jackson's command will proceed to-morrow from Ashland towards the Slash Church and encamp at some convenient point west of the Central Railroad. Branch's brigade of A. P. Hill's division will also, to-morrow evening, take position on the Chickahominy near Half Sink. At three o'clock Thursday morning, 26th instant, General Jackson will advance on the road leading to Pole Green Church, communicating his march to General Branch, who will immediately cross the Chickahominy and take the road leading to Mechanicsville. As soon as the movements of these columns are discovered, General A. P. Hill, with the rest of his division, will cross the Chickahominy near Meadow Bridge and move direct upon Mechanicsville. To aid his advance the heavy batteries on the Chickahominy will at the proper time open upon the batteries at Mechanicsville. The enemy being driven from Mechanicsville and the passage across the bridge opened, General Long-

¹ *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part ii. p. 498, *et seq.*

street, with his division and that of General D. H. Hill, will cross the Chickahominy at or near that point; General D. H. Hill moving to the support of General Jackson, and General Longstreet supporting General A. P. Hill; the four divisions keeping in communication with each other, and moving *en échelon* on separate roads if practicable; the left division in advance, with skirmishers and sharpshooters extending in their front, will sweep down the Chickahominy and endeavor to drive the enemy from his position above New Bridge, General Jackson, bearing well to his left, turning Beaver Dam Creek, and taking the direction towards Cold Harbor. They will then press forward towards the York River Railroad, closing upon the enemy's rear, and forcing him down the Chickahominy. Any advance of the enemy towards Richmond will be prevented by vigorously following his rear, and crippling and arresting his progress.

"II. The divisions under Generals Huger and Magruder will hold their positions in front of the enemy against attack, and make such demonstrations, Thursday, as to discover his operations. Should opportunity offer, the feint will be converted into a real attack, and should an abandonment of his intrenchments by the enemy be discovered, he will be closely pursued.

"III. The 3d Virginia cavalry will observe the Charles City road. The 5th Virginia, the 1st North Carolina, and the Hampton Legion cavalry will observe the Darbytown, Varina, and Osborne roads. Should a movement of the enemy down the Chickahominy be discovered, they will close upon his flank and endeavor to arrest his march.

"IV. General Stuart, with the 1st, 4th, and 9th Virginia cavalry, the cavalry of Cobb's Legion, and the Jeff Davis Legion, will cross the Chickahominy to-morrow, and take position to the left of General Jackson's line of march. The main body will be held in reserve, with scouts well extended to the front and left. General Stuart will keep General Jackson informed of the movements of the enemy on his left, and will coöperate with him in his advance. The 16th Virginia cavalry, Colonel Davis, will remain on the Nine Mile road.

"V. General Ransom's brigade of General Holmes's com-

mand will be placed in reserve on the Williamsburg road by General Huger, to whom he will report for orders."

The mass of Holmes's forces were allowed to remain for the present at Drewry's and Chaffin's Bluffs, and were held in readiness to assist Huger and Magruder if necessary. Holmes had 6573¹ troops, Huger about 9000, and Magruder 13,000. Thus General Lee was about to leave nearly 30,000 troops (including a part of his cavalry) on the south side of the Chickahominy to hold in check the mass of the Federal army, while he gathered all the remainder of his forces, which in the aggregate, however, did not exceed 50,000 men, to throw them on McClellan's right wing on the north bank of that stream.

McClellan seems not to have been convinced of the approach of Jackson and of the probable designs of Lee against his right flank and his communications with the Pamunkey until late on the 25th. On the preceding day, as already stated, a deserter had brought him information that Jackson had reached Fredericksburg on the 22d en route for Richmond. McClellan telegraphed to Washington for information, and sent out two negro scouts² towards Hanover Court House. The reply of the

¹ General Early, in *Southern Historical Papers*, vol. i. p. 415, gives a careful and exhaustive statement of the strength of the Confederate army in the Seven Days' battles. This statement is made up, in large part, from the official reports. Where these are wanting, General Early has used all other available sources of information. The numbers are as follows : —

Longstreet	9051
D. H. Hill	10,000
Magruder	13,000
Holmes	6573
Huger	8930
A. P. Hill	13,000
Whiting	4000
Lawton	3500
Jackson and Ewell	8000
Cavalry	2500
Artillery Reserve	1500
	<hr/>
	80,054

Colonel W. H. Taylor, in his *Four Years with General Lee*, p. 53, from all the data extant, deduces 80,762 as General Lee's total strength in the Seven Days' battles.

² McClellan's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 49.

Washington authorities, already given, did not reach him until the next day, and showed an entire ignorance of Jackson's whereabouts. The scouts were stopped by Confederate pickets at Hanover Court House and learned nothing. The Federal general gave little or no credence to the deserter's story,¹ and employed himself on the 25th, not in preparing to resist Jackson on his right, but in trying to push forward his left on the Williamsburg road. Some time during the afternoon of the 25th, McClellan received information that "strengthened his suspicions" of the advance of Jackson, but it was only at six P. M. that some negroes brought him news "confirming the supposition."² These negroes also brought him stories of the arrival of Beauregard and large reinforcements in Richmond, stories which were rendered credible by the marvelous reports of his "Secret Service Corps." This astute body had succeeded at this time in figuring up the Confederate strength to 180,000 as a minimum!³ McClellan seems now suddenly, for the first time, to have fully realized his danger. Indeed, he greatly exaggerated it, and his dispatch to Secretary Stanton gives evidence of panic.⁴ No important change was made,

¹ See *Hist. Civil War in America*, Comte de Paris, vol. ii. p. 85; Swinton's *Army of the Potomac*, p. 144.

² McClellan's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 51.

³ McClellan says in his report: "The report of the chief of the Secret Service Corps . . . put his numbers on the 26th of June at about 180,000, and the specific information obtained regarding their organization warrants the belief that this estimate did not exceed his actual strength." (*Ib.* p. 51.)

⁴ The dispatch, dated June 25, 6.15 P. M., is as follows: "I have just returned from the field, and find your dispatch in regard to Jackson. Several contrabands just in give information confirming the supposition that Jackson's advance is at or near Hanover Court House, and that Beauregard arrived with strong reinforcements in Richmond yesterday. I incline to think that Jackson will attack my right and rear. The rebel force is stated at 200,000, including Jackson and Beauregard. I shall have to contend against vastly superior odds if these reports be true. But this army will do all in the power of men to hold their position and repulse any attack. . . . I will do all that a general can do with the splendid army I have the honor to command, and if it is destroyed by overwhelming numbers, can at least die with it and share its fate. But if the result of the action, which will probably occur to-morrow, . . . is a disaster, the responsibility cannot be thrown on my shoulders; it must rest where it belongs." (*Ib.* p. 51.)

however, in the dispositions of his troops. He determined to await the developments of the next day.

Jackson, who was to have passed Ashland on the 25th and camped in the vicinity of the Virginia Central Railroad,¹ was only able to reach Ashland on that day. Next morning he moved forward at three o'clock, with Whiting's division in front. This column followed the Ashcake road and crossed the Virginia Central Railroad at ten A. M. General Branch, with one of A. P. Hill's brigades, had been stationed at Half Sink, where the Brook turnpike crosses the Chickahominy, and was instructed to cross and move down the north side of that stream, when Jackson should have reached the Central Railroad. He waited for Jackson from early morning until ten o'clock, then crossed and moved toward Mechanicsville, driving back the Federal pickets. Jackson continued his march toward Hundley's Corner, reaching the Tolopotomoy at three P. M. At this creek the Federal cavalry outpost retired, after burning the bridge, and attempted to blockade the road beyond; but a few rounds of artillery drove them off, and General Whiting quickly repaired the bridge and resumed his march. Meantime A. P. Hill, with five brigades, had been quietly waiting at Meadow Bridge where the Virginia Central Railroad crosses the Chickahominy, until the advance of Jackson and Branch should uncover this approach and enable him to cross. He waited until three P. M., but as Jackson and Branch were not sufficiently advanced at that hour for the purpose he determined to seize the bridge in his front, and force a passage, fearing lest longer delay might "hazard the failure of the whole plan." Field's brigade was the advance of A. P. Hill's division. It was thrown forward and took the bridge after but slight opposition, the enemy retiring towards Mechanicsville. Hill now crossed and moved down the north bank of the stream. As he approached Mechanicsville his leading brigade under Field was fired into by a Federal regiment and battery which occupied that village. Field deployed his command, and the Federal troops soon fell back before his attack to their main position on Beaver Dam Creek.

¹ Now the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad.

This tributary of the Chickahominy is tortuous in its course, but for the last mile or two before entering the river it flows nearly southward, and is bordered by hills of considerable height. The right flank of McClellan's army had been strongly posted along the east bank of this creek, where the hills gave fine positions for artillery, and where the swampy banks of the stream, in addition to abattis and earthworks, constituted a most formidable barrier to an attacking force. Here McClellan had placed McCall's division of 9500 men. Two principal roads going eastward from Mechanicsville cross the stream. At Ellyson's Mill, where the lower road crosses, Seymour's brigade was posted. On Seymour's right was Reynolds's brigade guarding the intersection of the creek by the upper road. The other brigade of McCall's division (Meade's) was held in reserve. Soon after the attack began, General McClellan moved up Martindale's and Griffin's brigades of Morell's division, placing them on the right of Reynolds to guard the right flank. They did not become seriously engaged, however.¹

A. P. Hill had by his movement on Mechanicsville uncovered the bridge over which D. H. Hill and Longstreet were to pass, and they were now crossing to the north side of the Chickahominy. It had not been General Lee's design to attack the right flank of the Federal army in its strong position along Beaver Dam. Jackson's column to the north was intended to turn this position and force the enemy to fall back. But it was now late in the afternoon, and Jackson had not reached a point sufficiently advanced for this purpose. A. P. Hill was directly in the enemy's front, D. H. Hill and Longstreet were crossing the Chickahominy behind him. The Confederate plan of operation must now be apparent to General McClellan. The Confederate leader felt that with two thirds of his army north of the Chickahominy, and but one third holding the lines in front of the city against McClellan's main body, no time must be allowed his adversary to make new dispositions, or to set forward a counter movement against Richmond. He therefore ordered A. P. Hill to make a direct attack on the Federal positions. The brigades of Generals J.

¹ McClellan's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 54.

R. Anderson, Archer, and Field were sent forward along the Mechanicsville turnpike against the position held by the Federal General Reynolds. A severe fight, principally of artillery, followed, the creek separating the combatants and the Confederates not attempting to cross, save on the extreme left, where Colonel Thomas, of Anderson's brigade, established himself on the east side of Beaver Dam and maintained his position until dark. The Federal batteries on the lower road at Ellyson's Mill were active as the Confederates advanced from Mechanicsville, and Pender, with his brigade, was sent to attack them. Ripley's brigade, the advance of D. H. Hill's division, which was just coming on the field, was ordered to reinforce him. These two brigades made a determined attack on Seymour, whose position was only to be approached across a mill-race, a swamp, and abattis, but they were not able to reach his lines, and finally experienced a bloody repulse. The losses suffered in these preliminary attempts, the strength of the Federal position, and the fact that Jackson's approach might at any moment force the enemy to retreat, prevented A. P. Hill from any further efforts to carry the hostile lines by storm. Vigorous firing, however, was kept up until nine o'clock P. M., when the Confederates rested on their arms.¹

The advantage in this first trial of strength between the contending armies was altogether with the Federals, who had maintained their ground with comparatively slight loss, while inflicting a severe one upon the attacking party. But notwithstanding this, the day's operations taken as a whole could not have seemed other than very satisfactory to General Lee. The long, forced march of Jackson to Ashland had consumed half a day more than was expected. He had consequently reached the Central Railroad, his arrival at which point was to be the

¹ General Porter says he had eleven regiments and six batteries engaged. The Union loss by official returns was 361. The Confederates had twenty-one regiments and eight batteries engaged, according to General Porter. According to the *Century History*, the Confederate loss was 1589, exclusive of Field's and Anderson's brigades and of the batteries. (*Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, vol ii. p. 331.) The Confederate loss seems excessive, but the reports are so imperfect that it is difficult to get at the truth.

signal for the movement of the other divisions, five or six hours late, and his march all day, though vigorously pressed, had been impeded to some extent by the enemy's scouting parties, but far more by the unknown character of the country, which was all new to him. He had therefore not reached Beaver Dam Creek in time to dislodge or in conjunction with A. P. Hill to overwhelm McCall. But Jackson was only a few miles off when he bivouacked for the night at Hundley's Corner, and he was so completely in rear of the Federal right wing that it must retire in the morning or be destroyed. Lee's other columns, under the two Hills and Longstreet, had fully carried out their part of the programme, and night found them on the north side of the Chickahominy near Mechanicsville, and ready to sweep down the river on the morrow. Stuart with his cavalry was on Jackson's front and left, guarding against surprise, and gathering information of the enemy. What was still more important, the transfer of the greater part of the Confederate army to positions from which it could easily attack the Federal right wing in the morning had been effected without any attempt at a counter movement by the enemy. Lee had anxiously watched his opponent's movements in front of Richmond. But there had been no renewal of the fighting of the day before. McClellan had not followed up the attack of the 25th, and each hour was putting it more and more out of his power to do so.

The Federal commander, indeed, was not thinking of plans to checkmate his bold opponent, but simply of providing for the safety of his army. Laboring, as he had done from the opening of the campaign, under a singular hallucination, which to his imagination more than doubled the strength of his enemy, as soon as the Confederates developed a purpose to attack he threw himself strictly on the defensive, and spent the day in watching the development of Lee's plans and in preparations to ward off the blow that he saw coming. The advance of Jackson during the 26th in strong force towards his rear, conjoined with the crossing of the Chickahominy on his right by heavy masses of troops, revealed to him the danger that threatened his depot at the White House, and his commu-

nications, as well as Fitz-John Porter's command, which was north of the Chickahominy. McClellan determined to abandon his present line of supplies. He ordered all the supplies forward to his army from the White House that it might be possible to send. Trains were to be kept running on the York River Railroad until it was actually interrupted by the Confederates. Then the base of supplies was to be transferred at once to James River, and everything forwarded up that stream to a point as near the army as practicable.¹ Stores and army trains north of the Chickahominy were ordered to the south of that river; siege guns, and indeed everything not needed in the impending battle, were put on the road toward the James. Fitz-John Porter was directed to take up a curved line covering the heads of the bridges that crossed the Chickahominy, his left flank resting on the river, and the right curved round in rear of Cold Harbor, so as to defend the approaches from the north and northeast, and orders were issued looking to the withdrawal early on the morrow of McCall, and the brigades of Morell which were with him, from Beaver Dam to this line. McClellan did not deem it practicable or advisable to withdraw Porter to the south side of the Chickahominy. There was not time to do so without a sacrifice of material, nor was it probable that the movements to be made in consequence of the change of base to the James could be safely executed if the whole north side of the river was abandoned without a struggle.² Doubtless, too, McClellan believed that 30,000

¹ McClellan's orders to Colonel Ingalls, Quartermaster at the White House, were as follows: "Run the cars to the last moment, and load them with provisions and ammunition. Load every wagon you have with subsistence, and send them to Savage's Station, by way of Bottom's Bridge. If you are obliged to abandon White House, burn everything that you cannot get off. You must throw all our supplies up the James River as soon as possible, and accompany them yourself with all your force. It will be of vast importance to establish our depots on James River without delay if we abandon White House. I will keep you advised of every movement so long as the wires work; after that you must exercise your own judgment." (McClellan's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 53.)

² McClellan's report, *Ib.* p. 55. He says, "It was not advisable at that time, even had it been practicable, to withdraw the 5th corps to

men, the flower of his army, strongly posted and intrenched, would be able to hold their own against any force that Lee might succeed in bringing against them. To insure this, however, he made arrangements to reinforce his right from the south side of the river.¹

Before daylight on the 27th the Federal batteries along Beaver Dam were opened, and a brisk shelling was kept up for some hours. Under cover of this fire the Federal troops were withdrawing gradually to Porter's lines at Gaines's Mill and Cold Harbor. On the Confederate side A. P. Hill and Longstreet replied to the enemy's fire, and advanced their skirmishers to the borders of the stream. D. H. Hill was ordered to advance on the road from Mechanicsville to Bethesda Church, and turn the Federal right flank, while Jackson, having left his camp at Hundley's early in the morning, was moving south to gain their rear. The Federal retreat was orderly. Meade's and Griffin's brigades were first drawn back, then the others, Seymour bringing up the rear. By the time Jackson was fairly across Beaver Dam and D. H. Hill had gained the flank of the line held the evening before, the Federals had abandoned their intrenchments, and, after destroying such property as could not be easily removed, had fallen back, without serious loss, to their new position.

the right bank of the Chickahominy. Such a movement would have exposed the rear of the army, placed us between two fires, and enabled Jackson's fresh troops to interrupt the movement to James River by crossing the Chickahominy in the vicinity of Jones's Bridge before we could reach Malvern Hill with our trains. I determined then to resist Jackson with the 5th corps, reinforced by all our disposable troops, in the new position near the bridgeheads, in order to cover the withdrawal of the trains and heavy guns, and to give time for the arrangements to secure the adoption of the James River as our line of supplies in lieu of the Pamunkey."

¹ McClellan's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 54. "On the 26th, orders were sent to all the corps commanders on the right bank of the Chickahominy to be prepared to send as many troops as they could spare on the following day to the left bank of the river. . . . General Franklin received instructions to hold General Slocum's division in readiness by daybreak of the 27th, and if heavy firing should at that time be heard in the direction of General Porter, to move at once to his assistance without further delay."

CHAPTER XIII.

THE SEVEN DAYS' BATTLES : GAINES'S MILL (COLD HARBOR).

THIS position, in which General McClellan determined that his right wing under Porter should give battle, stretched along the ridge that runs on the east side of the Powhite Creek, from the Chickahominy to the neighborhood of New Cold Harbor, where it curved to the right, passing in rear of Old Cold Harbor. McClellan thus describes the position and the disposition of his troops :¹ —

“The new position of the 5th corps was about an arc of a circle, covering the approaches to the bridges which connected our right wing with the troops on the opposite side of the river.

“Morell's division held the left of the line in a strip of woods on the left bank of the Gaines's Mill stream, resting its left flank on the descent to the Chickahominy, which was swept by our artillery on both sides of the river, and extending into open ground on the right toward New Cold Harbor. In this line General Butterfield's brigade held the extreme left, General Martindale's joined his right, and General Griffin, still farther to the right, joined the left of General Sykes's division, which, partly in woods and partly in open ground, extended in the rear of Cold Harbor.

“Each brigade had in reserve two of its own regiments. McCall's division, having been engaged on the day before, was formed in a second line in the rear of the first, Meade's brigade on the left near the Chickahominy, Reynolds's brigade on the right, covering the approaches from Cold Harbor and Dispatch Station to Sumner's Bridge, and Seymour's in re-

¹ McClellan's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. pp. 55, 56.

serve to the second line still farther in rear. General P. St. George Cooke, with five companies of the 5th regular cavalry, two squadrons of the 1st regular, and three squadrons of the 6th Pennsylvania cavalry (lancers), was posted behind a hill in rear of the position and near the Chickahominy, to aid in watching the left flank and defending the slope to the river.

"The troops were all in position by noon, with the artillery on the commanding ground and in the intervals between the divisions and brigades. Besides the division batteries there were Robertson's and Tidball's horse batteries from the artillery reserve, the latter posted on the right of Sykes's division, and the former on the extreme left of the line in the valley of the Chickahominy."

As soon as it became evident that the Federal troops were withdrawing from Beaver Dam, General Lee had ordered A. P. Hill to follow and attack, while D. H. Hill was directed to unite with Jackson in operating against the flank and rear of the new line. Meantime orders had been given to the Confederate commanders on the south side of the Chickahominy to prevent as far as possible all movement on the part of the Federal troops in their front, by vigorous demonstrations and a display of force.

A. P. Hill crossed Beaver Dam and followed closely the retreating foe.¹ Longstreet on his right was delayed an hour or two by the necessity of repairing a bridge over Beaver Dam Creek before his artillery could be got over, when he, too, pressed on nearer to the Chickahominy. A. P. Hill came up with the Federals at Gaines's Mill about noon. His front brigade (Gregg's) was at once deployed and sent forward. The Federal skirmishers were driven in, and Gregg crossed the stream and formed in line on the east side, preparatory to attacking the Federal lines on the face and crest of the ridge.

¹ At this time Porter dispatched McClellan as follows: "I hope to do without aid, though I request that Franklin, or some other command, be held ready to reinforce me. The enemy are so close that I expect to be hard pressed in front. I hope to have a portion in position to cover the retreat. This is a delicate movement, but . . . I expect to get back and hold the new line." (McClellan's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 55.)

General Hill rapidly moved up his other brigades and formed them in line with Gregg, the brigades extending from left to right in the following order: Gregg on the left, Branch, J. R. Anderson, Field, and on the extreme right, Archer. Pender was held in reserve. A. P. Hill deferred his attack until it was ascertained that Longstreet was within supporting distance on his right. The approach of Jackson and D. H. Hill farther on the left was momentarily expected.

A. P. Hill's division now advanced to the attack. It moved forward gallantly against the centre and left of the Federal position, and a fierce and sanguinary contest ensued, which is thus described by A. P. Hill:¹ "I had delayed the attack until I could hear from General Longstreet, and, this now occurring, the order was given. This was about half past two P. M. Gregg, then Branch, then Anderson, successively, became engaged. The incessant roar of musketry and the deep thunder of the artillery told that the whole force of the enemy was in my front. Branch becoming hard pressed, Pender was sent to his relief. Field and Archer were also directed to do their part in this murderous contest. Braxton's artillery, accompanying Archer, had already opened. They were ordered to turn the enemy's left. These two brigades, under their heroic leaders, moving across the open field, met the enemy behind an abattis and strong intrenchments at the base of a long, wooded hill, the enemy being in three lines on the side of this declivity, its crest falling off into a plateau, and this plateau studded with guns. My front now presented a curved line, its convexity toward the enemy. Desperate but unavailing attempts were made to force the enemy's position. The 14th South Carolina, Colonel McGowen (having hurried up from picket duty on the other side of the Chickahominy, and arriving in the thick of the fight), on the extreme left made several daring charges. The 16th North Carolina, Colonel McElroy, and 22d, Lieutenant-Colonel Gray, at one time carried the crest of the hill, and were in the enemy's camp, but were driven back by overwhelming numbers. The 35th Georgia, Colonel Thomas, also drove through the enemy's

¹ *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part ii. p. 836.

lines like a wedge, but it was of no avail. Gregg and Branch fought with varying success, Gregg having before him the vaunted Zouaves and Sykes's regulars. Pender's brigade was suffering heavily, but stubbornly held its own. Field and Archer met a withering storm of bullets, but pressed on to within a short distance of the enemy's works, but the storm was too fierce for such a handful of men. They recoiled and were again pressed to the charge, but with no better success. These brave men had done all that any brave soldiers could do. Directing the men to lie down, the fight was continued and help awaited. From having been the attacking I now became the attacked, but stubbornly, gallantly was the ground held. My division was thus engaged full two hours before assistance was received."

At the beginning of A. P. Hill's attack, Porter had asked for reinforcements, and McClellan ordered Slocum's division, which was near at hand on the other side of the Chickahominy, to his assistance. Slocum reached the field by 3.30 P. M.,¹ and was at once thrown into the fight, where he contributed to the repulse of Hill. Urgent orders were sent later in the afternoon to the other Federal commanders south of the Chickahominy for additional aid.

Meantime Lee, who in person directed the Confederates, saw Hill's division suffering heavily in the unequal contest, while as yet Jackson had not struck the enemy's right. He therefore sent orders to Longstreet, who was near at hand, to make a diversion against the Federal left near the river. Longstreet thus describes his position and the movements of his troops upon the receipt of this order:²—

"In front of me the enemy occupied the wooded slope of Turkey Hill, the crest of which is fifty or sixty feet higher than the plain over which my troops must pass to make an attack.

¹ McClellan's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 56. At this time Porter had from 20,000 to 25,000 men. A. P. Hill, whose division so far was the only one engaged, numbered less than 13,000. Porter says he had in all 30,000 fighting men (*Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, vol. ii. p. 337), in which he no doubt includes Slocum, who had not yet joined him.

² *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part ii. p. 757.

The plain is about a quarter of a mile wide; the farther side of it was occupied by sharpshooters. Above these, and on the slope of the hill, was a line of infantry behind trees felled so as to form a good breastwork. The crest of the hill, some forty feet above the last line, was strengthened by rifle-trenches, and occupied by infantry and artillery. In addition to this the plain was enfiladed by batteries on the other side of the Chickahominy. I was, in fact, in the position from which the enemy wished us to attack him.

"The attack was begun by Major-General A. P. Hill's division. My troops were drawn up in lines, massed behind the crest of a hill, and behind a small wood, three brigades in each position, and held in readiness as the reserve. We had not been in position long, however, before I received an urgent message from the commanding general to make a diversion in favor of the attacking columns. The three brigades, under Wilcox, were at once ordered forward against the enemy's left flank with this view. Pickett's brigade, making a diversion on the left of these brigades, developed the strong position and force of the enemy in my front, and I found that I must drive him by direct assault, or abandon the idea of making the diversion. From the urgent nature of the message from the commanding general, and my own peculiar position, I determined to change the feint into an attack, and orders for a general advance were issued. General R. H. Anderson's brigade was divided, part supporting Pickett's in the direct assault, and the other portions guarding the right flank of the brigades under Wilcox.

"At this moment, General Whiting arrived with his division, put it into position at once, and joined in the assault. The opportune arrival of this division occupied the entire field and enabled me to hold in reserve my rear brigade (Kemper's). Our gallant officers and men were moved forward in the face of three lines of infantry fire, supported by batteries from both sides of the Chickahominy. The troops, moving steadily on under this terrible fire, drove the enemy from his positions, one after another, took his batteries, and finally drove him into the swamps of the Chickahominy."

While A. P. Hill and Longstreet had been closely following the retiring Federals from Beaver Dam during the forenoon, Jackson had been making his way by a considerable circuit to the position assigned him. As on the day before, the obstructions offered by the enemy, but still more the want of familiarity with this difficult country, retarded his progress. He had found the direct road from the left of the Federal position on Beaver Dam to Cold Harbor obstructed and defended by sharpshooters, and to save time had gone back into the Bethesda Church road. This threw him in rear of D. H. Hill, and it was past midday when these commanders reached the vicinity of Cold Harbor. Here the Confederates found the Federal right strongly posted beyond a swampy creek. Jackson was unacquainted with the ground, he was on the flank and rear of the enemy if they should retreat towards the Pamunkey, and, not yet suspecting McClellan's contemplated change of base, this was the line of retreat he expected them to take. He says :¹ —

“Soon after, General A. P. Hill became engaged, and being unacquainted with the ground, and apprehensive, from what appeared to me to be the respective positions of the Confederate and Federal forces engaged, that if I then pressed forward, our troops would be mistaken for the enemy and fired into, and hoping that Generals A. P. Hill and Longstreet would soon drive the Federals towards me, I directed General D. H. Hill to move his division to the left of the road, so as to leave between him and the woods on the right of the road an open space, across which I hoped the enemy would be driven.

“Thus arranged, it was in our power to distinguish friend from foe in case the enemy should be driven as expected. Major-General Stuart, who had been covering my left with his cavalry, was also posted so as to charge, should the Federals attempt a retreat to the Pamunkey by Cold Harbor.

“But, it soon becoming apparent from the direction and sound of the firing, that General A. P. Hill was hard pressed, I ordered a general advance of my entire corps, which commenced with D. H. Hill upon my left, and extended to the

¹ *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part ii. p. 553.

right through Ewell's, Jackson's, and Whiting's divisions, posted from left to right in the order named."

Whiting's division, as above stated, joined Longstreet in his attack on the Federal left, and now an assault was made along the Federal line at the same time by Longstreet, A. P. Hill, and Jackson. It was between four and five o'clock. For two hours or more the struggle was severe and bloody. Longstreet, aided by Whiting's division of Jackson's command, moved forward steadily under the terrific fire, and, in spite of the heavy depletion of his ranks, forced the enemy to yield. Whiting, in conjunction with Pickett's brigade of Longstreet, charged over part of the ground where the Federals had checked the assault of A. P. Hill earlier in the afternoon, and carried all before him; and though his brigade commanders, Hood and Law, left 1000 of their brave men on the field, they crushed and broke the Federal lines in their front, and held as trophies of victory fourteen pieces of artillery. Wilcox, with the three brigades of Longstreet farthest to the Confederate right, after a fierce and bloody struggle, pressed back and routed the extreme left of McClellan's forces. On the Confederate left, Jackson threw the divisions of D. H. Hill and Ewell against the Federal right and centre, and dividing the troops of his own old division¹ sent them in wherever needed. D. H. Hill pressed in the Federal right in spite of the wood and marsh and tangled undergrowth and abattis which separated him from the enemy's lines, while Ewell made a bold attack on the enemy's centre, and maintained a fierce conflict for two hours on equal terms with Sykes's regulars, until the arrival of Lawton's brigade turned the scale in his favor. Lee continued to urge his subordinates to press forward on every part of the line. Near dusk a vigorous and simultaneous assault was made. D. H. Hill, aided by Winder with his brigade, made a final charge, and carried all on the right of the Federal line not heretofore taken.² Ewell, reinforced by Lawton, drove back the centre,

¹ Jackson's old division comprised the brigades of Winder, Taliaferro, and Jones; and Winder as senior brigadier commanded it.

² General D. H. Hill says: "Confederate troops upon our right (subsequently discovered to be Winder's and Lawton's brigades) were advancing

taking artillery and prisoners. Whiting and Longstreet had already carried the Federal left. In confusion the Federal troops were being forced to the edge of the plateau nearest the Chickahominy. Another hour of daylight, and it is hard to see how Porter could have saved any considerable part of his corps.

McClellan had been making efforts all the afternoon to strengthen Porter. He first sent Slocum's division, which reached the field about 3.30 P. M. He subsequently ordered Meagher's brigade, and three regiments of French's brigade from Sumner's corps, to the north side of the Chickahominy, and appealed to his other corps commanders for every man they could spare. But so efficiently had Lee's orders to Magruder and Huger, to hold the enemy in their front by demonstrations and a display of force on the Richmond side, been carried out, that none of the Federal commanders thought it safe to spare any more troops to aid Porter.¹ Meagher and French, across the plain to attack them. I found Generals Anderson and Garland discussing, with great enthusiasm, the propriety of attacking the Yankees in flank with their two brigades, while Lawton and Winder attacked in front. The only objection to the movement was that a Yankee battery on our extreme left could enfilade our line on its advance. Garland observed: 'I don't think it can do much harm, and I am willing to risk it.' Anderson replied in the same spirit, and I ordered an advance of the whole division. . . . The enemy broke and retreated; made a second stand, which induced my immediate command to halt under cover of the roadside and return their fire, when, charging forward again, we broke and scattered them in every direction." (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part ii. p. 625.)

¹ The following is from McClellan's report: "At fifteen minutes past five P. M., the following was received from General Franklin: 'I do not think it prudent to take any more troops from here at present.' General Sumner replied as follows: 'If the General desires to trust the defense of my position to my front line alone, I can send French with three regiments, and Meagher with his brigade, to the right; everything is so uncertain, that I think it would be hazardous to do it.' These two brigades were sent to reinforce General Porter, as has been observed. At twenty-five minutes past five P. M., I sent the following to General Franklin: 'Porter is hard pressed; it is not a question of prudence, but of possibilities. Can you possibly maintain your position until dark with two brigades? I have ordered eight regiments of Sumner's to support Porter; one brigade of Couch's to this place; Heintzelman's reserve to go in rear of Sumner. If

however, crossed over, about dusk, and "advanced boldly to the front, and by their example as well as by the steadiness of their bearing reanimated the Federal troops, and warned the Confederates that reinforcements had arrived."¹ The growing darkness and the shouts of the fresh troops indicating the arrival of reinforcements caused the Confederates to halt. General D. H. Hill, whose division was in the advance, did not think it prudent to push on to an attack upon fresh troops in the night and in an unknown and densely wooded country.²

The victory of the Confederates was thorough. For five hours the very flower of the Federal army had fought gallantly and stubbornly to hold their ground, but they had yielded at last to the impetuous valor and superior numbers of their assailants, and, beaten at every point, had been driven at nightfall, in large part a disordered mass, towards the bridges, by which it was alone possible for them to reach the south side of the Chickahominy. The arrival of Meagher's and French's brigades at the supreme moment had given them a respite, and behind this cover the well-disciplined troops of Porter were

possible send a brigade to support Porter. It should follow the regiments ordered from Sumner.' " (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 59.)

¹ McClellan's report, *Ib.* part i. p. 57. In regard to the latter part of the day he says: "The enemy, already repulsed several times with terrible slaughter, and hearing the shouts of the fresh troops, failed to follow up their advantage. This gave an opportunity to rally our men behind the brigades of French and Meagher, and they again advanced up the hill ready to repulse another attack. During the night our thin and exhausted regiments were all withdrawn in safety, and by the following morning all had reached the other side of the stream." (*Ib.* p. 57.)

² General D. H. Hill says: "It was now fairly dark, and hearing loud cheers from the Yankees in our immediate front, some two hundred yards distant, I ordered our whole advance to halt and wait the expected attack of the enemy. Brigadier-General Winder, occupying the road to Grape Vine Bridge, immediately halted, and the whole advance columns were halted also. The cheering, as we afterwards learned, was caused by the appearance of the Irish brigade (Meagher's) to cover the retreat. A vigorous attack upon it might have resulted in the total rout of the Yankee army and the capture of thousands of prisoners. But I was unwilling to leave the elevated plateau around Magee's house, to advance in the dark, along an unknown road, skirted by dense woods, in the possession of the Yankee troops." (*Ib.* part ii. p. 626.)

in some sort reformed. But the condition of affairs called for prompt action on the part of the Federal commander. One third of his army had been driven from a well-selected and strongly protected position with heavy loss of men and material.¹ His communications with the Pamunkey were at the mercy of his foe. It was hardly possible to retrieve Porter's defeat by attacking Lee on the north side of the Chickahominy on the morrow. Besides, McClellan must now look to the James River for his new base of supplies. He therefore did the wisest thing left to him. He withdrew Porter's shattered forces during the night to the south side of the river, and thus reunited his army, while that of his antagonist was divided by the Chickahominy. The Confederates rested on the field. Hundreds were busy all night long in gathering up from wood and clearing, from morass and thicket, their wounded comrades. The others lay down, where darkness found them, to rest through the short hours of the summer night. When the Confederates advanced in the morning it was to see the last of the Federal troops disappearing, and the bridges on fire under the protection of the enemy's guns on the south side.

¹ The Comte de Paris places McClellan's losses at twenty-two guns and 7000 men killed and wounded. *History of the Civil War in America*, vol. ii. p. 104. See, also, McClellan's report. Union loss by official reports: 894 killed, 3107 wounded, 2836 missing; total 6837. Confederate loss (excepting A. P. Hill and Longstreet): 589 killed, 2671 wounded, 24 missing; total 3284. The losses of A. P. Hill and Longstreet may have increased this to 6000. (*Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, vol. ii. p. 342.)

CHAPTER XIV.

THE SEVEN DAYS' BATTLES : MCCLELLAN RETREATS TO THE JAMES.

MCCLELLAN called his corps commanders about him on the night of the 27th, and discussed future operations. It is impossible to deny that the Federal commander had committed grievous mistakes in the conduct of his campaign, so far. At the beginning of it he had allowed a handful of men to hold him at bay at Yorktown until the Confederates could gather in force in his front. His forward movement had then been without vigor, and after reaching the Chickahominy it had been characterized by a caution which degenerated into timidity. That he placed his army astride the Chickahominy and its treacherous swamps was perhaps unavoidable, but not so his remaining for many weeks in a position which invited attack, first on one flank and then on the other. The bloody but indecisive action of Seven Pines or Fair Oaks did not induce him to change his dispositions. He was ever preparing but never ready to move forward to attack his adversary. Stuart's raid at the middle of June showed the exposed character of his communications, and foreshadowed the attack on his right flank, but, though then realizing the necessity of a change of base to the James River, he had taken no steps to effect it. Not until Jackson was at hand, and he was forced to do it, had he looked in earnest to the James River as his avenue of supply. To cover the beginnings of his movement he had found it necessary to fight a pitched battle with one third of his army against two thirds of his adversary's forces, and, while Porter's corps was being crushed on the north side of the Chickahominy, 70,000 Federal troops within sound of the battle, on the south side, were held idly in their intrenchments by 30,000 Confederates.

Timely reinforcements to Porter, or a vigorous advance of the main body on Richmond during Porter's fight, might have changed the result. But it was now too late. An advance on the morrow on Richmond with Lee's victorious forces on his flank promised nothing but disaster. To recross the Chickahominy and retreat down the Peninsula was to give up the contest, when as yet two thirds of his troops had not been engaged. It was, in addition, an operation of difficulty and danger, as it must be done in the face of his enemy, who was already on the left bank of that stream. Whatever his previous mistakes, McClellan's decision now to retreat to the James across White Oak swamp on the north side of the Chickahominy was judicious. He selected the best of the alternatives within his reach.

To cover the movement of his immense trains towards the James River, McClellan disposed his troops for the 28th as follows: "Porter's corps,¹ after crossing the Chickahominy, occupied the line of heights which command the course of this river on the right bank. Turned toward the north, these troops faced the hills where their adversaries of the day previous were posted. Slocum's division had taken post on their left, adjoining that of Smith, which with it formed Franklin's corps, and which was posted among the earthworks of Golding. The rest of the line of intrenchments facing Richmond was occupied by four divisions, disposed as follows from right to left: Richardson, who had just been joined by the two brigades sent to Gaines's Mill, then Sedgwick, both under the orders of Sumner; farther on, Hooker and Kearny, composing Heintzelman's corps; at the extreme left, Keyes, with the divisions of Couch and Peck, guarding the passes of White Oak swamp."

Keyes's corps was ordered to move across White Oak swamp, and to take position on the south side of the stream to cover the passage of the other troops and trains.² This was effected by midday on the 28th. All day the enormous train of the army was urged forward through the narrow defile by which alone it could cross White Oak swamp.³

¹ See Comte de Paris, *History of the Civil War in America*, vol. ii. p. 109.

² McClellan's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 60.

³ McClellan says: "Before daybreak of the 28th I went to Savage's Sta-

The movement adopted by McClellan and the vast and impenetrable forest and jungle under cover of which it was being executed secured the Federal army a day's breathing time, for it cost General Lee the whole of the 28th to discover his enemy's intentions. On the morning of that day, the Confederate leader found the Union troops in strong force on the opposite side of the Chickahominy, commanding with their artillery the bridges which they had destroyed in retreating. It was not possible, therefore, to follow directly on Porter's rear. Lee had not yet divined McClellan's intention to abandon his communications with the Pamunkey, and his depots and stores along that line, without further struggle. The cavalry under Stuart, and Ewell's division, were therefore sent to seize the York River Railroad, and develop the enemy's intentions in that direction, while Magruder and Huger were directed to observe the Federal troops in their front on the Richmond side with the utmost vigilance, and to follow up promptly any movements in retreat. Stuart and Ewell struck the railroad at Dispatch Station, whence the small guard quickly fled to the south side of the Chickahominy, burning the railroad bridge over that stream behind them, and thus effectually severing McClellan's communications with the White House. Ewell remained for the night at this point, and next day was sent lower down, to Bottom's Bridge, to prevent a crossing at that point. Stuart, on the other hand, as soon as the railroad, telegraph, and stores at Dispatch Station had been destroyed, turned down the railroad toward the White House, capturing wagons and prisoners, until he reached Tunstall's Station. Here he passed the night. The sky was illumined in his front by the

tion, and remained there during the day and night, directing the withdrawal of the trains and supplies of the army.

"Orders were given to the different commanders to load their wagons with ammunition and provisions, and the necessary baggage of the officers and men, and to destroy all property which could not be transported with the army.

"Orders were also given to leave with those of the sick and wounded who could not be transported a proper complement of surgeons and attendants, with a bountiful supply of rations and medical stores." (McClellan's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 60.)

immense destruction of stores at the White House by Generals Casey and Stoneman, preparatory to its evacuation. On the 29th, Stuart marched to the White House, drove off a gunboat that lay in the river, which was the only force left to oppose him, and, having fully supplied his command from the stores yet untouched, completed the destruction of Federal property there which had been left unfinished by Stoneman.¹ This accomplished, Stuart returned to the lower Chickahominy on General Ewell's left.

Meantime, on the Richmond side the hostile lines remained without material change all day. The mass of the Federal army still manned their works in front of Magruder and Huger, and interposed an obstacle to an advance too great to be overcome by the comparatively small forces of the two Confederate divisions. Behind the Federal lines, under cover of the wilderness, the trains of the Union army were hurrying across White Oak swamp. Fitz-John Porter's corps was sent with them to aid Keyes in covering the roads which led from Richmond to the flank of the Federal line of march. He was followed by McCall's division during the night. The only movement on this part of the Confederate line was an attack on the Federals at Golding's farm, as General Franklin was withdrawing a part of his troops from that position. This attack was made by order of General Toombs, and in consequence of some confusion of orders only two regiments of G. T. Anderson's brigade were engaged in it. They advanced gallantly, but were soon forced to retire. General Magruder countermanded the order to attack as soon as informed of it.²

¹ General Stuart says in his report: "Provisions and delicacies of every description lay in heaps, and the men regaled themselves on the fruits of the tropics, as well as the substantials of the land. Large quantities of forage were left also. . . . Nine large barges, loaded with stores, were on fire as we approached; immense numbers of tents, wagons, and cars, in long trains, loaded, and five locomotives; a number of forges; quantities of every species of quartermaster's stores and property, making a total of many millions of dollars — and all more or less destroyed." (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part ii. p. 517.) Lee says the amount of property rescued included more than ten thousand stand of small arms.

² See reports of Magruder (*Ib.* p. 661), G. T. Anderson (*Ib.* p. 706), and McClellan (*Ib.* part i. pp. 60, 61). General Franklin says this attack

General Lee thus describes the Confederate operations on the 28th :¹ " During the forenoon, columns of dust, south of the Chickahominy, showed that the Federal army was in motion. The abandonment of the railroad and the destruction of the bridge proved that no further attempt would be made to hold that line. But from the position it occupied, the roads, which led towards James River, would also enable it to reach the lower bridges over the Chickahominy, and retreat down the Peninsula. In the latter event, it was necessary that our troops should continue on the north bank of the river, and until the intention of General McClellan was discovered it was deemed injudicious to change their disposition. Ewell was therefore ordered to proceed to Bottom's Bridge to guard that point, and the cavalry to watch the bridges below. No certain indications of a retreat to the James River were discovered by our forces on the south side of the Chickahominy, and late in the afternoon the enemy's works were reported to be fully manned. The strength of these fortifications prevented Generals Huger and Magruder from discovering what was passing in their front. Below the enemy's works, the country was densely wooded, and intersected by impassable swamps, at once concealing his movements and precluding reconnoissances except by the regular roads, all of which were strongly guarded. The bridges over the Chickahominy, in rear of the enemy, were destroyed, and their reconstruction impracticable in the presence of his whole army and powerful batteries. We were, therefore, compelled to wait until his purpose should be developed. Generals Huger and Magruder were again directed to use the utmost vigilance, and pursue the enemy vigorously should they discover that he was retreating. During the afternoon and night of the 28th the signs of a general movement were apparent, and no indications of his approach to the lower

was made upon the 49th Pennsylvania and 33d New York, the rear of Smith's division, by the 7th and 8th Georgia, and that Colonels Lamar and Towers and 50 men of the Georgia regiments were captured, and 100 killed and wounded. (*Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, vol. ii. p. 369.)

¹ *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 493.

bridges of the Chickahominy having been discovered by the pickets in observation at those points, it became manifest that General McClellan was retreating to the James River."

The movement of Porter and McCall across White Oak swamp was completed on the night of the 28th, and the morning of Sunday, the 29th, found their troops with Keyes's corps on the south side of that stream. "During the same night the corps of Sumner and Heintzelman, and the division of Smith,¹ were ordered to an interior line, the left resting on Keyes's old intrenchments, and curving to the right, so as to cover Savage's Station. General Slocum's division of Franklin's corps was ordered to Savage's Station, in reserve. They were ordered to hold this position until dark of the 29th, in order to cover the withdrawal of the trains, and then to fall back across the swamp and unite with the remainder of the army. . . . The headquarters camp at Savage's Station was broken up early on the morning of the 29th and moved across White Oak swamp."²

Early on the morning of the 29th, Slocum was ordered to cross White Oak swamp³ and relieve Keyes, who was then instructed "to move to James River and occupy a defensive position near Malvern Hill to secure the extreme left flank of the Federal army. General Porter was ordered to follow him and prolong the line towards the Federal right. The trains were to be pushed on towards James River in rear of these corps, and placed under the protection of the gunboats as they arrived."⁴ Such were the Federal dispositions for the 29th.

¹ Of Franklin's corps.

² McClellan's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. i. part i. p. 61.

³ General Frauklin says, because it "had suffered so severely in the battle of Gaines's Mill, and had not yet recovered from its exhaustion." (*Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, vol. ii. p. 370.)

⁴ McClellan's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 62.

CHAPTER XV.

THE SEVEN DAYS' BATTLES : SAVAGE'S STATION.

GENERAL LEE, having ascertained by the night of the 28th the direction in which the Federal army was moving, ordered Longstreet and A. P. Hill to recross the Chickahominy early on the 29th on the New Bridge, and move by the Darbytown road to the Long Bridge road with the purpose of striking the flank of the retreating army. By sunrise of this day it was discovered that McClellan had evacuated his lines near the Chickahominy, and in consequence Huger and Magruder were immediately ordered in pursuit, the former by the Charles City road and the latter by the Williamsburg road. Jackson was directed to cross at Grape Vine Bridge, and move down the south side of the Chickahominy. Jackson was delayed the greater part of that day (29th) by the necessity of rebuilding the bridge which had been partially destroyed by the retreating Federals. Magruder put his division in motion on both sides of and perpendicular to the York River Railroad, advancing towards Savage's Station. D. R. Jones's division of two brigades constituted his left, Magruder's own division of two brigades the centre, and McLaws's division, also of two brigades, the right. The latter advanced between the railroad and the Williamsburg road. D. R. Jones first came up with the enemy (Sumner's corps), and a brisk skirmish was maintained for some time.¹ Jones, finding himself in advance of the remainder of Magruder's forces, and unsupported by Jackson on his left, did not attempt to press the Federal rear-guard, which shortly after noon withdrew to Savage's Station.

¹ The skirmish was at Allen's farm, where Sumner had halted on his way from Fair Oaks to Savage's Station. This fight is also called by the name of Peach Orchard.

Magruder continued to advance with his whole force towards Savage's Station, but being without Jackson's support on his left, and resting under a misapprehension in regard to Huger's orders on his right, his movements were very slow. Semmes's brigade was transferred to the Williamsburg road, and the remainder of his troops advanced in the order already given. It was late in the afternoon before he gave the order to attack. The Federal skirmishers were driven in, and when the main Federal position was reached near Savage's Station, McLaws's division at once went gallantly forward.

The Federal troops in front of Magruder consisted now of Sumner's corps and of Smith's division of Franklin's corps. Heintzelman's corps, which had been on Sumner's left, had been ordered by General McClellan to remain with Sumner and Franklin until nightfall, to cover the movement of trains from Savage's Station and complete the destruction of abandoned property. But General Heintzelman, thinking his right flank exposed by Sumner's movement,¹ and deeming the mass of troops which were crowding in some disorder about Savage's Station more than could be used at that point effectively,² had moved in the afternoon toward White Oak swamp. He crossed it at Brackett's ford, which is a short distance above the bridge at which the trains and other troops were passing. Sumner, surprised to find Heintzelman gone, had posted Sedgwick's division perpendicular to the railroad and extending to the Williamsburg road, while he placed Richardson on Sedgwick's right along the railroad and facing north. As soon as the Confederate attack was made, Smith's division, which was in reserve, was ordered up, and Brooks's brigade was sent to reinforce the extreme left on the Williamsburg road, while Hancock and Davidson were placed on the Federal right and rear. The Federal batteries engaged were Hazzard's, Pettit's, and Osborn's. It was after five P. M. when McLaws moved to the attack, and from this time until night a vigorous and hotly contested fight took place on the Williamsburg road. Kershaw's South Carolina brigade, with

¹ When Sumner had drawn back to the vicinity of Savage's Station.

² Heintzelman's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part ii. p. 99.

Kemper's and part of Hart's batteries, attacked between the railroad and the Williamsburg road. Besides the batteries mentioned, Kershaw had a 32-pounder rifled gun under Lieutenant Barry, which was mounted on a car on the railroad and pushed forward into action. This gun was protected by a sloping roof of iron plates. Kershaw succeeded in piercing the enemy's centre and producing some confusion.¹ It was at this time that Brooks's Federal brigade was thrown into the fight, and, advancing along the Williamsburg road and to the south of it, checked Kershaw's advance. McLaws then ordered General Semmes to meet this new danger. Semmes, with three regiments² of his brigade, in turn checked the advance of Brooks, and thus covered the flank of Kershaw. Later, two regiments of Barksdale's brigade³ were sent to reinforce the Confederates, but though the battle was kept up till dark no advantage was gained by either party. While McLaws was thus struggling to overthrow a greatly superior force, the other and greater part of General Magruder's troops was not engaged. General D. R. Jones's division was recalled when about to attack the Federal right, and all of Magruder's own division except two regiments was kept in reserve.

Jackson had been delayed all day by the necessity of reconstructing the bridge by which he was to cross to the south side of the Chickahominy. This fact, together with Magruder's failure to use the greater part of the troops he had at hand in the attack on Sumner, enabled the Federal commander to hold his ground until night, and thus to effect the object he had in view, namely, the withdrawal of the last of his trains from Savage's Station, and the retreat of the rear of his army under cover of the darkness. Had Jackson been able to reach the field, or had Magruder thrown his whole strength on the Federals, more important results might have followed.

¹ It was Burns's brigade that Kershaw first met. He broke through its centre, wounding General Burns. Burns was reinforced on his left by Brooks, and then Dana and Gorman supported the remainder of his line. (*Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, vol. ii. p. 374.)

² 10th Georgia, 32d Virginia, 5th Louisiana.

³ 17th and 21st Mississippi.

While these events were taking place along Magruder's front, Huger moved down the Charles City road. Two of his brigades, at one time in the day, were recalled to assist Magruder, who called for reinforcements to resist an aggressive movement which he apprehended from the enemy in his front, but it being soon found that there was no danger of this, these brigades returned to the Charles City road. Huger advanced cautiously until he met the Federal pickets on his left, and then halted for the night. Longstreet, in command of his own and A. P. Hill's divisions, had crossed to the south side of the Chickahominy at New Bridge in the morning, and crossing the Nine Mile road, the York River Railroad, and the Williamsburg and the Charles City roads to the Darbytown or Central road, had moved down the latter to Atlee's farm, where he encamped for the night after a march of about twelve miles. General Holmes, at Drewry's Bluff, was ordered to cross to the north side of the James to be ready to move on the morrow along the River road towards Malvern Hill.

Thus, at nightfall on Sunday the 29th, Jackson's divisions were still on the north side of the Chickahominy, Ewell's division near Bottom's Bridge, and the others at Grape Vine (or Alexander's) Bridge, which they were just beginning to cross; Magruder was in front of the Federal lines at Savage's Station; Huger at Brightwell's, where a road from the north side of the White Oak swamp intersected the Charles City road; Longstreet and A. P. Hill were on the Darbytown road at Atlee's, and Holmes on the north side of the James at Drewry's Bluff. General Lee's design was to close in as rapidly as possible on the rear and flank of the retreating enemy, and, by throwing his whole force on McClellan's army, already staggered as it was by Porter's defeat and still more demoralized by a hurried retreat and an immense destruction of stores, to deal it a decisive blow. For this purpose all his lieutenants were ordered to press the enemy on the morrow.

General McClellan, on the other hand, having held his lines about Savage's Station until night, and having sent off all the stores for which he had transportation, ordered the destruction of those that were left and the abandonment of the hospitals,

containing 2500 sick, and directed Sumner to fall back and place White Oak swamp between himself and his pursuers before morning. This was accomplished early on the 30th, and the bridge by which he crossed the swamp was destroyed.¹ Franklin, with his own corps and Richardson's division and Naglee's brigade in addition, was directed to hold the passage of White Oak swamp; Keyes and Porter were ordered to take position perpendicular to the James River near Turkey Bend, while the remainder of the Federal army was placed between these two extremes so as to cover the various roads which led from Richmond across the route by which its trains were moving.²

¹ McClellan's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 65. McClellan says (*Ib.* p. 64) all was over by five A. M. General Franklin says it was ten A. M. when the rear-guard passed. (*Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, vol. ii. p. 375.)

² McClellan's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. ii. part i. p. 64.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE SEVEN DAYS' BATTLES: FRAZIER'S FARM.

EARLY on the morning of the 30th of June, Jackson, who had crossed the Chickahominy during the night, advanced to Savage's Station, and then followed up the retreating army to White Oak swamp. The immense quantity of burning stores, the number of sick abandoned in hospital, the dead and wounded left on the field, and the number of stragglers that fell into the hands of the pursuers, all indicated the hurried retreat of the Federals.¹ Jackson reached White Oak swamp soon after midday, but here his progress was stayed by the strong force with which the enemy held the opposite side and vigorously resisted all attempts to reconstruct the bridge. Magruder was ordered to make a *détour* to the right and enter the Darbytown road. He reached Timberlake's store on that road about two P. M., after a march of twelve miles. Later in the afternoon he was sent forward to unite with Holmes in attacking the enemy at Malvern Hill, but reached the point indicated too late for this purpose. General Holmes had advanced early on the morning of the 30th as far as New Market, where part of Wise's brigade joined him, thus raising his force to some 6000 effective men and six batteries. He then moved on towards Malvern until he came upon the Federal lines between West's house and Malvern Hill, when after some hours delay he opened fire with his batteries and sent forward part of Wise's brigade. Porter had at hand only Warren's brigade and the 11th United States infantry, some

¹ General Lee's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part ii. p. 495. D. H. Hill says, "We picked up about a thousand prisoners, and so many arms that I detached the 4th and 5th North Carolina regiments to take charge of them both." (*Ib.* p. 627.)

1500 in all, but there was abundance of artillery. Thirty-six guns were at once turned upon Holmes, and the gunboats in the river were also directed to open fire from their large pieces. The heavy fire from the gunboats on his flank and the superior artillery in his front soon forced Holmes to retire, with the loss of two guns. His loss in men was but fifty-one killed and wounded. He made no further attempt on the enemy's lines.¹

While the two wings of the Confederate army were thus held at bay, the one by Franklin at White Oak swamp and the other by Fitz-John Porter at Malvern Hill, the centre was advancing in two columns against the centre of the Federal army, with the design, if possible, of cutting it in two and of interrupting its line of retreat to the James River. One of these columns, under Huger, of about 8000 or 9000 men, was moving along the Charles City road, the other, under Longstreet, of less than 20,000 men,² was advancing on the Darbytown road.³

The centre of the Federal army, numbering over 40,000 men,⁴ consisting of Slocum's division of Franklin's corps, of

¹ McClellan says of this affair: "The enemy began to appear in General Porter's front, and at five o'clock advanced in large force against his left flank, posting artillery under cover of a skirt of timber, with a view to engage our force on Malvern Hill, while with his infantry and some artillery he attacked Colonel Warren's brigade. A concentrated fire of about thirty guns was brought to bear on the enemy, which, with the infantry fire of Colonel Warren's command, compelled him to retreat, leaving two guns in the hands of Colonel Warren. The gunboats rendered most efficient aid at this time, and helped to drive back the enemy." (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 67.)

² Huger's strength at the beginning of the contest was 8930, that of Longstreet's division, 9051, and of A. P. Hill's division, 13,000. These last two divisions had suffered severely on the 26th and 27th, and were certainly less than 20,000 strong on the 30th.

³ The Darbytown and New Market roads unite a short distance from their junction with the Charles City road, and so the road on which Longstreet was marching is often called the New Market road.

⁴ Heintzelman's strength "present for duty" June 20 was 18,810, Sumner's, 17,581, Franklin's, 19,405, McCall's, 9514. One half of Sumner's and Franklin's corps were on this part of the field. Slocum had lost nearly 2000 men on the 27th (Franklin's testimony), and Sumner had suf-

Heintzelman's whole corps, of Sedgwick's division of Sumner's corps, and of McCall's division, was placed a short distance in front of the intersection of these two roads in such a way as to cover the Quaker road, by which the Federal trains were moving towards the James River. Slocum's division was north of and perpendicular to the Charles City road, his left resting on that road. Kearny's division of Heintzelman's corps joined Slocum and extended the line southward. Next came McCall's division immediately in front of the intersection of the Charles City and Darbytown roads and somewhat advanced, and then Sumner with Sedgwick's division thrown back, and last, on the left, Hooker's division of Heintzelman's corps. Huger's line of march brought him therefore against Slocum and Kearny, while Longstreet was opposed by McCall.

General Lee's design was that Jackson, who had over 20,000 men,¹ should attack simultaneously with Huger and Longstreet. The route of Jackson across White Oak swamp would have brought him in rear of the position held by McCall and the other Federal generals supporting him, and it was hoped that by a combined and vigorous attack the Federal army might be cut in twain, and the rearmost portion of it overwhelmed. But the admirable cover afforded by the White Oak swamp to the retreating army, and the skillful way in which Franklin availed himself of it, baffled Jackson, and defeated the execution of this part of Lee's plan. General Franklin, who commanded the Federal rear-guard, consisting of Smith's and Richardson's divisions and of Naglee's brigade, composing about 20,000 men,² had reached the south

fered considerable loss at Savage's Station. McCall says his division had been diminished, by losses on the 26th and 27th, to less than 6000 men. Heintzelman, however, had not been seriously engaged. Putting Heintzelman at 18,800, Slocum's division at 7500, Sedgwick's at 8000, and McCall's at 6000, we have 40,300.

¹ The forces with Jackson at the beginning of the Seven Days' Battles were Jackson's and Ewell's divisions, 8000, Whiting's, 4000, Lawton's, 3500, and D. H. Hill's, 10,000. These commands had suffered severely on the 27th.

² Smith's and Richardson's divisions were half of the corps of Franklin

side of White Oak swamp in the morning, and, having destroyed the bridge, had disposed his artillery and troops under cover of the forest, so as to command the crossing. The course of this stream presents an impassable quagmire except at the few points where roads cross it on rough causeways. It is lined, too, with a dense forest, affording excellent cover for sharpshooters. General Jackson reached the swamp about midday, and took steps at once to force a passage. He says: ¹

"We found the bridge destroyed, and the ordinary place of crossing commanded by their batteries on the other side, and all approach to it barred by detachments of sharpshooters concealed in a dense wood close by. A battery of twenty-eight guns from Hill's and Whiting's artillery was placed by Colonel S. Crutchfield in a favorable position for driving off or silencing the opposing artillery.

"About two P. M. it suddenly opened upon the enemy. He fired a few shots in reply, and then withdrew from that position, abandoning part of his artillery. Captain Wooding was immediately ordered near the bridge to shell the sharpshooters from the woods, which was accomplished, and Munford's cavalry crossed the creek, but was soon compelled to retire. It was soon seen that the enemy occupied such a position beyond a thick intervening wood on the right of the road as enabled him to command the crossing. Captain Wooding's battery was consequently recalled, and our batteries turned in the new direction. The fire so opened on both sides was kept up until dark. We bivouacked that night near the swamp."

There were some small clearings on the south side of the swamp, just behind the timber that lined the creek, and in them were packed a mass of wagons and Tyler's heavy artil-

and Sumner respectively, and numbered some 18,000 men at the beginning of the contest. In addition to Naglee's brigade, two brigades (Dana's and Sully's) were sent up from Sedgwick's division in response to General Franklin's call for reinforcements when Jackson first attempted to force the passage of White Oak swamp. These two brigades were sent back late in the evening, and arrived just in time to enable General Sumner to hold his ground against Longstreet. Franklin's force at White Oak swamp was therefore over 20,000 during part of the afternoon.

¹ *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part ii. pp. 556, 557.

lery, which General Franklin ordered to the rear when he came up. Before the wagons had all gone, Crutchfield opened, and his guns produced a stampede among the trains, destroying a number of wagons and perhaps causing a temporary abandonment of some guns. It was at this juncture that Jackson attempted to cross, but the Federal artillery soon drove Munford and Wooding back, and so completely swept the site of the bridge during the remainder of the afternoon that wrecking parties could not repair it.¹

Jackson continues: "A heavy cannonading in front announced the engagement of General Longstreet at Frazier's farm, and made me eager to press forward; but the marshy character of the soil, the destruction of the bridge over the marsh and creek, and the strong position of the enemy for defending the passage, prevented my advancing until the following morning."² General McClellan says: "Between twelve and one o'clock the enemy opened a fierce cannonade upon the divisions of Smith and Richardson and Naglee's brigade at White Oak swamp bridge. This artillery fire was continued by the enemy through the day, and he crossed some infantry below our position. Richardson's division suffered severely. Captain Ayres directed our artillery with great effect. Captain Hazard's battery, after losing many cannoneers, and Captain

¹ General Franklin speaks of the Confederate artillery fire as very severe, but says it did not do much damage to his infantry outside of Caldwell's brigade, which was supporting the Federal artillery. (*Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, vol. ii. p. 378.)

² Jackson's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part ii. p. 557. General Whiting says (*Ib.* p. 566), "Sundry ineffectual attempts were made during the day to repair the bridge, but the enemy keeping up a distant and random fire of shell about the crossing, the men would not work. During the afternoon the furious battle of Frazier's farm was raging between the enemy and the troops of General Longstreet. It could be distinctly heard, and was scarcely two miles from us." General D. H. Hill says: "Munford's cavalry and my skirmishers crossed over, but the Yankees got some guns under cover of the wood, which commanded the bridge, and the cavalry was compelled to turn back. The skirmishers stayed over all day and night. We attempted no further crossing that day." (*Ib.* p. 627.) The enemy's rifled guns were much superior to the Confederate artillery in range.

Hazzard being mortally wounded, was compelled to retire. It was replaced by Pettit's battery, which partially silenced the enemy's guns.

"General Franklin's held his position until after dark, repeatedly driving back the enemy in their attempts to cross the White Oak swamp." ¹

While Jackson was thus being held in check at the White Oak swamp by General Franklin, Huger, with Mahone's and Armistead's brigades, was following slowly in the wake of the enemy on the Charles City road. Huger had come up with Heintzelman's pickets the evening before as the latter was crossing from Savage's Station to the Charles City road, but did nothing to impede the movement. He probably did not divine the character of it. He supposed there was still a large force on the north side of White Oak swamp at the very time that the last of Heintzelman's forces were passing into the road in front of and but a short distance from him.² On the morning of the 30th, Mahone and Armistead, with two of his brigades, were sent forward down the Charles City road, and Wright with the other was ordered to turn off to the left, and, proceeding toward the swamp, determine the position of the enemy and guard that flank.

When Wright reached the swamp he found a bridge destroyed and a few Federal pickets. These he drove off, and crossing his infantry over the stream came upon the deserted camps which Heintzelman had left the evening before. Proceeding through these and down the north side of the swamp, he reached at two P. M. the point where General Jackson's forces had arrived an hour or two before. He was directed by Jackson to retrace his steps and try to find a crossing above and near. He returned to Brackett's ford and made an effort to cross. But here the rear-guard left by Heintzelman, reinforced by two of Sedgwick's brigades, so completely commanded the narrow and difficult passage that Wright gave it

¹ McClellan's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 65.

² General Huger says: "The advance of the column reached the Charles City road at 6.30 P. M., and the rear at ten P. M., without accident." Compare *Rebellion Record*, vol. v. p. 255.

up,¹ and, moving still further up, finally recrossed to the south side at a fort near Fisher's house and rejoined Huger at night-fall on the Charles City road. While this brigade was thus accomplishing nothing, General Huger with his other two brigades was moving down the Charles City road. The Federals had, as they passed along the night before, felled trees behind them and thus obstructed the road "for more than a mile,"² and General Mahone undertook to cut a new road to get around these obstructions. This consumed valuable time, and it was far in the afternoon when the head of the column moved forward again and came upon the position of the enemy on Brackett's farm. General Huger then devoted the remainder of the day to reconnoitring and an artillery duel.³ Thus this fine division of fresh troops, numbering nearly 9000 men, frittered away the day, while close at hand, and within full hearing, Longstreet and A. P. Hill were maintaining a furious and unequal contest with the enemy.

The troops of the latter two officers had moved forward in the morning on the Darbytown road, under the eye of General Lee, who in person superintended the operations on that part of the field. About noon Longstreet's own division, which was in front, came up with McCall's pickets on Frazier's farm in the position heretofore described, a short distance west of

¹ General Franklin says: "About four o'clock the enemy made a movement to our left, threatening Brackett's ford, where I knew we were very weak. This was met by Dana's and Colonel Alfred Sully's brigades of Sedgwick's division, which were sent by General Sumner upon information of the danger. There was no further movement in that direction after these troops appeared, and they were returned to General Sumner about five o'clock, in time to do good service at Glendale." (*Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, vol. ii. p. 378.)

² Mahone's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part ii. p. 797.

³ Huger says, report: "As we advanced through the woods, and came to an open field, on high ground (P. William's, on Map), a powerful battery of rifled guns opened on us. General Mahone disposed his troops and advanced a battery of artillery (Moorman's), and a sharp artillery fire was kept up for some time. The enemy's fire was very severe, and we had many men killed and wounded. . . . I went to the front and examined the position. I withdrew most of our guns, and only kept up a moderate fire." (*Ib.* pp. 789, 790.)

the intersection of the Darbytown and Charles City roads. The front Confederate brigade, under Colonel Jenkins, was at once sent forward to develop the enemy. The pickets having been driven in, the Federal troops were discovered in position and ready for battle. Soon brisk cannonading was heard to the left, and Longstreet, thinking this came from Huger's column¹ which was to act in concert with his own, hastened forward his batteries and opened fire to let his colleague know that he was about to attack. The ground between Longstreet and the enemy was difficult. On the left there were thick woods filled with tangled underbrush, with here and there open fields; on his right a marshy river constituted an additional obstacle, and the ground was so uneven and broken as to make marching in order almost impossible.² McCall had drawn up his troops with Meade's brigade on the right of the road, Seymour's on the left, and Reynolds's in reserve. His batteries were in front of his infantry line—one on the right, two opposite the centre, and two on the left. Longstreet ordered Colonel Jenkins to silence one of the Federal central batteries which was on his near front, and this movement quickly brought on a general engagement. Jenkins could not make headway without support, and the remaining brigades of Longstreet's division were rapidly sent forward. Pryor and Featherstone were sent through the woods to the Confederate left; Wilcox moved forward on both sides of the road, while Kemper advanced on the Confederate right through the rough land and over the marshy creek. Kemper was the first to strike the enemy. He placed his battery (Rogers's) so as to cover his flank. His troops, after floundering through the marsh and dense brush, emerged in somewhat irregular order on the side next the enemy, and driving in the pickets charged with great impetuosity and at double-quick through the woods and open fields on the Federal lines half a mile in front. The

¹ It was really the sound of the artillery duel between Jackson and Franklin at White Oak swamp bridge, which was not more than two miles away.

² See Kemper's report (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part ii. p. 762), and also Colonel Strange's report (*Ib.* p. 768).

ground was so broken that it was impossible "for any officer to see more than a few files of his men at one view."¹ These gallant men were guided, therefore, by the opposing lines, whence a storm of shot and shell was pouring upon them. To the fire in front was added a cross fire from one of the batteries opposite the Federal centre, but, without wavering, Kemper's men marched up to the guns in front, scattered Seymour's brigade which supported them, and seized the artillery.

So rapid had been Kemper's advance, and so impossible was it for any one to see in this densely wooded country what was going on even at a distance of a few yards, that Longstreet's other brigades were not up with Kemper when the successful charge was made. Jenkins and Wilcox, on his left, had not moved forth simultaneously with him, while Branch's and Pickett's brigades, which had been ordered to cover and extend his right, were making their way through the difficult ground to the position assigned them, and were some distance in the rear at the moment of Kemper's charge. Thus Kemper's brigade found itself in a very exposed position. McCall sent forward two regiments from his reserve, while Hooker, who was 500 or 600 yards to McCall's left, threw his nearest brigade (Grover's) upon the flank of the Confederates, as soon as the fugitives from Seymour's brigade, rushing by his lines, convinced him of McCall's disaster.² Sumner, with Sedgwick's

¹ Kemper's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part ii. pp. 763, 764.

² Hooker's report, *Ib.* p. 111. "Meanwhile, the enemy's attack had grown in force and violence, and after an ineffectual effort to resist it the whole of McCall's division was completely routed, and many of the fugitives rushed down the road on which my right was resting, while others took the cleared field, and broke through my lines, from one end of them to the other, and actually fired on and killed some of my men as they passed. . . . Following closely upon the footsteps of these demoralized people were the broken masses of the enemy, furiously pressing them on to me under cover of the woods, until they were checked by a front fire of the 16th Massachusetts volunteers, and afterwards by a diagonal fire on their right and left flanks from the 69th Pennsylvania volunteers and the left of the 16th Massachusetts. Also, whenever the enemy ventured to uncover himself from the forest, a destructive fire was poured into him along my right wing. After great loss the enemy gave way."

division, was a little in rear, covering the opening between McCall and Hooker, and his artillery was at once brought to bear on the Confederates, and his infantry advanced. Kemper held his ground a few minutes, looked in vain for his supports, and was then swept back by the storm of fire now concentrated upon him. As he was driven back, Branch's and Pickett's brigades were advancing. The latter, under Colonel Strange, pushed forward toward the point taken by Kemper, soon forced back the enemy, and took and held the guns. Branch advanced at the same time and checked the troops that were pursuing Kemper. Driving them back until he came in contact with the main body of Hooker's and Sumner's troops, he maintained a stubborn contest¹ until nightfall. Late in the evening Colonel Strange turned the captured guns upon the enemy. These brigades were reinforced finally by Pender's and Archer's brigades, and held at night the ground from which the Federals had been driven.

While this fierce contest was taking place on the south side of the Darbytown road, one no less severe was taking place to the north of it. Pryor had been sent forward on the Confederate left, and soon after Featherstone joined him, extending the Confederate line still farther to the left, with the expectation of connecting with Huger. But the latter, as already stated, was not in place, and upon these two brigades alone fell the task of attacking the right of McCall's division and the left of Kearny's. A vigorous and prolonged struggle took place, lasting until darkness put an end to the contest. The repeated efforts of the Confederates to drive the Federals from their position were repulsed. Kearny brought the whole of his division into the fight, and late in the evening was reinforced by

¹ Sumner says (*Report on Conduct of War*, part i. p. 364) : "The firing of shells and musketry at this place continued very severely for several hours, until some portion of General McCall's command retreated, forcing their way right through my front. Finding the action becoming so severe, I sent for my two brigades that were in White Oak swamp, and fortunately got them there just in time to enable me to maintain my position." These were Dana's and Sully's brigades, which had been sent to Brackett's ford.

Taylor's brigade of Slocum's division,¹ which in consequence of Huger's inaction was able to assist him. Caldwell's brigade of Richardson's division was also hastened to his assistance from White Oak swamp bridge. It arrived late, and went in on Kearny's left. Featherstone's brigade of Confederates having suffered severely, and having been thrown into some disorder, Gregg's brigade was sent to reinforce this part of the line. This brigade restored the battle. One regiment of it (14th South Carolina, Colonel McGowan) checked the enemy on the left, forced him back, and held the ground, against all efforts to dislodge it, until dark.

In the centre, along the Darbytown road, a still more furious battle, if possible, was progressing. Here Wilcox's brigade, after some delay from conflicting orders due to the impenetrable nature of the country in front, had been sent forward on both sides of the road directly against the enemy which Jenkins had attacked early in the afternoon. Wilcox, at the time that Pickett's brigade was going forward, advanced two of his regiments (8th and 11th Alabama) on the left of the road, and two (9th and 10th Alabama) on the right of it. The left regiment (8th Alabama) became engaged with the Federal infantry as it advanced, while the 11th, nearer the road, after emerging from dense woods, found itself in front of Randol's Federal battery, supported by the 4th Pennsylvania infantry. This battery began at once a rapid discharge of grape and canister upon the Confederates. The 11th Alabama "did not halt an instant, but continued to advance steadily and rapidly and without firing, until it approached within two hundred yards of the battery, when it gave loud cheers and made a rush for the guns. Halting for an instant in front of it, they fire upon the battery and infantry immediately in rear of it, and then make a successful charge upon, and take, the battery."²

¹ Taylor's brigade went in to replace some of McCall's troops. Kearny says (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part ii. p. 163): "I found McCall's position abandoned, although not occupied by the enemy. I placed in it the 1st New Jersey brigade, General Taylor."

² Wilcox's report, *Ib.* p. 777. And General McCall says of this charge (McCall's testimony, *Report on Conduct of War*, vol. i. pp. 587, 588; *Re-*

Meantime "the two regiments on the right of the road continued steadily to advance through the woods, which extended along the roadside to within one hundred yards of a second six-gun battery,¹ this battery being nearly opposite to the one on the left of the road, and some two hundred yards distant from it. Halting for a few minutes in the woods fronting this battery to deliver their fire, these regiments, the 9th and 10th Alabama, charge upon and take this also — the enemy's infantry supports being driven back. Both these batteries were now in our possession, having been carried in the most gallant manner, the men and officers behaving with the most determined courage and irresistible impetuosity. The taking of the battery on the right of the road (Cooper's) was not attended by such a bloody strife as followed the assault and capture of the one on the left (Randall's) ; for here the enemy had not the heavy pine forests so close in rear, and on one flank, in which he could retire, reform, and then renew the conflict, with increased numbers."² Wilcox was forced back

bellion Record, companion vol. pp. 670, 671) : "On the right, *more than one hour later in the day*, Randall's [*sic*] battery was charged upon by the enemy in great force, and with a reckless impetuosity I never saw equaled. They advanced over a space of six hundred yards of open ground. The guns of the battery mowed them down at every discharge, yet they never paused. A volley of musketry was poured into them at short distance by the 4th regiment, in support on the battery, but it did not check them for an instant ; they dashed on and pistoled and bayoneted the cannoneers at their guns. Part of the 4th gave way ; the remainder, however, with part of the 7th in their rear (then coming forward), stood their ground like heroes. As I was with the battery at the time, it was my fortune to witness, in the bayonet fight that there took place, such a display of reckless daring on the part of the Alabamians, and of unflinching courage on the part of the Pennsylvanians, as is rarely beheld. My men were, however, overpowered by numbers and borne off the ground. The battery was taken, but immediately abandoned by the enemy, who rapidly retired."

The "great force" and "overpowering numbers" consisted of only the 11th Alabama regiment.

¹ Cooper's and Amsden's batteries were opposite the Federal centre on the south of the road, supported by the 1st and 9th Pennsylvania regiments. Amsden withdrew his battery before the charge, and it was Cooper's that was taken. (Report of General Seymour, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part ii. p. 403.)

² Wilcox's report, *Ib.* p. 777.

by a counter attack,¹ and Field's brigade was now hurried forward to support him. "Forming in line of battle, the 55th and 60th Virginia on the right of the road, and the 47th and 2d Virginia battalion on the left, the command was given to cheer heartily and charge. About three hundred yards directly in our front were two of the enemy's batteries posted in an open field on the right and left of the road we were advancing on. I had heard that these batteries had been several times during the day taken and retaken, a constant struggle being maintained for their possession. At this time they were held by the enemy, but the horses being killed or wounded he was unable to remove the guns. The whole line now rushed forward under heavy fire, beat the enemy back from the guns into the woods beyond, and pushed him on the right of the road back half a mile. The two regiments on this side the road, the 55th and 60th Virginia, were at this time in the enemy's rear, having penetrated through his centre in the eagerness of pursuit, but were withdrawn before he could profit by the circumstance. . . . The 47th Virginia, Colonel Mayo, after getting possession of the guns on the left of the road, manned two of them and used them against the enemy. This regiment also captured Major-General McCall, commanding the Federal forces on the field."²

The last remaining brigade of A. P. Hill (J. R. Anderson's) was sent forward after sunset. It did what was possible, amid the confusion and darkness, to strengthen the Confederate lines and to decide the day. Once more the retiring Confederate troops, in conjunction with Anderson, and with great

¹ Major Woodward, in his *History of the Third Pennsylvania Reserve*, p. 107, says the flag of the 10th Alabama was captured by the Federals in this countercharge, as well as Cooper's battery recaptured. The countercharge on the south side of the road was made by the 9th Pennsylvania, which came up at the opportune moment.

² Field's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part ii. p. 842. General McCall says, "I rode forward to look for Conrad, and on the ground where I left him I rode into the enemy's picket, the 47th Virginia, Colonel Mayo, resting under some trees, and before I knew in whose presence I was, I was taken prisoner." (McCall's report, *Rebellion Record*, companion vol. p. 669.) Cf. *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part ii. p. 392.

cheering, advanced to the attack,¹ and in a very brief space darkness ended the strife, and the Federals retired, leaving the field of battle (except on their extreme right, where Kearny held his ground), and fourteen pieces of artillery, in the hands of the victors. During the night Magruder's division was brought up to relieve the Confederate troops that had been engaged.

Thus closed one of the bloodiest struggles that took place during the civil war. Under the eye of General Lee, and also of President Davis, who was on the field during the afternoon, the divisions of Longstreet and A. P. Hill had thrown themselves with unsurpassed courage and obstinacy against the centre of the Federal army. The enemy was largely superior in numbers,² though there was at first want of prompt concert of action. His forces were strongly posted, and his front was covered by a country so difficult, from jungle, marsh, and broken ground, that an advance in order and simultaneously against his lines was impracticable. Yet these lines, though bravely defended, had been in large part carried, fourteen of the guns which defended them captured, and very heavy losses inflicted on the troops that held them.

On the other hand, these advantages had been won at bloody cost, and the reckless valor of the Confederates had not achieved the main object of their commander: the Federal army was not cut in twain, the line of retreat to the James was yet in its possession. McCall's division, it is true, had been terribly beaten and demoralized; its commander was a prisoner; the other Federal troops had suffered severely, and their officers were not willing to risk a renewal of the contest on the same ground;³ in a word, a staggering blow had been

¹ A. P. Hill's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part ii. p. 838.

² See page 77. Longstreet and Hill were under 20,000 strong. Opposed were the corps of Heintzelman and the divisions of Sedgwick, McCall, and Slocum. But only one brigade of Slocum's was actually engaged. Even leaving out of view the two thirds of Slocum, the Federals had 35,000 men on the field. McCall was, however, beaten for the most part before the others became seriously engaged.

³ General Heintzelman says, "From the exhaustion of the men, want of ammunition and provisions, uncertainty as to the force and position of

dealt to the Federal army, but night found it still holding the Quaker road, and its line of retreat consequently unobstructed.¹ This day marked the crisis in the Seven Days' Battles, for it was on this 30th of June that Lee more nearly grasped the full fruits of his strategy and McClellan more narrowly escaped complete overthrow than on any other. The retreat of the Federal army — misjudged, no doubt, in its inception; for, with two thirds of his army intact, McClellan had no sufficient reason for retreating after Gaines's Mill — had been skillfully planned and successfully conducted. The difficult country gave every opportunity to conceal movements and ward off pursuit, and these advantages had been well used. Lee had lost the day of the 28th because the forest completely screened his adversary's movements. On the 29th, the Chickahominy had prevented Jackson from joining Magruder in attacking the Union rear. But on the 30th, the Confederate commander had arranged with admirable strategy to throw his whole army upon the flank and rear of his retreating foe. While Holmes on his right was to try to seize Malvern Hill, and Jackson on his left was to press the rear of the retreating army, three columns, under Huger, Longstreet, and Magruder, were to strike its centre. McClellan was hampered to some extent by the care of his trains, but his army was compact, the parts within easy supporting distance of each other. The Confederates were far more widely separated, and natural obstacles rendered concert of action difficult. Still, they were all in position by midday, and by the middle of the afternoon 50,000 men or more should have been attacking the Union lines. But, as we have seen, only the column under Long-

the enemy, I also gave my opinion that the troops had better be withdrawn. I had no fear of the force we had just defeated so signally, but of the fresh troops they could bring against our worn-out men." (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part ii. pp. 101, 102.)

¹ The Comte de Paris says, "If Jackson had succeeded in pushing his way beyond Frazier's farm, he would have taken the Federal combatants at Glendale in rear and crushed them between two fires. If, on the other hand, Hill had been able to penetrate as far as the Quaker road, he would have cut the Federal army in two and secured the destruction of one half that army." (*History of the Civil War in America*, vol. ii. p. 132.)

street and A. P. Hill did anything — the others accomplished nothing. They did not even prevent reinforcements from going to the Federal centre. It is impossible to deny that General Lee was very poorly served on this occasion by his subordinates. Holmes was so imposed upon by Porter's demonstration that he was not only paralyzed for the day, but continued inactive during the great struggle at Malvern Hill on the morrow. He is also responsible for keeping Magruder out of the fight, who spent the afternoon in marching and countermarching because of Holmes's request for reinforcements. Huger's feeble operations were the most disappointing of all. He was nearest to Longstreet, and he was almost on the edge of the battlefield, yet he did nothing, while Slocum in his front reinforced Kearny and thus held Longstreet's left wing at bay. Nor is it possible to free from blame on this occasion a greater soldier than Holmes or Huger. Jackson, ignorant of the country, had in the swamp and Franklin's veterans substantial causes of delay, but they were not such obstacles as usually held Jackson in check. Vigorous demonstrations at the fords above and below as well as at White Oak swamp bridge would probably have secured a crossing at one point or another, and the tremendous prize at stake was such as to justify any efforts. Jackson's comparative inaction was a matter of surprise at the time, and has never been satisfactorily explained. Some have attributed it to physical exhaustion, and the demands of the campaign had been severe; but it is best to set it down as one of the few great mistakes of his marvelous career.

CHAPTER XVII.

THE SEVEN DAYS' BATTLES : MALVERN HILL.

NIGHT brought a much-needed respite to the Federal army, and afforded still further opportunity for retreat. Confusion and uncertainty marked the early hours of the night. The Federal commander had not been on the field during the battle, but was some miles off, at Haxall's, on James River, where he was determining the final position to which to direct the retreat of his army. In the darkness of the night and the dense forest, communication between him and his corps commanders was difficult, and indeed seems to have been for some hours entirely interrupted. Hence the latter found themselves without instructions. The results of the day's operations, however, were not such as to warrant any further attempt on the part of the Federal army to maintain its present position. A renewal of the attack on their centre by Lee with largely increased forces might be expected in the morning, and Confederate success at this point meant disaster. Franklin's corps would be most exposed in such an event. He had in his front a determined enemy, whom he had only kept at bay for half a day by means of the cover afforded by White Oak swamp. During the night this obstacle might be surmounted by the Confederates, and next day he might find himself assailed in front by Jackson and threatened in rear by Longstreet. Hence he determined to retreat, and at ten P. M. he began to withdraw towards James River.¹ Slocum, Heintzelman, and Sumner followed Franklin, and by day-

¹ Franklin says : "Not being able to communicate with headquarters, I determined to evacuate the position at ten o'clock at night and fall back to James River. Before evacuating, I sent word to General Heintzelman that I was about to leave." (Franklin's testimony, *Report on Conduct of War*, part i. p. 624.)

light these commands reached Malvern Hill overlooking James River at Turkey Bend, where Porter had been placed the day before, and where McClellan determined to make another stand.

The now famous battlefield of Malvern Hill is an elevated plateau embraced by the two branches of Western Run. The main branch of this stream gathers near the battlefield of the day before (Frazier's farm), and flows with a marshy course until it expands into the long milldam that supplies Carter's mill. After passing this mill it turns with a sinuous course at a sharp angle to the northwest along the base of the bluff that constitutes the south end of Malvern Hill, and enters the James at Turkey Bend. Before entering the river it receives a branch, which, rising about a mile further west, pursues a southeast course parallel to the main branch, and, skirting the western base of Malvern Hill, joins the main stream, as above stated, near the point where the latter enters the river. Small tributaries drain the country to the north of Malvern Hill between these two streams. The Quaker road, crossing the larger stream, follows the water-shed between the two, and gradually rising to the plateau constitutes the northern and best approach to Malvern Hill. The open plateau on the top of the hill is one and a half miles in length by half a mile in breadth. To the north, northwest, and northeast it slopes off gradually. Towards the southwest and south it terminates in abrupt bluff-like hills that overlook the river. To the southeast it slopes away through a forest to the long milldam which bounds it on that side.

The Federal army was drawn up in an arc on this plateau, the centre convex towards the north; the left wing extending southward towards the bluffs above the low ground of the river, and facing west; the right wing curved back along the eastern side of the plateau, and facing east. Porter's command constituted the left of the Union army. Warren's brigade, with the 11th U. S. infantry, was on the river road on the high ground southwest of the Malvern house, where it had repulsed Holmes the day before. On the west side of Malvern Hill, overlooking Warren, were some thirty-six guns, some

of long range, sweeping completely the valley and the cleared lands north of the river road. To these were added later in the day the siege guns of the 1st Connecticut artillery (Colonel R. O. Tyler) on high ground immediately to the left of the Malvern house.¹ Chapman's brigade of Sykes's division (under Major C. S. Lovell) supported some of these batteries, and with Buchanan's brigade on the right in a clump of pines extended the line northward to the vicinity of the Crew house. Morell's division, with headquarters at the Crew house, held a curved line from this point round to the Quaker road. On Morell's left, facing west, was the 14th New York (Colonel McQuade), with a section of Weeden's battery C, 1st Rhode Island artillery. Next, under cover of a narrow strip of woods skirting the Quaker road, were Martindale's and Butterfield's brigades, and in front of them, facing north, was Griffin's brigade. This infantry supported the batteries of Morell's division, which were placed under the general supervision of Griffin. At the West house, on the east side of the Quaker road, Couch's division (with which was Caldwell's brigade) joined Morell, and extended the Federal line in the direction of the Binford house. Heintzelman's corps was in the right rear of Couch, protecting that flank. Sumner was behind Heintzelman, with Franklin on his right, facing towards Western Run. These last three corps, except the brigades of Sickles and Meagher sent to reinforce Porter, and Kearny's division which was immediately on Couch's right, were not engaged. Peck's division of Keyes's corps guarded the bridge at Carter's Mill and the approaches to Haxall's landing on the extreme right-rear of the Union army. Warren and Peck were back to back, facing in opposite directions. McCall's badly shattered division was placed in reserve near the Malvern house.² In regard to this position the Comte de Paris (then on General McClellan's staff) says, "There was every indication that the efforts of the Confederates would be

¹ General Porter says General Hunt posted all these batteries. (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part ii. p. 229; *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, vol. ii. p. 410.)

² *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, vol. ii. p. 408, etc.

directed against the Federal left. In fact, they could only approach the Army of the Potomac by two roads, that from Richmond to Haxall's (the River road), and the Quaker road, which, fortunately for the Federals, led to that part of their position easiest to defend. It was this side, therefore, that McClellan took particular care to fortify. The division of Pennsylvania Reserves, which McCall had commanded till the battle of Glendale (Frazier's farm), where he was taken prisoner, was placed in rear of Porter. Although this small band had been terribly decimated, it was yet ready to make a gallant fight. The general-in-chief gave, moreover, a powerful reinforcement of artillery to his left wing. For the first time since the beginning of the campaign the ground was admirably adapted to the employment of this arm, and the foresight with which McClellan had organized a reserve of more than one hundred cannon, the constant care he had shown in attending to its requirements, and the energy he had displayed in preserving it intact during the retreat, in spite of its weight and the many dangers to which it had been exposed, were at last to be abundantly rewarded on this evening of July 1. The reserve batteries were massed on the left and centre of the Federal lines under the direction of Colonel Hunt, an officer of the highest merit. They were placed wherever a favorable position could be found, and more than sixty pieces were so disposed as to cover with their converging fire every point of Porter's line. Finally, the heavy siege guns having reached Haxall's, thanks to the unremitting zeal of Colonel Tyler, who had left but one behind during the retreat, ten of them were hauled up to near the Crew House, whence they could, by firing over the friendly lines, reach the assailants if they should venture upon the slopes of Malvern Hill."¹

General Lee says, "Early on July 1, Jackson reached the battlefield of the previous day, having succeeded in crossing White Oak swamp, where he captured a part of the enemy's artillery and a number of prisoners. He was directed to continue the pursuit down the Willis Church road, and soon found the enemy occupying a high range, extending obliquely across

¹ *History of the Civil War in America*, vol. ii. p. 136.

the road, in front of Malvern Hill. On this position of great natural strength he had concentrated his powerful artillery, supported by masses of infantry, partially protected by earthworks. His left rested near Crew's house, and his right near Binford's. Immediately in his front the ground was open, varying in width from a quarter to half a mile, and, sloping gradually from the crest, was completely swept by the fire of his infantry and artillery. To reach this open ground our troops had to advance through a broken and thickly wooded country, traversed, nearly throughout its whole extent, by a swamp, passable at but few places, and difficult at those. The whole was within range of the batteries on the heights and the gunboats in the river, under whose incessant fire our movements had to be executed. Jackson formed his line with Whiting's division on his left and D. H. Hill on his right, one of Ewell's brigades occupying the interval. The rest of Ewell's and Jackson's own division were held in reserve. Magruder was directed to take position on Jackson's right, but before his arrival two of Huger's brigades came up and were placed next to Hill."¹

Armistead's brigade was the front one of Huger's division, on the Quaker road, and was followed by Wright's. These two brigades inclined to the right when they reached the vicinity of the enemy, and took position on the right of Jackson and opposite the Federal troops of Porter. They reached their position by midday, but hours elapsed before Magruder's forces and the remainder of Huger's were ready to attack. Magruder was delayed by some mistake about the road on

¹ Lee's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part ii. pp. 495, 496. The pieces taken by Jackson were those abandoned by the gunners the day before under his artillery fire. The prisoners were no doubt stragglers, with which the line of retreat of the Federal army was by this time filled. Jackson thus describes his dispositions: "General Whiting was directed to move to the left and take position on the Poindexter farm, General D. H. Hill to take position further to the right, Taylor's brigade of Ewell's division to move forward between the divisions of Hill and Whiting, the remainder of Ewell's division to remain in rear of first line. Jackson's division was halted near Willis Church, in the wood, and held in reserve." (Jackson's report, *Ib.* p. 557.)

which he was to move, a mistake that led to useless marching and the loss of much valuable time.¹

Jackson was opposite the Federal centre, Armistead and Wright opposite their left. Magruder was formed in the rear and to the right of these last-mentioned brigades, which, together with Mahone's brigade of Huger's division, were placed under his command.² Longstreet and A. P. Hill were held in reserve behind Magruder. Holmes was on the river road, and should have advanced on the extreme Confederate right, but he deemed his enemy's position too strong to assail, and allowed the day to pass and the battle to be decided in his hearing without doing anything.³

There were no Confederates opposite the Federal right, and the positions held by Peck, Franklin, and Sumner were unassailed.

Armistead formed his own and Wright's brigades opposite the Federal position at Crew's house, and ordered up his batteries to engage the enemy.⁴ The few Confederate batteries

¹ Magruder says he was ordered to move on the Quaker road, and that he did so, and offers the testimony of his guides and of some citizens. Longstreet informed him early in the day that he was wrong; and subsequently, when he had marched some distance, Longstreet first and then General Lee ordered him to return and take a road nearer to Jackson's right. Magruder's command had been severely marched the day before. It had fought late on Sunday evening at Savage's Station, and early on Monday had marched twelve miles to Timberlake's on the Darbytown road. This point was reached at two P. M. At four P. M. Magruder was ordered to reinforce Holmes on the river road near Malvern Hill. He failed to find Holmes, and after night was ordered to the battlefield of Frazier's farm to relieve Longstreet and A. P. Hill. It was three A. M. on July 1 before he reached this point, and shortly after his troops were again on the march pursuing the enemy. (See Magruder's report and reports of his subordinates, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part ii. p. 666, etc.) The editors of the *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, vol. ii. p. 412, say that besides the true Quaker road running by Willis Church there is an unused road two miles west, running between the Long Bridge and Charles City roads, which was sometimes called the Quaker road, and this Magruder took.

² Lee's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part ii. p. 496.

³ Holmes's report, *Ib.* pp. 907, 908.

⁴ Wright's report, *Ib.* p. 812.

at hand were no match for the sixty pieces of field artillery and ten siege guns which swept all the approaches to the position at Crew's, and so Grimes's, Moorman's, and Pegram's batteries were quickly disabled in succession, after a useless display of splendid courage. Greenlee Davidson's battery was sent to Pegram's assistance, and these officers continued to fight most gallantly under a terrific fire. Armistead and Wright now attempted an advance, but this was repulsed with loss. More artillery was called for, but worn out as men and horses were by marching and fighting, and impeded by the woods and marshes through which the Confederate line had to advance, it was slow in reaching the field. After the repulse of this first attempt, McClellan advanced Couch's line a little, so as to strengthen its position, and reinforced it by a brigade (Caldwell's) from Sumner's corps; he then awaited further attacks. Armistead and Wright, finding it impossible to make headway alone against the strong position in front, withdrew their damaged batteries, and held their infantry in hand until the arrival of other troops.

It was now past four o'clock, and no serious fighting had yet taken place on the other parts of the line. D. H. Hill had suffered considerably in getting his troops into position, from the fire of the Federal artillery. By this fire G. B. Anderson's brigade of his division had been "roughly handled" and Colonel Anderson wounded.¹ The division was then placed under cover of some woods 400 or 500 yards from the enemy's front, and there awaited the signal for the general attack. Whiting was carrying on a spirited but unequal artillery contest on the extreme Confederate left. General Lee had directed that the signal for the general attack should be the advance of Armistead's brigade with a "yell" against the batteries in its front.² This movement of Armistead's was to be followed by Magruder's whole force, and to be supported by a simultaneous advance of the other parts of the line. The signal had not been given, for Magruder was not yet ready.

Soon after four, Magruder reached the ground assigned him

¹ Hill's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part ii. p. 627.

² Hill's (*Ib.* p. 628) and Magruder's (*Ib.* p. 669) reports.

and assumed command. His troops were greatly worn by two days and a night of almost constant marching with but little food. Hours of this day had been lost from want of knowledge of this intricate country, and now the afternoon was far spent. If anything was to be done, no more time should be lost. General Lee was urgent that the assault be made. Magruder reconnoitred the position, and sent for thirty rifled pieces of his artillery, under cover of which to make his grand attack, but the guns were in the rear, and the dense woods and marshy stream were obstacles that could not be rapidly overcome. He could not wait; it was five o'clock. Armistead had just repulsed a strong line of the enemy's skirmishers that had moved out against him. General Lee ordered that this success be followed up and the whole of Magruder's line be thrown forward. Magruder says: "Having completed the necessary arrangements for my three divisions, and not feeling myself at liberty to hesitate, under the stringency of my instructions, I galloped to the front, and, at the request of General Wright, again reconnoitred the enemy, in company with himself and General Armistead, from the meadow on the right and the hill in front, and arranged with them a simultaneous attack from that portion of the line under my command. . . . My plan being to hurl about fifteen thousand men against the enemy's batteries and supporting infantry, to follow up any successes they might obtain, and if unable to drive the enemy from his strong position, to continue the fight in front, by pouring in fresh troops, and in case they were repulsed, to hold strongly the line of battle where I stood, to prevent serious disaster to our arms."¹

It was about half past five when the order to advance was given.² Such guns as were in reach had opened on the enemy, and Armistead's brigade, in conjunction with Cobb's, was ordered to carry the batteries in front. Wright's brigade was sent in on the right of Armistead's, and Mahone's brigade of Huger's division, which was the next to arrive, was also ordered to the support of Wright. To the right and rear of

¹ Magruder's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part ii. p. 669.

² Magruder's report, *Ib.* p. 670.

these, Barksdale's brigade was placed in position by Magruder himself. Jones's division, consisting of the brigades of G. T. Anderson and Toombs, was ordered to support the centre, while the strong brigade of Ransom, of Huger's division, was directed to attack on the left of Armistead and Cobb. These latter officers advanced as ordered, but were soon met by a terrific fire from the enemy's artillery and infantry, which swept all parts of the slope that gradually ascended to their position at Crew's. A little farther to the Confederate right, the troops of Wright and Mahone, taking advantage of a hill and a ravine, made their way almost to the hostile guns, and compelled a battery in their front to retire. Gallant and desperate were the repeated efforts made by these four brigades, or what was left of them, to force the enemy's line, but in vain. That line was strong, it was fully manned, it bristled with artillery; it was firmly held by men who knew that a repetition of Gaines's Mill meant the entire destruction of the Federal army. Barksdale's brigade, on the right rear of Wright and Mahone, became involved in a fierce struggle with Porter, against whom it could make no considerable headway. Holmes, who should have aided at this point with his division, kept aloof on the extreme Confederate right, and did nothing.

While this inadequate force of Confederates was thus trying to make its way to the Federal batteries, Magruder was hurrying up his supports. D. R. Jones did not arrive promptly, but when he did, his brigades were sent in to strengthen Armistead and Cobb. Ransom was to have come up on Magruder's left, but here a foolishly pressed point of etiquette lost him an hour, and prevented his coöperation at the proper moment. Ransom was at this time of Huger's division,¹ and when Magruder's order reached him, he, under Huger's direction, declined to move until the order was sent through the latter officer. Thus Huger, whose feeble conduct on the preceding day had probably prevented General Lee from delivering a crushing blow to the Federal army at Frazier's farm, unwittingly contributed what was in his power to render the assault at Mal-

¹ Ransom had been attached to Holmes's division, but at the beginning of the Seven Days' Battles about Richmond had been sent to support Huger, and afterwards remained under his command.

vern Hill a failure. He did not attempt to carry Ransom's brigade forward, though he knew his other three brigades were fiercely engaged on Magruder's front, but contented himself, in reply to repeated calls for Ransom, with finally giving the latter permission to go to Magruder's assistance. It was after seven o'clock when Ransom moved forward.¹ D. R. Jones's troops had meantime gone in and met the fate of those preceding them. G. T. Anderson's brigade had advanced under a heavy fire and with severe loss to the front, but was unable to carry the guns.²

Toombs's brigade, in the midst of the noise and smoke of the battlefield, became confused from conflicting orders, and moved to the left into a wood on Jackson's part of the field. It accomplished nothing.³ Ransom came up, passed over part of G. T. Anderson's brigade, and attempted to carry the enemy's position.⁴ It was twilight when Ransom made a bold dash almost to the mouths of the guns, but he was repulsed, and withdrew from the field.

While this series of fierce but disjointed and ineffectual efforts was being made by Magruder with his own and Huger's division to carry the heights at Crew's house, D. H. Hill, holding the right of Jackson's line and joining Huger on the latter's left, advanced against the Federal centre and left centre, held by Kearny's and Couch's divisions.⁵ General D. H. Hill says: "While conversing with my brigade commanders, shouting was heard on our right, followed by the roar of musketry. We all agreed that this was the signal agreed upon, and I

¹ Ransom's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part ii. p. 794.

² G. T. Anderson's report, *Ib.* pp. 707, 708.

³ Early's, D. H. Hill's, and Toombs's reports, *Ib.* pp. 612, 628, 697.

⁴ Ransom's report, *Ib.* p. 794.

⁵ From the meagreness of the Federal reports and want of completeness of those of the Confederates, it is very difficult to say with precision what troops fought each other on this day. Heintzelman says that Kearny's division was not heavily engaged and Hooker's not at all, — in which case D. H. Hill's assault must have been confined to Couch. The Comte de Paris says that D. H. Hill had before him "Morell's right, Couch's division reinforced by Caldwell's brigade, which had been temporarily detached from Richardson, and finally the left of Kearny." Sickles's and Meagher's brigades joined Couch during the struggle. (Comte de Paris, *History of the Civil War in America*, vol. ii. pp. 141, 142.)

ordered my division to advance. This, as near as I could judge, was about an hour and a half before sundown" (about six o'clock).¹ His division went forward in the following order: Garland's brigade on the right; then Rodes's brigade, under Colonel J. B. Gordon; then G. B. Anderson's brigade, under Colonel Tew; then Ripley's brigade on the left. Colquitt's brigade was in reserve, but was speedily sent forward to support the others. The Confederate artillery had produced no serious effect on the Federal lines, and at the time of the charge the Federals were able to concentrate the full fire of numerous batteries, as well as of their infantry, on the advancing troops. The slope from the Federal position was here from 800 to 900 yards without cover, and the Confederates had to advance directly in the face of the guns. Such a storm of shot and shell met them that D. H. Hill's division withered under it. Garland says: "The brigade moved forward with alacrity about half way to the battery, or nearer, when the terrible fire of artillery and the opening fire of the infantry induced them to halt, lie down, and commence firing, without my orders, and contrary to them. . . . After some delay a brigade appeared from the woods in my rear,² and seemed coming up to my support. But their movements seemed slow, and before they reached me my men began to give way."³ Gordon says: "The whole ground in front of the 26th, 5th, and 3d Alabama regiments was swept by the fire of the artillery, which had in rapid succession silenced two Confederate batteries in our front. As there was no artillery to attract the enemy's attention, his batteries from the beginning, and his infantry finally, poured a most destructive fire upon my ranks. Never was the courage of troops more severely tried and heroically exhibited than in this charge. They moved on under this terrible fire, breaking and driving off the first line of infantry, until within a little over 200 yards of the batteries. Here the canister and musketry mowed down my already thinned ranks so rapidly that it became impossible to

¹ D. H. Hill's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part ii. p. 628.

² Toombs's brigade, which D. H. Hill led forward himself to support Garland. (*Ib.* p. 628.)

³ Garland's report, *Ib.* p. 643.

advance without support.”¹ Ripley says: “At its brow [the brow of the hill] our troops were met with a furious fire of shot and shell and musketry. Officers and men fell fast, but they maintained their ground, opening and keeping up a severe fire upon the enemy in return, before which his advanced battery fell back and his troops wavered.”² General Hill says: “The division fought heroically and well, but fought in vain.”³

Later in the evening, Taylor's brigade (under Stafford, of Ewell's division, which was on D. H. Hill's left) moved against the lines in its front, but was repulsed. Whiting, who held the left of the whole Confederate line, kept his troops in position, and maintained an artillery fire on the enemy during the battle, which, on account of the great Federal superiority in that arm, accomplished but little.⁴ General D. H. Hill called earnestly for reinforcements. General Jackson says: “I ordered that portion of General Ewell's division held in reserve and Jackson's division to his relief, but from the darkness of the night and the obstructions caused by the swamp and undergrowth through which they had to march none reached him in time to afford him the desired support.”⁵

Thus the battle on Jackson's line consisted mainly of the gallant effort of D. H. Hill's division to carry the Federal

¹ Gordon's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part ii. p. 634.

² Ripley's report, *Ib.* p. 650.

³ Hill's report, *Ib.* p. 628.

⁴ General Jackson says: “On my left, General Whiting moved his division, as directed, to a field on the Poindexter farm. Batteries were ordered up. The position of the enemy, as already shown, naturally commanding, was materially strengthened by the judicious distribution of his artillery. The first battery placed in position, finding itself exposed to the superior cross-fire of the enemy, was compelled to retire with loss. Balthis's, Poague's, and Carpenter's batteries held their positions and fought well. The position occupied by the artillery rendered infantry support necessary. Whiting formed his line accordingly, and supported by Trimble's brigade on his left, and by the third brigade of Jackson's division as a reserve, was directed to remain there until further orders. Some of these batteries were well served, and effectually drove back at one time an advance of the enemy upon my centre. Toward night Whiting received orders to send General Trimble's brigade to the support of General D. H. Hill, on the right, which order was promptly executed, but the brigade did not reach its destination until after Hill had withdrawn his division to the woods.” (Jackson's report, *Ib.* p. 558.)

⁵ Jackson's report, *Ib.* p. 558.

position, and with the failure of this attempt virtually ended there. But not so on Magruder's front. Ransom was repulsed at the time that D. H. Hill's lines were broken and forced back. By this time the Federal lines about Crew's house had been severely shaken. General Porter called for reinforcements, and Meagher's brigade of Sumner's corps and Sickles's brigade of Heintzelman's corps were sent from the Federal right to his assistance, and with these he strengthened the weak places in his lines. On the Confederate side one more gallant but useless charge was to be made. McLaws's division, consisting of the brigades of Semmes and Kershaw, was the only part of Magruder's command that had not yet been seriously engaged during the afternoon. These brigades were ordered forward. "The fatigue of the two previous days and want of sleep and food" ¹ had sadly diminished the numbers of these commands; the thickness of the woods through which they had to advance, the rapidly approaching night, and the broken troops through which it was necessary to make their way, still further lessened them, so that not 1500 men in all were carried into action.² Semmes was on the right and Kershaw was on the left, with a considerable interval between them. The story of this charge is but a repetition of that of the preceding ones. After suffering severe loss and getting, on Semmes's part of the line, within a few yards of the Federal batteries, they were broken and driven back, and in the darkness found it impossible to do more. As Kershaw retired, General Ewell with Early's brigade was coming on the field, and these last troops took position and lay all night in front of and near the Federal lines,³ while, further to the Confederate right, Wright and Mahone⁴ held a similar position, close to the Federal batteries which Magruder had vainly attempted to take. It was nine o'clock at night before the firing ceased and quiet settled down on the bloody field.

Late in the afternoon, when all his troops had been ordered into action, Magruder had called on Longstreet for aid. The

¹ McLaws's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part ii. p. 719.

² McLaws's (*Ib.* p. 719), Semmes's (*Ib.* p. 722), and Kershaw's (*Ib.* p. 728) reports.

³ Early's report, *Ib.* p. 612.

⁴ Wright's (*Ib.* p. 815) and Mahone's (*Ib.* p. 800) reports.

latter ordered forward A. P. Hill's division to support the troops in front, and placed his own so as to secure the right flank.¹ Neither division, however, was engaged, though Branch's and J. R. Anderson's brigades (the latter under Thomas) of A. P. Hill's division advanced near enough to be fully exposed to the fire of the Federal artillery.²

The Confederate losses at Malvern Hill were probably a little over 5000. Jackson reports the loss of the division under his command as 2301.³ Magruder puts his and Huger's losses at 2900 in round numbers.⁴ The losses in part of the

¹ Longstreet's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part ii. p. 760.

² Hill's (*Ib.* p. 839) and Branch's (*Ib.* p. 884) reports.

³ Jackson's report : —

	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total.
Jackson's division	26	177		203
Ewell's division	33	143	1	177
Whiting's division	10	164	1	175
D. H. Hill's division	336	1373	37	1746
				2301

⁴ The Confederate losses in troops under Magruder's command from subordinate reports are as follows, aggregating 2765 : —

HUGER.

	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total.
Wright's brigade	55	243	64	362
Armistead's brigade	38	203	39	280
Mahone's brigade	37	164	120	321
Ransom's brigade	69	354	76	499

Strength, July 1 : Mahone, 1226 ; Ransom, 3000.

MAGRUDER.

	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total.
G. T. Anderson	31	242	36	309
Toombs				194
Cobb				500
Kershaw	22	113	29	164
Semmes	17	56	63	136
Barksdale, not found				

Strength, July 1 : Toombs, 1200 ; Cobb, 1500 ; Kershaw, 956 ; Semmes, 557.

artillery are probably to be added to this. The Federal official reports give no separate statement of their losses on July 1. They were doubtless much smaller than those of the Confederates. Swinton estimates them at one third.

Both commanders have been criticised in regard to the battle of Malvern Hill. General Lee has been blamed, in the first place, for fighting at all, since the retreat of the Federal army to Westover was certain without it; and in the next place, for the imperfect and injudicious manner in which the battle was fought. General McClellan has been criticised for not taking advantage of the repulse of the Confederates and achieving a decided victory by throwing forward his fresh troops at the proper moment. He has been severely blamed, too, for having his headquarters too far from the line of battle, and thus leaving the conduct of affairs at critical moments in the hands of his subordinates.

So far as concerns the propriety of the attack on Malvern Hill, those who criticise General Lee seem to forget that the object aimed at was the overthrow of the Federal army, not the prevention of its retreat to Harrison's Landing. The Federal army had been forced from its position in front of Richmond; its communications with the Pamunkey had been severed; its depots had been captured; many of its divisions had been severely beaten; great captures of stores had been made; greater amounts still had been destroyed by the retreating army; and the signs of demoralization were increasing. General Lee had tried to throw his whole force on McClellan, but up to this day he had been so baffled by the intricate and marshy country which concealed the enemy's movements and impeded his own, that he had never been able to do so. Now his army was concentrated, and though greatly exhausted by marching and fighting, was in splendid spirits. The Federal army was making for the James River and the protection of its gunboats. A united and determined attack with his whole force on the enemy before they were out of reach seemed to promise the overthrow in part, if not in whole, of the Federal army. The attack seems to us to have been wise, and the expectations based on it not unreasonable. That this attack was

a failure, and that the failure was most probably due to the manner in which it was made, are facts affording much better ground for criticism. The assault was made late in the day ; it was preceded by a very inadequate use of artillery ; it was made by three only out of the nine divisions present, and among these three there was no proper concert of action. The two divisions under Magruder were beaten in detail ; two or three brigades at a time were sent forward, and, when broken and beaten back, others took their places only to meet a similar fate. The battle was a succession of desperate but disjointed and badly managed charges. What part of the blame for all this should rest on the shoulders of the Confederate leader, and what part should be charged to inefficient subordinates and to circumstances beyond control, is a difficult question, and one that will probably never be settled. General Lee had been but one month in command of an army organized and officered by others, an army of which both the men and the officers were for the most part but slightly experienced in war. The country was unmapped,¹ and peculiarly difficult for aggressive movements, and the battlefield itself afforded every advantage to the enemy.

The battle of Malvern Hill is not the only one in regard to which General McClellan has been criticised for not taking a more personal direction of affairs on the field, and it is certain that in this respect he did not follow the example of most great captains. But we think he has been unjustly censured for not assuming the aggressive upon the repulse of the Confederates. Such a movement would most probably have been unsuccessful, and might have led to disaster. The larger part of General Lee's forces had not been engaged, and would have been ready to meet such an advance. Nor was the Federal army in any condition to attempt it. Severe defeats, loss of stores, continual retreat, short supplies, had greatly affected the *morale* of

¹ Some Northern writers have severely criticised General Lee for want of knowledge of the country. Of course the Confederates had a great advantage over the Federals in being at home and among friends, but it should not be forgotten that the Confederate government had but few officers or facilities for topographical surveys, and that up to this time few or no maps were to be had except those in existence before the war.

the Federal troops, and their lines had more than once wavered during the afternoon. It was this condition of his army,¹ no doubt, as much as the difficulty of bringing supplies up the river to Haxall's, that prevented McClellan from making a longer stand on Malvern Hill.

¹ McClellan wrote to the Federal adjutant-general on July 1, before the battle : "My men are completely exhausted, and I dread the result if we are attacked to-day by fresh troops. If possible, I shall retire to-night to Harrison's Bar, where the gunboats can render more aid in covering our position. Permit me to urge that not an hour should be lost in sending me fresh troops. More gunboats are much needed." (*Report on Conduct of War*, vol. i. p. 340.)

CHAPTER XVIII.

MCCLELLAN RETREATS TO HARRISON'S LANDING (WESTOVER).

GENERAL MCCLELLAN had gained his object. His army was in danger of destruction. He had saved it. The severe check he gave his pursuers enabled him to resume his retreat unmolested. This he did as soon as the battle had ceased, at ten o'clock on the night of July 1, and by morning the head of his column was at Westover. General Keyes, with his corps, was directed to cover the retreat, and he managed the movements of the troops and of the immense trains of the army with great celerity and skill.¹

¹ McClellan's order to Keyes July 1 was : "The army of the Potomac moves to-night to Harrison's Bar. Your command will form the rear-guard, Franklin's corps just preceding yours. The gunboats are instructed to cover your flank and rear. Bring along all the wagons you can, but they are to be sacrificed, of course, rather than imperil your safety. Celerity of movement is the sole security of this operation. At Harrison's Bar additional gunboats, a comfortable position, and considerable reinforcements under General Shields. Stimulate your men to fortitude and renewed courage by a knowledge of the fact. Couch's division has already been ordered to move under the direction of General Porter." (*Report on Conduct of War*, part i. p. 611.) McClellan says : "The greater portion of the transportation of the army having been started for Harrison's Landing during the night of the 30th of June and 1st of July, the order for the movement of the troops was at once issued upon the final repulse of the enemy at Malvern Hill. The order prescribed a movement by the left and rear, General Keyes's corps to cover the manœuvre. . . . It being evident that the immense number of wagons and artillery carriages pertaining to the army could not move with celerity along a single road, General Keyes took advantage of every accident of the ground to open new avenues and to facilitate the movement. He made preparations for obstructing the roads, after the enemy had passed, so as to prevent any rapid pursuit, destroying effectually Turkey Bridge on the main road, and rendering other roads and approaches temporarily impassable by felling trees across them." (McClellan's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 70.)

On the morning of the 2d of July, the Confederates discovered that the enemy had retreated, leaving many of his dead and wounded on the field. General J. E. B. Stuart, who had returned from his scout on the lower Chickahominy the evening before, was sent to harass their rear, while Longstreet, with his own and A. P. Hill's divisions, and Jackson, with all his troops except D. H. Hill's division, were made ready to pursue. A heavy rainstorm added to the difficulties and discomforts of both armies. Through the wet and mire the Federals made their weary way to Harrison's, abandoning at every step the things that impeded their march.¹ The Confederates did not move far on the 2d. In Jackson's command the "day was consumed in replenishing the ammunition of the batteries, and in refreshing the men."² Longstreet moved some two miles to Poindexter's through the rain, and then halted for the night. Next morning the pursuit was resumed, but because of the deep mud, of the obstructions with which General Keyes had blocked the direct road, which caused them to seek another route, and of inefficient guides who misled them, Longstreet and Jackson were still miles from Harrison's on the night of the 3d.³ However, on the morning of the 4th, the Confederate infantry arrived in front

¹ D. H. Hill says: "They retreated in the night, leaving their dead unburied, their wounded on the ground, three pieces of artillery abandoned, and thousands of superior rifles thrown away. None of their previous retreats exhibited such unmistakable signs of rout and demoralization." (Hill's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part ii. p. 629.)

² Dabney, *Life of Jackson*, p. 475.

³ Dabney says: "The remainder of July 2d was therefore consumed in replenishing the ammunition of the batteries, and in refreshing the men. Orders were given that on Thursday morning, the 3d, all the army should pursue the enemy by way of Turkey Creek and the river road, with Longstreet in front. But after that general had put his troops in motion, General Lee determined to march toward Harrison's Landing, where the Federalists were now assembled, by returning to the Charles City road, and making his way thence down to the river. His purpose was to avoid the obstructions which they were reported to have left behind them to cover their rear. The brigades of Longstreet were therefore countermarched by Willis's Church, and Jackson was directed to give him the road. The guides of the former proved incompetent to their duties, and he was compelled to halt his division before half the day's march was completed. Hence General Jackson only moved three miles on Thursday.

of the Federal position, when Jackson "drove back the enemy's pickets, and made the necessary dispositions of his troops" ¹ for attack. At this point, General Longstreet, who was in command, having doubts as to the propriety of an assault, suspended operations until General Lee could arrive.² The latter, after a reconnoissance of the Federal position and consultation, decided it was inexpedient to make the attack.

The Federal army was encamped on the old estates of Westover and Berkeley,³ occupying the peninsula between Herring Run and the James River. This position had been selected by General McClellan in preference to that at Malvern Hill because it was less extensive; it was more completely under the protection of the gunboats, and it promised more uninterrupted river communication.⁴ Above the mouth of the Appomattox at City Point the James is comparatively narrow, and as the south bank was in Confederate possession, batteries on that side might obstruct or prevent the passage of transports. Westover (or Harrison's Landing) is below the mouth of the Appomattox, and from this point downward the river is wider and could be more easily kept open by the gunboats. The peninsula on which McClellan encamped was easily defended. The lower part of it was well protected by the marsh through which Herring Run makes its way to the river. The upper extremity was in like manner protected near the river by Kimage's Creek. Along the higher part of this stream the eastern side afforded a fine position for defense, while the western was fully exposed to the gunboats. The narrow neck of three fourths of a mile between Kimage's creek and Roland's millpond on Herring Run was obstructed and fortified. The main approach from Malvern Hill entered through this neck. On the northeast side of Herring Run, high ground

Chafing like a lion at the delay, he moved his troops at early dawn of Friday, and pressing close upon the heels of Longstreet, reached the enemy's front by the middle of the day." (Dabney's *Life of Jackson*, p. 475.)

¹ Longstreet's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part ii. p. 761.

² Longstreet says Jackson advised a delay in attacking until General Lee could come. (*Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, vol. ii. p. 403.)

³ These old places are famous in the earlier history of Virginia.

⁴ McClellan's testimony, *Report on Conduct of War*, part i. p. 436.

extended from near Roland millpond to the Westover or Evelling church, and this ground commanded much of the Federal camp on the south side of the run.¹ Stuart was informed on the night of the 2d, by Captain Pelham,² of the advantages to be obtained by holding this position, and at once moved round from the rear of the Federal army to occupy this vantage ground on their flank. He seized it, and on the morning of the 3d got a gun into position and shelled the Federal camp. Expecting Longstreet and Jackson to come up with the infantry, he prepared to hold the heights until their arrival. But the enemy, perceiving the danger, pushed artillery and infantry across Herring Run, and at two P. M. forced Stuart to retire. Misled by his guides, Longstreet was still some miles away, and did not get up until the next morning. Meantime the Federals occupied the heights in force, and fortified them so that, as above stated, when the Confederates arrived before them next day General Lee did not think it judicious to attack.

The Confederate army rested in the vicinity of the Federal lines for the next three days while parties were engaged in collecting the arms and other property abandoned on their march by the Federals. On the 5th of July, Stuart, with his cavalry and some artillery³ under Colonel S. D. Lee, was sent down the river to the vicinity of Charles City Court House to do what might be possible to interrupt the Federal communications. From different points on the north bank of the river a fire was opened on the transports that were passing up. On the 7th, the artillery sank one transport and damaged others. The Federal gunboats, however, patrolled the river thoroughly, and, by landing troops and driving off the Confederate field guns, prevented any considerable injury. Stuart returned to camp without loss. On the 8th of July, General Lee drew back his army to the vicinity of Richmond.

¹ For a minute description of the Federal position, see General Barnard's report, appended to his testimony. (*Report on Conduct of War*, part i. p. 409 *et seq.*)

² Pelham, who commanded Stuart's horse artillery, had been sent to reconnoitre.

³ The artillery consisted of Squiers's company of the Washington artillery, of Rogers's battery, and one of Pelham's guns.

CHAPTER XIX.

RESULTS OF THE SEVEN DAYS' BATTLES.

THUS ended the long and exhausting struggle known as the Seven Days' Battles.¹ The losses of the Confederates were, by the official reports, about 19,700 men.² The Federal loss by McClellan's report was 15,765,³ of which "more than

¹ These "days" begin June 25, when McClellan pushed forward his left wing and fought on the Williamsburg road. The next six days, ending with July 1 (Malvern Hill), embrace the aggressive movements of General Lee, beginning with the crossing of the Chickahominy and the battle of Mechanicsville on June 26.

² General Early (*Southern Historical Papers*, vol. i. p. 421) makes it 19,557. In going over the same data I make it 19,711, viz.: Longstreet, 4429; A. P. Hill, 3870; Huger, 2045 (four of Armistead's regiments and a battalion lost 280 by the regimental reports. The regiment not reporting I place at 70. The loss in that brigade is then 350. Mahone's loss is 431. The other brigades are correctly reported by General Early); D. H. Hill, 3995; Jackson, 810; Ewell, 987; Whiting, 1190; McLaws, 658; D. R. Jones, 832; Magruder, 750, estimated; Holmes, 51; Stuart, 79; Pendleton, artillery, 15. (H. P. Jones's battalion included in D. H. Hill's report.) Total 19,711. The editors of the *Century History* make the total Confederate loss 20,135. (*Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, vol. ii. p. 404.)

³ McClellan's statement in detail is (*Reb. Rec.*, companion vol. p. 593) :—

	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Aggregate.
McCall's division	253	1240	1581	3074
Sumner's division	187	1076	848	2111
Heintzelman's division	189	1051	833	2073
Keys's division	69	507	201	777
Porter's division	620	2460	1198	4278
Franklin's division	245	1313	1179	2737
Engineers		2	21	23
Cavalry	19	60	97	176
Total	1582	7709	5958	15,249
Loss on June 25				516
Total				15,765

10,000”¹ were prisoners, wounded and unwounded. General Lee also states that “fifty-two pieces of artillery and upwards of 35,000 stand of small arms were captured. The stores of every description which fell into our hands were great in amount and value, but small in comparison with those destroyed by the enemy.”²

This statement of the losses of the Federal army gives, however, but a very inadequate idea of the severity of the defeat it had suffered.

Much nonsense has been written about McClellan’s “change of base” from the Pamunkey to the James, as his retreat after Cold Harbor (or Gaines’s Mill) has been called. His correspondence at the time and the official reports and testimony of himself and others show plainly the condition of affairs. On the night of June 27, McClellan found the right wing (one third) of his army thoroughly defeated and driven across the Chickahominy, his communications and depot on the Pamunkey at the mercy of the victors. He called a council, and decided not to risk another battle, but to retreat. Retreat towards the Pamunkey or York was impossible, for General Lee was in the way. He could only go down the Chickahominy, cross it below, and make his way down the peninsula on the James River side, or march for the James at the nearest point through the swamps and forests that lay between him and Turkey Bend. General Lee evidently expected him to take the former course, which is itself the strongest testimony to his skill in selecting the latter. The movement of the immense trains of his army began at once, and, concealed as he was by the forest, he gained a day before Lee divined his intentions. But from the very first this was no strategist’s movement, but simply the retreat of an army seeking safety from a victorious foe. Large hospitals filled with sick and wounded were left behind; an immense amount of quarter-

The *Century History* puts McClellan’s loss at 15,849. (*Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, vol. ii. p. 404, note.) To this should be added his loss on June 25, — 516, making in all 16,365.

¹ Lee’s report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part ii. p. 498.

² *Ib.* p. 498.

master and other stores were burned or abandoned; ammunition and arms were blown up.¹ Even greater sacrifices were contemplated. Lieutenant-Colonel B. S. Alexander, an engineer, and aide-de-camp to General McClellan, having been summoned to General McClellan's headquarters on the afternoon of June 28, testifies as follows: "I arrived there about dark. After seeing General McClellan and receiving his instructions to conduct a reconnoissance to James River for the purpose of ascertaining whether there was any enemy on the road, and for ordering up supplies for the army, — as he intended to march there, — while waiting for an escort I was shown a printed order directing the destruction of the baggage of the officers and men, and I think also the camp equipage, appealing to the officers and men to submit to this privation because it would be only temporary, — 'only for a few days,' I think the order stated. Whether it contemplated any farther destruction than that I have mentioned I do not now remember. As soon as I saw this order I returned to General McClellan's tent and remonstrated with him against allowing any such order to be issued. I told him I thought it would have a bad effect upon the army; would demoralize the officers and men; that it would tell them more plainly than in any other way that they were a defeated army, running for their lives. The general asked me very earnestly if that was my opinion. I told him it was. . . . I have heard since that that order was never promulgated, but suppressed."² On the next afternoon (29th), Heintzelman left the battlefield near Savage's Station against orders, and hastened to put White Oak swamp between

¹ See McClellan's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 60. General Sumner says: "After the battle of Gaines's Mill . . . I was ordered to withdraw from my position at daylight on the morning of the 29th of June and to retire down the railroad, seeing to the destruction of all the government property, of which there was an immense amount at the depot at Oak Orchard." (*Report on Conduct of War*, vol. i. p. 363.)

² *Report on Conduct of War*, part i. p. 592. General McClellan testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, March 2, 1863, that he had no recollection of this order. (*Report on Conduct of War*, part i. p. 436.)

his corps and the enemy.¹ On the night of the 30th, Franklin first, then the other corps commanders that had been engaged that day, fell back without orders from White Oak swamp and Frazier's farm.² On the morning of July 1, McClellan writes to Adjutant-General Thomas, "My men are completely exhausted, and I dread the result if we are attacked to-day by fresh troops. If possible, I shall retire to-night to Harrison's Bar, where the gunboats can render more aid in covering our position. Permit me to urge that not an hour should be lost in sending me fresh troops. More gunboats are much needed. I hope that the enemy was so severely handled yesterday as to render him careful in his movements to-day. I now pray for time," etc.³ Of the retreat from Malvern Hill, General Hooker testifies, "We were ordered to retreat, and it was like the retreat of a whipped army. We retreated like a parcel of sheep; everybody on the road at the same time, and a few shots from the rebels would have panic-stricken the whole command."⁴ The Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War say: "The retreat of the army from Malvern to Harrison's Bar was very precipitate. The troops upon their arrival there were huddled together in great confusion, the entire army being collected in a space of about three miles along the river. No orders were given the first day for occupying the heights which commanded the position, nor were the troops so placed as to be able to resist an attack in force by the enemy; and nothing but a heavy rain, thereby preventing the enemy from bringing up their artillery, saved the army from destruction."⁵ On July 3, McClellan writes to Secretary Stanton, "The army is thoroughly worn out and requires rest and very heavy reinforcements. Our losses have been very great, for the fighting has been desperate, and officers and men behaved heroically. I am in hopes that the enemy is as completely worn out as we are. He was certainly very severely punished in the last battle. The roads are now very bad; for

¹ General Sumner's and General Heintzelman's testimony, *Report on Conduct of War*, part i. pp. 357, 364.

² See testimony of Generals Franklin and Heintzelman, etc., *Ib.*

³ *Ib.* p. 340.

⁴ *Ib.* p. 580.

⁵ *Ib.* p. 27.

these reasons I hope we shall have enough breathing space to reorganize and rest the men, and get them into position before the enemy can attack again. . . . It is, of course, impossible to estimate as yet our losses, but [I] doubt whether there are to-day more than 50,000 men with their colors."¹ As the Federal army numbered 105,825 on June 20, and had lost, by the official reports, but 15,765 in the Seven Days' Battles, it should have contained 90,000 men on July 3. It appears from the above that of this number nearly half were sick or straggling!

The foregoing statements, all from Federal sources, as to the character of the retreat need no comment. They serve to illustrate also the frank statement of General Lee that, "under ordinary circumstances, the Federal army should have been destroyed."² Prompt information on the morning of June 28 as to McClellan's designs would have enabled Lee to concentrate his army one day sooner on the south side of the Chickahominy, and might have rendered the escape of the Federal army far more difficult. Again, on the afternoon of the 30th, had Huger and Holmes thrown their divisions against the enemy with half the vigor of Longstreet and A. P. Hill, or had Jackson, with the skill and audacity that characterized his Valley campaign, forced Franklin from White Oak swamp, that day would have been fatal to a large portion of the Federal army. Of Malvern Hill, General Hunt, who commanded the Federal artillery, which was the principal agent in the repulse of the Confederates, says: "The battle was desperately contested, and frequently trembled in the balance. The last attack . . . was nearly successful; but we won from the fact that we had kept our reserves in hand for such an attack."³ Lastly, had the Confederates pursued vigorously to Westover, the complete overthrow of the Federal army might have been their reward.

But if such were the unattained possibilities of this campaign, the very existence of these possibilities was due to the

¹ *Report on Conduct of War*, part i. p. 342.

² Lee's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part ii. p. 497.

³ General Hunt's testimony, *Report on Conduct of War*, part i. p. 574.

skill and courage of the Confederate army and its leader. The task they undertook was a bold and difficult one, and they accomplished it in a way deserving of admiration. The Federal army in their front was the largest, best organized, and best appointed force that had ever taken the field on this continent. It outnumbered the Confederates in the proportion of five to four, and its superiority in equipment was far greater. It had changed its defensive rôle of the previous autumn to one of aggression; it had transferred the seat of war from the vicinity of Washington to that of Richmond. Its advance had been slow, but unbroken, and now with both the York and James rivers at command as avenues of supply, and all its preparations complete, it was about to strike the final blow for the capture of Richmond. Eighty thousand Confederates had attacked this army of 105,000 men in its chosen position, and had driven it from Mechanicsville and Cold Harbor across the Chickahominy, and thence to James River, where, half disorganized, it had sought safety from destruction under cover of the fleet of gunboats in the river. Here, powerless for offense, it was left, amid the swamps and lowlands of the river, under a midsummer sun, to the ravages of diseases more depleting than Confederate arms. The so-called siege of Richmond was ended, and a few weeks later we are to see McClellan holding the fortifications of Washington against the victorious advance of Lee.

This great result the Confederate army had accomplished at a much larger cost of toil and blood than its enemy had undergone. Jackson's troops had made a forced march of one hundred and forty miles to enter without rest on the contest, and those divisions of the Confederate army which were near Richmond marched far more during the seven days than their adversaries.¹ While McClellan's losses in battle were not one

¹ The distance from Gaines's Mill to Westover by the route followed by the Federal army is not over twenty miles, and two thirds of that army did not march so far. On the other side, Longstreet's division, for instance, marched from its camp near the Williamsburg road to the Chickahominy opposite Mechanicsville, crossed at that point, and followed down the north side to Gaines's Mill. After the battle of the 27th, Longstreet recrossed at New Bridge and by a circuit reached the Darbytown road, by

sixth of his forces, Lee's amounted to one fourth of his command. The Federal commanders complain of the fatigue and exhaustion of their troops. The Confederates, under so much severer exertions, must needs have suffered greatly from the same causes. On July 5, Jackson had present for duty but 10,000 men in his command, exclusive of D. H. Hill's division.¹ The same part of his command had numbered about 15,500 on June 25, and had lost 3000 in battle. Hence 2500 were sick or broken down. At the same rate General Lee must have been short some 12,000 or 13,000 from the same causes at the close of the contest. But while there would thus have remained in his ranks near 50,000 men, many of these were completely worn out by the excessive fatigues of the campaign, and rest and recuperation were absolutely necessary. A few days of rest brought back many men to both armies. In this way, and still more by the return of convalescents and the slightly wounded from the hospitals, General Lee's forces increased to 67,000 by July 20,² and this number was still further increased soon after by a reinforcement of two brigades and two regiments from the South.³

McClellan, in a letter to President Lincoln⁴ July 15, states that he had "present for duty" 88,665 and "present sick"

which route he reached Frazier's farm,—the battlefield of the 30th. Next day he followed in the wake of the Federals to Malvern Hill, but was forced to make a very wide détour in following the retreating army to Westover. The distance he marched was over thirty miles.

¹ Dabney, *Life of Jackson*, p. 477.

² *Four Years with General Lee*, pp. 59, 165.

³ *Southern Historical Papers*, vol. i. p. 421 ; vol. viii. pp. 179, 218. General Lee's official report for July 20, 1862, gives his force "present for duty" as 69,559. This includes 12,231 belonging to the department of North Carolina, south of the James River ; but it does not include Jackson's and Ewell's divisions and Lawton's brigade. According to Dabney, these last commands together with Whiting's division numbered on July 5, 10,000. They may have reached this number on July 20 without Whiting, who is included in General Lee's returns above. Early in August, Jackson, Ewell, and Lawton numbered about 11,000. Hence 10,000 cannot be far out of the way for their strength on July 20. By adding this number to General Lee's return and subtracting the troops belonging to the department of North Carolina, we obtain 67,000 as Lee's strength July 20.

⁴ *Report on Conduct of War*, vol. i. p. 343.

16,619. His return for July 20¹ gives his "present for duty" (omitting Dix's corps) 91,694. The sick were sent off as rapidly as possible, but their numbers increased so fast that when the Federal army was ordered away in the early part of August there were 14,159 sick to be moved.²

Both armies were greatly in need of rest after the bloody and protracted struggle of the seven days before Richmond, and both rapidly recuperated under its influence. McClellan, who doubted on July 3 if he had 50,000 men with their colors, had at Harrison's Landing by the 20th 91,000 men present for duty, exclusive of the 16,000 or more that were sick. General Lee, who had lost some 20,000 of the 80,000 he had at the beginning of the fight, had risen to about 67,000 present for duty on July 20.

¹ *Report on Conduct of War*, p. 344.

² Medical Director Letterman's report, Appendix to *Medical and Surgical History of War*, p. 95.

CHAPTER XX.

POPE'S CAMPAIGN.

BUT while Lee and McClellan were resting, important events were taking place at Washington and in Northern Virginia. The Federal administration, satisfied of the impolicy of the separate departments and independent commands which they had organized in that region, had determined to unite under one leader the three armies of Banks, Fremont, and McDowell, which Jackson had beaten or baffled in succession. The Mountain department under Fremont, that of the Shenandoah under Banks, and that of the Rappahannock under McDowell were merged into one, and their united armies were henceforth to be styled the Army of Virginia, while McClellan's forces continued to be known as the Army of the Potomac. General John Pope, whose deeds and still more his dispatches in the West, had given him some reputation, was called to Washington and placed at the head of the new army. General Pope was assigned to command on the 26th of June,¹ which was the second of the seven days, and marked the beginning of General Lee's attack on McClellan. He remained in Washington a month, while the different forces placed under him were being united and prepared for an aggressive campaign. He was no doubt held there, too, by the authorities, who, in the midst of the great events happening on the Peninsula, desired his counsel.

¹ The order is as follows : —

"I. The forces under Major-Generals Fremont, Banks, and McDowell, including the troops now under Brigadier-General Sturgis at Washington, shall be consolidated and form one army, to be called the Army of Virginia.

"II. The command of the Army of Virginia is specially assigned to Major-General John Pope as commanding general." . . .

Fremont's troops were to constitute the 1st, Banks's the 2d, and McDowell's the 3d corps of the Army of Virginia.

At the date of Pope's assignment there was virtually no Confederate force of importance in the district which was to be the scene of his operations. Jackson had left but a small body of cavalry to hold the Valley and cover his movements, while all his infantry had united with Lee at Richmond. The cavalry thus left, as well as that along the line of the Rappahannock and south of Fredericksburg, was barely sufficient to picket the country and watch the movements of the enemy, and was not enough to offer any serious obstacle to an advance. But so crippled had Jackson left his foes that no advance was possible in time to relieve McClellan or to embarrass Lee's operations in front of Richmond.

On June 26, the forces that constituted Pope's army were located as follows: Banks's corps and Fremont's (now under Sigel, Fremont having resigned in disgust because Pope was put over him) were between Winchester and Middletown in the lower valley of the Shenandoah; Ricketts's division of McDowell's corps was at Manassas, while McDowell's other division,¹ under King, was still at Fredericksburg. The cavalry brigades, consisting of one for each corps, accompanied their respective commands.² The troops numbered, according to the official reports, about 50,000 present for duty. Besides these forces there were 12,000 men,³ under Pope, in and about Washington, constituting the garrison of the capital.

The unification of these commands under Pope was followed by another and still more important change of the same kind. The dissatisfaction of the Federal administration with General McClellan had been steadily growing for many months. This officer's caution often exposed him, and sometimes not unjustly, to the charge of timidity. He habitually exaggerated the strength of his opponents and the difficulties in his path, and though at the head of the largest and best equipped army ever seen up to that time in America, he was never quite ready or willing to move vigorously against his enemy. Hesitation to attack the Confederates at Manassas, slowness in advancing up

¹ Shields's division had in large part been sent to McClellan at Westover.

² The cavalry brigades were Beardsley's, Buford's, and Bayard's.

³ See Pope's testimony, *Report on Conduct of War*, part i. p. 277.

the Peninsula, waste of time before insufficient obstacles, as at Yorktown, constant complaints and demands for reinforcements, incessant delays and feeble advances, had now been followed by severe defeat and heavy losses. No doubt other causes, such as his moderation and his conservative political views, rendered him distasteful to the progressive radicals who at this time predominated in Mr. Lincoln's cabinet; but it must be confessed that McClellan's military conduct was not such as to inspire confidence or diminish antagonisms, and it, alone, is sufficient to account for the manner in which he was treated by his government. There can be no question that he was badly treated, but the best apology for his superiors is that he submitted so tamely. Secretary Stanton had not been a month in office when McClellan was ordered peremptorily, without consultation, upon a campaign which it was known he disapproved; he had no sooner been permitted to adopt the Peninsula route than he was, without notification, deprived of his position as commander-in-chief, and reduced to that of commander of the Army of the Potomac; he had hardly left Washington for Fort Monroe when three new departments were carved out of his military district and their commanders made independent of his authority; and by the retention of McDowell's corps he was deprived of nearly one fourth of the army he expected to operate with in the Peninsula. Our wonder at such treatment by a government that still thought it proper to intrust him with the command of its principal army only gives way before our wonder that an able and honorable man could have quietly submitted to it. About the time that the Federal administration first began to show its dislike to McClellan, one of the latter's classmates at West Point was a junior major-general in the Confederate Army. He had made his first expedition after his promotion in the winter, and had accomplished in the public estimation but little, and that little at great cost of suffering to his troops. At the earnest representations of some of his subordinates, the Confederate Secretary of War, without consultation, directed him to withdraw a portion of his command from an exposed position to one more safe. Within an hour after the reception of this order the offi-

cer referred to notified the Secretary that the order was being executed, and at the same time forwarded his resignation for immediate acceptance. Nor was the matter adjusted, and the resignation withdrawn, until the officer was satisfied that such a policy would not be adhered to. The then comparatively unknown Confederate officer (who subsequently had no cause to repeat his spirited course) was Stonewall Jackson. Had the commander-in-chief of the armies of the United States pursued a similar course in February, 1862, the result would probably have been greatly to the advantage of both his government and himself.

After the Seven Days' Battles, the Federal government called General Halleck from the West, where he had had general control of the operations which had resulted so favorably to the Federal cause, and placed him in chief command of the armies of the United States, the position from which McClellan had been deposed in March. The order assigning General Halleck was dated July 11, but the latter did not arrive in Washington and enter upon his duties until July 23. By this appointment it was designed to give a common head to the two armies in Virginia, and insure the coöperation of McClellan and Pope.

The first great question that presented itself to Halleck was, what to do with McClellan's forces, and on the day after assuming command he left Washington to visit this army. The visit seems to have satisfied him of the propriety of withdrawing the Army of the Potomac at once from the Peninsula, and of placing it on the line of the Rappahannock. In this way the two armies of Pope and McClellan would be united, and a new advance on Richmond could be made from the direction of Fredericksburg or the upper Rappahannock. McClellan earnestly opposed this course, and proposed, if strongly reinforced, to resume his movement on Richmond; but Halleck, taking the former's exaggerated estimates of the Confederate strength in his front, showed that withdrawal was the only wise thing to do. He pointed out clearly that it was injudicious to keep the two armies separated so that they could not aid each other, while Lee with a force, according to McClellan's estimates,

superior to them both combined was between them.¹ The most potent reason, however, with the Federal administration for the withdrawal from Harrison's Landing was, no doubt, the want of confidence felt in McClellan's energy and capacity, and the conviction that if allowed to remain his army would be exposed to the ravages of disease at a sickly season in an unhealthy region, without any compensating advantage. Halleck's mind seems to have been made up when he returned to Washington on July 27, but, though ordered to send off his sick on the 30th, it was not until August 3 that McClellan was informed of the determination of the government to transfer his army from the James to the Rappahannock.

During the month of July, while McClellan was resting at Westover, General Pope, though in Washington, was not idle. Having devoted some days to the reorganization and equipment of his command, he directed the concentration of the mass of his forces at the eastern base of the Blue Ridge Mountains in Rappahannock County, from which position he could cover the approach to Washington, or threaten the flank of any columns going toward the Shenandoah Valley, while he prepared for an aggressive campaign. Sigel, who had succeeded Fremont, was ordered by way of Front Royal and Luray to Sperryville; Banks, to a position ten miles east of that point; and Ricketts's division of McDowell's corps was ordered up from Manassas to Waterloo on the Rappahannock River.² King's division was left for the present at Fredericksburg. The cavalry was thrown forward, and directed to damage the railroad from Gordonsville to Richmond as much as possible.

And now it was that General Pope issued the "address" and "orders" which subsequently gained him an unenviable notoriety, and which made known the radical changes he was about to make in carrying on the war. He first issued a bombastic address to his army, dated July 14, in which, after

¹ See Halleck's letter to McClellan, August 6. (McClellan's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 82 *et seq.*)

² Waterloo is the point where the turnpike from Warrenton to Sperryville crosses the Rappahannock.

extravagant boasts of the deeds of the Western army, he condemns unsparingly the military phrases and methods of operation he finds in Virginia.¹ "I hear constantly of taking strong positions and holding them, — of lines of retreat and of bases of supplies. Let us discard such ideas. The strongest position a soldier should desire to occupy is one from which he can most easily advance against the enemy. Let us study the probable lines of retreat of our opponents, and leave our own to take care of themselves. Let us look before us and not behind. Success and glory are in the advance. Disaster and shame lurk in the rear."

It is not to be wondered at that such brave talk, when contrasted with his subsequent campaign, provoked something more than a smile. This address, however, is a small matter for criticism compared with the orders that followed it and gave character to the warfare he was about to wage. Thus,

¹ Pope's address is as follows: "Washington, Monday, July 14. To the Officers and Soldiers of the Army of Virginia: By special assignment of the President of the United States I have assumed command of this army. I have spent two weeks in learning your whereabouts, your condition, and your wants; in preparing you for active operations, and in placing you in positions from which you can act promptly and to the purpose. I have come to you from the West, where we have always seen the backs of our enemies, — from an army whose business it has been to seek the adversary, and beat him when found, whose policy has been attack, not defense. In but one instance has the enemy been able to place our Western armies in a defensive attitude. I presume that I have been called here to pursue the same system, and to lead you against the enemy. It is my purpose to do so, and that speedily. I am sure you long for an opportunity to win the distinction you are capable of achieving: that opportunity I shall endeavor to give you. Meantime, I desire you to dismiss from your minds certain phrases, which I am sorry to find much in vogue amongst you. I hear constantly of taking strong positions and holding them, — of lines of retreat and of bases of supplies. Let us discard such ideas. The strongest position a soldier should desire to occupy is one from which he can most easily advance against the enemy. Let us study the probable lines of retreat of our opponents, and leave our own to take care of themselves. Let us look before us and not behind. Success and glory are in the advance. Disaster and shame lurk in the rear. Let us act on this understanding, and it is safe to predict that your banners shall be inscribed with many a glorious deed, and that your names will be dear to your countrymen forever." (*Rebellion Record*, vol. v. p. 552.)

General Order No. 5 (July 18) directed the troops of his command to subsist upon the country in which their operations were carried on. Vouchers were to be given to the owners of the supplies taken; these vouchers were to be paid at the conclusion of the war, upon sufficient testimony being furnished of the loyalty of the holder after the date of the voucher. In General Order No. 7 (July 20) the people within his lines were notified that they would be held responsible for all damage done by guerrillas to telegraphs, railroads, and trains in his rear; that they would be turned out in mass, and forced to repair all such damages, as well as to pay the expenses incurred in "coercing the performance of the work;" and that if a soldier or camp-follower should be fired upon at any place distant from settlements, the people within five miles around should be held accountable. General Order No. 11 (July 23) says, "Commanders of army corps, divisions, brigades, and detached commands will proceed immediately to arrest all disloyal male citizens within their lines or within their reach, in rear of their respective stations. Such as are willing to take the oath of allegiance to the United States, and will furnish sufficient security for its observance, shall be permitted to remain at their homes, and pursue, in good faith, their accustomed avocations. Those who refuse shall be conducted South, beyond the extreme pickets of this army, and be notified that if found again anywhere within our lines, or at any point in rear, they will be considered spies, and be subjected to the extreme rigor of the military law." These orders had been preceded by one from Brigadier-General Steinwehr, commanding a brigade of Sigel's corps, dated July 13, which directed Major William Steadman, a cavalry officer of his brigade, to arrest five of the most prominent citizens of Page County, Va., to be held as hostages, and to suffer death in the event of any of the soldiers of said Steinwehr being shot by bushwhackers.

Mr. Ropes, in his excellent narrative of "Pope's Campaign" (p. 10), thinks that Orders 5 and 7 are "clearly warranted by the laws of civilized warfare," while for No. 11 he admits "there is absolutely no justification." He does not mention

Steinwehr's order at all. But when it is noted that No. 5 is so worded and was so construed as to give large license to any petty officer who had a commissary or quartermaster under his command to institute wholesale robbery, and that No. 7 was made to include the operations of partisan rangers and other companies of regular cavalry as well as of guerrillas, of which there were very few, it will be hard to disprove that General Pope in these orders gave indications of the savage cruelty which indisputably inspired his Order No. 11. An able Northern historian (Tenney)¹ says: "These orders of General Pope were followed by the pillaging of private property and by insults to females to a degree unknown heretofore during the war." The Confederate government, by way of retaliation, issued an order declaring that General Pope and the commissioned officers serving under him were "not entitled to be considered as soldiers, and therefore not entitled to the benefit of cartel for the parole of future prisoners of war. Ordered, further, that in the event of the capture of Major-General Pope, or any commissioned officer serving under him, the captive so taken shall be held in close confinement so long as the orders aforesaid shall continue in force and unrepealed by the competent military authority of the United States, and that in the event of the murder of an unarmed citizen or inhabitant of this Confederacy by virtue or under pretense of the order hereinbefore recited, it shall be the duty of the commanding general of the forces of this Confederacy to cause immediately to be hung, out of the commissioned officers, prisoners as aforesaid, a number equal to that of our own citizens thus murdered by the enemy."²

But it is time to turn from McClellan and his 90,000 men resting at Harrison's Landing, and Pope with his 50,000 on the line of the Rappahannock, to see what steps General Lee was taking to meet them. Notwithstanding the great success of the Confederate commander, the vastly superior resources at the command of the Union government threatened soon to

¹ Tenney, p. 255.

² The Confederate order in retaliation, General Order No. 54, is to be found in the *Rebellion Record*, companion vol. p. 359.

neutralize the advantages he had gained. The mighty wave of Federal invasion had been checked, broken, forced to recede, but it was only to gather new strength with which to dash against breastworks already tested to their utmost. McClellan was rapidly recuperating at Harrison's Landing. Troops were being drawn from North Carolina, probably to reinforce him.¹ The command of the James River placed it in his power to renew the direct advance on Richmond, or to cross to the south bank and attack from the Petersburg side.² While the Federal army in front of Richmond, which he could not attack in its intrenched position, thus threatened General Lee with full occupation, the appointment of Pope to command in Northern Virginia, and the concentration of the latter's forces on the upper Rappahannock and at Fredericksburg, and the demonstrations of his cavalry, imperatively called Lee's attention to the danger impending in that direction. The armies from which Jackson had slipped away to join Lee at Richmond had been united, and were about to resume the offensive. An advance of Pope to Gordonsville and Charlottesville would cut all railroad communication between Richmond and Northern Virginia, including the Shenandoah Valley, would place the richest part of the State in hostile hands, and would deprive the Confederate army of necessary supplies. It was vitally important to hold Pope in check until McClellan's plans should be developed, or arrangements could be made for aggressive operations against one or the other of the Federal armies in Virginia. Under these circumstances, General Lee on July 13 ordered Jackson with the veteran troops of his own and Ewell's division to Gordonsville to oppose Pope's advance. The force thus sent numbered about 11,000 men.³ Robertson's brigade of cavalry, which

¹ Burnside was ordered July 4, with 13,000 men, to Newport News. Subsequently he was ordered to Aquia Creek, after it had been decided to transfer McClellan's army.

² This plan, adopted by Grant two years later, was outlined in McClellan's interview with Halleck July 25, 1862. See *Report on Conduct of War*, vol. i. p. 454.

³ Jackson had with him the regiments that had composed his force in the Valley (less the 16th Mississippi of Trimble's brigade), and in addition

was already in Pope's front, added 1000 or 1200 more. General Lee remained with some 65,000 men between McClellan and Richmond.

General Jackson reached the vicinity of Gordonsville on July 19. His arrival was opportune. The Federal reconnoitring parties had already advanced through Culpeper to the Rapidan,¹ and on July 14 Banks had been ordered to send forward all his cavalry under Hatch to seize Gordonsville and destroy the railroad in both directions from that point. Hatch, however, was slow, and, selecting a route by way of Madison Court House, had only reached the latter place on the 17th. Jackson's approach prevented his prosecuting farther his attempt on Gordonsville. A few days after, Hatch was had Lawton's brigade of six regiments and the 47th and 48th Alabama that had been added to Taliaferro's brigade, — a net addition of seven regiments. The organization was as follows : —

Winder's division. Winder's or Stonewall brigade contained the 2d, 4th, 5th, 27th, and 33d Virginia. Jones's or Campbell's brigade contained the 21st, 42d, and 48th Virginia, and 1st Virginia battalion. Taliaferro's brigade contained the 10th, 23d, 37th Virginia, and 47th, 48th Alabama. Batteries : Poague, Carpenter, Caskie, Wooding. Lawton's brigade contained the 13th, 26th, 31st, 38th, 60th, 61st Georgia.

Ewell's division. Early's brigade contained the 13th, 25th, 31st, 44th, 52d, 58th Virginia, and 12th Georgia. Trimble's brigade contained the 15th Alabama, 21st Georgia, and 21st North Carolina, and 1st battalion of North Carolina sharpshooters. Hays's brigade contained the 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 14th Louisiana, and 1st Louisiana battalion. Batteries : Latimer (Courtney artillery), Johnson (Bedford artillery), D'Aquin (Louisiana Guard artillery), Dement (1st Maryland), Brown (Chesapeake, or 2d Maryland), Pleasants (Manchester artillery). Ewell's division return for July 10–12 gives his infantry "present for duty" (including 1st Louisiana, or Wheat's battalion) as 4657. Lawton's brigade numbered 2041 on August 13. (*Southern Historical Papers*, vol. viii. p. 304.) Winder's division, which had seen the hardest service in the Valley, was more depleted than Ewell's. For instance, the only two regiments of Winder's brigade whose strength at Cedar Run is officially given did not average 150 each. Even if Winder's strength per regiment had been 291, which is the average of Ewell's regiments above given, the number of the thirteen and a half regiments composing Winder's division would have been only 3928. Hence the total infantry was about 10,000 ; the artillery could not have raised the number to 11,000. Ewell's division gained about 400 in number by August 9. See Early's return, *Southern Historical Papers*, vol. viii. p. 304.

¹ Pope's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 23.

directed to take some "1500 or 2000 of the best mounted men,"¹ of his own and Bayard's brigade, and, striking the railroad west of Gordonsville, push forward to Charlottesville and destroy the railroad running from that place to Lynchburg. This expedition was abandoned, however, almost as soon as undertaken, no doubt because of Jackson's proximity, and General Hatch returned to Sperryville. He was now relieved of command, and Buford assigned in his stead.² The Federal cavalry, operating on General King's line at Fredericksburg, were more enterprising, for, on the 20th, they made a dash at the Virginia Central Railroad at Beaver Dam, after Jackson had passed up, and did some damage, and a few days later made another raid towards Hanover Junction, but retired before J. E. B. Stuart, who advanced against them.

Jackson found himself at Gordonsville in front of a force several times as numerous as his own,³ and was thus reduced to a defensive attitude, while he applied to Lee for reinforcements. The Confederate commander-in-chief, largely inferior to McClellan in strength, and as yet uncertain as to the designs of the latter, deemed the risk of sending more troops to Jackson too great to be incurred at the moment. It became known to Lee that Burnside was withdrawing from North Carolina to reinforce McClellan. Jackson was therefore "directed to observe the enemy's movements closely, to avail himself of any opportunity to attack that might arise, and assistance was promised, should the progress of General Pope put it in our power to strike an effectual blow without withdrawing the troops too long from the defense of the capital."⁴

A week, however, passed away with no movement on McClellan's part, while Pope showed increased signs of activity. Lee concluded to take the risk and reinforce Jackson. He says:—

¹ Pope's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 24.

² Pope's report, *Ib.* p. 24. General John P. Hatch was now placed in command of one of the brigades in King's division.

³ Jackson's strength was about 12,000; Pope's (including King at Fredericksburg) was 49,500 by the returns, and 43,000 by his report.

⁴ Lee's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 176. See Lee's letters of 23d, 25th, and 26th of July.

"The army at Westover continuing to manifest no intention of resuming active operations, and General Pope's advance having reached the Rapidan, General A. P. Hill, with his division, was ordered on July 27 to join General Jackson. At the same time, in order to keep McClellan stationary, or, if possible, to cause him to withdraw, General D. H. Hill, commanding south of James River, was directed to threaten his communications by seizing favorable positions below Westover from which to attack the transports in the river. That officer selected Coggins's Point, opposite Westover, and the conduct of the expedition was committed to Brigadier-General French.

"On the night of the 31st, General French, accompanied by Brigadier-General Pendleton, chief of artillery, placed forty-three guns in position, within range of the enemy's shipping in the river and of the camps on the north side, upon both of which fire was opened, causing consternation and inflicting serious damage. The guns were withdrawn before daybreak, with the loss of 1 killed and 2 wounded by the gunboats and batteries of the enemy. This attack caused General McClellan to send a strong force to the south bank of the river, which intrenched itself on Coggins's Point."¹ McClellan reports 10 killed and 15 wounded in this night attack of French's, but says no harm was done to his shipping.

Events began to crowd each other more rapidly towards the close of July. On the 29th, Pope left Washington, and transferring his headquarters to "the saddle" assumed command, in person, of his army. On the next day, Burnside, who was at Newport News with his corps, was ordered to proceed to Aquia Creek instead of going to Harrison's Landing. On the same day, McClellan was directed to send off his sick, though the determination of his government to withdraw his army was not yet made known to him. On this same 30th of July, information received from Pope was sent to McClellan to the effect that the Confederates were leaving Richmond, and this was repeated again next day. McClellan was directed to press forward and determine the truth of the report.² For this purpose

¹ Lee's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. pp. 176, 177.

² McClellan's report, *Ib.* Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 76.

Hooker's division and Pleasanton's cavalry were ordered to gain possession of Malvern Hill while the gunboats ascended the river in their flank. Delays occurred, and it was not until August 5 that Hooker drove off the Confederate outposts and seized the hill. On the 6th, General Lee moved down to meet him. "McLaws's and Ripley's divisions, reinforced by D. R. Jones's division, formed our left; Longstreet the right. The heat was intense, and the progress of the troops necessarily slow. Before the road was cleared of the enemy's pickets and his line of battle disclosed, the sun had almost set. Orders were given for our left wing to advance to Willis Church, threatening the communication between Westover by extending well to the left, while two brigades of Longstreet's division were directed to advance upon Malvern Hill and drive in the enemy on Curl's Neck. The latter operation was handsomely executed by General Evans, with his own and Cobb's brigade, forcing the enemy back to his guns on Malvern Hill.

"The next morning, upon advancing, it was found that he had withdrawn during the night and retired to Westover."¹

McClellan found that he could only hold Malvern Hill by supporting Hooker and perhaps fighting a general battle, which, under reiterated orders² to withdraw from the Peninsula, that had now been sent, he was unwilling to do. He had therefore directed Hooker on the night of the 6th to abandon his position. This closed McClellan's campaign on the Peninsula. For the next two or three weeks he was occupied in transferring his material and troops to the Potomac at Aquia and Alexandria, a movement that his adversary made no attempt to impede.

McClellan's advance to Malvern deterred General Lee at the time from sending other forces in addition to A. P. Hill's division to Jackson's assistance. He informed Jackson, on the morning of August 7, that though he did not believe McClellan's movement was more than a demonstration, he could not send him the reinforcements he intended and desired.³

¹ Lee's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part i. p. 177.

² McClellan received the first order to withdraw August 4. He remonstrated against it, but it was reiterated and promptness urged on the 5th.

³ Lee's letters, August 7, nine A. M.

Simultaneously with this affair at Malvern Hill, Stuart, with Fitzhugh's cavalry brigade and the Stuart horse artillery, succeeded in checking a formidable demonstration against the Central Railroad, which was the main avenue of communication between Jackson and Lee. Two brigades of Federal infantry (Hatch's and Gibbon's), with artillery, were sent forward by the Telegraph road from Fredericksburg toward Hanover Junction. It was no doubt thought that this strong body would effect far more than had been accomplished by the desultory raids of the cavalry. Stuart, who had been delayed by high water, set out from Hanover Court House on an expedition towards Fredericksburg on August 4. Camping that night near Bowling Green, he next day marched directly to Port Royal on the Rappahannock, in order to flank the enemy's forces, as well as to attack any transports he might find on that river.¹ Finding no boats passing, he turned towards Fredericksburg, halting for the night at Grace Church. Hearing next morning (6th of August) that a considerable force had moved southward from Fredericksburg, he struck the Telegraph road at Massaponax Church in the rear of this body, which was Hatch's and Gibbon's brigades, and scattering or capturing a train, pressed on after them until he overtook and attacked their rear-guard at the Po River. The whole body of Federals now halted and reversed their march to attack him. Keeping up a brisk skirmish, he gradually retired, at first towards Fredericksburg, and then turned off to Bowling Green. The Federals, having reopened their communications with Fredericksburg, returned to that place and abandoned their designs. Stuart lost but two men and brought off 85 prisoners, 11 wagons and teams, besides cavalry horses and arms,² and by his mingled boldness and good fortune, put an effectual check on the raids against the Confederate lines of communication.

¹ Stuart's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 120.

² Stuart's report, *Ib.* p. 121. For Federal notice of this expedition, see *Rebellion Record*, vol. v., Diary of Events, August 7, p. 55.

CHAPTER XXI.

CEDAR RUN.

IT is time to return to Jackson at Gordonsville. For two weeks he had rested quietly at this place, watching closely Pope's movements, and waiting to see if Lee could strengthen him sufficiently to enable him to strike at his adversary. A. P. Hill's division and Stafford's brigade joined him in the early days of August, but no farther additions to his force could be made at this time. Hill's strength was 10,623;¹ and Stafford possibly made this number 12,000. Jackson now had 24,000 troops in all;² but he was still only half as strong as Pope, while Burnside's corps, now uniting with the latter's wing at Fredericksburg, was about to render the disparity more marked.³ A

¹ Taylor, *Four Years with General Lee*, p. 165.

² General Lee's letter of July 27. Lee says Hill and Stafford exceeded "18,000 men." There is probably a misprint here, for though General Lee is evidently speaking of the "aggregate" and not the effective strength, the discrepancy is wider than would be expected. Hill's official report of "present for duty" July 20 (Taylor, p. 165) gives him 10,623 officers and men. Of this force one regiment (60th Virginia) was transferred from Hill's division before he joined Jackson, and another (3d Louisiana battalion changed into 15th Louisiana regiment) was incorporated in Stafford's brigade. Stafford's brigade (1st, 2d, 9th, 10th, 15th Louisiana, and Coppen's battalion) took one regiment from Hill and another (9th Louisiana) from Ewell. At the same time the 5th and 14th Louisiana regiments were added to Taylor's brigade of Ewell's division to make up for the 9th Louisiana. Thus, through these changes, Stafford added really but four and one half regiments to Jackson's numbers, while one regiment (60th Virginia) is to be deducted from Hill, leaving a net increase of three and one half regiments in addition to Hill's numbers of July 20. These regiments are estimated above the average strength when in the text they are made to raise the number of reinforcements from 10,623 to 12,000.

³ Burnside reached Aquia Creek August 3. (Halleck's report, *War Records*, Ser I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 5.)

general battle with Pope was therefore to be avoided, but it was important to strike him a blow that would disconcert him and delay the development of his plans of campaign. Jackson knew that a strictly defensive attitude meant merely to wait until his adversary, with forces concentrated and plans matured, should advance in overwhelming numbers. He was therefore anxious to take advantage of the divided condition of Pope's army, the left wing at Fredericksburg being widely separated from the main body on the Rappahannock.

On the 2d of August, a brisk skirmish took place between some of the cavalry of the hostile armies at Orange Court House. General Crawford, with some of Buford's cavalry, was making a reconnoissance, and had occupied Orange Court House,¹ when Colonel W. E. Jones, with the 7th Virginia, on his way to relieve the pickets on the Rapidan, approached the place, and having been informed of the enemy's presence ordered an attack. The fighting took place in the streets of the village. Jones's dash was at first successful, but he was soon flanked on his right by a part of Crawford's force, and his command was thrown into confusion and forced from the town. The Federals attempted no pursuit, and in a short time withdrew and recrossed the river. Jones lost 10 wounded and 40 prisoners in this affair, while the Federal loss was 4 killed and 16 wounded.² The activity of the Federal cavalry along the Rapidan indicated early movements on the part of the main body. Pope was indeed preparing to move forward in force on Gordonsville, that he might, by occupying the Confederates, cover the withdrawal of McClellan from the James River.³

It was necessary for Jackson to strike promptly if he would not have the whole of Pope's army on his hands. He says: "Having received information that only part of General Pope's army was at Culpeper Court House, and hoping through the blessing of Providence to be able to defeat it

¹ Crawford had crossed at Somerville Ford. See *Rebellion Record*, vol. v. Doc. 168, p. 569.

² See *Rebellion Record*, vol. v. Doc. 168, p. 569.

³ Halleck's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 6.

before reinforcements should arrive there, Ewell's, Hill's, and Jackson's divisions were moved on the 7th in the direction of the enemy from their respective encampments near Gordonsville. On the morning of the 8th, the enemy's cavalry north of the Rapidan were driven back by ours, under Brigadier-General Robertson. Our cavalry pursued the enemy's on the direct road from Barnett's ford to Culpeper Court House, and was followed by the other troops, Ewell's division leading." ¹

On the very day that Jackson began his movement, Pope was concentrating his forces in the vicinity of Culpeper Court House. He says: "All preparations having been completed, I instructed Banks to move forward on the 7th of August and take post at the point where the turnpike from Sperryville to Culpeper crosses Hazel River. General McDowell was ordered on the day previous to move forward with Ricketts's division from Waterloo Bridge to Culpeper Court House, so that on the 7th of August all the infantry and artillery forces of the Army of Virginia were assembled along the turnpike from Sperryville to Culpeper, and numbered about 28,500 men. King's division, as I have before stated, was left on the lower Rappahannock, opposite Fredericksburg, and was not then available for active operations in the direction of Gordonsville." ² Buford's cavalry ³ at Madison Court House

¹ Jackson's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 182. Crawford's brigade of Banks's corps had for some days occupied Culpeper Court House. (Pope's report, *Ib.* p. 25.)

² Pope's report, *Ib.* p. 24. Pope, in his estimate of his infantry and artillery, reduces Banks's corps from the official report of 11,067 to 8000. The cavalry was about 5000 strong. Adding this, Pope had by his own statement 33,500 men to oppose Jackson; but he really had by his official returns 36,500. See Ropes, *The Army under Pope*, p. 194. Mr. Ropes follows General G. H. Gordon into a singular error in regard to the discrepancy between Banks and Pope. Banks had by his official return, July 31, 14,500 infantry and artillery and 4100 cavalry. But of the infantry and artillery 2500 were at Winchester and 1000 at Front Royal, leaving 11,000 as the infantry and artillery actually with Banks. Now Pope says in a note at the bottom of this return: "Instead of 14,500 infantry and artillery Banks

³ Buford had five regiments — 1st Maryland, 1st Vermont, 1st Michigan, 1st Virginia, and 5th New York.

picketed the Rapidan from Barnett's ford to the foot of the Blue Ridge. An infantry brigade and battery from Sigel supported him. Bayard¹ at Rapidan Station extended from Buford's left to Raccoon ford on the Rapidan. Cavalry pickets along the river connected Bayard's left with King at Fredericksburg.²

Jackson, having crossed the Rapidan early on the 8th, continued to advance, forcing the Federal cavalry back before him. Pope reached Culpeper Court House in the forenoon of this day, and, learning of the advance of the Confederates in force, he ordered Banks and Sigel to hasten on to Culpeper Court House, and dispatched Crawford's brigade of Banks's corps, which was already at that point, towards Cedar Run to support Bayard's cavalry. The Confederates did not make very rapid progress. A. P. Hill's division was tardy, and the march was, in consequence, disarranged and delayed. The excessive heat and the activity of the Federal cavalry were additional impediments.³ Ewell's, the front division, made but eight miles on the 8th, Hill's only two. Jackson dispatched General Lee on the morning of the 9th in a rather despondent strain: "I fear that the expedition will, in consequence of my tardy movements, be productive of but little good. My plan was to have been at Culpeper Court House this forenoon. The enemy's infantry . . . is about five miles in front, his cavalry near ours."⁴

Jackson continued to press forward, however, and having had only about 8000 from his report to me after the battle of Cedar Mountain." It seems evident from this that the discrepancy was 3000, not 6000 as General Gordon makes it, for on this very return the 3500 left at Winchester and Front Royal are deducted from the strength of the army. Sickness and heat (in addition to heavy detachments) were the causes that prevented Banks from bringing more than 8000 of his 11,000 infantry and artillery into the fight at Cedar Mountain.

¹ Bayard had four regiments — 1st New Jersey, 1st Pennsylvania, 1st Rhode Island, and 1st Maine.

² Pope's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. pp. 24, 25.

³ Jackson says there were several cases of sunstroke (Dispatch, August 9, *Ib.* p. 181), and that Lawton's brigade had to be detailed to protect the trains from the enemy's cavalry. (Jackson's report, *Ib.* p. 182.)

⁴ Jackson's dispatch from Locust Dale, *Ib.* pp. 180, 181.

reached the vicinity of Cedar Run, he found that Bayard's cavalry had now halted, and that the Federal infantry was at hand ready to dispute his advance.¹

The position occupied by the Federals was along the line of one of the tributaries of Cedar Run, which runs southward and joins the main stream near the eastern end of Slaughter Mountain. This last is the name of a range of hills, running northeast and southwest at this point, which overlook the battlefield. The road from Orange to Culpeper on which both armies were moving to meet each other crosses the small stream above mentioned at right angles. On the western side of this stream was a wood, and the ground was somewhat elevated. Here the Federals took position. In front of them the country was open and in some parts broken. On the north side of the Culpeper road in their front was a wheat-field, surrounded by woods, except along the road. Still farther to the north was heavily wooded high ground. On the south side of the road were a cornfield and pasture fields, and on that side the ground was more open. The plateau ascended by gentle slopes to the mountain.

Ewell's division was in the Confederate advance, and about one o'clock was ordered forward. Two of his brigades, Trimble's and Hays's, the latter under Forno, with Latimer's and part of Johnson's battery² under Ewell himself, diverged to the right towards the foot of Slaughter Mountain, and then marched along its side until they reached the slopes at the northeast point of the mountain, where they took up a commanding position which overlooked the Federal left wing. Here the guns were placed in battery. The other brigade of this division (Early's) moved forward near the Culpeper road, crossing a branch of Cedar Run, and pressing back the Federal cavalry until the Confederates reached the crest of the ridge, where they came in view of the Federal infantry and

¹ Crawford's infantry brigade had reached the field the night before, and was preparing to hold the Confederates in check until Banks could arrive with the remainder of his corps. The latter was rapidly approaching, and the head of the column arrived at midday.

² A section under Lieutenant Terry.

artillery on the plateau already mentioned. Here Early took up his position on a line perpendicular to the Culpeper road and to the south of it, his right resting on a clump of cedars not far in advance of Mrs. Crittenden's house, where were posted three guns from Brown's and Dement's batteries.¹ Five other guns were not far in rear of these, nearer Mrs. Crittenden's house.² In his front was open pasture ground sloping gently downward, beyond which was a cornfield which sloped up again to the opposite crest, on which was the Federal line. Some distance to Early's right and separated from him was Ewell, with the brigades of Trimble and Forno. North of the Culpeper road the wheatfield mentioned was just opposite the cornfield on the south side, but the country on the north side was much less open than on the south side. On the prolongation of Early's left was timber which everywhere on the north side of the road extended close up to the wheatfield. Winder, whose division followed Ewell's, was directed to support Early. He advanced along the Culpeper road, placed Campbell's brigade (under Garnett) in the woods north of that road facing the wheatfield, with its right regiments, however, bent back and facing the road, Taliaferro's brigade at the road supporting guns from Poague's, Carpenter's, and Caskie's batteries, while his own brigade under Ronald was kept in reserve.

While Jackson was thus preparing to deliver battle, his old adversary of the Shenandoah Valley, Banks, was hastening to meet him. Pope had given Banks the following order in the morning:—

CULPEPER, 9.45 A. M. August 9, 1862.

"General Banks to move to the front immediately, assume command of all forces in the front, deploy his skirmishers if the enemy advances, and attack him immediately as he approaches, and be reinforced from here."³

¹ One piece, three-inch rifle, from Brown, and two from Dement.

² Two of Dement's and three of D'Aquin's. (Courteny's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 238.)

³ Ropes, *The Army under Pope*, p. 20. Cf. *Report on Conduct of War*, vol. iii. (1865) p. 45, at end of volume. This order was sent verbally through Colonel Marshall, and was written out from Colonel Marshall's

Pope had also sent Ricketts's division two or three miles from Culpeper in the same direction,¹ and Sigel was being hastened forward to Culpeper from Sperryville, where he had foolishly wasted a day.²

General Roberts, of Pope's staff, was sent with Banks to select the ground he was to occupy. Roberts had already posted Crawford's brigade on the wooded plateau, before mentioned, to the west of the creek, and when Banks's corps reached the field about midday they were formed on the line thus taken. Augur's division, containing the three brigades of Greene, Prince, and Geary, were placed south of the main road and perpendicular to it, — Greene being on the Federal left and Geary next the road. In their front was the corn-field, and beyond that pasture grounds, which stretched towards Slaughter Mountain. North of the main road and in the timber was Crawford's brigade. In their front was the wheatfield spoken of.³ The woods on Crawford's right were held by a part of the 3d Wisconsin regiment, deployed as skirmishers, but the brigade (Gordon's) to which this regi-

dictation. Banks has been severely blamed for attacking at Cedar Mountain, and Mr. Ropes and some other writers tried to show that he exceeded his orders. In the light of subsequent events, Mr. Ropes undertakes to explain away even this order, and to make it mean that Banks should really assume the defensive until the remainder of the army could join him. But while Banks's military judgment was sadly at fault on this as on many other occasions, it will be hard to prove, if language means anything, that he at all transgressed his orders. Of course the order should not have been given, but it was given, and by a man who a few weeks later tried and broke Fitz-John Porter for not literally carrying out one not less ill-judged.

¹ Ricketts had been placed at the junction of the road from Madison Court House with that from Orange Court House, for Pope says that he was uncertain from the cavalry reports whether the enemy was moving on Madison or Culpeper.

² Pope blames Sigel severely for not marching to Culpeper on the 8th as ordered. Sigel stopped at Sperryville and sent to Pope at Culpeper (twenty miles off) a courier to inquire what road he should follow! (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 25.)

³ The wheatfield was about 800 yards in length perpendicular to the road, and from 400 to 600 wide, says General Gordon. Mr. Tripp makes it not more than 700 yards long, and from 300 to 400 wide.

ment belonged was 1500 yards¹ to the right and rear, on the eastern side of the branch of Cedar Run. It had been so placed because of the strength of the elevated wooded position which there covered the right of the Federal line.

As soon as Early had taken the position already described on the field, the Federal batteries opened. The guns of Dement and Brown quickly replied, and soon were aided by the batteries which General Winder had placed on Early's left, and also by Latimer's guns from the mountain side. "For some two hours a rapid and continuous fire of artillery was kept up on both sides."² At an early period in this artillery duel General C. S. Winder fell mortally wounded by a piece of shell. The Southern army thus lost an accomplished soldier, and the Confederate cause a chivalrous and unselfish defender. General W. B. Taliaferro now succeeded to the command of the division, and Colonel A. G. Taliaferro to that of the brigade. Meantime Banks was preparing to attack. Smarting under the criticisms to which his campaign of the preceding spring had subjected him, sent forward with orders to attack the enemy "immediately, if he approaches," by a commander noted for bluster,³ goaded by the remarks of the officer whom Pope had sent to select his field of battle,⁴ Banks was not in a cautious or hesitating mood. He was ignorant of the strength of the opposing forces. He no doubt judged of Jackson's army by that of Pope, and hoped to be able to strike a damaging blow at the leading division before the others could support it. About five P. M. Banks gave orders for the advance. Crawford's brigade on the north of the Culpeper road, and Geary's and Prince's brigades south of it, moved forward promptly and gallantly. Gordon's brigade, which was some distance to the right and rear of Crawford, remained for the time in reserve, while Greene's brigade

¹ Gordon, *Second Massachusetts and Stonewall Jackson*, p. 184.

² Jackson's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 183.

³ See Pope's orders and addresses.

⁴ Banks's testimony before Committee on Conduct of War as given by General Gordon, p. 220 of his *Second Massachusetts and Stonewall Jackson*. (*Report on Conduct of War*, 1865, vol. iii. p. 46, at end of volume.)

guarded the other flank of the Federals. Opposite the Federal left there was a gap in the Confederate line between Early's right and the brigades under Ewell in person, on the mountain side, and the Federals attempted to take advantage of this. But upon Early asking for troops to fill this space, Thomas's brigade of A. P. Hill's division was sent forward for the purpose, and the attacking forces failed to make any impression on this part of the line. Greater success, however, had meanwhile attended their efforts elsewhere on the field. Campbell's brigade occupied the wood on the Confederate side of the wheatfield. Taliaferro's brigade filled up the space between Campbell and Early.¹ Crawford's troops on the opposite side of the wheatfield were concealed by the woods, and the greater part of them were unseen by the Confederates until they advanced to the attack. With Crawford was a part of one of Gordon's regiments,² which struck Garnett's³ left and poured in a galling fire, while Crawford boldly charged across the wheatfield in front. The left regiment of Garnett's line⁴ first gave way, and the others were quickly driven back and thrown into confusion. Gallant efforts were made by the officers of Garnett's brigade to check the retreat, but for the time in vain. Every regimental commander fell, wounded or dead.⁵ The overthrow of Garnett's brigade exposed the flank of Talia-

¹ The 10th Virginia of Taliaferro's brigade was detached and sent to the extreme left of the Confederate line north of and next to Campbell's brigade, but apparently not in close contact with it.

² Six companies of the 3d Wisconsin.

³ Garnett commanded Campbell's brigade. This brigade was also known as Jones's.

⁴ The 1st Virginia battalion, or Irish battalion, as it was usually called. Major Seddon says it was attacked on the left flank as well as in front.

⁵ Lieutenant-Colonel Cunningham commanded the 21st Virginia. He had entered the service with Company F, a select company from Richmond, and had won a high reputation for ability and courage. Major Henry Lane fell at the head of the 42d, and Captain Hannum at that of the 48th, and Major Seddon in command of the 1st Virginia battalion. The 21st Virginia, being nearly at right angles with the left of the brigade and engaged with Augur's troops, was struck completely in the rear by Crawford and suffered heavily. The 48th was nearly surrounded. Part cut their way out. The others clung to their position in the woods until they were relieved by Branch's successful advance.

ferro, who, struck by Crawford in flank and Geary in front, was likewise driven back. The tide next struck the left of Early, and soon the half of his regiments were either broken or borne back. His left regiment, 13th Virginia, under Colonel J. A. Walker, made an unusually gallant and determined resistance, and preserved its organization. The right of Early's brigade, however (consisting of the 12th Georgia and parts of the 52d and 58th Virginia), stood firm, and the surging tide broke against it in vain. The Federal lines made no further progress. So sudden and vigorous had been the charge of Banks's corps that they had thus driven the whole of Jackson's left from its position before the Confederate reserves could be brought into action. But these were now at hand. As soon as Garnett's brigade had begun to yield, orders had been sent to Winder's brigade to move up to its support. Jackson next ordered up Branch's brigade of Hill's division, which deployed on the right of Winder's brigade. Winder's brigade (Stonewall) for the most part overlapped Crawford, but its two right regiments, the 27th and 33d Virginia, were at once heavily engaged, the 27th giving way before the Federals. At this moment Branch came forward in splendid order, his line extending to the road on his right, and struck Crawford in full force and quickly changed the aspect of affairs. Meantime the left of the Stonewall brigade, having advanced unopposed on Crawford's flank, wheeled at right angles to Branch, and poured their fire into the flank of the troops that were yielding to Branch's gallant onset. Crawford's men, more or less exhausted by the efforts they had made, were unable to resist this counter assault of fresh troops. The Confederates who had been driven back had been rallied, too, encouraged by the presence of reinforcements and inspired by the presence of Jackson, who threw himself among the disordered troops and aided to restore the battle. Colonel Walker's regiment served as a nucleus for some of them. Others joined the fresh brigades. The storm burst violently upon the Federals. They were quickly driven back to the wheatfield. Their lines melted away under the scorching fire until they broke and scattered. Crawford had

left one of his regiments (10th Maine) in reserve, when he first advanced to the attack. This was now ordered up and sent into the wheatfield. When it reached this, the remainder of Crawford's brigade had been scattered, and in a very short time the 10th Maine was overwhelmed.¹ Meantime, Gordon's brigade, the only Federal reserve on their right, had been hurried forward to sustain Crawford. When Gordon reached the field Crawford's troops had all been thoroughly beaten, but Gordon led his gallant brigade forward and attempted to check the Confederates. While he had been coming up, Archer's and Pender's Confederate brigades² had moved up to the left of Winder's brigade, and Pender had been thrown forward on the extreme left along the end of the wheatfield to take the Federal line in flank. Gordon's efforts against this accumulation of force were worse than vain. He held his ground for a short time, but was then forced from the field in disorder, leaving more than one third of his command killed, wounded, and prisoners. Soon after, a body of Federal cavalry charged down the Culpeper road, but they were quickly routed.³ Geary's and Prince's brigades of Augur's division on the south side of the road had been borne back and defeated at the same time as Crawford's and Gordon's.⁴ Generals Augur and Geary were wounded, General Prince and a number of men of his brigade were captured. Early and Thomas had held their own and turned the scale in the crisis of the battle. The two brigades under Ewell on the mountain side joined late in the day in the advance. They had been prevented for a time from attacking the Federal left because the ground over which it was necessary for them to pass was swept by Confederate batteries, but this difficulty

¹ See Gordon's *Second Massachusetts and Stonewall Jackson*, p. 184.

² Of A. P. Hill's division.

³ Mr. Tripp says this cavalry was the 1st battalion, 1st Pennsylvania cavalry, Major R. I. Tate, — 164 rank and file, — and that they were sent forward by General Bayard to save Krupp's battery, as there were no other troops at hand. But 71 escaped.

⁴ Crawford's and Gordon's brigades constituted Williams's division, and Geary's, Prince's, and Greene's brigades composed Augur's division of Banks's corps.

removed, they joined in the general advance. Pressed now on every part of the line, the Federal troops thought no longer of resistance, but of safety, and retreated in but little order a mile or two from the battlefield. Here they were met by Ricketts's division and Sigel's troops, which General Pope was hastening forward to their assistance. Jackson followed up the retreating foe as fast as the dark night would permit. One and a half miles from the battlefield he came upon the Federals once more in line of battle and ready to resist. This was Ricketts's division, which had been thrown forward to cover the retreat of Banks and to check pursuit. Jackson sent forward Pegram's battery and Field's brigade to test this new obstacle. Pegram produced some confusion among the retreating troops, but soon drew upon himself a well-directed fire from several of Ricketts's batteries, which inflicted some damage and silenced him. Jackson gave up farther pursuit, and bivouacked for the remainder of the night.

The Confederate losses in this battle were 1314. Nearly half of this loss (611) fell upon the two brigades (Jones's and Taliaferro's) which were driven from their position by the Federals at the outset of the fight. Early's brigade lost 163, while the four brigades of Winder, Branch, Archer, and Pender, which attacked and routed the enemy, lost altogether but 273.¹ Jackson captured 400 prisoners, some 5300² stand of arms, one 12-pounder Napoleon, and three colors.³

¹ *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. pp. 179, 180.

² Mr. Ropes thinks this a misprint, and says the total muskets in Banks's corps did not greatly exceed this number. Pope credits Banks next day with 5000 men (infantry and artillery), and estimates his loss at 1800 killed and wounded and prisoners, and 1000 stragglers. This gives Banks about 8000 infantry and artillery on the 9th, which is what Pope elsewhere credits him with. As to the small arms, the number reported to Jackson was probably the number picked up on the battlefield, and this included those belonging to the dead and severely wounded Confederates — in this case probably amounting to 1000. If we consider the actual losses of Banks's corps, the severity of the defeat, especially of the brigades on his right, and the condition of his command next day, which made Pope omit it altogether in estimating his available strength, a loss of 4300 muskets will not seem so much out of proportion.

³ One of these belonged to the 5th Connecticut and one to the 28th New York.

The Federal loss was officially reported, according to General Gordon, at 1661 killed and wounded, 732 missing. Total, 2393.¹ Of this loss 867 fell upon Crawford's brigade, nearly half of its strength, and 466 on Gordon's.²

Another scorching August day followed the battle. Instead of the storm and turmoil of the preceding evening and night, a Sabbath stillness reigned everywhere. Jackson had learned by the check to his advance on the night before that fresh troops had joined the enemy. This was confirmed by prisoners, and by the information obtained by cavalry and scouts. It was reported that Sigel and McDowell had come up to Banks's aid, which meant that Pope was concentrating his whole army in the front and had already a large part of it at hand. The Federal troops at Fredericksburg, including Burnside's, which had recently landed at Aquia Creek, could speedily join Pope, and were no doubt on the way. Such was the situation as it appeared to Jackson. The facts were, Pope had on the morning of the 10th 22,000 fresh troops (Sigel's corps and Ricketts's division)³ besides 2000 cavalry of Bayard and the remains of Banks's corps, which Pope puts at only 5000, and which he considered so badly beaten as to be unfit for service.⁴ Buford's cavalry was near Madison Court House the day before, and had not yet rejoined him, but it was threatening the Confederate flank and was within reach, and King's division of 10,000 men at Fredericksburg which had been ordered up on the 8th was approaching. King actually united with Pope on the evening of the next day (11th). Three marches behind King, Reno was coming with 8000 of Burnside's men. They arrived on the 14th. Thus there were before Jackson (whose strength of all arms could not have exceeded 22,000 or 23,000)⁵ not

¹ *Second Massachusetts and Stonewall Jackson*, p. 225, note. Cf. *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 139, where the total is given at 2381.

² Ropes, *The Army under Pope*, p. 30.

³ Pope puts Sigel's corps at 12,000 in his dispatches. Ricketts's return for August 9 shows his strength on that day. It was 10,164 present for duty.

⁴ Pope's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 27.

⁵ Jackson's strength before Cedar Run was not over 24,000. He lost 1314 on the field of August 9. So, making no allowance for sickness and

less than 27,000 infantry and artillery, while Bayard's cavalry was in front and Buford's on his left flank. Pope puts the Federal cavalry force at 5000, and it was nearly all in these two brigades. Hence, adopting Pope's figures, Jackson had to deal with over 30,000 men at hand, while 10,000 more were rapidly approaching, and 8000 others were hastening up, but three days behind. Jackson's comprehension of the situation was correct. To follow up his victory over Banks by attacking Pope was to strike at a superior force, which if it but parried his blows for a few days would then be strong enough to overwhelm him. Each mile he advanced in doing this removed him from his base, and put him the more completely out of reach of succor. He therefore halted where he was, and, placing his army in position to resist an attack if it should be made, rested quietly on his arms. General J. E. B. Stuart reached his headquarters this day on an inspecting tour, and him he requested to assume command of his cavalry and make a thorough reconnoissance of the enemy. Stuart did so, and the information thus obtained confirmed Jackson in the course he was pursuing. The Confederates remained in position during the 10th and 11th of August, while details of men gathered the spoils of the battlefield, and others cared for the wounded or paid the last sad rites to the dead. "On the 11th a flag of truce was received from the enemy, who requested permission until two o'clock to remove and bury his dead not already interred by our troops. This was granted, and the time subsequently extended, by request of the enemy, to five o'clock in the evening."¹ Late on the 11th the troops of King from Fredericksburg reached Pope. Jackson had been informed of their approach by Stuart, and deeming it imprudent to risk an attack from Pope with a force now nearly double his own, he fell back during the night of the 11th towards Gordonsville. He thus anticipated the design of his foe, for Pope had made up his mind to attack at daylight on the 12th; but when he moved forward it was only to find Jackson gone.

fatigue, which had so depleted Banks's corps, Jackson could not have had as many as 23,000 men.

¹ Jackson's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 184.

It has sometimes been said that the battle of Cedar Run was unnecessary and the victory a barren one. But such a view is inconsistent with a clear conception of the situation and strength of the contending forces in Virginia. Early in August Pope lay in the Rappahannock Valley with forces twice as numerous as Jackson's. He had pushed his advance to the line of the Rapidan. Repeated attacks had been made on the railroad which, running through Gordonsville, was at once the line of communication between Jackson and Lee and one main avenue of supply of the Confederate army at Richmond. Everything indicated an early advance in overwhelming force on the part of Pope. He had indeed been instructed¹ to cover by vigorous operations in his front the withdrawal of McClellan from the Peninsula. Twice had his cavalry advanced to seize the railroad at Gordonsville and Charlottesville. The rebuilding of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad alone delayed the advance of his main body.² Jackson knew he could not attack Pope when once concentrated; he did not think he could hold Gordonsville and the railroad against Pope's entire army if he should wait until the latter advanced. He therefore determined to strike if possible some part of Pope's force and overwhelm it before it could be supported, and in this way derange his plans and delay his advance until larger Confederate forces could be spared from Richmond. He hoped to strike the small force at Culpeper by a sudden and swift blow before Sigel and McDowell could be concentrated there to oppose him, and had he been successful and the way proved open, he might then, in accordance with Lee's suggestion,³ have descended like a thunderbolt on King at Fredericksburg. Delays in his march baffled him, and gave Pope time to gather force at Culpeper, and to meet him at Cedar Run; but here, thanks to the overconfidence of Pope and of Banks, the opportunity he was seeking was offered him. He had been able to throw nearly his

¹ See Halleck's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 6.

² Pope dispatched Halleck, August 3: "Unless the enemy is heavily reinforced from Richmond, I shall be in possession of Gordonsville and Charlottesville within ten days."

³ See General Lee's letter to General Jackson, July 25, 1862.

whole force on Banks's corps, and had defeated it so thoroughly that Pope considered the whole of it as *hors de combat* the next day ; and, indeed, it was so crippled as to be of but little use in the subsequent campaign. He had, then, at the latest safe moment, avoided the gathering forces of Pope by returning to Gordonsville after having accomplished his object. He had struck Pope a damaging blow ; he had raised the prestige of his own troops as much as he had injured that of the enemy, and of their new commander. By disconcerting Pope he had gained a week or ten days of delay, at the expiration of which time General Lee, with the mass of his army, was on the Rapidan, and he had expedited this last result by furnishing the Washington authorities a new spur with which to hasten McClellan's transfer of his army from the James to the Rappahannock.¹

Pope remained in the vicinity of Cedar Run until joined by Reno on the 14th, when, now at the head of over 50,000 men, he advanced to the Rapidan, and disposed his forces along that line from Locust Dale on Robertson's River to Raccoon ford.

¹ Halleck's dispatch August 10 to McClellan, and McClellan's reply. (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 86.)

CHAPTER XXII.

THE RAPPAHANNOCK.

THE situation of affairs as it appeared to General Lee after the battle of Cedar Run is thus described in his report: "The victory at Cedar Run effectually checked the progress of the enemy for the time; but it soon became apparent that his army was being largely increased. The corps of Major-General Burnside, from North Carolina, which had reached Fredericksburg, was reported to have moved up the Rappahannock, a few days after the battle, to unite with General Pope, and a part of General McClellan's army was believed to have left Westover for the same purpose.¹ It therefore seemed that active operations on the James were no longer contemplated, and that the most effectual way to relieve Richmond from any danger of attack from that quarter would be to reinforce General Jackson, and advance upon General Pope. Accordingly, on the 13th of August, Major-General Longstreet, with his division, and two brigades under General Hood were ordered to proceed to Gordonsville. At the same time General Stuart was directed to move with the main body of his cavalry to that point, leaving a sufficient force to observe the enemy still remaining in Fredericksburg, and to guard the railroad. General R. H. Anderson was also directed to leave his position on James River and follow Longstreet."²

The decision of General Lee was wise and prompt. The Confederate leader had nothing to gain by following up McClellan's retreat down the Peninsula. Both rivers were in

¹ McClellan had been busy for some days in sending off sick and some cavalry, but the main body of his army began its movements toward Fortress Monroe August 14. See his report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 89.

² Lee's report, *Ib.* vol. xii. part ii. pp. 551, 552.

the undisputed control of the Federal gunboats, and at best he could only have harassed and annoyed his adversary without the opportunity of inflicting serious damage. To concentrate against and defeat Pope before McClellan could unite with him was a plan of operations promising far more favorable results. General Lee entered upon the execution of this plan with conspicuous energy. The troops were ordered from Richmond, as above seen, on the 13th, the day before the retreat of McClellan's main body began. On the 16th, they had reached the vicinity of Gordonsville, and on that day Jackson's command at Gordonsville and also the troops on their way from Richmond were ordered to take position at the Somerville and Raccoon fords on the Rapidan. General Lee's design was to throw Stuart and his cavalry over the Rapidan at Morton's ford, whence they were to move against Pope's communications and damage them as much as possible, making an especial effort to destroy the railroad bridge and the other bridges over the Rappahannock. While this was doing, Longstreet at Raccoon ford and Jackson at Somerville ford were to cross and attack Pope in flank and rear.¹ The mass of Pope's troops

¹ Lee's order was as follows : —

HEADQUARTERS ARMY NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
August 19, 1863.

I. General Longstreet's command, constituting the right wing of the army, will cross the Rapidan at Raccoon ford, and move in the direction of Culpeper Court House. General Jackson's command, constituting the left wing, will cross at Somerville ford, and move in the same direction, keeping on the left of General Longstreet. General Anderson's division will cross at the Somerville ford, follow the route of General Jackson, and act in reserve. The battalion of light artillery, under Colonel S. D. Lee, will take the same route. The cavalry under General Stuart will cross at Morton's ford, pursue the route by Stevensburg to Rappahannock Station, destroy the railroad bridge, cut the enemy's communications and telegraph line, and operating towards Culpeper Court House, will take position on General Longstreet's right.

II. The commanders of each wing will designate the reserve for their commands. Medical and ammunition wagons will alone follow the troops across the Rapidan. The baggage and supply trains will be parked under their respective officers in secure positions on the south side, so as not to embarrass the different roads.

III. Cooked rations for three days will be carried in the haversacks of

were near the Rapidan, opposite Orange Court House, where they had been fronting Jackson at Gordonsville. Had nothing interfered with the execution of Lee's plan, it seems probable that Pope's overthrow would have taken place at this time on the Rappahannock, instead of ten days later at Bull Run. Lee's original design was to cross the Rapidan on the 18th, but unforeseen delays postponed the beginning of the movement until the 20th. Meantime, one of the chances of war, by which a trifle often turns the current of events, informed Pope of his adversary's movements. Stuart had ordered Fitz Lee's cavalry brigade to move on the 17th to the vicinity of the fords at which the Rapidan was to be crossed, and went himself with a few members of his staff on the evening of that day to Verdierville to meet it. Fitz Lee had moved slowly and by a circuitous route, and was not there. Stuart waited for him, and passed the night at a house on the roadside, where he was overhauled very early next morning by a scouting party of Federal cavalry. Stuart narrowly escaped capture by mounting his horse bareheaded and leaping a fence.¹ Major Fitzhugh, his adjutant-general, whom he had sent out the night before to find General Fitz Lee, fell into the hands of the Federal cavalry, and on his person were General Lee's instructions to Stuart in reference to the proposed movement against Pope. The Federal commander, thus informed of Lee's plans, decided at once to fall back behind the Rappahannock, where he would be nearer his base, and where he could be reinforced in a few days by a portion, at least, of McClellan's army.² He issued

the men, and provision must be made for foraging the animals. Straggling from the ranks is strictly prohibited, and commanders will make arrangements to secure and punish the offenders.

IV. The movements herein directed will commence to-morrow, 20th instant, at dawn of day. (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 729.)

¹ Stuart's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 726.

² Pope says (report, *Ib.* p. 29): "Among the papers taken was an autograph letter of General Robert Lee to General Stuart, dated Gordonsville, August 13, which made manifest to me the position and force of the enemy, and their determination to overwhelm the army under my command before it could be reinforced by any portion of the Army of the Potomac. . . . I determined accordingly to withdraw behind the Rappa-

his orders promptly on the morning of the 18th for this movement, and by nightfall on the 19th the Federal army was behind the Rappahannock, "with its left at Kelly's ford and its right about three miles above Rappahannock Station."¹

At four A. M. on the 20th the Confederate army crossed the Rapidan; Stuart, with the mass of the cavalry, crossed at Morton's ford on the Confederate right, Longstreet crossed at Raccoon ford, and Jackson at Somerville ford. Longstreet, preceded by Fitz Lee's cavalry brigade, marched to Kelly's ford on the Rappahannock, while Jackson took the route by way of Stevensburg and Brandy Station towards Rappahannock Station, bivouacking at Stevensburg on the night of the 20th. The only incident worthy of notice during the day was a spirited little contest near Brandy Station, between Stuart, with Robertson's cavalry brigade,² and Bayard's cavalry brigade, which latter was acting as rear-guard to the Federal army. Robertson's advance regiment (7th Virginia, Colonel W. E. Jones) ran into a part of Bayard's brigade posted in a wood near Brandy Station. Jones was held at bay until Robertson with the 6th and 12th Virginia regiments passed to the north and came down on the Federal flank. Bayard then retired to a good position between Brandy and Rappahannock Station, where he maintained himself until Stuart got Robertson's three regiments up. A charge was then made, Robertson directing the 12th Virginia (Colonel A. W. Harman) against Bayard's centre. The Federals were soon completely routed and driven to the Rappahannock River, which they crossed under cover of the batteries on the east side. Robertson captured sixty-four

hannock with all speed, and, as I had been instructed, to defend as far as practicable the line of that river."

¹ Pope's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 29. Reno was on the Federal left, McDowell and Banks, who had crossed at Rappahannock Station, in the centre, and Sigel, who had crossed at the Sulphur Springs, on the right.

² Robertson's brigade consisted of the 2d, 6th, 7th, and 12th Virginia regiments. The 2d was on detached duty, guarding Jackson's left flank. Bayard's brigade consisted of 1st Maine, 1st Rhode Island, 2d New York, 1st Pennsylvania, and 1st New Jersey. (His report, *Ib.* pp. 89, 90.)

prisoners. His loss was sixteen killed and wounded.¹ Bayard's loss in killed and wounded is unknown.

Thus the night of the 20th found the Confederate army all north of the Rapidan, with the right wing, under Longstreet, already on the Rappahannock. The day's operations had of course confirmed to Lee the fact that the delay of two days in crossing the Rapidan had enabled his adversary to elude his grasp.² Pope's retreat was dictated by sound military reasons. It is true that in numbers he was little, if at all, inferior to Lee,³ and that he might therefore have accepted battle south of the Rappahannock without exposing himself to the charge of rashness; but besides his exposed communications and line of retreat while south of that river, the rapid approach of large bodies from the Army of the Potomac to his assistance ought to have been, and no doubt was, a controlling reason to prevent his fighting before they had joined him.

On the 21st, Jackson moved forward to the Rappahannock, his troops extending from the railroad bridge to Beverly ford. Stuart sent two regiments of cavalry under Colonel Rosser

¹ Robertson's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part i. pp. 745, 746.

² General Lee, from his signal station on Clark's Mountain, had seen the movement of Pope in retreat the day before. (Stuart's report, *Ib.* p. 728.)

³ Much misapprehension exists about the relative strength of the two armies at this time. Thus, General Gordon of the 2d Massachusetts very erroneously places Lee's numbers at over 60,000 men, and in the same proportion underestimates Pope's. Even Mr. Ropes (*The Army under Pope*, p. 32) thinks Pope was greatly inferior to Lee, though the data in his hands should have shown him his error. Lee's strength was between 47,000 and 55,000 (see Ropes, *Ib.* p. 198), say something over 50,000. A dispatch from Pope to Halleck dated August 20 gives his effective strength on that day as follows:—

McDowell	18,000
Sigel	12,000
Banks	7,000
Reno	8,000
Total	<u>45,000</u>

Now if we add the cavalry to this, Pope must have had near 50,000 men, and a careful comparison with official reports will show that Pope understated his forces in this dispatch.

(5th Virginia) to precede him. This cavalry force made a dash over the river at Beverly ford, dispersed the infantry regiments, and disabled the battery which was there on guard.¹ Supported by a section of artillery which Jackson sent over (as well as by the batteries of Taliaferro's² division on the south side), this force remained on the north side of the river the greater part of the day.³ McDowell sent King's division to retake the ford, and upon the approach of this body, as well as of troops from Sigel above, Stuart withdrew his cavalry. An active artillery duel was maintained between the opposite batteries at this point for the remainder of the day. Farther down the river, at Rappahannock Station, was the mass of McDowell's corps, and in order to protect this bridge at that point he had left a small force from Hartsuff's brigade on two hills on the south side commanding the bridge head.⁴ Skirmishing took place between these troops and some of Jackson's, but the latter refrained here, as at Beverly ford, from attack. The object of Lee was to discover the position of the Federal army, and early in the day he decided it inexpedient to attempt to force a crossing in the face of the mass of Pope's army, and he then confined the operations of the Confederate forces to such artillery firing and skirmishing as would occupy the attention of their adversary. Meantime, while Jackson and Stuart were thus engaged, Longstreet was

¹ "That evening (20th) a battery of artillery and a regiment of infantry from Banks's corps, I think, were sent by you to guard a ford to the right of my line. Early on the morning of the 21st, the enemy attempted the ford held by the battery and regiment on my right, and drove them away, dispersing the regiment and disabling the battery." (McDowell's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 330.)

² Taliaferro commanded Jackson's old division.

³ Stuart's report, *Ib.* p. 730.

⁴ General Ricketts says: "On the 20th, two regiments, 3d brigade, with a section of Matthews's Pennsylvania battery under General Hartsuff, recrossed the river and occupied the heights commanding the ford. . . . On the morning of the 21st, the remaining regiments of the 3d brigade, with Thompson's Pennsylvania battery and the other sections of Matthews's Pennsylvania battery, crossed to the south side of the river and skirmished with the enemy during the day." (Ricketts's report, *Ib.* p. 383.)

ordered to move up from Kelly's ford to the positions occupied by Jackson, so that the latter might be free to seek a more favorable crossing higher up the river. As Longstreet was doing this, a body of Federal cavalry, which had crossed at Kelly's ford, hung on his rear. Wilcox, who had command of the Confederate rear, ordered Featherston's brigade (under Colonel Posey) to check and dispose of this cavalry. After a sharp skirmish Colonel Posey drove them off¹ with the assistance of the Thomas artillery. The brigade then followed the remainder of Longstreet's forces.

On the morning of the 22d, in pursuance of his plan to "seek a more favorable place to cross, higher up the river, and thus gain the enemy's right,"² Jackson left the positions he had occupied, and moved towards the fords near the Warrenton or Fauquier White Sulphur Springs. He was preceded by cavalry, and, conducting his march as much as possible in the forests and out of view of the Federal forces, he crossed the Hazel River at Welford's Mill, and arrived during the afternoon in the neighborhood of the Springs. Longstreet took Jackson's place, and an active artillery combat and some skirmishing were kept up all day along the river from Rappahannock Station to Beverly ford. Longstreet's demonstrations were such that Pope kept McDowell's and Banks's corps all day at hand to resist a crossing, and during the forenoon sent Gordon's brigade of Banks's corps to Beverly ford to strengthen that point against an apprehended attack in force.³

Jackson's movement was marked by reconnoissances from the Federal side of the river, and attempts were made upon his rear. Noticing that the Federals seemed to be moving in strong force up the Rappahannock on the other side, Jackson upon crossing Hazel River left Trimble's brigade to guard his trains. About noon, a dash was made across Freeman's ford

¹ Posey lost fourteen men. (Wilcox's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 597.) The Federal loss was supposed to be considerable, but the extent of it is unknown. Pope in a dispatch on the morning of the 22d says: "We have had a great many casualties within the last two days of skirmishing and cannonading; I cannot tell how many." (*Ib.* p. 58.)

² Lee's report, *Ib.* p. 552.

³ Gordon, *Army of Virginia*, p. 38.

by General Milroy¹ with a small force of cavalry and sharpshooters. This force reached the Confederate wagon train and captured some ambulances and mules. These were quickly recovered, however, and Milroy driven off by the 21st Georgia regiment, which Trimble sent forward for the purpose. From prisoners taken, Trimble learned that a considerable force of Federal infantry had crossed. This force was Bohlen's brigade of Sigel's corps, which, under cover of the batteries on the north side, crossed between Beverly's and Freeman's fords. Trimble, now far separated from support, dispersed his three regiments so as to protect the train, and awaited the attack of the Federals. This was not made, however, and the approach of Hood with two of Longstreet's brigades at four o'clock in the afternoon to relieve him enabled Trimble to assume the offensive. Asking Hood to support him, Trimble attacked Bohlen with vigor, dislodged and forced him to the river bank. Here the attempt of the Federals to make a stand under cover of the north side heights was defeated, and the brigade was routed and driven in confusion and with slaughter across the river. Colonel Bohlen was left dead on the field.² The Confederate loss was forty-seven, the Federal is not officially reported. A third crossing was made by Colonel Lloyd with a mixed force³ from Schenck's division at Fant's ford, but they were not engaged, and soon retired.

When Jackson arrived opposite the Springs, he found the river and ford at that point unguarded. Pope, though aware of the movement of forces toward his right, did not feel himself strong enough to extend his lines in that direction as far as the Springs. The necessity of holding the railroad and of keeping open the route from Fredericksburg by which rein-

¹ Milroy commanded an "independent brigade" attached to the 1st Army Corps (Sigel's).

² "The commander of this ill-starred expedition lay dead upon the field ; many pierced and shattered bodies were silent in the wood and on the plain, or rolling beneath the waters of the Rappahannock." (Gordon, *Army of Virginia*, p. 31.)

³ Colonel W. R. Lloyd with 6th Ohio cavalry, with an infantry regiment from Stahl's brigade and a section of mountain howitzers. (Gordon, *Ib.* p. 32.)

forcements were approaching, both of which seemed threatened by Longstreet, kept the mass of his army near Rappahannock Station.

Finding his way open, Jackson immediately began to transfer troops to the north side. The bridge had been destroyed, but the advance regiment of Lawton's brigade (13th Georgia, Colonel Douglas), with Brown's and Dement's batteries, was sent over the ford at the Springs, while Early's brigade was made to cross on the breast of a dilapidated dam about a mile below. A heavy shower in the afternoon had swollen the river slightly, and the rain continued while these troops were crossing. A night of storm and rain came on by the time Early had gotten over his difficult and insecure crossing, and the storm and the darkness put a stop to farther operations, leaving Early's brigade and the 13th Georgia with the batteries on the north side. The river rose rapidly in their rear, and before morning all communication was cut off.

When night fell, on the 22d of August, on the hostile armies, Pope had thus made no important changes in the disposition of his forces. They still lined the Rappahannock from the railroad bridge to Freeman's ford. Longstreet lay in their front, while Jackson was massed near the Springs, cut off from the troops which he had thrown across the river by the swelling torrent.

The most important movement of the day and night, however, is yet to be related. General Lee had before noon directed Stuart with the main body of his cavalry to make an expedition around Pope's right flank to the rear of the Federal army. Stuart, taking 1500 men and two guns,¹ ascended the river to Waterloo, where at Hart's Mill he crossed, and proceeded on the direct road to Warrenton. He reached Warrenton in the afternoon, when for a time he halted. No Federal force was met on the way, and none was found at Warrenton. Again setting forward, he marched by way of

¹ Stuart says all of Robertson's brigade except 7th Virginia, and all of Fitz Lee's except 3d Virginia. This gave him seven regiments of cavalry on the expedition. (Stuart's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 730.)

Auburn towards Catlett's Station, with the design of destroying the railroad bridge over Cedar Creek. The violent rain-storm of that afternoon and night caught the Confederates on the march, and they reached Catlett's in the midst of the darkness and storm. A captured negro led them to the encampment of some of the Federal trains, and, among others, to the staff wagons of General Pope. The guard was quickly driven off, and a number of prisoners including an officer of Pope's staff,¹ together with the Federal commander's personal baggage and official papers, were captured. Efforts were made to capture and destroy the large wagon trains found to be at Catlett's, but the pitch darkness and the pouring rain rendered these in large part futile. The same causes defeated Stuart's attempt to destroy the railroad bridge. Captain Blackford, who was sent to fire it, found it impossible to do so in the rain, and then Wickham's regiment was sent to cut it down. Their efforts were attended with no better success. Stuart finally "gave it up," and before daylight began his return march. He brought off over 300 prisoners, and reached the Rappahannock without molestation on the 23d.² The most important results of this expedition were the damage inflicted on the *morale* of the Federal army, and the capture of Pope's correspondence with Halleck, which revealed to General Lee the plans and strength of his adversaries.

What was General Pope doing during this stormy night? At five P. M. he telegraphed Halleck: "Under present circumstances I shall not attempt to prevent his (Lee's) crossing at Sulphur Springs, but will mass my whole force on his flank in the neighborhood of Fayetteville."³ At 6.30 he says: "I cannot move against Sulphur Springs just now without exposing my rear to the heavy force in front of me."⁴ At 9.15 he reports the crossings which the Confederates had made at the Springs and above, and says: "I must . . . either fall back and meet Heintzelman behind Cedar Run, or cross the Rappahannock with my whole force and assail the enemy's flank and rear. I must do one or the other at daylight,

¹ Major Goulding.

² Stuart's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 732.

³ Pope's report, *Ib.* p. 58.

⁴ *Ib.* p. 58.

which shall it be?"¹ Halleck approves the latter movement. Later in the night Pope directs all the troops approaching from Fredericksburg to march on Stevensburg and Brandy on the south side of the river, and says he will on the morrow cross himself and attack Lee.²

The rise of the Rappahannock and the consequent interruption of communication changed the plans of both commanders. Lee, finding that the flood prevented his crossing in force at the Springs, promptly abandoned a movement the success of which depended upon the vigor and celerity of its execution, and confined Jackson's efforts to the extrication of the troops already on the north side of the Rappahannock from their perilous position. Pope, on the other hand, gave up his scheme of a counter crossing and attack,³ and knowing the river to be impassable, determined to concentrate against and overwhelm the Confederate forces on the north side. With this design Sigel was directed at an early hour⁴ to march at once on Sulphur Springs and Waterloo. Banks and Reno were ordered to follow and support him. The guard at the railroad bridge head was withdrawn and the bridge destroyed, and then McDowell's corps was directed on Warrenton. Longstreet's batteries were active while these movements were going

¹ Pope's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 59.

² Pope's report, *Ib.* p. 60, dispatch to Halleck.

³ General G. H. Gordon, in his *Army of Virginia*, thinks Pope never had any serious idea of making this movement, and that his dispatches to Halleck were "fustian." Whether this be so or not, it is hard to see why such a movement should have been approved. Pope had retired behind the Rappahannock because he thought himself inferior in force to Lee, and large additions were on the way to join him. A week would double his numbers, and yet he now proposed to recross the river and fight a battle on the south side before these reinforcements could get up. Gordon severely criticises Pope as follows: "To sum it all up, it appears that Pope awoke on the morning of the 22d with a determination to hold on to the line of the river; that at five o'clock in the afternoon he determined to abandon it; that at eleven o'clock at night he rejected both plans, and resolved to cross the river; and that he awoke on the morning of the 23d with no very clear notions of what he intended to do." (Gordon, *Army of Virginia*, p. 54.)

⁴ 7.15 A. M., Pope's dispatch, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part i. p. 61.

on. During this forenoon Reynolds's division of 8000¹ from Aquia Creek reported, and was ordered to follow McDowell. Thus Pope took vigorous steps to crush the unknown Confederate force which to him seemed to lie from Sulphur Springs to Warrenton, and the advance of which had struck the railroad at Catlett's the night before.

Meantime, Early had passed a hungry and cheerless night in his wet bivouac, unrelieved save by a single incident. Major A. L. Pitzer, of his staff, in attempting to find the 13th Georgia regiment, was taken prisoner by a scouting party of the 6th Federal cavalry. Overmatched in force, the major had recourse to his wits. He persuaded his captors that they were within the Confederate pickets, and would be fired on whichever way they attempted to escape. He offered to lead them safely in, if they would submit to his guidance. The offer was accepted, and the disarmed major led in and delivered the squad to General Early.²

On the morning of the 23d, Early was in a precarious condition. Cut off by the river from retreat and support, he was exposed to whatever force Pope might concentrate against him. Fortunately his position was favorable. If the river was impassable in his rear, he had for the time an efficient barrier in front, in Great Run, a stream which enters the Rappahannock not very far below the point at which he had crossed. This creek, making but a small angle with the river, and crossing all the roads leading to the Springs, was too high to be forded, and there was no enemy on Early's side of it. As Great Run would fall much faster than the river, it could not long be depended upon, and Early sent a courier

¹ A strange error seems to have been made in Pope's report about the strength of Reynolds, who is there credited with but 2500 men, and this error has been widely copied. A dispatch of Smith's (of Pope's staff) to Reno, August 21, puts Reynolds at 8000. Another dispatch of Assistant-Secretary Tucker to Halleck from Fort Monroe, when Reynolds was leaving to join Pope, also puts his numbers at 8000. Reynolds's division contained three brigades besides artillery, and surely at this time numbered more than 2500. General G. H. Gordon estimates it at 4500, and Mr. Ropes at 6000.

² Early's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 705.

to swim the Rappahannock and acquaint Ewell and Jackson with his condition, suggesting the propriety of his retiring up the river towards Waterloo Bridge. Early was directed to move up to the Springs, and assume a position extending from the river to Great Run, which he was to hold until the bridge over the river was repaired, unless pressed by overpowering forces, when he was to retire towards Waterloo, Jackson undertaking to protect his march in such a case with batteries and infantry on the south side of the river. When this movement had been made, Early took a position facing northwest, his right resting on Great Run, where the road to Fayetteville crossed it on a bridge, and his left on the Rappahannock, his force being almost entirely concealed by the forest. Here, having destroyed the bridge over Great Run, he remained quiet until the afternoon, when the subsidence of the flood rendered the creek fordable, and the advance of Sigel from below threatened his right. He then faced towards the enemy, but concealed his infantry and artillery in the woods. At this time he was joined by General Robertson, with the section of guns and part of the cavalry which had accompanied Stuart the night before and were now returning from Warrenton. These were posted to the north of the Springs on Early's left, and the guns opened fire on the Federals beyond Great Run. This Federal force was some of Sigel's cavalry, which was soon after joined by Milroy's brigade, between whom and the Confederates a brisk artillery fire was kept up until sundown. At dusk the advance of some Federal infantry led to a few volleys, but the skirmish was without notable results on either side.¹

This feeble demonstration was all that was achieved by Sigel and the "25,000" men which Pope had sent forward to "attack and beat" whatever Confederates were on the north side of the river.² Sigel labored under the delusion that a large part of Lee's army was over the river; he lacked

¹ Early did not lose a man in his command. A few casualties occurred in the cavalry. The Federal losses are unknown.

² Pope's order to Sigel 7.15 A. M., August 23. (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 61.)

enterprise to find out the truth, and in consequence moved with such caution as to waste the greater part of the day in marching the few miles to Early's position. Arrived there, instead of attacking, he went into camp, and sent a dispatch to Pope suggesting a withdrawal of his corps to a more central position.¹

Meantime, the bridge over the Rappahannock at the Springs had been made temporarily passable, and, late in the afternoon, when it seemed probable that Early would be attacked, the remainder of Lawton's brigade² had been ordered to support him. These troops reached him after night. But the heavy masses of Sigel's troops which had appeared near at hand late in the day, and the reports that came in, convinced Early that he would be heavily attacked in the morning, and as a general battle was not now desired by the Confederates at this point, he suggested to Ewell the expediency of withdrawing during the night. In response Ewell himself went over, and at three A. M. gave orders to Lawton and Early to withdraw. This was accomplished safely a little after daylight, and the hungry Confederates, who had been two nights and a day without food, were sent to Jeffersonton to rest and cook rations.³

At nine or ten P. M. on the 23d of August, Pope himself, with McDowell's corps and Reynolds's division, reached Warrenton, and thus the whole Army of Virginia, increased now by Reynolds to over 50,000,⁴ camped from the Sulphur Springs to Warrenton. On the Confederate side Longstreet still held the Rappahannock from the railroad up, and Jackson, having drawn back from the attempted crossing, was massed between the river and Jeffersonton. The return of Stuart, on the evening of the 23d, from his expedition to Catlett's brought Lee the valuable information that had been captured as to the forces and designs of the Federals.

¹ Sigel's dispatch, August 23, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 60.

² 13th Georgia was already with him.

³ Early's report, *Ib.* p. 708.

⁴ Pope, on the 20th, had 45,000 in Sigel's, Banks's, McDowell's, and Reno's corps. To this must be added Reynolds and the cavalry.

On the 24th, General Pope's energies were bent to the destruction of the Confederate force, which he still supposed to be north of the Rappahannock. Buford, with a "heavy cavalry force,"¹ was sent to Waterloo to reconnoitre, and to destroy the bridge there if possible, while Sigel, followed by Banks and Reno, was to advance from Sulphur Springs towards the same point. McDowell's corps was made to camp from Warrenton towards Waterloo and the Springs, that it might be within supporting distance. Sigel, with Milroy in advance, first moved towards the Springs, and soon became engaged in an active artillery duel with the batteries of A. P. Hill, whose division now held the Confederate side of the river. The Federals then moved slowly up the river, Sigel still remaining under the delusion that a considerable Confederate force was in his front on the north side. It was not until Buford had reached Waterloo Bridge, and reported to Pope after midday that there was no enemy on the north side, that the latter knew he was engaged in a fruitless chase. Even as late as 3.45 P. M. Pope dispatched Halleck that "Sigel was pursuing the enemy in the direction of Waterloo Bridge. . . . No force of the enemy has yet been able to cross except that now inclosed by our forces between Sulphur Springs and Waterloo Bridge, which will undoubtedly be captured, unless they find some means of escaping."² Sigel spent most of the day in this imaginary pursuit of an enemy who had "escaped" before he began to move, and, late in the afternoon, completed the march of six miles from Sulphur Springs to Waterloo. There, finding the bridge not destroyed, as Buford had reported, but in good order and defended by the Confederates, he took position along the river to oppose a crossing.³ All day the Confederate bat-

¹ Pope's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 32.

² Pope's dispatch to Halleck, *Ib.* p. 74.

³ On the night of the 24th, the Federal army was posted as follows :—

"Sigel's corps near the Rappahannock, with his advance at Waterloo Bridge and his rear in the direction of Sulphur Springs." Banks was in his rear and in contact, Reno was east and near the Springs. Ricketts's division of McDowell's corps was four miles east of Waterloo on the Warrenton road, and King's division between Warrenton and Sulphur Springs. (Pope's report, *Ib.* p. 32.)

teries had been active along the river from Sulphur Springs to Waterloo. This activity, together with a display of force, was intended by the Confederate commander to occupy his opponent so as to distract attention from his real design. In this object Lee was entirely successful. Pope had so little suspicion of Lee's plans, that at the middle of the afternoon¹ he telegraphed Halleck that he should "early to-morrow . . . move back a considerable part of this force² to the neighborhood of Rappahannock Station."

¹ Pope's dispatch to Halleck, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 64.

² Sigel, Banks, and Reno.

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE PROBLEM BEFORE LEE.

LET us turn now to the Confederate camp. So far Lee had been balked in the principal object of his campaign. Ten days before, when convinced that McClellan was about to withdraw from the Peninsula, the Confederate commander had hurried the larger part of the forces at Richmond to the Rapidan. Here, uniting Longstreet with Jackson, he designed to attack Pope before reinforcements from McClellan could reach him. Difficulties in regard to transportation and supplies, and the slowness of subordinates, cost him a day. An error in the march of the cavalry designed to lead in the movement cost another. Meantime, Pope had learned of his approach, and had had this information confirmed by the capture of Major Fitzhugh.¹ When Lee crossed the Rapidan on August 20, it was only to find his adversary safe behind the Rappahannock. The quickness of General Pope and the loss of the two days had defeated the plan. Again, Lee's efforts for the past three days to find a favorable point from which to strike Pope had been futile. The north side of the Rappahannock is the best for defense, and the Federal artillery, well disposed and well served, had rendered the fords impassable, save at heavy cost. When an unguarded ford had given the desired opportunity, the elements seemed to turn against him, and delayed the movement until it could only have been prosecuted under adverse circumstances and in the face of the whole Federal army.

Thus the problem which Lee had, ten days before, set out to solve, was still before him, with the difficulties of a successful solution immensely increased by the delay. Yet the necessity for action seemed more than ever imperative; for whatever un-

¹ Stuart's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 726.

certainly may, up to this time, have existed in regard to McClellan's movements was removed by the captured correspondence of Pope. This showed that the whole Army of the Potomac was hastening to the assistance of the latter, and that a considerable part of it was already within reach. It showed that strong bodies, in addition, under Sturgis¹ from Washington and under Cox from West Virginia, were also hurrying to join him. McClellan's army numbered about 90,000 for duty² when he was ordered up from the James. Thus over 100,000 men were rapidly moving towards the Rappahannock where Pope with over 50,000³ was holding the ground, with instructions from Halleck to "fight like the devil," and "not to yield an inch of ground." It was evident that a vast army of 150,000 men would soon be concentrated in front of the Confederates. What were the resources at command to resist this force? Lee had with him from 50,000 to 55,000 men.⁴ Some 25,000 troops had been left for the defense of Richmond. As McClellan had withdrawn down the Peninsula, the greater part of these, under D. H. Hill and McLaws, had been moved to the north of the city, near the North Anna, to protect the railroads, and to meet any movement of Burnside from Fredericksburg. Lee had asked that they be sent to strengthen his scanty forces, but Mr. Davis had not thought it prudent as yet to strip the Confederate capital of defenders. Lee, now that all the Federal forces were evidently soon to be on his hands, ordered nearly the whole of these forces to march forward to join him, informing the Confederate President of the

¹ Pope expected 10,000 men under Sturgis and 7000 under Cox. (Gordon's *Army of Virginia*, p. 93.)

² See Halleck's letter to McClellan, August 6. (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 83.)

³ Lee got a copy of Pope's dispatch to Halleck of the 21st, in which he reported his strength at 45,000. This was too little and included no cavalry. Pope had at this time not less than 52,000. On the 24th, Reynolds's division, the advance of McClellan's army, had already joined Pope, and that night or next morning Heintzelman, with over 10,000 more, reported for duty.

⁴ See Analysis of Numbers, *Southern Historical Papers*, vol. viii. p. 181; also Taylor's *Four Years with General Lee*, p. 60; Ropes, *The Army under*

facts. Thus D. H. Hill's and McLaws's divisions and two brigades under J. G. Walker and Hampton's cavalry were ordered up, and only the brigades of Wise and Daniel left to defend Richmond.¹ If all these troops had been on the Rappahannock, they would only have swelled the Confederate army to near 75,000, or barely one half of the opposing forces. But they were much farther away than was Pope from the troops landing at Alexandria, for while the latter were but fifty-one miles from the Rappahannock, Lee's reinforcements were from eighty to one hundred and five miles distant over poorly equipped railroads.

Pope, pp. 197, 198. To Jackson's strength of 22,500 after Cedar Run (see *Ropes*, p. 198) Lee brought up from Richmond the following :—

Longstreet's command, viz. :—

His own division	8486
Hood's division	3852
Jones's division	3713
Anderson's division	6117
Drayton's and Evans's brigades *	4600
Cavalry †	2500
Artillery †	2500
	<hr/>
	31,768
Add Jackson	22,500
	<hr/>
General Lee's total strength	54,268

¹ D. H. Hill's strength July 20 was 9548 ; McLaws's, 7702 ; Walker's, possibly 3500 (Taylor, p. 73, puts it at 3200 at Sharpsburg) ; Hampton's, 1500 (Taylor, p. 60). So Lee ordered up about 22,000 troops. Daniel's brigade, left at Drewry's Bluff, was under 2000 (see President Davis's dispatch to Lee, August 26), and Wise's was still smaller. President Davis says in the above dispatch : "Confidence in you overcomes the view which would otherwise be taken of the exposed condition of Richmond, and the troops retained for defense of the capital are surrendered to you on a renewed request."

* The strength of these brigades was obtained by Colonel Taylor from Major H. E. Young, A. A. G. to General Drayton, while in command of them. It was confirmed by General Sorrel, A. A. G. to General Longstreet. But Evans in his report makes his aggregate 2200, which would leave 2600 for Drayton, who had the smaller brigade.

† The entire strength of Stuart's cavalry on July 20 was 4035. Hampton was left at Richmond with 1500 men, as Taylor estimates. The total strength of the artillery at Richmond at the same date was 3252. A large part of this was left behind, and Taylor probably overestimates the portion participating in the campaign against Pope when he puts it at 2500.

It was plain, therefore, that to await the arrival of reinforcements would be simply to increase the disparity of force with which the Confederates would have to contend. Nor did such a course promise anything but the renewal of the defensive campaign in which Lee, opposed by a splendidly organized and equipped army of double his numbers, should be gradually forced back towards Richmond. Instead of adopting such a policy, the Confederate leader determined upon a bold and perilous plan of campaign. Without waiting for reinforcements he would risk the issue of the campaign upon the 50,000 troops at hand. He would make one more effort to turn Pope's flank, break his communications, and fall upon his rear. In two days he might send a part of his army entirely around Pope, and plant it on the railroad by which McClellan's troops were approaching. Such a stroke would be sure to spread confusion and dismay. It would disconcert and paralyze Pope's reinforcements, which were coming forward with no expectation of having to force open a road by which to join him. It would compel Pope to let go the line of the Rappahannock, and devote himself to protecting his supplies and reopening his communications. He might be forced to fight at a disadvantage in doing this. At any rate, it was probable that so unexpected a movement would afford opportunities of striking Pope a damaging blow before his army could be rendered too formidable for attack by the arrival of all the troops that were *en route* to join it. The danger, of course, was in dividing a force already inferior, in the presence of a superior one. Pope might rapidly concentrate upon and overwhelm the audacious troops that should put themselves for the time out of reach of support in his rear. But in view of the relative strength of the contending armies there was no aggressive course open to the Confederates that did not involve great risk, and Lee followed in the footsteps of great captains in selecting one, the very audacity of which contributed largely to its success.¹

¹ General Lee said after the war, in referring to criticisms that had been made upon the great risks he had taken in this and in some of his other operations, that such criticisms were obvious, but that the disparity of force between the contending armies rendered the risks unavoidable. Mr. Ropes

(p. 44) thinks "the object proposed was not worth the risk. It was not supposed that Pope's army could be materially injured by this expedition." On the contrary, it was designed to injure Pope as much as possible before the mass of McClellan's army could join him, and it would be difficult indeed, even at this day, with all the facts before us, to map out a plan of operations that would have accomplished this object more thoroughly.

CHAPTER XXIV.

JACKSON MARCHES ON MANASSAS JUNCTION.

THE plan which, on August 24, General Lee determined upon and prepared to carry out was this : Jackson with his 22,000 men and a part of the cavalry was to cross the Rappahannock beyond the right flank of Pope, and move by forced marches through Thoroughfare Gap until he struck the Orange and Alexandria Railroad in Pope's rear. Here he was to break the railroad and do all the damage possible, as well as hold Pope at bay, if he could, until the remainder of the army could join him. Meantime, Longstreet (with whom Lee remained in person) was to continue vigorous demonstrations along the Rappahannock in the vicinity of the Sulphur Springs and Waterloo, in order to occupy Pope and divert attention from Jackson's march. When Jackson had struck the railroad and Pope had begun to withdraw, Lee would move Longstreet rapidly after Jackson, unite his army, and accept or deliver battle as circumstances might determine.

Time was most precious to Lee, and not an hour was lost in carrying out this bold design. All day on the 24th were Jackson's batteries kept busily at work along the river, and a strong display of force greeted every demonstration of the Federals.¹ It was necessary to deceive Pope and occupy his attention by vigorously threatening his front, and this Lee accomplished with eminent success during this and the following days. The Federals having pretty much withdrawn from the lower fords towards Rappahannock Station, Longstreet was ordered up dur-

¹ See Milroy's report for an account of his attempt to cross at the Springs (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. pp. 317, 318), and Sigel's report for the vigorous manner in which the Confederates held on to the Waterloo Bridge (*Ib.* p. 264).

ing the 24th that he might take Jackson's place. The batteries were not changed until after dark, so as not to attract the enemy's attention. Then Jackson's guns were quietly withdrawn and Longstreet's substituted for them. Late in the afternoon the troops of Jackson's corps had been gathered about Jeffersonton, where scant rations and scant time for preparation for the arduous marches of the coming days were given. All baggage and baggage wagons were to be left behind. Only ambulances and ammunition wagons were to accompany the column. A few days' cooked rations were to be carried in the haversacks, and, for the rest, some beef cattle driven on foot and the green corn standing in the fields were to be relied on, until a levy could be made upon Pope's better supplied commissariat. Many an officer's outfit consisted of a few badly baked biscuit and a handful of salt for the roasting ears on which he expected to live.

Under Jackson's orders to select the "best and most covered route," Captain J. K. Boswell, his chief engineer, suggested that which passes through Amissville, crosses the Rappahannock at Hinson's Mill, and passes thence through Orleans, Salem, Thoroughfare Gap, and Gainesville to Manassas. Boswell, who was familiar with this region,¹ was directed to select guides, and to lead in person the front division at dawn on the next morning.

The morning of August 25 broke bright and beautiful. The rain-storm had entirely passed away, having added freshness and coolness to the midsummer glory of Piedmont Virginia. The rising sun found Jackson's troops already on the march. Full of enthusiasm, they followed with quick step the leader in whom their confidence had become so absolute that no trace of doubt or hesitation found place as they neared the "imminent deadly breach." The flood had subsided on the upper Rappahannock, and the column forded it at Hinson's Mill, unobstructed and apparently unobserved by the enemy. Without halting, it pressed on, Boswell with a small body of

¹ This brave and modest officer was a native of this part of the country. He fell at Chancellorsville by the same fire that mortally wounded Jackson.

cavalry leading the way,¹ nor was the day's work done until the troops, late at night, had reached Salem after a severe march of twenty-five miles.² No opposition was encountered

¹ Boswell had with him part of the Black Horse Cavalry (Captain R. Randolph) and Captain W. W. Tebb's company of the 2d Virginia. After he reached Salem in the afternoon he was joined by Colonel Munford with the remainder of the 2d Virginia.

² "As the weary column approached the end of the day's march, they found Jackson, who had ridden forward, dismounted and standing upon a great stone by the roadside" (Dabney). General G. H. Gordon (2d Massachusetts infantry), a gallant and generous foeman, thus describes with burning eloquence the scene that followed: "It was sunset. His face was darkened by exposure; his uniform was soiled and dingy. But his figure was rigid, and his expression, though stern, was radiant with hope. Before him passed in review his faithful men and their devoted leaders. Ewell's division was foremost. What the half of a lifetime, passed as an officer in the regular army of the United States, could add to intrepid valor, to a high sense of honor, that feared death less than reproach, were exhibited in his professional capacity, and in his social relations, by General Ewell. His life in the Union army began some years before Jackson's and continued longer; but such a genius as Jackson's to permeate that life was wanting. The campaigns of the Shenandoah Valley, the battles around Richmond and at Cedar Mountain, Ewell shared. But in them all Jackson was the master. When the next division passed, a deeper flush overspread the face and a deeper feeling of pride swelled in the soul of Jackson. Here were the men whom he had so often hurled against the enemy to snatch victory from the very jaws of defeat, the men whose sturdy courage had marked them in 1861 as standing like a wall before the fiery assaults of the same enemy that they were now marching again to meet in the same cause, and, by a singular coincidence, upon the same field. 'Stonewall' Jackson the Confederates bestowed as his baptismal name upon the chief who now gazed upon his veterans with a pride greater even than when he bade them stand amidst the fiery torrent on the field of Manassas, and they obeyed him. They were as motionless as a wall. And now some of these men of the old Stonewall brigade were before him. Jackson could not repress their enthusiasm. In vain he sent to them to be silent, in vain urged them not to make known their presence to the enemy by their cheers. Such considerations had been urged to the first troops passing, and they had repressed their desires, giving token of their expressions of confidence and admiration for the commander by silently swinging their caps in air. But the men of the old brigade, now grown into a division, could not repress their shouts. They cheered tumultuously. 'It is of no use,' said Jackson, 'you see,' turning to one of his staff, 'I can't stop them.' Then he added, 'Who would not conquer with such men as these!'

by this column. No Federal troops were seen during the day. Meantime, Longstreet remained at Jeffersonton, and kept up an active skirmish across the river from Sulphur Springs to Waterloo.

“No one can read the closing scenes of the battle of Waterloo without emotion. The dark hour when Napoleon Bonaparte struggled with his destiny seems at times to be the history of an hour filled with the acts of gods, not men. All lost for France, save one more throw, and that Napoleon now will hazard. Upon the solid squares of British infantry the Old Guard shall be hurled. They came, and as they passed, they saw clear-cut and bold, as if the solid rock had taken form, the figure of Bonaparte. With arm outstretched, he pointed to the English squares ; his lips were closed ; but clearer than if the words were spoken they saw he meant, Your pathway : it lies there. In that devotion which men yield to monarchs of the battlefield, in that glow of pride which men share with the great chieftain whose powers have created chances and directed results, the soldier subjects under Napoleon Bonaparte were closely allied, in enthusiasm, in worship, and in admiration, with the soldier citizens under Stonewall Jackson.” (Gordon's *Army of Virginia*, pp. 113, 114, 115.)

CHAPTER XXV.

POPE'S SITUATION.

WHAT was Pope doing all this day, while Jackson was sweeping towards his rear, and Lee was putting twenty-five miles between the two wings of the Confederate army? The operations of the day before had so fully impressed upon Pope the conviction that the Confederates were preparing to force a passage of the Rappahannock somewhere between the railroad and Waterloo, that no trace of suspicion of the real design of his adversary seems to have crossed his mind. He had noted the steady movement of the Confederates towards his right for some days, but the only alternative that this suggested was that Lee might intend to cross the Blue Ridge Mountains into the Shenandoah Valley. This idea caused him to order Sigel, on the night of the 24th, to send spies and scouts into the valley to learn if this were the case.¹ Evidently he did not attach much importance to it, for his orders on the morning of the 25th were given with reference to an attack in front. Early on that day he ordered his troops to take position from Kelly's ford to Waterloo, not so much to dispute the passage of the river, which he now thought could be forced, as to fight the Confederates when once over. Thus Reno was ordered back to Kelly's ford and Banks to Bealeton Station with his left along Marsh Creek, and a division thrown forward to Rappahannock Station. Sigel was to occupy Fayetteville, McDowell and Reynolds were to hold Warrenton with advance brigades thrown out towards Waterloo and the Sulphur Springs, in front of which the cavalry were to keep the line of the river.² Heintzelman³ was to take position on

¹ Order to Sigel, August 24. (Pope's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 65.)

² Pope's order. (McDowell's report, *Ib.* p. 332.)

³ He had just come up with about 10,000 men.

Licking River with his centre at Germantown. Sturgis, who was thought to be at hand with 10,000 men, was to reinforce Banks, and Cox with 7000 more was to report to Sigel.¹ In this position the Federal commander proposed to accept battle.

But confusion marked the movements of the Federal troops that day. McDowell, in carrying out his part of the programme, sent Reynolds's division towards Sulphur Springs, with Meade's brigade thrown forward within four miles of the Rappahannock. Ricketts was sent on the Waterloo road with Tower's brigade in advance, while King was kept where these two roads unite near Warrenton. But when the orders found Sigel at Waterloo Bridge, he was skirmishing with the Confederates, who tenaciously held the bridge, and were making such demonstrations as to lead him to apprehend an attack in force. In view of Pope's efforts the day before to drive back Early and hold the line of the Rappahannock, and of the fact that to move off before any troops to relieve him had arrived was to surrender the bridge and crossing to the Confederates, Sigel hesitated, and referred to General Roberts,² who was present. The latter directed Sigel to hold on to his present position at every cost, and informed him that Buford's cavalry and McDowell's corps would be on his right, and Banks's corps on his left. Some information was brought to Sigel of the movement of Jackson's column on his right, and at the same time it was reported that the Confederates were crossing at the Sulphur Springs on his left. He sent the mass of his cavalry under Beardsley to repel this demonstration, and the remainder to protect his right flank. Colonel Beardsley, with two regiments of cavalry and four mountain howitzers, proceeded to the Springs, and drove back the skirmishers who had crossed there. Longstreet then opened his batteries, and renewed his demonstrations³ both at the Springs

¹ Only a small part of these commands ever reached Pope. Without them, but including Heintzelman, Pope gave orders, in the morning, to about 68,000 men, less his losses since the 21st.

² Chief of staff to General Pope.

³ In this artillery duel the buildings at the Springs were set on fire and burned.

and at Waterloo. Sigel, fully impressed with the belief that he was on the point of being attacked, and sending to communicate with his supports, found that Banks was on the march to Bealeton, and that McDowell was not within reach. In this condition Sigel reported about two P. M. to Pope that the main force of the enemy was advancing on him. This elicited no reply. At a later hour he was still more perplexed by an order which indicated that Pope thought he was on the way to Fayetteville. Another request for instructions brought him none. Thus, without orders or supports, in a situation he considered "exceedingly critical,"¹ Sigel determined, under cover of the night, to destroy the bridge and march to Fayetteville, but, just as he was starting, he received orders from Pope to go to Warrenton. This he did, though it seems from the Federal reports² he was nearly all night in traversing the distance of less than eight miles over a good road.

Longstreet's demonstrations had been entirely successful. He had kept Sigel all day in his front and thus disarranged Pope's plan,³ and at night he left the Federal commanders in a complete fog as to the intentions of their opponents. Pope seems to have misinterpreted everything during the day. In the morning he ordered his army into position to meet a direct attack from Lee.⁴ When informed by Sigel that his corps was in danger of attack in an advanced position from the whole Confederate army, he neither went to see (though distant but an hour), nor sent instructions. Banks, before noon, informed him definitely of the movement of Jackson's column toward Orleans, and suggested that it meant

¹ Sigel's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. pp. 264.

² McDowell's (*Ib.* p. 332) and Sigel's (*Ib.* p. 264) reports.

³ As Pope's plan was based on an erroneous conception, it was valueless.

⁴ During the forenoon Pope telegraphed Halleck as follows: "The enemy this morning has pushed a considerable infantry force up opposite Waterloo Bridge, and is planting batteries, and long lines of his infantry are moving up from Jeffersonville towards Sulphur Springs. His whole force, as far as can be ascertained, is massed in front of me from railroad crossing of Rappahannock round to Waterloo Bridge, their main body being opposite Sulphur Springs." (*Ib.* p. 66; *Conduct of War, Supplement*, part ii. p. 136.)

a transfer of Lee's army to the Shenandoah and possibly the Potomac. As the day wore on and the Confederates did not force a crossing, this idea took possession of Pope's mind, as is indicated in his orders at 9.30 P. M. To Sigel he dispatched at that hour: "You will force the passage of the river at Waterloo Bridge to-morrow morning at daylight, and see what is in front of you. I do not believe there is any enemy in force there, but do believe that the whole of their army has moved to the west and northwest." At the same hour he sent a similar dispatch to McDowell, expressing the conviction that the whole Confederate army had marched for the Shenandoah Valley, and directing him to make as early as possible in the morning a reconnoissance with his whole corps to ascertain what was beyond the river at Sulphur Springs. Reno was also ordered to cross below the railroad and make a reconnoissance as far as Culpeper.¹

Such were Pope's conclusions for the day, and such his plans for the morrow. But he seems to have been confused and ill-informed as to the position of his troops. Reno, instead of being at Kelly's ford, had for some reason gone to Warrenton Junction, and was therefore ten miles from the Rappahannock. Banks, on the way to Bealeton, had only gotten as far as the vicinity of Warrenton, while Sigel, who was retreating from Waterloo when the order was issued, was in Warrenton when he received it at two o'clock at night. He reported that it was impossible to carry it out, and declared his men were so exhausted by their skirmishes of the preceding days and the night march of seven and a half miles that they must have rest before doing anything. Thus nobody but McDowell was ready in the morning to carry out Pope's plan.

McDowell moved out on the 26th toward the Sulphur Springs, and King's division had reached the vicinity of the river when Pope, finding that the other parts of his programme had fallen through, informed McDowell of this fact, and left the execution of the order in his own case to his discretion. He, however, urged him to discover what force was

¹ Pope's and McDowell's reports, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. pp. 67, 333.

at Waterloo, and what had become of the column moving round to the right, and to insure concerted action, directed him to assume command of Sigel's and all other troops in his reach.¹ McDowell, when he found that his own corps was the only one near the Rappahannock, abandoned the idea of crossing the river, and ordered his troops, with the exception of King's division, back to the position they had occupied the day before.² King had become engaged in an artillery duel at the Sulphur Springs with Anderson's division, and this was kept up during the day. Meantime, McDowell attempted to send the cavalry to his right to solve the enigma of Jackson's march, but it was not ready to move.³ Buford prepared then to start on the next morning, with all the available cavalry, for Chester Gap, to determine certainly Jackson's whereabouts. Before the time for starting arrived, however, Jackson had made his whereabouts known unmistakably.

Longstreet's demonstrations along the Rappahannock and Jackson's march were as incomprehensible to McDowell this day as they had been to Sigel the day before. At 2.20 in the afternoon he dispatched Pope as follows: "What is the enemy's purpose, it is not easy to discover. I have thought he means to march around our right through Rectortown to Washington; others, that he intended going down the Shenandoah, either through Chester or Thornton Gap. Either of these operations seems to me to be too hazardous for him to undertake with us in his rear and flank. Others, that it was

¹ Pope's dispatches of five and 8.10 A. M. August 26. (McDowell's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. pp. 333, 347, 359.)

² McDowell's dispatch to Pope August 26, *Ib.* p. 349; McDowell's report, *Ib.* p. 333.

³ McDowell says that Buford and Bayard both reported their cavalry broken down on this morning. Buford said his was disorganized, Bayard, that his would neither charge nor stand a charge. It is hard to see what could have caused the exhaustion of which so many Federal officers complain at this stage of the campaign. The Federal cavalry had done but little since Pope had recrossed the Rappahannock — had certainly seen less service than had the Confederate cavalry, which had made the expedition to Catlett's, while the march which broke Sigel down on the night of the 25th was about one third of that made by Jackson on the same day.

his object to throw his trains around into the valley, to draw his supplies from that direction, and have his front looking to the east rather than to the north." At the same time, believing that the mass of the Confederates were at or above Waterloo, he suggested that Heintzelman's corps be sent to Warrenton. For the battle, he thought, would come off "above rather than below Sulphur Springs."¹

At nightfall on the 26th, Pope, impressed no doubt by McDowell's opinion, directed the concentration of his forces the next day in the neighborhood of Warrenton. McDowell, Reynolds, and Sigel were already there. Banks was at Fayetteville. Reno was ordered to move on the 27th to Warrenton and thence to Greenwich, to which latter point Kearny's division was also to be sent. Hooker was to remain at Warrenton Junction. Porter's corps, which had just reported near Bealeton, was ordered to the vicinity of Warrenton.² Sturgis

¹ *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 350.

² Porter added (including Piatt's brigade of Sturgis's division, which was incorporated with Porter's corps on the 27th) 10,000 men to Pope's numbers, and made his strength full 75,000. Mr. Ropes (*Army under Pope*, ed. 1882 (2d ed.), p. 195) estimates his numbers, exclusive of losses after Cedar Run, at 81,000, but adopts about half of Pope's estimates of his losses in the past few days, and gives him at Manassas "nearly 70,000 men" (p. 197). Pope's official report, made up long after the campaign was over, is full of errors, and frequently in direct conflict with his dispatches sent and recorded at the time. This is fully shown by General G. H. Gordon and by Mr. Ropes. But they do not seem to have been as suspicious of Pope's careless statement of numbers, though Mr. Ropes confesses himself staggered at the process by which Pope cuts down his 81,000 men to 55,000 before he had done any serious fighting. That in a week he could have lost 26,000 men without any severe engagement and with no hard service (the exhausting labors of Pope's troops on the 27th are imaginary) is incredible. The truth is, Pope carried back a large part of the losses incurred at Manassas and credited them before. Mr. Ropes attempts to get at the truth by reducing Pope's statement of losses by more than one half, that is, from 26,000 to 11,000 or 12,000 men. Mr. Ropes has, in comparing the strength of Pope's and Lee's armies, made a serious oversight, which is not in keeping with the painstaking fairness of his book. He gives to Lee at Manassas the full numbers he had at the opening of the campaign, while, as just stated, he has reduced Pope's numbers from 81,000 to 70,000 on the 27th. Now, as Lee did as much

and Cox were to be pushed forward in the same direction when they arrived, and Halleck was requested to send Franklin from Alexandria to Gainesville to make sure of that flank.

fighting as Pope (and the skirmishing along the Rappahannock did not entail any very considerable loss upon either side), and far more marching with much more scanty rations, he should have diminished his effective numbers at Manassas, at least in the same ratio as Pope's. This he has by an oversight forgotten to do. Such a rule would give Lee but 45,000 men on the 27th. We think the deduction too great in both cases. The fairest way to compare strength is to take the nearest returns and those as nearly as possible simultaneous, and by this rule Pope should be credited with from 75,000 to 77,000 men, and Lee with 50,000 to 55,000. (Pope's forces were : Sigel, McDowell, Reno, and Banks, 45,000 on August 21 ; cavalry 4000 ; Reynolds, 8000 ; Heintzelman and Porter, 20,000 ; total 77,000. For Lee's force, in detail, see pp. 198, 199, note.)

CHAPTER XXVI.

JACKSON AT MANASSAS.

WHILE Pope was thus making his dispositions to deliver battle about Warrenton, the swift-footed Jackson was hastening forward to strike the blow that McDowell and Pope had convinced themselves was too hazardous to be attempted. Leaving his bivouac at Salem early on the 26th, he marched through White Plains toward Thoroughfare Gap. Meeting with no opposition, he passed the Gap, and pressed on to Gainesville, where the Warrenton and Centreville turnpike intersects the Manassas Gap Railroad. Here he was overtaken at four P. M. by Stuart, who, with the mass of his cavalry, had left Waterloo Bridge at two P. M., and following Jackson's route had made up at this hour a march of over thirty-five miles. All day had Jackson marched unopposed and unobserved. It was long after nightfall when a negro and a scout of Sigel's brought McDowell the first news of the passage at midday of infantry, artillery, and cavalry through White Plains. All day had Stuart been hastening after Jackson, while the Federal cavalry were in camp cooking rations and preparing to go to the Shenandoah Valley on the morrow to hunt up the Confederate army. After passing Gainesville,¹ with Stuart to protect his right flank, Jackson moved to Bristoe Station. Ewell's division and the 2d Virginia cavalry (Colonel T. T. Munford) were in front, and just before sunset Hays's brigade of Ewell's division,² preceded by Munford, seized the railroad

¹ Here Colonel Munford picked up some twelve or fifteen prisoners, who were entirely ignorant, he says, of any movement of the Confederates.

² Early's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 708.

and dispersed the small Federal guard.¹ Three empty trains were coming down from Warrenton. The front one made its way over the obstructions, and escaped to carry the news to Manassas and Alexandria. The other two were captured. A short piece of track was torn up and the telegraph wires cut, and Pope's communications were severed.

Thus by a forced march of over twenty miles, preceded by an even longer one the day before, Jackson had gained Pope's rear and effectually interposed between him and the mass of the army which was hastening from Alexandria to his assistance. This was, however, to the Confederates but the beginning of the exertions and difficulties which this enterprise involved. If the garrison and stores at Manassas Junction were to be secured, time must not be allowed for the fugitives from Bristoe to put the Federals on their guard. At this juncture General Trimble volunteered to march at once to that point and seize it during the night. Jackson accepted the offer of the gallant old soldier, who thus proposed to make a night attack at the end of a march of over twenty-five miles.² Subsequently, to increase the prospect of success, Stuart was ordered to join with part of his cavalry in the expedition, and as ranking officer to take command. Trimble, with two regiments,³ numbering in all not over 500 men, moved along the railroad, while Stuart sent Wickham's cavalry regiment (4th Virginia) around to the rear of the place. Excitement sustained the weary Confederates. The night was dark, but when Trimble approached the place, he attacked. The garrison had been stirred up,⁴ and received him with the fire of musketry and two batteries. But the Federals were weak in numbers, and, staggered by this irruption of an unknown and unexpected hostile force, they were quickly overcome. Be-

¹ Munford reports that he killed 2, wounded 7, and captured 43 prisoners of the 4th New York regiment. He also got 14 horses from the cavalry, most of whom escaped. He lost 3 men wounded. (Munford's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 747.)

² Jackson says thirty miles, but he erroneously put the distance from Bristoe to Manassas at seven miles. It is four.

³ 21st Georgia and 21st North Carolina.

⁴ By the train that escaped from Bristoe, it is supposed.

tween midnight and daylight Trimble and the cavalry were in possession of the place. Trimble captured over 300 prisoners, besides 200 negroes, 8 guns, and nearly 250 horses.¹ But the most valuable result of the capture was the immense quantities of quartermaster and commissary stores which fell into the hands of the victors,² and which were to furnish Jackson with timely supplies. That Stuart might have support in case the enemy from the direction of Alexandria should make an effort in force to retake Manassas, Jackson ordered first a brigade from Taliaferro's division³ to march at once, and then directed the divisions of A. P. Hill and the remainder of Taliaferro's to move at daylight toward that point, while the three brigades of Ewell⁴ remained at Bristoe. When near Manassas, Baylor ran against a Federal regiment of cavalry (12th Pennsylvania), and after a short skirmish dispersed it. A distant battery then opened fire on the Confederates, but soon retired towards Centreville. Next was made a more serious attempt to recapture the place. General Taylor's New Jersey brigade had been sent up on the cars from Alexandria. Leaving the cars at Bull Run, they crossed the bridge on foot, and advanced with "great spirit and determination"⁵ towards Manassas. By this time Poague's and Carpenter's batteries opened, and several brigades and several batteries of Hill's division were so disposed as to attack both front and flank. Taylor began to retreat, and his brigade, subjected to an overwhelming fire from several directions, was quickly routed and driven from the field with the loss of their commander. Two hundred prisoners were taken by the Confederates, who ad-

¹ Trimble's loss was only fifteen wounded. His men were kept on guard all night.

² These stores included "50,000 pounds of bacon, 1000 barrels of corned beef, 2000 barrels of salt pork, 2000 barrels of flour, besides great quantities of ordnance, quartermaster, medical, and sutler stores deposited in buildings and filling long trains of cars." (Jackson's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 644.)

³ The Stonewall brigade, under Colonel W. S. H. Baylor, and Poague's battery were sent.

⁴ Hays's, Lawton's, Early's. Trimble's was at Manassas.

⁵ Jackson's report, *Ib.* p. 644.

vanced to Bull Run. Here Colonel Scammon, with the 11th and 12th Ohio regiments of Cox's division, made some resistance and tried to save the bridge, but he was soon overpowered and compelled to retreat, with a loss of 190 killed and wounded. The bridge and railroad trains at that point were then destroyed. Fitz Lee was sent by way of Fairfax Court House after the fugitives,¹ and he advanced as far as Burke's Station, only twelve miles from Alexandria. No further attempt was made to dispute the possession of Manassas during that day, and the hungry, weary, and footsore Confederates now turned their attention to supplying their pressing needs from the captured stores.²

It was while giving orders on the evening of the 26th for the concentration of his army in the neighborhood of Warrenton,³ with reference to an attack from the direction of Waterloo or above, that Pope received the first information of the cutting of the railroad and telegraph at Bristoe. Thinking this the work of a handful of cavalry, he ordered Heintzelman at Warrenton Junction, at 8.20 P. M., "to put a regiment on a train of cars and send it down immediately to Manassas to ascertain what had occurred, repair the telegraph wires, and protect the railroad there until further orders."⁴ Later on came the information from scouts and negroes of the march of the Confederates through Salem and White Plains. Sigel reported, as the result of a number of scouting parties, that the Confederate rear-guard was at Orleans and the main force at White Plains. Pope became uncertain. At midnight he

¹ Colonel Scammon says the retreat of Taylor's brigade after his fall was discreditable. They fled in disorder along the railroad towards Alexandria. (Scammon's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 406.)

² Taliaferro was put in command, and had issued as much as the men could eat or carry off, and loaded the few wagons with the troops and all the captured ones with commissary supplies. (Taliaferro's report, *Ib.* p. 656.) Many men obtained shoes and clothes. A large bakery, which was found there, was kept in operation all day by details from the Federal prisoners, and hundreds of men obtained, now for the first time in over two days, something to eat besides the green corn in the fields.

³ Pope's headquarters were at Warrenton Junction on this night.

⁴ Pope's report, *Ib.* p. 70.

sent McDowell the report made by Sigel's scouts, and directed him to "ascertain very early in the morning whether this is so, and to have the whole of your command in readiness to march. You had best ascertain it to-night. Communication has been interrupted by the enemy's cavalry near Manassas. Whether his whole force or the largest part of it has gone round is a question which we must settle instantly." At 5.30 A. M., he dispatches McDowell that it appears that "we had best move our whole force to occupy Gainesville," and adds, "Give me your view immediately on the subject, for we must act promptly in some way."¹ The regiment sent to reopen the railroad at Bristoe returned at daylight and reported the enemy in force, and then (at seven A. M.) Hooker's division was sent forward to do what the single regiment could not effect. At 8.30 A. M. on the 27th, though still in doubt, apparently, as to the extent of the force in his rear, Pope gave definite orders for the movement of his army towards Gainesville. McDowell, Reynolds, and Sigel were to follow the turnpike from Warrenton to Gainesville. McDowell at once ordered Sigel, who was in advance, to send forward a force and seize Buckland Mills, which was done. Bayard's cavalry preceded this column. Reno, followed by Kearny, was sent direct from Warrenton Junction to Greenwich. Banks was ordered from Fayetteville to Warrenton Junction, to guard the trains and railroad, and Porter, as soon as relieved by Banks, was also to march toward Gainesville. The trains under charge of Banks were to move towards Manassas in rear of Hooker.

Late in the afternoon of the 26th, Lee, leaving R. H. Anderson's division, had withdrawn Longstreet's corps from the Rappahannock, and it had crossed that river at Hinson's Mill to follow Jackson. It was time to lessen the great distance between the wings of the Confederate army, to reach a position from which Longstreet might support Jackson in the struggle to which his bold expedition would expose him. On the morning of the 27th, therefore, Lee was marching with the larger

¹ Pope's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 70 ; McDowell's report, *Ib.* p. 352.

part of his army towards Salem, while Jackson was resting and feeding his tired troops at Manassas and Bristoe. Pope had finally abandoned his front toward the Rappahannock, and had wisely directed his army upon Gainesville, where he expected to strike at least the main body of the force whose advance had broken his communications, or perhaps the whole Confederate army.

The greater part of the 27th was spent in marching without serious collisions between the hostile armies. A dash of Federal cavalry¹ into Salem in front of Longstreet delayed him a little while, but the cavalry retired, and Longstreet kept on to White Plains, where he rested for the night. But on the other wing, Hooker's division, which had been sent down the railroad, came in contact during the afternoon with Ewell in front of Bristoe, where Jackson had left him with three brigades. Ewell's instructions were to hold his position until hard pressed, when he was to retire upon the main body at Manassas. Early in the morning Ewell had taken up a position across the railroad a short distance to the south of Bristoe. He fronted towards Warrenton Junction. Lawton's brigade was placed on the left of the line and also to the left of the railroad. Hays's brigade was on the right of the railroad and constituted the Confederate centre, while Early held their right. Hays's brigade,² under Forno, was sent towards Warrenton Junction along the railroad to reconnoitre. At Kettle Run they found the regiment which had been sent up by Pope the night before. It retired, and Forno, leaving one of his regiments on picket and another to destroy the bridge and railroad, returned to the main body. As Hooker's division advanced, these regiments, having executed their orders, fell back until within supporting distance of Ewell's main body. There they took a position in a wood some 300 or 400 yards in advance of the main line, and were reinforced by the 60th Georgia and 5th Louisiana. Hooker came on with Carr's brigade in front, supported closely by Taylor's, while Grover's acted as reserve. The artillery on

¹ Some of Buford's.

² Four of Hays's regiments and one of Lawton's, it appears from Early's report.

both sides opened, and an active musketry fire soon followed. Carr's front regiments became hotly engaged.¹ After an hour's contest they were reinforced² by two others and then by Taylor's brigade, and meantime Hooker himself led the 6th and 7th New Jersey to the Federal left to threaten Early's flank and rear. The development of the Federal infantry showed Ewell that the enemy was present in force, and, knowing that large bodies from Pope's army might be at hand, he gave orders to retire on Manassas. This operation required some skill and coolness, for Broad Run was in his rear, and his advance was already actively engaged with Hooker. Early was directed to cover the withdrawal. Lawton was first brought back over Broad Run and placed in position north of it. Hays's brigade was then withdrawn, the first regiments retiring in good order under the fire of Hooker's advancing troops. When these brigades and the artillery had all crossed the creek, Early's brigade retired by regiments, Walker's 13th Virginia covering the rear and holding the Federal skirmishers in check. Early took position three fourths of a mile from Broad Run in rear of Lawton, whose brigade then marched through his line and followed Hays to Manassas. Hooker advanced to the Run, and, having crossed it, bivouacked for the night. The Federal advance here ceased, and Ewell then withdrew Early after dusk to Manassas. The Federal loss in the affair was 300;³ the Confederate was slight;⁴ but the numbers are not fully given in the official reports.⁵

The hostile forces on the ground each numbered about 5500 men.⁶

¹ 2d New York and 8th New Jersey.

² 115th Pennsylvania and 5th New Jersey.

³ Heintzelman's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 412.

⁴ Early's report, *Ib.* p. 710.

⁵ Forno reports 19 killed and 31 wounded left on the field. (*Ib.* p. 718.)

⁶ Ewell's division strength on August 26 was 7402 officers and men for duty. (*Southern Historical Papers*, vol. viii. p. 305.) Trimble's brigade was absent at Manassas, leaving about 5500 or 5600 at Bristoe. Mr. Ropes puts Hooker's strength at 5500, basing his estimate on Pope's statement that Heintzelman's corps was 10,000 strong. Mr. Ropes and General G. H.

Gordon give Hooker much credit for his management of this affair, from the fact that Ewell considered himself "hard pressed" and fell back before equal numbers. The reason for Ewell's retreat is very plain. He was instructed not to fight a battle at a disadvantage four miles in front of Jackson's main body. The advance of a strong infantry force to attack him and the certainty that Pope must be coming to reopen his communications rendered it probable that, if he accepted battle, largely superior masses might be thrown upon him and his retreat across Broad Run be made difficult if not impossible. He could not know that Pope, still incredulous as to the strength of the forces in his rear, had sent only Hooker's division to Bristoe. General Hooker's manœuvres, however, and the conduct of his troops, were very good.

CHAPTER XXVII.

POPE'S "PURSUIT" OF JACKSON.

POPE remained at Warrenton Junction the greater part of the day, directing the movement of his troops towards Gainesville. Even Hooker had been ordered, after resting for the night at Bristoe, to move to Greenwich on the morrow. Informed of Hooker's fight in the afternoon, and that he was driving the Confederates towards Manassas, Pope left the Junction at five P. M. and went to Bristoe. He reached there when the engagement was over, and then learned for the first time that Jackson's whole corps was near Manassas. This and Hooker's success produced a revolution in the mind of the Federal commander, and led to a change of programme on his part. He had not been able to realize that Jackson's entire force was on the railroad in his rear, until it had been in this position for twenty-four hours. All day he had clung to the idea that the railroad had been cut by a small force, and that the mass of the Confederates were east of Thoroughfare Gap and must be encountered at Gainesville. Now he knew the truth, and, imagining that Jackson's object was a raid around the right flank (faced as it then was towards Manassas) of the Federal army, brave hopes were born. Hooker's success seems to have inspired his chief with undue expectations. After a long series of petty mishaps and defeats, at last the tide seemed to Pope to have turned. Jackson had been overhauled and his advance division easily driven back on the main body, leaving wounded and dead on the field. He would follow up his success, and punish the rash attempt that had been made on his rear. At 6.30 P. M., he dispatches Porter at Warrenton Junction, ordering him to march at one o'clock at night so as to be at Bristoe by daylight.¹ "We must drive him from Manassas

¹ This is one of the orders which gave rise to the trial of Fitz-John Por-

and clear the country between that place and Gainesville, where McDowell is.”¹ Banks was hurried forward to take Porter’s place at the Junction, and convey the trains towards Manassas. At nine P. M., Pope’s plan assumed more precise shape, for at this hour he sent the following to McDowell: “At daylight to-morrow morning march rapidly on Manassas Junction with your whole force,² resting your right on the Manassas Gap Railroad, throwing your left well to the east. Jackson, Ewell, and A. P. Hill are between Gainesville and Manassas Junction. We had a severe fight with them to-day, driving them back several miles along the railroad. If you will march promptly and rapidly at the earliest dawn of day upon Manassas Junction, we shall bag the whole crowd. I have directed Reno to march from Greenwich at the same time upon Manassas Junction, and Kearny, who is in his rear, to march on Bristoe at daybreak. Be expeditious, and the day is our own.”³

Thus Pope closed the day by directing a rapid concentration early in the morning of his whole army upon Manassas Junction. Disregarding Lee’s rapid approach by Thoroughfare Gap, he designed to throw his whole force upon Jackson, and “bag” him before Lee could interfere. Jackson destroyed, it would be an easy matter to look after the other half of the Confederate army. No doubt seems to have crossed the mind of the Federal commander that Jackson would remain at Manassas Junction with his twenty odd thousand men and permit himself to be “bagged” by the 70,000 or 80,000 troops which he knew were converging upon him. No misgivings disturbed Pope lest delays should occur in destroying Jackson, and

ter. Porter had marched from eighteen to nineteen miles to reach Warrenton Junction, where he arrived at nightfall. Receiving Pope’s order at ten P. M., he was induced by his division commanders to delay his start until three A. M., that the troops might eat and rest. The night was dark and the roads blocked with trains, and but little progress was possible in the night. At three A. M., the corps marched, but was so delayed by trains, etc., that it did not reach Bristoe until ten A. M.

¹ Pope’s order, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 71.

² Sigel and Reynolds were with McDowell and under his orders.

³ *Ib.* p. 72; *Report of Committee on Conduct of War, Supplement*, part ii. p. 145.

in consequence Lee should, after all, reach the theatre of action in time to throw Longstreet's sword into the scale. Pope seems to have expected Jackson to make a sweep around his right flank, and, striking at the trains towards Warrenton Junction, return in that way to the Rappahannock.¹ Why the Federal commander did not expect his swift-moving adversary to sweep round his left flank in order to rejoin Lee, it is difficult to imagine. One thing appears plain, Pope's conception of Lee's strategy on the 28th was as utterly inadequate as his comprehension of Jackson's tactics.

Let us look first at the Confederate movements on the morning of August 28. When Pope was issuing orders to McDowell and his other lieutenants to march at dawn on Manassas, Jackson was already evacuating that place. Ewell's fight in the afternoon and the reports from Stuart informed him of the approach of the mass of the Federal army, and, having fed and rested his tired and hungry men during the day of the 27th, he issued orders for the movement of his corps during the night. As the advance of a large body of Federal troops was at Gainesville, and might in another day, by continuing its movement along the Warrenton and Centreville turnpike, interpose completely between him and Lee, Jackson decided to place himself north of this road on the old battlefield of July 21, 1861. Here he would be opposite the left wing and flank of the Federal army if it advanced towards Centreville, and would have his back towards the Bull Run Mountains, through the passes of which Lee might soon be confidently expected. If compelled to retreat, the way was open; if able to outmanœuvre Pope and hold him in check until Lee's arrival, the position was favorable for a general battle. Soon after night-fall on the 27th, Taliaferro's division,² accompanied by all the trains, was sent on the direct road from Manassas to Sudley Springs. A severe tramp it was, over dark roads, on a hot night, when scant and muddy water to slake thirst was eagerly sought for. When day dawned, however, this division was north of the turnpike and east of Groveton. A. P. Hill was ordered

¹ Pope's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. pp. 35, 36.

² Jackson's old division, commanded by General W. B. Taliaferro after the death of Winder at Cedar Run.

to move at one A. M. to Centreville, which point he reached by morning. Ewell, whose troops had been fighting at Bristoe, stopped long enough to feed and refresh his men at Manassas, and then followed Hill towards Blackburn's ford, but bivouacked before crossing Bull Run. All the supplies captured at Manassas that could be issued or transported were used, and arrangements had been made to burn the rest. At midnight the torch was applied to the storehouses and the immense trains of cars, and soon the sky for miles around was illumined by the glare of the conflagration. As soon as it was day, Ewell continued his march, crossing Bull Run at Blackburn's ford, then moving up the east side and recrossing it at the Stone Bridge on the Warrenton and Centreville turnpike. He thus joined Taliaferro. A. P. Hill, later in the forenoon,¹ moved from Centreville across the Stone Bridge to the same point. Thus it was that Jackson, during the night of the 27th and the morning of the 28th, transferred his corps without loss or molestation from Manassas Junction to the vicinity of Groveton. He at the same time so managed his movements as to leave his adversary groping all day after him.

While Jackson was stepping out of the path of the blow that Pope was aiming at him, Stuart was doing all he could, both to conceal the Confederate movements and to spread uncertainty and panic as widely as possible. Fitz Lee, with three regiments,² by his dash to Fairfax Court House and Burke's Station, spread the alarm all the way to Alexandria, and prevented any prompt efforts from that direction for reopening communications with Pope.³ Munford and Rosser⁴ covered

¹ Hill says he left Centreville at ten A. M.

² 3d, 4th, and 9th Virginia cavalry. (Stuart's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. pp. 735, 739.)

³ The burden of McClellan's telegrams to Halleck on the 27th and 28th was to dispose the large forces in Alexandria in such a way as to cover Washington, and on the 28th Halleck said to McClellan, "I think you had better place Sumner's corps as it arrives near the guns and particularly at the Chain Bridge. The principal thing to be feared now is a cavalry raid into this city, especially in the night-time." (McClellan's report, *Ib.* p. 97.)

⁴ Munford commanded the 2d Virginia cavalry, Rosser the 5th Virginia cavalry.

Ewell's rear, and Brien¹ watched the advance of the enemy at Gainesville. Robertson's brigade was at Sudley Church on the 28th, whence Stuart led it to Haymarket, where he expected to find the Federal cavalry.² When Taliaferro reached his position north of the Warrenton turnpike, he threw forward the 2d brigade of his division under Colonel B. T. Johnson to Groveton to guard one flank, and the 3d brigade under Colonel A. G. Taliaferro to Sudley Mills to guard the other. Jackson now quietly awaited the movements of Pope, knowing that every hour brought Longstreet nearer. The latter was marching on the morning of the 28th from White Plains towards Thoroughfare Gap.

To the Federal army the 28th was a day of much fatiguing and fruitless marching. As already set forth, Pope had, at nine P. M. the night before, issued urgent orders for the concentration of his forces on Manassas. These orders found McDowell making arrangements to send Sigel with a large force to Haymarket, to oppose Longstreet, of whose approach he was now well informed, while McDowell himself led the remainder of his troops against Jackson.³ Upon the receipt of Pope's nine o'clock dispatch, however, McDowell abandoned his own plans, and proceeded to carry out Pope's orders. Sigel, who was in advance, was directed at once from Gainesville upon Manassas. Reynolds was to follow Sigel, and form upon his left, King was to follow Reynolds, and Ricketts was to bring up the rear, with instructions to watch and oppose the advance of the Confederates from Thoroughfare Gap, if necessary.⁴

¹ Brien commanded the 1st Virginia cavalry.

² Stuart says a captured dispatch of Pope's gave the information that his army was marching on Manassas, and that his cavalry under Bayard was ordered to Haymarket. (Stuart's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 735.)

³ McDowell's report, *Ib.* p. 335.

⁴ McDowell's order (given to Sigel at half past two A. M. on the 28th) is as follows: "General Orders No. 10: 1. Major-General Sigel will immediately march with his whole corps on Manassas Junction, his right resting on the Manassas Railroad.

"2. Brigadier-General Reynolds will march on the turnpike, immediately in the rear of General Sigel, and form his division on the left of General Sigel, and march upon Manassas Junction.

McDowell sent his cavalry, as it came up, to the Gap to check and delay Longstreet as long as possible. The Federal troops were tired, and the movements of McDowell's wing were slow and confused. Sigel did not move promptly, and at half past seven A. M. his men were cooking their breakfast at Gainesville, while his trains blocked the road in the way of the divisions that were to follow. McDowell urged Sigel forward, but it was late in the forenoon before he was fairly on the road. Then Sigel fell into an error in regard to the route. He was ordered to move from Gainesville, with his right resting on the Manassas Gap Railroad, but in some way understood that his right was to rest on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad,¹ which carried him to the south instead of the north of the Manassas Gap Railroad. Reynolds passed him and formed on his left, but when King came up, it was found necessary to put him in the gap between Reynolds and Sigel, made by the latter's erroneous movement to the south of the Manassas Railroad. Finally, the mass of McDowell's corps was in motion with its face towards Manassas, hoping, after a march of eight or nine miles, to overhaul Jackson, who was close at hand at Groveton, and whom they were about to leave behind them.

Nor were the Federal leaders without signs of Jackson's proximity. As heretofore stated, when Taliaferro reached the north side of the Warrenton turnpike, he had thrown the brigade under Colonel B. T. Johnson² forward to Groveton. Johnson found the 1st Virginia cavalry (under Brien) in his

"3. Brigadier-General King will follow immediately after General Reynolds and form his division on General Reynolds's left, and direct his march on Manassas Junction.

"4. Brigadier-General Ricketts will follow Brigadier-General King and march to Gainesville, and if, on arriving there, no indication shall appear of the approach of the enemy from Thoroughfare Gap, he will continue his march along the turnpike, form on the left of General King, and march on Manassas Junction. He will be constantly on the lookout for an attack from the direction of Thoroughfare Gap, and in case one is threatened, he will form his division to the left and march to resist it.

"The headquarters of the corps will be at King's division." (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 360.)

¹ Now the Virginia Midland.

² 21st Virginia, and 42d and 48th Virginia, and 1st Virginia battalion.

front towards Gainesville, and soon Captain Gaither brought in, as prisoner, a courier, with the order from McDowell to Sigel for a concentration of the Federal forces upon Manassas.¹ Some skirmishing took place with Sigel's cavalry, and meantime Reynolds's division was approaching from Gainesville to place itself on Sigel's left according to McDowell's orders. Johnson quickly occupied a commanding position on the north side of the turnpike and a little west of Groveton, where he placed in battery two rifled guns which Brien had with him, and opened upon Meade's brigade, which was in the advance of Reynolds. The Federals replied with artillery,² and for a short time a brisk skirmish of infantry and artillery was kept up. This artillery firing caused Sigel to halt, retrace his steps, and put his troops in line of battle upon the south side of the turnpike opposite Johnson. This display of force from both Sigel and Reynolds caused Johnson to withdraw, and all was again quiet. When the Federal skirmishers advanced to the hill where the Confederate guns had been placed, no Confederates were in sight, and McDowell and Reynolds soon concluded that Johnson's force was merely a rear-guard or reconnoitring party.³ Instead of following him up, therefore, McDowell turned once more to the execution of Pope's order. Sigel and Reynolds were again directed to march on Manassas, and King was ordered to follow. Not so, however, with the rear division under Ricketts. The contingency apprehended by McDowell in the early morning had already taken place. Colonel Wyndham (1st New Jersey cavalry), followed by other cavalry, had been sent early in the

¹ Johnson says he sent this dispatch by courier to General Jackson, and that he also afterwards sent Captain Gaither to communicate its contents, and Captain Gaither was captured by the Federal cavalry in trying to find Jackson.

² First Ransom's and then Cooper's battery were used. (Reynolds's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 393.)

³ McDowell says: "Supposing from the movements of this force that it was some rear-guard or cavalry party, with artillery, sent out to reconnoitre, the march of the division, after caring for the killed and wounded, was resumed, and it turned off to the south of the road to go to Manassas." (*Ib.* p. 336.)

morning to Thoroughfare Gap to look after Longstreet. He found the Confederates already in the Gap, ready to pour down upon the flank and rear of McDowell as he moved on to Manassas. When this was reported, Ricketts was at once sent to hold Longstreet in check. We will postpone our account of his conflict in the afternoon with Longstreet until we have traced farther the operations of the main body of the Federal army.

It will be remembered that when Pope sent orders to McDowell¹ for an early march from Gainesville on Manassas, he issued similar and most urgent directions to Reno and Kearny and Porter. Reno was to go from Greenwich to Manassas; Kearny from Greenwich, and Porter from Warrenton Junction, to Bristoe. The large force ordered to Bristoe was to provide against an apprehended movement of Jackson around the Federal right flank.² Pope awaited in person the arrival of Kearny at Bristoe, and then directed this division, followed by Hooker's, upon Manassas. Kearny's troops arrived at Bristoe about eight A. M., and continued forward with Reno upon their left, the whole reaching Manassas about midday.³ Porter arrived at Bristoe at 10.30 A. M., when he was permitted to halt and rest his men.⁴

Thus at midday Pope was in possession of Manassas with the corps of Heintzelman⁵ and Reno, while Porter was but four miles in his rear at Bristoe, and McDowell, with Sigel and Reynolds, was not far from Gainesville on the way to join him. The Federal commander found nothing, however, but

¹ At nine P. M. on August 27.

² Pope's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 36.

³ Pope says he reached Manassas at twelve o'clock, and that Jackson's evacuation of that place was then just fairly completed. He is, of course, entirely in error about this, as Taliaferro was near Groveton, Hill at Centreville, and Ewell near Blackburn's ford at or before daylight on the 28th.

⁴ Pope bitterly criticises Porter for his delay, and for this request to halt; but a court of inquiry has exonerated Porter, and it is impossible to see now what damage was done by what Porter did or failed to do that day.

⁵ Hooker's and Kearny's divisions composed Heintzelman's corps.

the charred and still smoking remains of his burnt depots, and what neither the circumstances of the case, the character of his antagonist, nor the conflagration of the night before had forced upon his comprehension, was now revealed to him beyond question. Jackson was not there to be "bagged." Baffled and disappointed at the result of his hurried march, Pope set himself at once to determine what had become of his adversary, whom he imagined to have only an hour or two's start. The first information he received seems to have been the most correct. For an order was promptly sent to stop McDowell, who was now directed to move on Gum Spring¹ to intercept Jackson. At 1.20 P. M. this order was made discretionary, and McDowell was promised the aid of Reno and Heintzelman in pushing the Confederates north of the Warrenton turnpike.² By four o'clock, however, the rumors of Fitz Lee's work on the railroad east of Bull Run and the information of Hill's march toward Centreville the night before had thrown General Pope completely off the track, and at 4.15 P. M. he sent the following to McDowell: "The enemy is reported in force on the other side of Bull Run on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad as also near Centreville. I have ordered Sigel to march on Centreville immediately, as also Kearny and Reno. I will advance Hooker as reserve. Please march immediately with your command directly upon Centreville from where you are."³ General Pope states that orders were at the same time sent to Porter to move up to Manassas.⁴

¹ Gum Spring is on Little River turnpike, about fifteen miles north of Manassas.

² McDowell's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 337. This order did not reach McDowell until about the same time as the subsequent one, dated 4.15.

³ McDowell's report, *Ib.* pp. 337, 360, 361. Hill's division, the only part of Jackson's force that had gone to Centreville, had left there six hours before this order was written (at ten A. M.), and the force on the railroad east of Bull Run was the three regiments of cavalry under Fitz Lee which had gone on a raid the day before.

⁴ *Ib.* p. 37. These orders, if sent, were never received, and Mr. Ropes seems to doubt that any were ever sent. (Ropes, *Army under Pope*, p. 79.)

CHAPTER XXVIII.

THE BATTLE OF GAINESVILLE.

THUS, in the middle of the afternoon, the Federal army, already wearied by many hours of tiresome march and halt, was hurried forward again on a false trail after Jackson. Kearny led the way, and at night had reached Centreville, only, of course, to find it evacuated.¹ Reno was behind him and near at hand, and Hooker had gotten as far as the fords on Bull Run. The order to move on Centreville forced McDowell's troops in various stages of advancement toward Manassas. Sigel, whose march had been painfully slow, halted two and a half miles from Manassas upon learning that Jackson was not there, and reported to Pope in person. He was directed to proceed by a cross road which passed near New Market, and thence crossing Bull Run below the Stone Bridge enter the turnpike east of that bridge. Reynolds had reached Bethlehem Church, nearly three miles from Manassas. He took the road leading from Manassas to Sudley Springs, intending, when he reached the Warrenton turnpike, to turn down it toward Centreville. King was still near Gainesville, having made but little progress on the road towards Manassas. He retraced his steps to Gainesville, and proceeded to march down the Warrenton turnpike from that place toward Centreville.

It was this movement of King's, late in the afternoon, which brought on the first serious collision of the day with Jackson, and revealed his whereabouts to Pope. What Reynolds had failed to discover, though so close at hand in the morning, King was destined to find out and make known. When Jack-

¹ Pope speaks of driving out the Confederate rear-guard, but there had been nothing there but a cavalry regiment for many hours.

son had placed his corps north of the turnpike, and thus provided a secure line of retreat if necessary, he was ready to resume the offensive if the enemy did not anticipate him. Successful as his expedition had so far been, and great as had been the loss of stores and, still more, the confusion and demoralization inflicted on the Federal army by his occupation of Manassas and the complete severing of Pope's communications with Washington, Jackson was well aware that but a small part of the fruits of Lee's strategy had so far been gathered. The loss of stores meant but little to the Federal government. The forcing of Pope from the Rappahannock to Bull Run would be something, but, if unaccompanied by a defeat in battle, it meant merely the hastening of the junction of McClellan's army with Pope's, and the advance of the latter in a week or two in overwhelming force. The Confederate design looked to a battle with Pope before he could receive farther reinforcements, and to General Jackson now fell the difficult duty of securing the success of that design. Two plans of action were open to the Federal commander. One (which he adopted and adhered to) was to concentrate his greatly superior forces upon Jackson and defeat him before Lee could come up. Against this danger Jackson had already provided as far as was possible by rapidly transferring his corps under cover of the night to a field which afforded him good defensive positions, and at the same time the readiest means for a junction with Longstreet. The other alternative left to Pope was to retire behind Bull Run, reestablish his depots and his communications, receive the additions to his force which were now at Alexandria, and then resume the offensive against Lee. There was much in the movements of the Federal troops on the forenoon of the 28th to make Jackson suspect Pope of the latter design. The forces which the preceding afternoon had fought Ewell at Bristoe were moving to Manassas. Larger masses, of whose approach the cavalry had informed him, were now between Gainesville and Groveton, and seemed to be passing along the Warrenton turnpike toward Centreville. The attack upon Colonel B. T. Johnson appeared to be dictated by a design to clear the road for the

movement of these masses. Though at the risk of drawing upon himself greatly superior numbers, Jackson took steps at once to delay and thwart such a movement. "Dispositions were promptly made to attack the enemy, based upon the idea that he would continue to press forward upon the turnpike towards Alexandria."¹ A. P. Hill, who was approaching from Centreville, was ordered to stop at the fords of Bull Run and intercept the Federals.² But McDowell did not press forward across Jackson's front. As we now know, the point he was trying to reach at this time was not Centreville but Manassas. Reynolds and Sigel left the turnpike and moved toward the latter point. Jackson waited some hours, and then, seeing that the steady drift was toward Manassas, he ordered Taliaferro's and Ewell's divisions toward Gainesville that they might come in contact with the Federals.³ These troops moved some two or three miles to the position selected, and formed a line parallel to the turnpike and not far to the north of it. Soon after this movement had been completed, the looked-for opportunity was offered to Jackson. The stream of troops which had been setting all day toward Manassas stopped. Pope's order of 4.15 P. M. had caused McDowell to head all his columns toward Centreville. King's division, which was nearest Gainesville, quickly regained the turnpike and, unconscious of the proximity of Jackson, was moving along it in column toward the newly appointed goal. It was near sunset when King came opposite to Jackson's position. The latter at once ordered an advance and attack. Taliaferro formed his line with the 1st (Stonewall) brigade on his right

¹ Jackson's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 644.

² When Hill received this order, he had seen the captured order of Pope, directing a concentration of his forces at Manassas, to overwhelm Jackson. He therefore pressed on across the Stone Bridge to join the other divisions of the corps.

³ "As he did not appear to advance in force, and there was reason to believe that his main body was leaving the road and inclining toward Manassas Junction, my command was advanced through the woods, leaving Groveton on the left, until it reached a commanding position near Brownner's house." (Jackson's report, *Ib.* pp. 644, 645.) Taliaferro says that he was ordered to move about twelve M. (*Ib.* p. 656.)

and the 4th (Starke's) next; while Johnson's 2d brigade was left where it had rested after the skirmish of the morning. Lawton's and Trimble's brigades, of Ewell's division, were ordered to form on the left of Starke. Poague's, Wooding's, and Carpenter's batteries were placed in front of Starke's brigade.¹ When Taliaferro's brigade (3d of Taliaferro's division) reached the field, it went first to support these batteries and then took position on the right of the Stonewall brigade.

Hatch's brigade was the leading one of King's division, followed by Doubleday's, Gibbon's, and Patrick's in the order named. The Confederate batteries opened as the middle of this column was opposite to them, and soon a shower of shot and shell fell in the midst of Doubleday's and Gibbon's brigades. Deeming it a dash of cavalry, as the Federals knew nothing of Jackson's presence,² Gibbon sent a regiment to drive off the guns, while he opened a vigorous fire from his artillery.³ The Federal guns were admirably served, and soon compelled the Confederate batteries to move their position, but Gibbon quickly found that his regiment was attacking a strong infantry force, and he supported it with the remainder of his brigade. King and Doubleday were urgently called on for help, and the latter sent three regiments to Gibbon's assistance. Meantime, Hatch was skirmishing in front, and Patrick had not come up. Taliaferro advanced to a position, the right of which rested in an orchard and on some farm-houses, while the left was in an open field. Gibbon came through a piece of wood which intervened between the Confederates and the turnpike, and entered the south side of the orchard and of the field, where he was received with a fierce

¹ Colonel Crutchfield, chief of artillery 2d corps Army of Northern Virginia, reports that the batteries of Wooding and Garber were those engaged. During the action Major Pelham of the Stuart horse artillery succeeded in bringing two guns into action on the extreme right. (Crutchfield's and Pelham's reports, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. pp. 651, 652; 753, 754.)

² General Gibbon says General Hatch had been on the hill from which the Confederate batteries fired "not three quarters of an hour before." (Gibbon's report, *Ib.* p. 378.)

³ 4th artillery, Captain Campbell.

fire by the Confederates. A most severe and sanguinary contest now took place, lasting until darkness put an end to it. The Federal onset was of course checked by the superior force in front,¹ but Gibbon and his men made a most gallant and stubborn fight. Subjected to a sudden shelling, as they were moving in column in the road, and then, when sent to drive off a supposed cavalry party, finding themselves face to face with a large and well-posted force, these troops behaved with a coolness and determination rarely surpassed. Taliaferro thus describes the conflict: "The enemy . . . withstood with great determination the terrible fire which our lines poured upon them. For two hours and a half without an instant's cessation of the most deadly discharge of musketry, round shot, and shell, both lines stood unmoved, neither advancing, and neither broken nor yielding, until at last, about nine o'clock at night, the enemy slowly and sullenly fell back and yielded the field to our victorious troops."² Trimble on the Confederate left says: "The contest was fiercely maintained for an hour by both forces with severe loss on both sides." Two of Trimble's regiments (21st Georgia and 21st North Carolina) lost very heavily in a charge made at dusk, at which time General Ewell fell.³

The losses in this action were heavy on both sides. Gibbon reports that he lost 751 men, "or considerably over one third of the command."⁴ Doubleday states that his loss was "nearly

¹ Gibbon reports that only his own four regiments and two of Doubleday's were engaged in his advance, — probably about 3000 men, while one of Doubleday's supported his battery. Taliaferro had three of his brigades, all small, and Ewell had two.

² Taliaferro's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 657. Gibbon says: "The fight was kept up vigorously until after dark, when, finding that we were far outnumbered and outflanked on the left, where I at length lost all hope of getting help from Patrick's brigade, I ordered the line to fall back, which was done in good order. We, however, occupied the ground with our pickets and collected the wounded." (Gibbon's report, *Ib.* p. 378.)

³ Trimble says, of 242 men in 21st Georgia, next day but 69 reported for duty. (Trimble's report, *Southern Historical Papers*, vol. viii. p. 308.)

⁴ Gibbon reports 133 killed, 539 wounded, and 79 missing. Total 751. (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 378.)

one half of the force engaged.”¹ Full official reports of the Confederate loss are wanting,² but it no doubt equaled, if it did not exceed, that of the Federals. Generals Ewell and Taliaferro were both wounded, the former losing a leg, and a large number of field officers were killed or wounded.³

General Early, with his own and Hays's brigade of Ewell's division, had been ordered late in the action to follow up and support the Confederate left. He advanced with some difficulty across the old railroad cut, and came into position near the left of Trimble's brigade, but did not join in the action, as darkness had by this time put an end to the conflict.

No Federal troops, other than King's division, were present during the battle, and Hatch's and Patrick's brigades seem to have been slightly or not at all engaged. The artillery firing, however, attracted the attention of Reynolds and Sigel, who were both moving from the direction of Manassas toward the Warrenton turnpike, and their troops were hastened forward toward the battlefield. But night closed in, and the battle ceased before they reached it, and Sigel and Reynolds camped near the turnpike on the old battlefield of July, 1861.

¹ Doubleday's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 369.

² General G. H. Gordon (*Ib.* p. 224, note) says a report in the Archives at Washington gives Ewell's loss as 219 killed, 539 wounded, and 11 missing. Total 769.

³ Taliaferro reports Colonel Neff, 33d Virginia, killed; and Colonel Grigsby, 27th Virginia, Colonel Botts and Major Nadenbousch, 2d Virginia, and Major Ferry, 4th Virginia, wounded. Colonel Botts afterward died. Lieutenant-Colonel Walker and Major Stone, 10th Virginia, and Major Scott, 23d Virginia, were also wounded.

CHAPTER XXIX.

THOROUGHFARE GAP.

IT is time to turn to the operations of Longstreet, and of Ricketts who was opposing him at Thoroughfare Gap. Lee, who had halted with Longstreet at White Plains on the night of the 27th, ordered the latter forward on the 28th, and before the middle of the afternoon¹ the head of this column had reached the vicinity of Thoroughfare Gap. G. T. Anderson's brigade of D. R. Jones's division² was in front. One of his regiments (the 9th Georgia, Colonel Beck) was sent forward to reconnoitre, and the remainder of the division followed. But Lee anticipated opposition at this point, and appreciating the vital importance of forcing his way over Bull Run Mountain, that he might promptly succor Jackson, did not confine his efforts to a direct attempt upon the pass. When D. R. Jones with three brigades was sent forward on the main road, Hood with two brigades³ was ordered over the mountain by a narrow path a short distance north of the Gap, and Wilcox with three brigades⁴ was directed to cross at Hopewell Gap, a pass some three miles to the north. This strong flanking force it was expected would materially aid in clearing the way.

The 9th Georgia regiment came in contact first with the pickets of the 1st New Jersey cavalry, but when these were forced to the eastern outlet of the mountain, the Confederates found themselves in the presence of Ricketts's division, which,

¹ Longstreet says he reached the Gap at three P. M., the exact hour at which Ricketts reports that he was approaching it on the other side. (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 564.)

² This division then consisted of the brigades of G. T. Anderson, Toombs, and Drayton.

³ Hood's and Law's brigades.

⁴ Wilcox's, Featherstone's, and Pryor's brigades.

under McDowell's orders in the forenoon, had pressed on through Haymarket to seize the Gap, if possible. This division had just arrived, and had taken possession of a plateau opposite the mouth of the Gap. Ricketts promptly ordered an advance. His third brigade (under Colonel Stiles, 83d New York) led the way, supported by the 1st and 4th brigades, while the 2d was held in reserve. The Georgia regiment was driven back, and the Federal artillery advanced and opened a vigorous fire into the pass. D. R. Jones soon brought up his troops, and placed Anderson's brigade on the left and Drayton's and part of Toombs's on the right of the road. The ground did not permit Jones to use artillery, but his troops scaled the mountain side, and driving back the Federal skirmishers seized and held the heights which commanded the pass. Ricketts advanced against them, and made an attempt to drive Anderson's brigade, on the north side, from its position. This attempt failed, and the Federal troops were repulsed with severe loss,¹ mainly through the efforts of the 1st Georgia regulars (Major J. D. Walker).² On the south side of the road only skirmishing occurred, but the Confederates (Colonel H. L. Benning, with the 20th and 2d Georgia regiments) advanced over the point of the mountain until, at sunset, they had secured a position at its eastern foot, from which they threatened the left flank of the Federals. After the repulse on the north side, Ricketts withdrew his artillery to the plateau at the mouth of the Gap, but continued active demonstrations until nightfall. Then, impressed with the hopelessness of his undertaking and alarmed at the reported advance of forces on his flanks, he fell back to Gainesville.³ After this retreat, D. R. Jones advanced, and bivouacked on the eastern side of the pass.

¹ General Ricketts says: "The men moved forward gallantly, but owing to the nature of the ground, the strongest position being already held by the enemy, we were subjected to severe loss without any prospect of gaining the pass." (Ricketts's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 384.)

² G. T. Anderson's and D. R. Jones's reports, *Ib.* pp. 579, 594.

³ Ricketts reports (*Ib.* p. 384) that "the enemy with superior forces were turning both right and left in the endeavor to surround us." There

Thus Thursday night, the 28th, found General Lee in full possession of the passes through Bull Run Mountain, and within certain reach of Jackson on the following day. Indeed, Longstreet's advance was not four miles from Haymarket, where Stuart, during most of the day, had been skirmishing with the Federal cavalry.¹ Only six or eight miles intervened between the two wings of the Confederate army when, late at night, they lay down to rest. A courier from Longstreet informed Jackson of his approach. The greatest danger that attended Lee's strategy was now past. It was no longer possible for the Federal commander to overwhelm Jackson while holding Longstreet at bay. Victory, if won at all, must be achieved over the whole of Lee's forces. It was true that the final result yet depended upon a great battle, in which Lee could only muster two men against his adversary's three, but it was evident to all that in such a contest the success of the bold movements of the past few days would tell immensely in favor of the Confederates. Lee was not unduly confident, if he felt sure on this night that he would be able to outfight the adversary whom he had so completely outgeneraled.

was no flanking force on his left except Benning and his two Georgia regiments, and Wilcox, having been delayed by the rugged road, did not get through Hopewell Gap until about midnight. (Wilcox's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 598.)

¹ Stuart remained near Haymarket (where he saw the smoke of the fight at Thoroughfare Gap), hoping to communicate with Longstreet, until late in the afternoon, when the severe fire between King and Jackson recalled him to his position on the latter's right.

CHAPTER XXX.

GENERAL POPE'S EFFORTS TO CONCENTRATE HIS ARMY.

THE day had been one of mistakes, of disappointment, of uncertainty to General Pope, but the night of the 28th was to witness, if possible, still greater errors and confusion. About nine P. M. Pope learned of King's fight. He entirely misconceived it, and at once issued new orders for the movement of his army. All day had the Federal army been fruitlessly hunting for Jackson, and night had settled down on the baffled commander and his weary troops, when the news of the accidental collision between King and Jackson revealed the position of the Confederates. This information greatly relieved General Pope, for it ended his uncertainty. It should have convinced him that it was no longer possible to prevent the union of Lee's forces, for they were now only half a day's march apart. Pope had two plans of operation open to him. One was to collect his forces and attack Lee's whole army, which was, even when united, much inferior in strength to his own; the other was to retire to Centreville until the residue of McClellan's forces from Alexandria could join him. He adopted neither, but, resolutely shutting his eyes to the fact that his able antagonist was near at hand with Longstreet's corps, he conceived that he could yet throw a sufficient portion of his army upon Jackson to crush him alone. The evening's combat seemed to him an unsuccessful effort on Jackson's part to cut his way through to Longstreet. King's and Ricketts's divisions he imagined to be squarely planted between these two bodies of Confederates, and, stranger still, he imagined that these two Federal divisions, inserted wedge-like between the two halves of Lee's army, would be able to hold them

asunder, until he could destroy the one half.¹ He "felt sure that there was no escape for Jackson."² Orders were sent to McDowell and King directing the latter "to hold his ground at all hazards, and prevent the retreat of Jackson to the west."³ At 9.50 P. M. the following was sent General Kearny at Centreville: "General McDowell has intercepted the retreat of the enemy and is now in his front, Sigel on the right of McDowell. Unless he can escape by by-paths leading to the north to-night, he must be captured. I desire you to move forward at one o'clock to-night, even if you can carry with you no more than 2000 men, though I trust you will carry the larger part of your division. Pursue the turnpike from Centreville to Warrenton. The enemy is not more than three and a half miles from you. Seize any of the people of the town to guide you. Advance cautiously and drive in the enemy's pickets to-night, and at early dawn attack him vigorously. Hooker shall be close behind you. Extend your right well towards the north and push forward your right wing well in the attack. Be sure to march not later than one, with all the men you can take."⁴ A similar order ten minutes later was sent to Heintzelman, directing him to send Hooker forward at three o'clock. Reno was ordered to follow Heintzelman. At three A. M. Porter was ordered to move at the first dawn of day with his whole command upon Centreville.⁵ Pope's only apprehension at this time was that Jackson might attempt to retreat towards Leesburg, and Kearny was ordered to prevent this by keeping closely in contact with him during the

¹ The truth is, Pope seems not to have realized Longstreet as a factor in the problem at all. In some unaccountable way he reached the conclusion that he could overwhelm Jackson before Longstreet could reach him, though well aware that the latter was not far off, and that there was nothing seriously to delay his march.

² Pope's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 37.

³ Pope's report, *Ib.* p. 37.

⁴ Pope's report, *Ib.* p. 75.

⁵ Pope's report, *Ib.* p. 75. Why Porter should have been ordered from Manassas (or Bristoe, where he actually was) to move by way of Centreville, in order to reach Jackson at Groveton, is one of the things which would puzzle more people than Lord Dundreary.

night of the 28th. With these dispositions made, Pope expected to crush Jackson before "Longstreet could by any possibility reach the scene of action,"¹ though the route by which Porter was to move placed the latter just about twice as far from Jackson as was Longstreet.²

General Pope's plan quickly broke down. When King, resting along the turnpike between Groveton and Gainesville, had time to consider the results of the afternoon's fighting, it is not strange that the severity of his losses, the absence of the other divisions of McDowell's corps, and the certainty of a large force in front, impressed him with the danger of his position. Reynolds came over and informed him that his division and Sigel's corps were not far off, and King seems then to have concluded to hold on.³ But Ricketts, falling back from Thoroughfare Gap, soon reached Gainesville, and brought news of the certain advance of Longstreet in the morning. King and Ricketts consulted together. McDowell, who had gone in the afternoon to see Pope, had lost his way, and was wandering somewhere in the woods. He could not be found, and King and Ricketts, thus thrown on their own responsibility, in the absence of their corps commander, determined to fall back towards Manassas and Bristoe. At one o'clock at night the retreat was begun. This movement was no doubt prompted by the want of success that had attended the operations of both Ricketts and King during the day, but was mainly due to a fear of being attacked by overwhelming forces in the early morning. The retreat in itself was justifiable enough, but why they should have gone to Manassas and Bristoe, instead of falling back in the direction of Reynolds and Sigel, who were near,⁴ is inexplicable, and a proper

¹ Pope's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. pp. 37, 38.

² The distance from Manassas to Centreville is some six miles, and from the latter point to Groveton it is about the same. As already stated, the two wings of the Confederate army were not more than six or eight miles apart.

³ Reynolds says King told him he would hold on. (*Ib.* p. 393.)

⁴ Thus, instead of King holding the road to prevent Jackson moving west, it was the fear that Jackson held the road which prevented King from moving eastward to unite with Reynolds and Sigel, which may have

ground of criticism. Pope's orders, therefore, to McDowell's corps to hold on found two thirds of it in retreat.

Informed, late in the night, of the retreat of King and Ricketts, Pope issued a batch of new orders. Sigel with Reynolds was to attack Jackson "as soon as it was light enough to see, and bring him to a stand if it were possible for him to do so."¹ Kearny, Hooker, and Reno were to push forward towards Gainesville and unite with Sigel's right. Fitz-John Porter and King, and subsequently Ricketts, were to move directly from Manassas towards Gainesville and join Sigel's left. This last was reiterated in a joint order to McDowell and Porter. This joint order, however, gave the first intimation that Pope was beginning to doubt the possibility of catching Jackson. It directed that, as soon as McDowell and Porter had established communications with Sigel, "the whole command shall halt. It may be necessary to fall back behind Bull Run at Centreville to-night. I presume it will be so on account of our supplies."² McDowell and Porter were em-

induced King to retire on Manassas. Undue apprehension seems to have caused a serious mistake of judgment in this case. Reynolds behaved very differently, for he held on, even after he knew that the others were gone.

¹ Pope's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xi. part i. p. 38.

² The text of this famous order in full is : —
General Orders, No. 5.

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF VIRGINIA,
CENTREVILLE, August 29, 1862.

GENERALS MCDOWELL AND PORTER :

You will please move forward with your joint commands toward Gainesville. I sent General Porter written orders to that effect an hour and a half ago. Heintzelman, Sigel, and Reno are moving on the Warrenton turnpike, and must now be not far from Gainesville. I desire that, as soon as communication is established between this force and your own, the whole command shall halt. It may be necessary to fall back behind Bull Run at Centreville to-night. I presume it will be so on account of our supplies.

I have sent no orders of any description to Ricketts, and none to interfere in any way with the movements of McDowell's troops, except what I sent by his aide-de-camp last night, which were, to hold his position on the Warrenton pike until the troops from here should fall upon the enemy's flank and rear. I do not even know Ricketts's position, as I had

powered to depart from the order, too, "if any considerable advantages were to be gained" thereby. Banks was still to remain at Kettle Run in charge of the trains, and make efforts to repair the railroad bridge at that point. The night was at an end, and the last set of orders were to determine the movements of the Federal army on the eventful day of the 29th.

not been able to find out where General McDowell was until a late hour this morning. General McDowell will take immediate steps to communicate with General Ricketts, and instruct him to rejoin the other divisions of the corps as soon as practicable.

If any considerable advantages are to be gained by departing from this order, it will not be strictly carried out. One thing must be had in view, that the troops must occupy a position from which they can reach Bull Run to-night or by morning. The indications are that the whole force of the enemy is moving in this direction at a pace that will bring them here by to-morrow night or next day.

My own headquarters will be for the present with Heintzelman's corps, or at this place.

JOHN POPE,

Major-General Commanding.

CHAPTER XXXI.

GROVETON.

JACKSON'S troops rested during the night of the 28th, some on the field of battle, and others at the points in rear of it to which they had been brought in order to be within supporting distance of the troops engaged. When Jackson learned of the retreat of the forces that had fought him on the preceding afternoon, he supposed they had gone by roads south of the turnpike, to rejoin the main body of the Federal army in the direction of the Stone Bridge,¹ and therefore formed his line of battle on the morning of the 29th to meet an attack from that direction. This line extended for the most part along the partly graded road-bed of an unfinished section of the Manassas Gap Railroad.² This road-bed intersects the turnpike half way between Groveton and Gainesville at an acute angle, and running thence northeasterly with gentle curves it crosses Bull Run a short distance east of the mouth of Catharpin Creek and Sudley Mills. It is partly in excavation and partly in embankment, and the country through which it runs is for the

¹ This is what they ought to have done.

² The Orange and Alexandria Railroad (now the Virginia Midland) runs from Alexandria, through Manassas, Bristoe, Warrenton Junction, Culpeper, Orange Court House, etc. At Manassas the Manassas Gap Railroad branches off from it to the right, and runs through Gainesville, Thoroughfare Gap, White Plains, Salem, Manassas Gap, etc. The Manassas road used the track of the Orange and Alexandria in getting from Manassas to Alexandria. Shortly before the war, however, this company undertook to build an independent line of their own, to avoid this necessity. This independent line left the Manassas Railroad at Gainesville, and, making a circuit to the north of Centreville, approached Alexandria from that direction. The war interrupted the work before it was complete, and it yet remains unfinished. It was along this incomplete road that the Confederates formed their line.

most part wooded, with openings here and there. The land rises on the northwest side of this road-bed, and affords good positions for artillery. Jackson placed A. P. Hill's division on his left, next Sudley, then Lawton's and Trimble's brigades of Ewell's division (now under Lawton)¹ in the centre, and then Taliaferro's division, now under Starke, near Groveton. On his extreme right on the turnpike he placed Early, with his own and Hays's brigade (under Colonel Forno), to hold that flank until Longstreet should arrive.² These troops faced the turnpike, and two regiments³ were thrown forward on the south of it to guard against an advance from the direction of Manassas. A number of batteries were posted on the heights in rear of Groveton on the Confederate right centre.⁴ On the Confederate left, Gregg's brigade held the flank, then came Thomas and then Field. The other three brigades (Branch's, Pender's, and Archer's) of A. P. Hill's division were held in reserve. The Confederate line was so short (from two to two and a half miles) that Jackson had ample force both in line and in reserve. Gregg's position was where the railroad passed through a stony, brushy knoll, which sloped from the north to the railroad and then beyond it towards Bull Run.⁵ On

¹ Trimble was on Lawton's left, and had but two of his regiments in line, 12th Georgia and 15th Alabama. The other two had been left on the battlefield of the day before to bury the dead. (Trimble's report, *Southern Historical Papers*, vol. viii. p. 308.)

² Early's main body was on a ridge northwest of both railroad and turnpike. (Early's report, *Ib.* p. 711.)

³ 13th and 31st Virginia. Early also placed a detachment on his right flank, and located Johnson's battery so as to command his front. (Early's report, *Ib.* p. 711.)

⁴ Those subsequently engaged were Poague's, Carpenter's, Dement's, Brockenbrough's, and Latimer's, under Major L. M. Shumacker.

⁵ Colonel McGowan of Gregg's brigade thus describes the position: "We occupied a small, rocky, wooded knoll, having a railroad excavation bending round the east and north fronts and a cleared field on the northwest. This position was slightly in advance of the general line, and besides being on the extreme left was considered important, because of the Sudley ford road which it commanded. Our line made an obtuse angle pointing towards the enemy, one side of which ran nearly parallel with the railroad cut, and the other along the fence bordering the cleared field before spoken of. Within these contracted limits was the little tongue of woodland which

Gregg's left flank, however, there was an open field, the farther side of which was in corn. To protect this flank Gregg disposed one of his regiments along the nearer fence that bounded the field. His front thus formed an obtuse angle, the vertex and right side of which were on the railroad cut. Still farther to the Confederate left and rear were the trains, under charge of some cavalry.

In obedience to Pope's orders to attack, Sigel formed his line of battle at daybreak and advanced against Jackson. Sigel's right under Schurz crossed Young's branch, and, bearing to the north of the turnpike, came opposite A. P. Hill. Milroy's brigade constituted the Federal centre, and Schenck's division their left. The latter division, its right resting on the turnpike, advanced towards the Confederate line from the south side of that road, and soon participated in an active artillery duel, but made no other attack. Later on in the day Stahel's brigade was for a time sent farther to the right to relieve Milroy, but did not become seriously engaged, and afterwards returned to its command.¹ Milroy in the centre was more actively employed than Schenck. He came upon the Confederate skirmishers soon after crossing Young's branch, and an active artillery fight and some skirmishing filled up half the day on this part of the line. Milroy sent two of his regiments to Schurz's assistance. These regiments took position in the centre of Schurz's line, and, as will be seen, were broken and scattered, together with another, which Milroy sent to reinforce them.² It was Schurz on Sigel's right who was to deliver the

we occupied, and which we were directed to hold at all hazards. On this spot, barely large enough to hold the brigade, we stood and fought with intervals of cessation from eight o'clock in the morning until dark." (*Southern Historical Papers*, vol. viii. p. 679.)

¹ Stahel's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 284.

² Milroy's report, *Ib.* p. 319 *et seq.* Milroy's reports are usually rich reading. His report of his achievements on this day especially is highly colored. He represents his brigade and batteries as engaged in a terrific combat all day. The truth is, there was no "combat" except an artillery duel and some skirmishing, which at times was active, on Milroy's front, until Grover charged in the afternoon. The part of Milroy's force which was seriously engaged was that which went to Schurz's line.

principal blows, and to receive them, too, in the first half of this day's fight. He placed his first brigade (Schimmelfennig's) on the Federal right, with instructions to outflank and press the Confederate left, while his second brigade (Kryzanowski's) filled the space between the first and Milroy's. Some Federal skirmishers, passing around A. P. Hill's flank, came within reach of the Confederate trains and caused them rapidly to decamp. Captain Pelham of the horse artillery and Major William Patrick with six companies of cavalry were sent by General Stuart to drive them back. This was quickly done, but cost the life of the brave Patrick. Schurz's main body advanced for some distance through the woods, driving back the Confederate skirmishers towards the railroad cut, where it was held by Gregg's brigade. Gregg did not wait to be attacked, but, hearing the skirmish fire, sent Lieutenant-Colonel McCrady with the 1st South Carolina Volunteers to determine the number and location of the enemy. This regiment crossed the railroad cut and moved forward into the woods some distance, but was soon attacked in front and on the flanks by Schurz's advancing forces and driven back. The 12th South Carolina (Colonel Barnes) was sent in on McCrady's left, and the two regiments now advanced and in turn drove back the Federals. The 13th South Carolina (Colonel Edwards) was sent in on McCrady's right, and the 1st South Carolina Rifles (Colonel Marshall) went to the support of Barnes. The Confederate attack was so vigorous that the Federal centre broke under it, and Gregg's troops like a wedge were driving the two brigades of Schurz apart. When the force of their onset had spent itself, however, the Federals rallied and renewed the contest.¹ As Barnes was pressed back, he met Marshall coming to his assistance, and the two found themselves confronted by a new body of Federal troops near the railroad. This consisted of Milroy's two regiments, sent to the assistance of the broken line, and of the 54th New York,

¹ Schurz says in his report (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 297): "Immediately after, the enemy began to press my centre so severely that it gave way: but we soon rallied it again, and after a sharp contest reoccupied the ground previously taken from the enemy."

which Schurz had ordered forward for the same purpose. Again assuming the offensive, the South Carolinians fell upon the fresh enemies, and soon broke and drove them through and out of the woods in disorder.¹ While Gregg's troops had been thus employed, Thomas's brigade on his right had attacked Schurz's left under Krzyzanowski, and had forced it back from the position near the railroad to which it had advanced.² The Confederates had been instructed not to bring on a general engagement,³ and the troops in advance were now recalled,⁴ and took up their position near the railroad.

Thus at midday⁵ Sigel had accomplished that part of Pope's instructions which directed him to bring Jackson "to a stand," but not much else. Schenck had been kept at arm's-length by the Confederate skirmishers near Groveton, while A. P. Hill had very roughly handled Schurz and Milroy. Other factors were now to enter into the problem. Heintzelman and Reno had been hurrying up to Sigel's assistance. About ten o'clock Kearny⁶ reached the field, and soon led his troops to Sigel's right, with the intention of turning and attacking A. P. Hill's left. About the same time Longstreet, who had been hastening forward since early morning, reached the battlefield, and took position on the turnpike on Jackson's right. His arrival relieved Early, who with two brigades had guarded that flank all the morning, and the latter now returned to the position held by Ewell's division at the centre of Jackson's line.

Schurz was to make one more effort. As the Confederates

¹ Schurz says (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 298) : "The two regiments above mentioned [Milroy's] as well as the 54th New York broke and were thrown out of the woods in disorder, the enemy advancing rapidly in great force to the edge of the forest. The 29th New York poured several volleys into them, checking the pursuit of the enemy only for a moment, and then fell back in good order. The moment was critical."

² Schurz says (*Ib.* p. 298) : "Colonel Krzyzanowski had contested every inch of the ground against the heavy pressure of a greatly superior force."

³ Jackson's design was of course to hold Pope at bay until Longstreet could get into position, and his tactics on this day were therefore defensive.

⁴ McGowan's (*Ib.* p. 680) and Thomas's (*Ib.* p. 702) reports.

⁵ McGowan says at midday his whole front was clear. (*Ib.* p. 680.)

⁶ With the advance division of Heintzelman's corps.

retired after their last repulse of Schurz, his lines were again moving up. A request was sent by Sigel to Kearny to attack on the Federal right, the hope even then being that Jackson's lines might be broken before Longstreet could get into position to succor him. This letter was shown to Schurz, who at once ordered a fresh attack by his division, now concentrated on a much shorter line since the arrival of Kearny. Schurz was also strengthened by reinforcements from Reno and by a part of Steinwehr's brigade.¹ The effort now made was a gallant and determined one. The Federals advanced to the railroad cut, and a fierce fight took place between the opposing lines at close quarters. Both sides fought with the greatest determination, the one to hold, the other to gain the position. Schurz's right pushed over the railroad, and penetrated a short distance beyond it, but soon, in turn, was forced back to it, and a little while later gave way, when the Confederates, reinforced at this point by Branch's brigade, again became the aggressors. Schurz's left, which was stubbornly engaging Gregg and Thomas, at the same time received the reinforcements sent up by Sigel, and making its way over the railroad at a gap² which intervened between Gregg and Thomas, forced back the Confederates, and for a little while threatened to separate Gregg from the remainder of Hill's division. But two regiments, one from Gregg and one from Thomas,³ were quickly hurled against the advancing troops and checked them. The Federals held for a time tenaciously, however, the piece of railroad they had seized. In this attack Kearny did not participate. His troops had at first been kept at bay by the Confederate artillery, and when his right brigade under Robinson finally advanced, it did not get into position to aid Schurz until Schimmelfennig had been repulsed.⁴ Robinson then found it impossible to make headway.

It was now about two P. M. Pope had arrived in person an hour before, and Hooker's division, having reached the field, was sent to relieve the exhausted troops of Schurz and Milroy.

¹ Sigel's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 267.

² Of about 125 yards.

³ 14th South Carolina and 49th Georgia.

⁴ Robinson's (*Ib.* p. 421) and Poe's (*Ib.* p. 434) reports.

Carr's¹ brigade took the place of Krzyzanowski, while Grover occupied some heights opposite the Confederate centre, where Milroy had been stationed. Taylor was held in reserve for a time, but was soon sent forward, as was also a brigade of Reno's corps, to support Carr. At this time, Pender's Confederate brigade was advancing to the support of Thomas, and, falling upon the left of the Federals, soon broke Carr's troops and carried back with them the forces that were just coming to their assistance. Thus, once more the railroad cut and the ground beyond it were cleared by the Confederates. Pender retired to the railroad, and soon after was relieved by Archer.²

The fiercest assault on this part of the Confederate line was yet to come. Grover's brigade³ had for some hours been resting opposite the Confederate centre. About three o'clock orders were sent to them to charge. Steadily and in fine order they moved across the space that separated them from the railroad,⁴ and, delivering a single volley, carried the railroad at the point of the bayonet and pressed on beyond. Parts of Thomas's and Gregg's brigades were borne back, and for a moment it seemed that this determined attack must secure the prize. But not so. Hays's brigade and Field's were at hand to stem the advancing tide. Archer, to whose left they had passed, fought them on the railroad, and Bradley Johnson and Starke, coming from the Confederate right with their brigades, swept down with overwhelming force on the flank. The Confederate artillery poured a hot fire into their ranks, and in a few minutes the attacking column was broken and driven in terrible defeat back to the heights from which it had come. Of this brigade, whose strength was about 2000, nearly one fourth was lost in this gallant but

¹ Hooker's division comprised the brigades of Carr, Grover, and Taylor.

² Reports of Pender and Archer, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. pp. 698, 700.

³ Grover's brigade consisted of the 1st, 11th, 16th Massachusetts, 2d New Hampshire, and 26th Pennsylvania.

⁴ General G. H. Gordon says it was 1300 yards. (*Army of Virginia*, p. 265.)

fruitless charge.¹ Two 3-inch rifle guns fell into the hands of Johnson and Starke.²

"Thus ceased the Federal attack upon the Confederate centre on the 29th day of August. In succeeding waves, succeeding divisions had assailed in vain. First, Schurz had gained the railroad track; then Carr and Taylor of Hooker's division, and one brigade of Reno's, had assaulted, but all their assaults had been repelled before three o'clock in the day; and finally came the charge by General Grover, surpassing all in boldness and power, and yet, like all the rest, it too had failed."³

But the battle was not yet over. Kearny's operations against Hill's left had so far been but partial, ill-timed, and ineffective. He had failed to coöperate with Schurz, and again Hooker had been permitted to attack alone and meet defeat.⁴ At last, however, after five P. M., he was ready to attack. Robinson was ordered forward against Hill's flank, with line perpendicular to the railroad. The greater part of Birney's brigade had been sent to strengthen Robinson, and also a regiment from Poe's brigade.⁵ Notwithstanding the heavy fire of the Confederate batteries, these troops pressed forward through the cornfield, and delivered telling blows on the thin and exhausted line of Gregg and his supports. Simul-

¹ Killed 41, wounded 327, missing 118; total 486. (Gordon, *Army of Virginia*, p. 267.) A bloody but indubitable testimony to their valor. Heintzelman says the contest lasted only twenty minutes.

² Colonel Johnson claims the capture of the flag of the Excelsior brigade (Taylor's), which he says was the attacking one. It had probably been left on the field when that brigade was repulsed, or it is possible that this brigade, coming up to cover Grover's repulse, had been involved in his defeat.

³ General G. H. Gordon, *Army of Virginia*, p. 270.

⁴ Heintzelman complains of Kearny's slowness: "Several orders were sent to him to advance, but he did not move until the troops on his left had been forced back." (Heintzelman's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 413.)

⁵ Poe's brigade seems to have been kept all day in reserve or on guard against a flank attack. For Poe says that the only one of his regiments that was exposed to musketry fire was the 3d Michigan, which he had sent up to Robinson. Poe speaks of suffering from a heavy artillery fire.

taneously with this flank attack, Stevens, commanding one of Reno's divisions, who was on Kearny's left, moved against the front of the position Gregg had held so stubbornly all day. When A. P. Hill saw this formidable storm bursting on his lines, he felt that the supreme test had come. Would Gregg be able to hold his own against this fresh onset? That gallant soldier, from a field that through ten hours of strife he had held, where he was surrounded by more than one third of his command wounded or dead, replied that he "thought he could, — his ammunition was about expended, but he still had the bayonet."¹ And nobly did these sons of South Carolina prove their courage and endurance on that bloody day. Stubbornly they resisted Kearny's and Stevens's attack, and when finally forced back, slowly did they yield. Thomas's Georgians on their right and Branch's North Carolinians in support, like Gregg's men, fought fiercely, and, when borne back, continued the struggle foot by foot. Field's small brigade was now thrown by Hill into the scale. The Confederates could not be broken. Forced to yield ground, they steadily faced the advancing Federals with a withering fire, and thus exhausted the impetus of the attack. Meantime A. P. Hill, looking anxiously for help for his wavering lines, had called on Lawton and Early, who were near at hand. Early's brigade and one regiment from Lawton's,² together with the 8th Louisiana of Hays's brigade, which had just come up, were promptly sent forward to meet the Federals. With the utmost coolness and promptness Early led forward these troops against the enemy. One vigorous, well-aimed blow, and the tide was turned. Spent by the resistance they had already met with, Kearny and Stevens were not able to withstand this fresh force. Early's charge swept all before it, and the impetus he gained in driving back the Federals to the railroad carried him over and beyond it. He had been in-

¹ Colonel McGowan's report of Gregg's brigade. (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 681.) "When Major-General Hill commanding sent to inquire whether he could hold out or not, he replied modestly, he thought he could, adding, as if casually, that his ammunition was about expended, but he still had the bayonet."

² 13th Georgia.

structed that it was desirable to stop at the railroad, but his troops had passed some distance beyond it before they could be recalled to that position, which they held during the night. As Early's troops passed to the front of Gregg, the latter "collected the remnants of his regiments, and placing them in line behind the troops now engaged, gave them instructions to lie down, and if our friends are overpowered and had to fall back over them, to wait until the enemy was very near, then rise and drive them back at the point of the bayonet."¹ The success of Early's charge relieved Hill's troops of farther effort.

It is time to see what was going on elsewhere, while these events had been taking place on one wing of the hostile armies. Schenck, who had advanced on the Federal left at the same time that Milroy and Schurz had gone forward on the centre and right, attempted but little and accomplished less. Reynolds supported him on the extreme left. These two divisions, with line virtually parallel to the Warrenton turnpike, threatened the whole right and flank of Jackson's line. Nothing more than a skirmish, and that merely an artillery one, ensued for hours. The Confederate batteries on this flank were well placed and admirably served, and they easily kept back the Federals. About midday, Schenck sent one of his brigades (Stahel's) to support Milroy. Reynolds came up at this time, and moved forward to the attack. The Confederate batteries, which had been increased at this time by the batteries of Hood's division of Longstreet's corps, soon demolished the guns of Reynolds and compelled him to retire.² It was Taliaferro's division which held this part of the Confederate line during the morning, but before noon Longstreet was at hand, though his arrival seems to have been unknown to the Federal commanders on the spot, as well as to Gen-

¹ McGowan's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 681. The courage and determination exhibited by Gregg's brigade on this day has been rarely equaled. Out of an entire strength of probably not more than 1500, it lost 613 men killed and wounded.

² Reynolds's report, *Ib.* p. 392. Also report of Major Froebel, chief of artillery, Hood's division. (*Ib.* p. 607.)

eral Pope. Later in the afternoon, when Pope was hurling Heintzelman's corps against the Confederate left, he sent orders to Schenck and Reynolds to attack again. The attempt was made, a battery of 20-pounder Parrotts and some infantry having been sent to Schenck's assistance from Stevens's division of Reno's corps. But the Confederates were seen to be in strong force, and after a feeble effort Schenck fell back.¹ Reynolds made a more vigorous attack, but was repulsed.² Nothing farther was attempted by him until McDowell came up with Hatch's (King's) division at six p. m., when Meade's brigade participated in the combat brought on by Hatch.

Let us now turn to the movements of McDowell and Fitz-John Porter. The operations of these officers and the orders under which they acted are discussed with tedious elaboration in most of the Federal accounts of this day's work. The guilt or innocence of General Porter is carefully argued, and Pope's accusations are discussed *in extenso*. We do not purpose to go into this matter farther than is necessary for the purposes of the general historian, contenting ourselves with a statement of the facts.

It will be remembered that at three A. M. on the 29th Pope had sent urgent orders to Porter to move to Centreville, being then under the impression that King's engagement of the evening before indicated that McDowell had "intercepted the retreat of Jackson."³ A little later he learned that King had fallen back from the vicinity of Gainesville towards Manassas. He then ordered Porter to take King's division with him and move towards Gainesville,⁴ and one and a half hours later sent the joint order⁵ to McDowell and Porter, directing them to move on Gainesville until they should have established com-

¹ Schenck's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. pp. 280, 281.

² "Generals Seymour and Jackson led their brigades in advance, but notwithstanding all the steadiness and courage shown by the men, they were compelled to fall back before the heavy fire of artillery and musketry which met them both in the front and left flank." (Reynolds's report, *Ib.* p. 394.)

³ Pope's order to Porter. (*Ib.* pp. 75, 518.)

⁴ *Ib.* p. 518.

⁵ *Ib.* p. 520.

munications with the main body of the army on their right, and then to halt. They were to keep in view the necessity of falling back behind Bull Run towards Centreville at night, for supplies, but otherwise were left a large discretion. Pope's fatuity about Jackson's intentions and Lee's movements still continued. He still dreamed that the latter would not be up for a day or more, and clung to the belief that he could crush Jackson, if he could only "catch him." Porter had moved towards Centreville in obedience to Pope's first order, and was already some distance beyond Manassas on the road to that place when Pope's second order reached him. He at once retraced his steps to Manassas Junction, and headed his columns towards Gainesville. Continuing his march past Bethlehem Church he reached Dawkins's branch, a small rivulet, about half past eleven o'clock, and here first perceived the Confederates. Morell's division was in front, and the command having been halted the leading brigade (Butterfield's) was partially deployed across the rivulet, and skirmishers thrown out. As this was being done the "joint order" was brought to Porter, and immediately after General McDowell joined him. It was noon.

The noise of the battle at Groveton was heard by these officers, and a cloud of dust was visible along the turnpike from Gainesville to Groveton, indicating the movement of troops. General McDowell had, too, a dispatch from Buford dated at 9.30, which informed him that, three quarters of an hour before, seventeen regiments, one battery, and five hundred cavalry of Confederates had passed Gainesville going towards Centreville. It was evident that Longstreet was in their front, and it was also evident that the progress of the right of the Federal army had been stayed near Groveton. To move to the right, so as to fill the gap between the two wings, seemed, under their orders, the proper thing to do. But the country was so broken and difficult that it appeared impracticable for artillery. It was therefore determined that McDowell should go back to Bethlehem Church, which the head of King's column had just reached, and, turning off King's and Ricketts's divisions at that point, take them by the Sudley road to Newmar-

ket, and thence push them forward towards the Warrenton turnpike between Groveton and Porter's position on Dawkins's branch. Porter was to remain where he was, and, according to McDowell, was to attack the Confederates at that point. Porter, however, weakened by the withdrawal of McDowell, in presence of a heavy and constantly increasing force, and ignorant of the results of the fighting with Jackson, waited for McDowell to get into position, and attempted to establish communications with him. McDowell, once fairly on the Sudley road, and possibly influenced by the roar of battle which increased as he approached it, continued his march directly towards the battlefield, and late in the afternoon came up to Reynolds, on whose left he ordered King's division (now under Hatch) to take position. He seems to have sent no orders or information to Porter, and the latter appears to have wasted valuable time in fruitless attempts to push his right through the broken country, to where he supposed it would unite with McDowell. His scouts and couriers ran into the enemy, and he complains that he could get nothing from McDowell or Pope. Listening to the firing far off on his right, he became convinced at one time that Pope had met defeat, and that the Federals were retreating, and he made arrangements to fall back. He held on, however, skirmishing from time to time with the troops in front. These were three Confederate brigades under D. R. Jones, which Longstreet had sent along the Manassas Gap Railroad from Gainesville upon receiving information from Stuart that a large force from Manassas was threatening that flank. On the left of Jones was Kemper, with three brigades, and at one time in the afternoon, when Porter made aggressive demonstrations, Wilcox, with three brigades, was sent over to reinforce Jones. No attack was made by Porter, however, and Wilcox was recalled to the turnpike. Thus the afternoon wore away. Porter was undoubtedly without orders suited to the exigency in which he was placed, and he appears to have displayed no great enterprise in trying to obtain them.

At 4.30 o'clock, before Kearny and Stevens made their final effort against A. P. Hill, Pope sent peremptory orders to Por-

ter to attack.¹ He appears to have designed a simultaneous onset against both of Jackson's flanks. But this order, like all of Pope's on that day, ignored entirely the presence of Longstreet, and had it reached its destination in time to be carried out would have led to a fruitless and perhaps disastrous attack upon superior numbers. It did not reach Porter, however, until after 6.30 P. M. The latter then gave orders for the forward movement, but night was at hand, and after going to the front and convincing himself by reconnoissance and consultation with his subordinates of the impracticability of accomplishing anything at that hour, Porter desisted, and bivouacked on the field he had occupied all the afternoon.²

There yet remains one effort of Pope's to be narrated. As heretofore stated, McDowell, at the head of Hatch's division, followed, after an interval, by Ricketts, had been marching all the afternoon from Bethlehem Church by the Sudley road towards Groveton, and having come up with Reynolds he had ordered Hatch to take position on the left of the latter. Before this order had been fully executed, however, General Pope directed Hatch's division to the right of Reynolds. It was to cross over to the north of the turnpike to support the line held by Reno.³ As the division was being withdrawn to effect this change, new orders came. General McDowell says,

¹ *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 525; Ropes, *The Army under Pope*, p. 127.

² Porter was subsequently tried by court-martial, found guilty, and dismissed the service for his conduct on this day. He was also charged with disobedience of orders on the night of the 27th and 28th in not marching by night from Warrenton Junction to Bristoe, but the gravest matter against him was the failure to attack on the afternoon of the 29th. After a persistent effort, extending over many years, Porter finally obtained from President Hayes a rehearing of his case before a board of officers consisting of Generals J. M. Schofield, A. H. Terry, and G. W. Getty, who, after a full investigation, honorably exonerated him, and recommended that the decision of the court-martial should be reversed as far as possible. Porter, on this occasion, gave no strong evidence of resource or ability, but the charges against him were absurd, and could never have obtained serious attention but for the passions of the times and especially the animosity of Pope. Porter did much to provoke the bitter hostility of his commander by caustic and unprofessional criticisms upon the conduct of the campaign.

³ McDowell's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 339.

"About the time the division arrived at the crossing of the Sudley Springs road and the Warrenton turnpike, I received word from you that the enemy were falling back, and to send the division right up the turnpike after them.¹ It was now near dusk, and though the men had been on foot since one o'clock in the morning, they moved forward with the greatest enthusiasm."² Facing Hatch was the division of Hood, consisting of his own and Law's brigades, which had been placed by Longstreet upon the prolongation of Jackson's line, about midday. On Hood's left was Wilcox, and on his right was Kemper. For hours Hood had remained quiet, his batteries only being engaged, but about sunset General Lee ordered Hood "to move forward and attack."³ Hatch was at this moment advancing with three brigades, and was near at hand.⁴ Hood says: "Before this division (Hood's) could come to attention it was attacked, and I instantly ordered the two brigades to move forward and charge the enemy, which they did most gallantly, driving them in confusion in front of them. Colonel Law's brigade, being engaged with a very heavy force of the enemy, captured 1 piece of artillery, 3 stands of colors, and 100 prisoners; and the Texas brigade, 3 stands of colors. It soon became so very dark that it was impossible to pursue the enemy any farther."⁵ Evans's brigade efficiently coöperated with Hood in this countercharge, and Wilcox's division and Hunton's brigade went forward as supports, but were not needed.⁶

¹ What induced this belief on General Pope's part, it is impossible to say. Mr. Ropes (p. 91) says, Pope was "a sanguine man," a statement which his orders and dispatches on this day and night put beyond controversy.

² McDowell's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 339.

³ Hood's report, *Ib.* p. 605.

⁴ Hatch says he "proceeded with all the haste possible, hoping by harassing the enemy's rear to turn their retreat into a rout." (Hatch's report, *Ib.* p. 367.)

⁵ Hood's report, *Ib.* p. 605. The Texas brigade was on the south side of the turnpike, Law's brigade on the north side.

⁶ Hatch says: "Night had now come on, our loss had been severe, and the enemy occupying a position in the woods on our left which gave them a flank fire upon us, I was forced to give the order for a retreat." (Hatch's report, *Ib.* p. 367.)

As the darkness closed in, the roar of battle lessened and finally ceased altogether, and only the movements of the ambulance corps and the groans of the wounded and dying remained to disturb the rest into which thousands of weary men sank. How many were to join their dead comrades ere another night! Longstreet found the Federal position, to which Hatch had been forced back, a strong one, and, believing it very strongly manned, he quietly withdrew his lines about one o'clock at night to the position they had held before Hood's advance.

Thus ended the battle of the 29th. At every point the Federal commander had been defeated or baffled. Gallant and costly efforts had been made by Sigel, Heintzelman, and Reno to carry Jackson's position, but their efforts had been fruitless of aught but blood. With unsurpassed courage and determination had Jackson broken and hurled back the attacking columns on his left, while with equal skill he had parried the less formidable onsets of Schenck and Reynolds. Longstreet had paralyzed Porter, repulsed Reynolds, and when Hatch ventured to assume the aggressive, at nightfall, had inflicted prompt and bloody punishment. True, the Confederates had maintained the defensive all day and forborne to commit themselves to a general attack, but this was in order that Lee might get into position to deliver battle on the morrow.¹ And yet the "sanguine" General Pope, thinking over the events of the day, concluded during the night that he had gained a great victory, and even so judicious a writer as Mr. Ropes thinks "the advantage had certainly been with his army."²

It is impossible to give the Confederate losses on the 29th, as the losses for the several days are not separated in the

¹ Longstreet says that Lee was anxious to deliver battle on the 29th, but that the arrangements could not be made in time. He says that had any favorable opportunity occurred (such as an attack by and a repulse of Porter), it would have been followed by an aggressive movement on the part of the whole army, and that the battle of the 30th would have been thus anticipated. (Longstreet's testimony in Fitz-John Porter case, pp. 63, 64.)

² Ropes, *The Army under Pope*, p. 109.

reports of the Confederate officers.¹ On that day Brigadier-Generals Field and Trimble and Colonel Forno, commanding brigades, were severely wounded. On the Federal side, General Pope estimated his loss in killed and wounded alone at "not less than 8000."²

General Longstreet, in a letter³ dated September 23, 1864, written to General F. J. Porter in reference to the hours at which on August 29 his command joined Jackson, says: "We all were particularly anxious to bring on the battle after twelve m., General Lee more so than the rest." The success of the Confederate leader's strategy depended upon his fighting Pope before the whole Army of the Potomac had united with him. General Lee knew that a part of McClellan's forces had already joined Pope, he realized that after the seizure of Manassas by Jackson on the 27th every effort would be made to hurry forward the remainder of those forces from Alexandria. When the two wings of the Confederate army had therefore united at Groveton, it was the evident policy of its commander to bring on a general battle as promptly as possible, as every hour's delay might add to the strength of his adversary. At midday on the 29th, General Lee was ready to receive attack at all points of his lines, and it seemed that a general battle was about to be joined. Severe fighting had already taken place along Jackson's lines, and the Federals were evidently gaining strength for still stronger efforts on that part of the field. Opposite the Confederate right, Porter appeared in force and seemed to be preparing for assault. Knowing Pope's superiority of numbers,⁴ Lee preferred to receive the

¹ The entire Confederate loss was near 8000 (see below) in the battles of August 27, 28, 29, 30, and September 1. Possibly between one third and one half of this was incurred on August 29.

² Pope's dispatch, August 30. (*Report on Conduct of War*, vol. i. p. 466.) Mr. Ropes (p. 192) thinks this estimate excessive, and would reduce it to 4500. No doubt Pope was speaking in round numbers, but there can be little doubt that his loss largely exceeded that of the Confederates, as the battle consisted entirely of repeated and desperate charges on his part, which were uniformly repulsed. (See Summary of Losses in Record of F. J. Porter's trial, vol. iii. p. 1450.)

³ Statement of General F. J. Porter, N. Y., 1878, p. 5.

⁴ The numbers were in the proportion of about 50,000 Confederates to

attack rather than give it. He hoped to be able to repulse Pope's assaults, and then to strike him a crushing blow before the Federals could recover from the exhaustion these attacks would produce.¹ As we have seen, the delay of McDowell in reaching the field, and the failure of Porter to receive Pope's order to attack until too late, alone prevented the centre and the left of the Federal army from being hurled against Longstreet at the same time that the Federal right wing made its most determined onset against Jackson. In this way the opportunity anxiously sought and expected by Lee did not occur on the 29th, and the hours spent in waiting for it rendered offensive operations on his part impracticable.

70,000 Federals, though perhaps neither army had so many in ranks on the 29th.

¹ Lee says, in a letter to Porter (Statement of F. J. Porter, p. 51), dated February 18, 1870, in reply to Porter's question as to what would have been the probable result of an attack upon Longstreet after twelve M. with about 12,000 men, and of a repulse at an early hour or before five P. M., "The result of an attack" under the circumstances stated "would have been a repulse, and if a repulse, especially at an early hour or before five P. M., the effect would have been an attack on General Pope's left and rear by Longstreet and Stuart, which, if successful, would have resulted in the relief of Jackson, and have probably rendered unnecessary the battle of the next day."

CHAPTER XXXII.

THE SECOND MANASSAS.

THE situation on the morning of the 30th was satisfactory to the Confederates. The day was fine. The Federal assaults of the preceding day, which, though partial, had increased in vigor as the day wore on, indicated renewed attacks upon the Confederate position. The strength of the Federal army and the character of its commander confirmed Lee in anticipating aggressive movements. Lee's dispositions therefore on the morning of the 30th were still defensive. The Confederate army remained for the most part in the position it had held the afternoon before. Jackson on the left wing continued to hold the line of the unfinished railroad with his divisions in the same order, A. P. Hill on his left, Ewell's division, under Lawton, in his centre, and Jackson's old division (under Starke) on his right. On the high ground in the rear of the line artillery was placed at favorable points. The right of Jackson's infantry rested on the old railroad where it becomes parallel to the turnpike, half a mile or more northwest of Groveton. Here the Confederate line of battle crossed the railroad and extended perpendicularly along the high ground to the turnpike, thus forming nearly a right angle with Jackson's line. Here eighteen of Jackson's guns¹ were placed by Colonel Crutchfield so as to enfilade any forces attacking the infantry. On the right of Crutchfield,² still farther toward the turnpike and about half a mile west of Groveton, was a battalion of eighteen guns, under Colonel S. D. Lee.³ These guns at the centre of the

¹ They were from the batteries of Johnson, D'Aquin, Rice, Wooding, Poague, Carpenter, Brockenbrough, and Latimer. (Crutchfield's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 653.)

² Jackson's chief of artillery.

³ Lee had four batteries, Eubank's, Parker's, Rhett's, and Jordan's.

Confederate line held a commanding position. Colonel S. D. Lee¹ describes it as "an admirable ridge of over a quarter of a mile, generally overlooking the ground in front of it for some 2000 yards. This ground was occupied by several farms, with cornfields, orchards, fences, etc., making it much desired by the enemy for their skirmishers, being quite undulating. Opposite the top of the ridge and distant about 1300 yards was a strip of timber with quite a fall of ground behind it. Between this strip and General Jackson's right, along an old railroad excavation, was an open field." These guns of Crutchfield and S. D. Lee completely swept the front of Jackson's centre and right. Longstreet's forces constituted the right wing of the army. They swept from Jackson's right, first across the Warrenton and Centreville turnpike, and then across the angle between the turnpike and the Manassas Gap Railroad; and lastly extended some distance across the latter along the west side of Dawkins's branch, where they had confronted Porter the evening before. Wilcox's brigades, two in front and one in reserve,² were on Longstreet's left, supporting S. D. Lee's artillery, next came Law's brigade, somewhat advanced and with his right on the turnpike. South of the turnpike on the same line was first Evans's and then Hood's brigade. The three brigades last mentioned had advanced from their position to attack Hatch the evening before. After midnight they had been brought back from the point in front which they had reached in their repulse of Hatch. To the right of Hood, Kemper with three brigades³ prolonged the line in the angle between the turnpike and the Manassas Gap Railroad, and, lastly, D. R. Jones with three brigades⁴ held the right of the Confederate infantry line on both sides of this railroad. R. H. Anderson's division had come up during the night from Thoroughfare Gap, and was held in reserve behind Longstreet's

¹ *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 577.

² Featherstone was on the left nearest Jackson, Pryor was next, Wilcox's own brigade was behind them forming the second line.

³ Kemper's, Pickett's, and Jenkins's in order from left to right. (*Southern Historical Papers*, vol. viii. p. 539; report of Colonel Corse, commanding Kemper's brigade.)

⁴ Toombs's, Anderson's, and Drayton's.

troops on the Centreville turnpike. Robertson's cavalry brigade was placed on Longstreet's right by General J. E. B. Stuart, and Colonel Rosser, with the 5th Virginia cavalry and two batteries,¹ was thrown out in the direction of Bristoe to guard the approaches from that direction and from Alexandria. The left flank of the Confederate army was guarded by the cavalry of Fitz Lee, who had returned the day before from the expedition he had made toward Alexandria.

When it was discovered that Porter had withdrawn from the front of D. R. Jones, the latter's position was slightly changed by throwing his command forward and to the right.² Here it remained until the general advance of the Confederates in the afternoon. On Jackson's extreme left there was some withdrawal of the cavalry pickets from the most advanced positions held by them the day before. This was possibly due to the removal of Jackson's baggage trains from the exposed position they had occupied on the morning of the 29th. It will be remembered that these trains were fired into on that day, but that the Federal advance at this point had been checked by Patrick's cavalry and Pelham's guns and some infantry sent by Jackson for the purpose. The trains were removed to the rear before midday on the 29th, and the Confederates seem afterward to have retired from some of the ground it had been necessary for them to hold at this point in order to shield the trains. This too is to be noted. After the final repulse of the Federals by Early on the evening of the 29th, the Confederates had occupied the railroad without molestation and then slept upon their arms.³ At an early hour the next morning Gregg's brigade on Early's left had gone back some distance to get ammunition, and remained there a short time to cook and eat breakfast. The cornfield and a short space of the railroad on Early's left were thus left for a short time undefended, and when the Federal skirmishers first advanced on

¹ Stribling's and Rogers's.

² Jones's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 579.

³ The absence of the reports of the Confederate cavalry officers on this flank and the scant references in the reports of the infantry officers leave us in the dark as to the exact movements made, but the reports of the Federal officers on the 30th show that the Confederate pickets on that day were not as far advanced in the flank as they had been on the 29th.

the morning of the 30th they met no resistance until they struck the left of Early's brigade.¹ As will be seen, this retirement on the Confederate extreme left, together with the withdrawal on the night of the 29th of Hood and Evans along the Centreville turnpike to their original position of the evening before, gave rise to a misapprehension on the part of the Federal commanders.

There, in a strong position, with troops well in hand, Lee awaited attack. On Jackson's line the artillery had been supplied with ammunition and the cartridge boxes filled during the night. His men, who had looked anxiously for Longstreet the morning before, were now elated and full of confidence. They had interrupted Pope's communications, destroyed his supplies, baffled and defeated all his attempts to overthrow them. Now that the Confederate army was united, no doubt of victory crossed their minds. Their confidence in Lee was perfect, their enthusiasm for Jackson unbounded. Such was the condition of things in the Confederate army. Let us turn for a time to the opposite camp.

Some confusion and inconsistency exist in the accounts that have been given of the purposes of the Federal commander on the morning of August 30. This is due to the fact that General Pope's report, written after the battle was over and disaster had been incurred, had altogether a different tone from the dispatches he sent on the day itself from the battlefield. In his report, Pope represents himself on the morning of the 30th as discouraged by the non-arrival of expected supplies and troops from Alexandria, and speaks as if leading a forlorn hope. He says: "I felt it to be my duty, notwithstanding the desperate condition of my command from great fatigue, from want of provisions and forage, and from the small hope I had of any effective assistance from Alexandria, to hold my position at all hazards and under all privations, unless overwhelmed by the superior forces of the enemy."² Had this been General

¹ Early informed General Hill of this fact, and Gregg's brigade was soon sent back and reoccupied its position. See Early's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. pp. 712, 713, and Colonel Ed. McCrady's report, 1st South Carolina regiment of Gregg's brigade, *Ib.* p. 690.

² *Ib.* p. 41.

Pope's view of the situation at the time, it would be hard to explain why he did not place his army in the strong position of Centreville, a few miles in his rear, or at least retire behind Bull Run, and, by disputing the crossings of that troublesome stream, gain a day or two. Franklin and Sumner were hastening to join him with 20,000 veteran troops. Pope says he did not know of their near approach; but he knew well enough that they had arrived in Alexandria, and that Halleck was hurrying them forward to his assistance. A single day's march was sufficient to bring them from the Potomac to Centreville, and the whole theory of his campaign, according to his report, had been to hold Lee in check as well as he could until the union of McClellan's army with his own should render the Federal force too great for Lee to oppose. Franklin and Sumner, on the 30th, were on the way to join him, Franklin arriving in advance of Centreville the same afternoon in time to resist the stream of fugitives from the battlefield. Had Pope retired across Bull Run on the night of the 29th or on the morning of the 30th, and postponed battle for a day or two, he could have fought with a well-rationed army and one stronger by 20,000 fresh troops. "Holding his position at all hazards," and delaying any "further advance" of the Confederates "toward the capital," did not at all involve a general assault by his whole army upon what he terms "superior forces."¹ To lead an inferior and exhausted army in a hopeless struggle against a well-posted adversary in order to gain time, was not the real part played by General Pope on that memorable day, however fully he may afterwards have persuaded himself that such was the case.

Let us look at the plans of the Federal commander as shown by his orders and dispatches. At five P. M. on August 29, he orders Banks to send his trains direct from Bristoe to Manassas and Centreville, and urges him to get the railroad in such order as to permit the railroad trains then massed in the neighborhood of Bristoe to be brought back behind Bull

¹ As already stated, Pope's strength as compared with Lee's was not less than seven to five.

Run.¹ At five P. M. he sends a most peremptory order to Fitz-John Porter to march his command at once to the battlefield, near Groveton.² At five A. M. on the 30th, he sends the following to General Halleck:³ “We fought a terrific battle here yesterday with the combined forces of the enemy, which lasted with continuous fury from daylight until dark, by which time the enemy was driven from the field, which we now occupy. Our troops are too much exhausted yet to push matters, but I shall do so in the course of the morning, as soon as General F. J. Porter comes up from Manassas. The enemy is still in our front, but badly used up. We have lost not less than 8000 men killed and wounded, but, from the appearance of the field, the enemy lost at least two to one. He stood strictly on the defensive, and every assault was made by ourselves. The battle was fought on the identical battlefield of Bull Run, which greatly increased the enthusiasm of the men. The news just reaches me from the front that the enemy is retiring toward the mountains; I go forward at once to see. We have made great captures, but I am not able yet to form an idea of their extent. Our troops behaved splendidly. I think you had best send Franklin’s, Cox’s, and Sturgis’s regiments to Centreville, as also forage and subsistence.

“I received a note this morning from General Franklin, written by order of General McClellan, saying that wagons and cars would be loaded and sent to Fairfax Station as soon as I would send a cavalry escort to Alexandria to bring them out. Such a request, when Alexandria is full of troops, and we fighting the enemy, needs no comment.

¹ See order to Banks, *Conduct of War, Supplement*, part ii. p. 153; *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 76.

² The order to Porter is as follows (*Ib.* p. 18): “Immediately upon the receipt of this order, the precise hour of receiving which you will acknowledge, you will march your command to the field of battle of to-day and report to me in person for orders. You are to understand that you are expected to comply strictly with this order, and to be present on the field within three hours after its receipt, or after daybreak to-morrow morning.”

³ *Report on Conduct of War*, vol. i. p. 466,—not appended to Pope’s report.

“Will you have these supplies sent without the least delay to Centreville?”

This last was General Pope's official report of the situation as it appeared to him about sunrise on the 30th. The battle of the 29th had closed eight or ten hours before. Time had elapsed for him to receive information from every part of the field, and the above dispatch sums up the results and the outlook as he then understood them. The reconnoissances made by Pope on the morning of the 30th all seem to have confirmed his impression that Lee was retreating. He says that, during the night of the 29th and up to ten o'clock next morning, everything indicated to him a retreat of the Confederates. Paroled Federal prisoners brought him this news, and McDowell and Heintzelman repeated it as the result of their observations on the morning of the 30th.¹ Full of elation at the prospect ahead, Pope ordered a renewal of the attack upon Jackson, giving McDowell, who was to conduct it, his own, Porter's, and Heintzelman's corps for the purpose. Meantime, Sigel, Reno, and Reynolds were to hold the centre and the left. Before beginning this attack, Generals McDowell and Heintzelman made a personal reconnoissance of Jackson's position. The Confederate lines seemed to them to have been drawn in. There was no Confederate cavalry north of Bull Run, as had been the case the day before.² Even south of

¹ Pope's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 41.

² Fitz Lee, returning from his cavalry raid towards Alexandria, had rejoined Jackson the day before, by way of Centreville and Sudley, and his presence on the flank had no doubt increased the impression upon the Federal officers that a strong force had been thrown out in that direction, and led to the erroneous supposition on their part that the absence of this force the next morning indicated retreat. In a letter to the authorities, dated November 23, 1883, General Fitz Lee said: “I left Jackson on the afternoon of August 27, and followed Taylor's troops toward Alexandria, camping for the night on the north or Alexandria side of Bull Run. On the 28th moved down Little River turnpike, surprising and capturing a squadron of the 2d (regulars), etc., below Chantilly, — returned to Centreville on the 29th, reaching there just after its evacuation by the Federal troops under General Birney, — from that point went on that afternoon and evening to Sudley ford, and on the 30th was on Jackson's extreme left at Sudley Springs, and but slightly engaged.”

that stream the ground about Sudley Springs was no longer occupied by them. There were no signs of aggression on Jackson's part. All was comparatively quiet. The Federal corps commanders reached the too hasty conclusion that Jackson was retreating.¹ Riding toward Pope's headquarters, which were near the Stone house, they met General Sigel, who informed them that appearances in his front indicated retreat.² General Patrick, commanding a brigade of King's division on the turnpike, sent in a similar report. The ground for Sigel's and Patrick's impressions was no doubt the fact that Hood and Evans had withdrawn before daylight to the position from which they had advanced the evening before. These various reports confirmed and greatly enhanced the conclusion to which Pope had already come, viz.: that he had beaten Jackson the day before, and that the latter was now falling back upon Longstreet, whose presence in full force on the battlefield Pope would not even yet admit.³ Porter's representations of Longstreet's arrival only increased Pope's anger against Porter. They did not cause in Pope any hesitation. He now felt sure that the victory had been already won. Only a vigorous pursuit was needed to complete the work, which would have been finished yesterday if Porter had done his duty. A hot pursuit of the flying Jackson would add prisoners and captured material to the laurels of the Federal

¹ McDowell says: "On going with General Heintzelman to the position held by his troops, we found all the points held by the enemy the day before beyond Bull Run abandoned; and in going over to the Sudley Springs road and west of it we saw no evidences of the enemy in force, some skirmishers and advanced posts or rear-guards, as the case might be, being all that we found. On returning to headquarters and reporting these facts, we found that word had been sent in from the front that the enemy was moving back on the road to Gainesville. Similar word was given by General Patrick. On the supposition that the enemy was falling back, I received your orders to take command of the corps above named and pursue the enemy." (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 340.)

² See Heintzelman's report, *Ib.* p. 413.

³ Though Pope speaks in his dispatch at five A. M. August 30 of fighting the "combined forces of the enemy" the day before, his dispatch on the night of the 30th shows that he thought only a small part of Longstreet's troops present at that time. See *Ib.* pp. 78, 79.

army, while it was plainly wise to inflict all the damage possible upon that part of the Confederate army which had been defeated, before it could recover itself under cover of the reinforcements which Lee was hurrying to its relief. Thus, with a misconception of the real situation which has hardly a parallel in military history, Pope at midday issued the following order: "The following forces will be immediately thrown forward, and in pursuit of the enemy, and press him vigorously during the whole day. Major-General McDowell is assigned to the command of the pursuit. Major-General Porter's corps will push forward on the Warrenton turnpike, followed by the divisions of Brigadier-General King and Reynolds. The division of Brigadier-General Ricketts will pursue the Haymarket road, followed by the corps of Major-General Heintzelman. The necessary cavalry will be assigned to these columns by Major-General McDowell, to whom regular and frequent reports will be made. The General Headquarters will be somewhere on the Warrenton turnpike."¹

Let us look for a while at the principal features of the battlefield. Standing at the Confederate centre, half a mile west of Groveton, we look along the Warrenton and Centreville turnpike, which runs in a straight line a little north of east towards Bull Run and Centreville. This road, the main thoroughfare of the region, divides the battlefield into equal portions. In front of us on the road is the little hamlet of Groveton, still on high ground, but beyond it the road descends to cross Dogan's Branch, and then continues in the valley of Young's Branch and near that stream until it crosses it just east of the Stone house. The road then ascends a steep hill near the Robinson house, and descends rapidly to the second crossing of Young's Branch, after which it continues across the low grounds to Bull Run, which it crosses at the Stone Bridge. Young's Branch, gathering near the heights on which we stand and making a wide détour to the right, then takes a northwest course until it nearly reaches the turnpike half a mile east of Groveton, then runs in a western course beside that road until it crosses it east of the

¹ *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 361.

Stone house, after which it makes a sharp curve on the north side around the end of the Henry and Robinson Hill, and, again crossing to the south side of the turnpike, flows south-eastwardly into Bull Run. A tributary known as Dogan's Branch gathers on the north side of the turnpike, and crossing the turnpike half a mile east of Groveton soon unites with Young's Branch. These streams mark decided depressions in the surface. Young's Branch has a number of tributaries on the south side, the two most important of which are Holcum's Branch and the Chinn Branch, both running in a northeasterly direction and giving that direction to the ridges they separate. Between the two last-named tributaries is the broad, flat-topped hill on which stand the Henry and Robinson houses. It is the highest part of the field east of Groveton. Coming westward, another high, flat-topped ridge intervenes between the Chinn Branch and Young's Branch itself, on which stands the Chinn house. Finally, between Young's Branch and Dogan's Branch is a high uneven plateau on which Groveton stands. The ground rises steeply from the streams to this plateau, which itself gradually ascends to the centre of the Confederate position. On the north side of the turnpike the ground is less cut up by the little tributaries of Young's Branch.

The main plateau north of the turnpike is the line of the unfinished Manassas Gap Railroad, coming from a northeasterly direction near Sudley church towards the centre of the Confederate lines, and then bending away parallel to the Warrenton road. This railroad line runs near the base of the stony ridge which separates the waters of Bull Run and Young's Branch from those of Catharpin Run. At about the middle of Jackson's position this railroad line is intersected by the Groveton and Sudley dirt road, and on both sides of this point a heavy wood extends, especially in front of the Confederate position. This wood continues in a narrow belt on the east side of the Groveton and Sudley road some distance towards Groveton, and it was behind this timber that Fitz-John Porter formed his lines for attack. The last named road, crossing the turnpike at Groveton, soon divides into the

Lewis and Compton roads or lanes, which pass through a heavy body of timber. Between this timber and the turnpike, and rising abruptly from the west of Young's Branch, is a high cleared space commanding a good view of Groveton and the country north and west of it. It was here that Warren was to meet the first shock of Longstreet's attack.

The Stone house, a noted landmark in both battles of Manassas, is a large stone dwelling alongside the turnpike just east of the intersection with the Newmarket and Sudley road. This latter road, coming from Manassas Junction, runs at right angles to Young's Branch and the turnpike, and their intersection was in the rear of the centre of the Federal army. The Stone house is in the valley of Young's Branch, but the Newmarket road, after descending the Henry hill and crossing the stream and the turnpike, ascends a steep hill, a little more to the east, known as Buck Hill, and continues on high ground until it approaches Sudley. West of this road on the north side of the turnpike is the ridge on which stood the Dogan house. This ridge, on the north side of the valley of Young's Branch, is nearly opposite to the Chinn ridge on the south side, and was the position held by Sigel at the centre of the Federal army. North of the turnpike and east of the Newmarket and Sudley road the country was rolling. Near the centre of this region, on a gentle elevation, stood the Carter house, destined to mark the last stand made by the right wing of the Federal army at nightfall. Two country roads moving nearly parallel in general direction to the turnpike, the one on the north and the other on the south side, mark the extreme limits of the battlefield. The Haymarket road from Sudley Springs to Haymarket is the route by which Pope attempted to throw his right forward to turn and overwhelm the Confederate left. The old Warrenton and Alexandria road, about one and a half miles to the south side of the turnpike, afforded an avenue by which Stuart's cavalry and D. R. Jones's infantry completely turned Pope's left.

During the forenoon, skirmishing had taken place on different parts of the field. On the Federal extreme right General Ricketts advanced Duryea's brigade supported by Thorburn's,

early in the day. Finding the way clear, the Federal skirmishers advanced as far as the left of Early's brigade and into the cornfield on his flank, but were checked by the return of Gregg's brigade to its position on the old railroad. Later in the forenoon, Duryea's brigade was thrown forward in line, and a brisk skirmish ensued. Duryea's left ran against and was repulsed by the skirmishers of Early's brigade, under Captain R. D. Lilly,¹ while his centre and right were vigorously shelled by McIntosh's battery, which was serving with Gregg's brigade.² General Duryea was wounded and his brigade was forced back into the woods,³ where it took up a more sheltered position. After the repulse of this attempt, the troops on this part of the Confederate line were managed so that the Confederate left was (as on the day before) confided to A. P. Hill, who, having sent Branch's brigade to the left flank of Gregg's, placed Thomas and Archer, supported by Pender, on Gregg's right. Early's brigade moved to the right,⁴ until it joined those of Lawton and Trimble, belonging to the same division (Ewell's).⁵ Field's brigade (under Colonel J. M. Brockenbrough) was separated from its own division (A. P. Hill's), and was placed in rear of the left of Taliaferro's division in support of Starke's and of the Stonewall brigade. Jackson's line was everywhere well supplied with artillery, especially in its flank.⁶

¹ Early's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 713.

² McGowan's report, *Ib.* p. 681. General Ricketts at this time asked for reinforcements in the following dispatch: "August 30, 1862, 9.30 A. M. My two brigades are now under heavy batteries of the enemy. We require at least six heavy Parrott guns and the rest of the division, as this seems to be the point of attack. We must have assistance. The ground has been pointed out to me by General Kearny. My advance brigade is engaged, and I have no support."

³ Colonel McCoy's report, 107th Pennsylvania regiment, *Ib.* p. 481.

⁴ Early says the front space left for him was only sufficient for three of his regiments (44th, 49th, and 52d Virginia), and that he kept the others in reserve. (*Ib.* p. 713.)

⁵ Hays's brigade of Ewell's division, under Colonel Strong, had gone to the rear for ammunition, and, from General Hill's report, seems to have been placed in rear of Gregg and Branch in reserve. (Hill's report, *Ib.* p. 671.)

⁶ Behind and to the left of A. P. Hill were the batteries of Braxton,

But little firing took place for the first half of the day along the line held by Jackson's centre and right, but S. D. Lee's battalion of artillery, occupying the ridge in rear of Groveton, and between Jackson and the turnpike, kept up at times a spirited contest. Whenever the Federals pushed forward reconnoissances toward him, S. D. Lee opened fire, which drew the fire of the Federal batteries opposite, and brought on an artillery duel for a time. About noon the Federal skirmishers advanced with more spirit than before, and occupied an orchard in S. D. Lee's front. They were soon forced back, however, by the fire of his howitzers,¹ and all gradually grew still.

Several hours thereafter quiet rested on the battlefield. The Confederates, now fully prepared, awaited the assault, of which the massing of Federal troops in their front left them no longer in doubt. The Federal army was busy with the tactical dispositions which were necessary as a preliminary to the advance which its commander had ordered.

Fitz-John Porter's corps,² in obedience to Pope's peremptory order, had left its camp near Manassas in the night, and arrived on the battlefield by ten A. M. It was ordered to take position on the right of the turnpike and in the woods in front of the Dogan house. Here Porter made his dispositions for attack upon what he very well knew, in spite of Pope's hallucination, was not a flying army. Sykes's division of regulars, consisting of the brigades of Buchanan, Chapman, and Warren, were drawn up north of the turnpike. Buchanan's brigade was deployed in front and Chapman's placed in "columns of division"³ in rear of it. Warren's brigade and the three batteries of Sykes's division⁴ were held in reserve. To the right of Sykes and in advance of his line was formed

Pegram, Latham, Davidson, McIntosh, and Crenshaw. The Staunton artillery (Lieutenant Garber) was behind Ewell's line, while, farther to the right, next S. D. Lee's battalion, Colonel Crutchfield (chief of artillery for General Jackson) had placed eighteen guns, already referred to.

¹ S. D. Lee's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 577.

² Porter's corps consisted of the divisions of Sykes and Morell. One of Morell's brigades (Griffin's) had by some misunderstanding gone to Centreville. It remained there all day, and was not in the battle.

³ Chapman's report, *Ib.* p. 496.

⁴ Weed's, Randol's, and Smead's.

Morell's division, under Butterfield. The 1st brigade (Colonel Roberts) was placed on the right of the division and the 3d brigade (Colonel Lansing) on the left. They were so drawn up as to constitute three lines in attack.¹ King's division of McDowell's corps (under Hatch) was placed on the right of Porter's corps, and in preparation for the advance, which was to be made simultaneously with Porter, was drawn up in seven lines.² In rear of Porter and behind the Dogan house was Sigel's corps, with one division of Reno's corps on his right. These troops were intended as a general reserve. They rested in column, with their left on the turnpike in rear of the hill on which the Dogan house stood, and were protected by this rise of the ground which intervened between them and Porter; Schenck's division was in front, and Schurz's in rear. Thus General Pope had massed at the centre of his position on the north side of the turnpike the entire corps of Porter and Sigel, with half of those of McDowell (Hatch's division) and Reno (Reno's division). South of the turnpike, Reynolds's division had been drawn up in column³ near the Henry house, from which point it advanced to take position on Porter's left, and thus form the left wing of the Federal army. On the opposite flank of that army was Heintzelman's corps, Stevens's division, holding much the

¹ Colonel Roberts says he was posted as follows: 25th New York deployed as skirmishers, 18th Massachusetts in line of battle in rear of skirmishers, 13th New York in line of battle in rear of 18th Massachusetts, 1st Michigan and 2d Maine "in double column and in rear by echelon of the other regiments respectively." (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 471.) The 3d brigade was formed with 17th New York deployed in line of battle, and the 44th New York, 83d Pennsylvania, 12th New York, and 16th Michigan "in columns doubled in centre." (*Ib.* p. 480; see pp. 474, 475, 478.)

² "On reporting to General Porter and informing him of the order under which I came, he directed me to post the division on the right of his own troops, and to make the attack simultaneously with himself. The division was drawn up in seven lines, composed as follows: 1st and 2d Hatch's brigade, 3d and 4th Patrick's brigade, 5th and 6th Gibbon's brigade, 7th Doubleday's brigade, and the 2d United States sharpshooters being advanced as skirmishers in the woods." (Hatch's report, *Ib.* p. 368.)

³ "In column by company at full distance, with the whole of my artillery on the left." (Reynolds's report, *Ib.* p. 394.)

same position they had held the day before, but now strengthened by Ricketts's division on their right flank.

Pope's plan of "pursuit" was to throw forward his right strongly, and thus double up on the Confederate centre whatever force Lee had left to hold his lines. Hatch and Porter were then to advance pivoting on the left, and, carrying everything in front, were to press forward vigorously. As the first step in the execution of this programme, Heintzelman sent forward Ricketts's division towards Sudley Springs to turn the Confederate flank and seize the Haymarket road. The movement was not pressed, but seems to have been abandoned, as soon as it was discovered that the Confederates still held in force their position along the old railroad directly in Ricketts's front. General Heintzelman says: "The first step in advance brought us in contact with the enemy's skirmishers. These were driven out of the wood, but our further advance was resisted by the rebel artillery commanding the road."¹ General Ricketts, upon finding the enemy had no intention of retiring, and reporting this fact to Colonel Shriver, chief of staff to General McDowell, says he was directed "to abandon pursuit and resume my (his) first position, where the brigades were soon exposed to a galling crossfire."² The reports of McGowan (of Gregg's brigade), Thomas, and Archer, who held the Confederate left, show that no serious attempt was made to carry their lines. McGowan states that McIntosh's battery was sufficient to defeat an attempt on the position held by Gregg's brigade on the extreme Confederate left. Thomas speaks of repulsing attacks made in strong force on his position, which was next to Gregg's, but this was probably nothing more than the repulse of Ricketts's skirmishers. No farther attempt was made on the Confederate left. When McDowell ordered Ricketts to abandon pursuit, he turned his attention to the grand attack to be made by the centre of the Federal army, and left Heintzelman to hold his own while the fate of the day was being decided elsewhere.³

¹ *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 413. McIntosh's and other batteries of A. P. Hill's division.

² *Ib.* p. 384.

³ Ricketts's movement preceded Porter's attack, and it was over by two p. m., according to General Heintzelman. (*Ib.* p. 413.)

Let us turn to the opposite flank of Pope's army, — the extreme left. Here Reynolds was advancing on the south of the turnpike, but parallel to it. He saw indications of the Confederates in front and to his left, but met with no serious opposition until he arrived near Groveton. His command was preceded by one regiment deployed as skirmishers.¹ When the skirmishers arrived in the thick woods to the south of Groveton and west of Young's Branch, they found the resistance so great that another regiment² was deployed to support them, and finally a second ;³ in all three regiments.⁴ In addition to this he took another regiment⁵ through the woods to cover his left. When they had reached open ground in that direction, they came upon the Confederate skirmishers in line parallel to that flank, and, as General Reynolds puts it, evidently masking a column of attack. These troops were either the skirmishers of Robinson's cavalry covering Kemper's division,⁶ or that division itself. Having made known the presence of this force on his left to General McDowell, Reynolds was ordered to form his division so as to resist it, and reinforcements were promised him. Sigel had for some time been uneasy about the movements which had been reported to him of Confederate troops towards the Federal left. In order to get information, he had, an hour or two before, sent a regiment of cavalry,⁷ with orders, after having passed behind the left of the Federal army, to scout on that flank as far as they could go. Subsequently he had ordered one of McLean's regiments⁸ to the south side of the turnpike to observe the enemy and to connect with General Reynolds. It was not long after this that Reynolds reported as above the presence of a strong force opposite that flank. General McDowell,

¹ 1st rifles, Colonel McNeil.

² 1st infantry, Colonel Roberts.

³ 7th infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel Henderson.

⁴ Reynolds's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 394.

⁵ The 6th regiment, Colonel Sinclair.

⁶ General Reynolds seems to have himself ridden on these Confederates unexpectedly, for he says he had to run the gauntlet of a severe fire from them in getting back to the rear of his division.

⁷ 4th New York, Lieutenant-Colonel Nazer.

⁸ 55th Ohio.

impressed by the report Reynolds had brought, took the farther precaution to send for the two brigades and two batteries of Ricketts's division, which were in reserve, and had not, so far, been engaged. These troops, under General Tower, were placed on the Henry house hill. They were thus ready, either to advance to the assistance of Reynolds, or to protect his rear. (General Pope directed that McLean's brigade of Schenck's division should be sent to the Bald hill near the Chinn house to take position in Reynolds's rear.) Such was the condition of affairs on the left of the Federal army at three P. M.: Reynolds with his skirmishers engaged both in front and on his left flank, and disposing the body of his troops to resist an attack on the flank, which seemed to him the danger that threatened most at the moment, McLean's brigade taking position on the Bald Hill, and Tower's two brigades on the Henry house hill, to support Reynolds, if need be, while the mass of Sigel's corps and Reno's division remained in reserve behind the Federal centre, awaiting the result of the blow about to be struck by Porter, at the left centre of the Confederate army. On the Federal right wing, as we have already seen, Heintzelman's efforts had subsided to a desultory skirmish. He, too, awaited the developments which were to follow the concentration of such heavy masses at the Federal centre.

It is time to turn to the great effort of the day, the attack of Porter. Porter had formed his own troops, as already described, for assault, and had ordered Hatch, whom McDowell had placed under his command, to form on his right and attack simultaneously. Hatch's and Butterfield's divisions were to move forward together, while Sykes to the rear and left of Butterfield was to support this latter. Berdan's sharpshooters were thrown out in front of Butterfield as skirmishers. All the dispositions of Porter had been made under cover of a strip of thick woods,¹ which extended over this part of the field. These woods approached the Confederate line on Hatch's front near the point where the road from Groveton to Sudley crossed

¹ "A narrow but dense forest was on my right front." (Porter's Statement, ed. 1878, p. 64.)

the unfinished railroad, and for some distance to the northward the old railroad runs through them. To the southward, however, an open country extends between the forest and the railroad, which gradually widens as one approaches Groveton. The curvature of the railroad to the west on this part of the field increased the distance between it and the wood above mentioned, and gave to the right of Jackson's line, which followed the railroad, a convex shape towards the southeast. The right of Jackson's infantry being thus "refused," as it were, his front could easily be swept by an enfilade fire from the mass of Confederate artillery which was concentrated south of the railroad and on the heights west of Groveton. The width of the open space between the railroad and the wood occupied by Porter was, where the right of Jackson's infantry rested, about 1200 or 1400 yards. The open space lessened towards the north until, as we have said, it disappeared altogether. This opening consisted of undulating fields in full view of and commanded by the heights west of Groveton, to which there was a gradual ascent of the ground.

Porter was not deceived by the hallucination which had so completely taken possession of Pope and McDowell on this day, namely, that Lee was retreating. He had therefore formed his troops with reference to delivering a vigorous assault upon a strongly held position. He had received a verbal order from Pope between one and two o'clock to "attack; King (Hatch) will support."¹ He then pushed forward Butterfield "to develop the strength of the enemy," and directed Hatch to deploy in four lines. The midday written order of Pope reached Porter at 2.30, accompanied by a similar order from McDowell.² Porter, feeling that he was already too far committed to an attack on Jackson in his front, to "push forward on the Warrenton turnpike,"³ and convinced too that no "pursuit" anywhere was possible until the army in front had been defeated, informed McDowell "that availing himself of the cover of the timber, he should attack Jackson, and if successful would wheel towards the left and move towards the

¹ Porter's Statement, p. 66.

² *Ib.* p. 66.

³ *Ib.* p. 67.

turnpike.”¹ He had asked before that Sigel should be brought up to assist him, and he now renewed the application. McDowell approved. Butterfield’s division was already skirmishing vigorously with the troops of Taliaferro’s division, and, finding themselves without support from Hatch on their right, were unable to make headway against the infantry fire of the Confederates. They were made to wait until Hatch’s troops were gotten up and connected with them, when the whole line was ordered to advance. Much time had been consumed in these various delays, and it was fully three P. M. when Porter’s lines finally moved forward to the assault.²

Let us see how Jackson’s troops were disposed at the points where this storm was about to break. The Confederates were drawn up in two lines of battle, the front was on the old railroad, the second on the wooded ridge some two hundred yards in rear of the first. Of Taliaferro’s division, now under Starke, Taliaferro’s brigade was on the right, then came the Stonewall brigade under Colonel Baylor, then B. T. Johnson’s brigade, and on the left of the division Starke’s Louisiana brigade under Colonel Stafford. In front of Stafford and Johnson the railroad was in a cut. This cut ran out, however, towards the right, and afforded but little cover for some distance on the front of the Stonewall brigade. Ewell’s division, under Lawton, joined Starke, and held the centre of Jackson’s line.

The heavy artillery fire which preceded Porter’s attack had done but little damage, and did not prevent the Confederate guns from pouring a heavy fire into the woods whence Porter must advance. The railroad cut afforded excellent cover and constituted a good line of defense, and Jackson ordered his troops to hold it at all hazards. Suddenly Butterfield’s line of battle emerged from the woods, and with cheers moved rapidly and in splendid order across the open towards the railroad. They were received with a severe fire by the first line of Con-

¹ Porter’s Statement, p. 68.

² General Lee says “about three P. M.” Captain McCoy, commanding 83d Pennsylvania regiment of Butterfield’s division, says about three P. M. General Jackson says about four P. M. (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. pp. 480, 557, 647.)

federates at the railroad, while the second line was promptly ordered forward to support the first. Trimble's brigade on Starke's left delivered an oblique fire on Butterfield's troops as they came forward, and a tremendous artillery fire was poured on them from the batteries in rear of Starke's division as well as from the large number of guns posted on the Groveton heights to Jackson's right. But the line of Porter's troops kept steadily forward until they came in close contact with the Confederates on the railroad. Here the fighting became most sanguinary and determined. Stafford's and Johnson's brigades in the railroad cut held their position most tenaciously. Johnson had thrown one of his regiments, 48th Virginia, into a cope behind the railroad. It was soon driven out by the advancing Federals, but the other three regiments of his brigade held firmly their position at the cut, and the most strenuous efforts of Porter's veteran troops were not sufficient to dislodge them. A little farther to the Confederate right, where the Stonewall brigade was posted, the Federal lines fought their way with fierce courage to the railroad, and pushed back the first line before the second could be gotten forward from the hill to support it. But the success was only momentary. Baylor led forward his men, and, though he fell gallantly leading the charge, the men who had followed Jackson on so many fields failed not on this to carry out his behest to "hold the position at all hazards." Taliaferro's brigade¹ maintained an impenetrable front, against which Porter's brave troops dashed in vain. For twenty or thirty minutes the furious combat was kept up. The men of Johnson's and Stafford's brigades ran out of ammunition. Some supplied themselves from the dead. Others, having no other means of offense, fought with the stones² which

¹ Colonel A. G. Taliaferro, whose courage on the battlefield was only surpassed by his coolness and courtesy.

² Colonel Stafford says: "They made repeated charges upon us while in this position, but were compelled to retire in confusion, sustaining heavy loss and gaining nothing. It was at this point that the ammunition of the brigade gave out. The men procured some from the dead bodies of their comrades, but the supply was not sufficient, and in the absence of ammunition the men fought with rocks and held their position." (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 669.)

covered the ground. General B. T. Johnson says : " I saw a Federal flag hold its position for half an hour within ten yards of a flag of one of the regiments in the cut, and go down six or eight times, and after the fight one hundred dead were lying twenty yards from the cut, some of them within two feet of it. The men fought until their ammunition was exhausted, and then threw stones. Lieutenant Lewis Randolph, of the battalion, killed one with a stone, and I saw him after the fight with his skull fractured. Dr. R. P. Johnson of my volunteer staff, having no arms of any kind, was obliged to have recourse to this means of offense from the beginning." ¹ General Porter says : " Many of the enemy, hard pressed, had not time to reload, and received us with stones, severely wounding many and killing some of our men." ²

While this fierce struggle was going on, Hatch's division had struck the Confederate line farther to the left, where it was held by Lawton's brigade (under Colonel Douglas³), and Early's brigade. Here the fighting was severe, but the Federal attack was repulsed more easily. On Early's front his first line was able to drive back the Federals. As Hatch's supporting lines came up, they spread over a broader front, and the whole of Lawton's division, as well as Archer's and Thomas's brigades of A. P. Hill's division on its left, became involved. The onset here was so fierce and in such force on Hill's right that the Confederate line there was shaken, and it was necessary to throw in Pender's brigade in order to check the Federals.⁴ The fire was now so heavy, and extended over so large a part of his whole line, that Jackson sent to Lee for reinforcements.

While Porter's lines were engaged in the sanguinary conflict we have described, the supporting lines were moved forward from the timber on his side of the field. But the ordeal through which they had to pass was now such as to paralyze them in great measure before they reached their comrades.

¹ Johnson's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. pp. 666, 667.

² Porter's Statement, ed. 1878, p. 68.

³ Killed at Sharpsburg.

⁴ A. P. Hill's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 671.

The front lines had advanced so quickly across the open space that they had come to close quarters with the Confederates along the railroad before the fire of the mass of artillery on the flank could be concentrated upon them. Once engaged in hand to hand conflict, the Confederate guns could not fire on them from fear of striking friend as well as foe. The artillerymen then turned their attention to the woods from which the Federal support must come and the fields over which they must pass. Crutchfield's and S. D. Lee's guns now did great execution. Half of these guns were of short range, but even these were effective on the nearest part of Porter's lines, while the others poured a storm of iron over all parts of the field. The Federal artillery was largely occupied in covering the advance of their infantry, and Lee's and Crutchfield's guns had greatly the advantage in position. Hence there were no effectual steps taken to neutralize this terrible flank fire. Porter's troops, veterans of Cold Harbor¹ and Malvern Hill, moved forward into it, but with torn ranks and broken lines they found it impossible to carry any effective aid to the men who, along the railroad, were engaged in a life and death struggle against the muskets, the bayonets, and the stones with which the Louisianians and Virginians were then "holding their position at all hazards."² Jackson had moved up Field's brigade under Brockenbrough to reinforce the sorely tried centre and left of Starke's division, and then, uncertain how long he could bear the tremendous strain, had sent to Lee for reinforcements. The guns on his right and the stubbornness of his infantry, however, were breaking the force of Porter's repeated assaults. Important aid, too, was about to come from General

¹ Gaines's Mill.

² Jackson says : "As one line was repulsed, another took its place and pressed forward as if determined by force of numbers and fury of assault to drive us from our position." (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 647.) Porter says his troops "gallantly attacked and desperately contended for victory. The resistance could not be overcome. The enfilading artillery, combined with the direct infantry fire, almost annihilated line after line, as each was about to crown the embankment. . . . Four successive, unceasing, vigorously desperate attacks were repulsed." (Porter's Statement, ed. 1878, p. 68.)

Longstreet. The latter had just ridden to his front on Hood's lines, near the turnpike, when he received from General Lee a message informing him of General Jackson's condition and his wants. From Longstreet's position on the field Porter's attacking columns were in full view and within artillery range. Instead of sending infantry to Jackson's assistance, Longstreet ordered up two batteries and at once opened fire. These batteries to the right front of those of S. D. Lee had a flank and rear fire upon Porter's attacking columns. They added all that was needed to end an attack the force of which was already exhausted. General Longstreet says,¹ "Before the second battery could be placed in position, the enemy began to retire, and in less than ten minutes the ranks were broken and that portion of his army put to flight." Porter's troops, after a struggle the gallantry of which was only exceeded by the tenacity of the defense, gave up the contest, and with confused and sadly thinned ranks sought shelter behind the forest through which they had advanced. Hatch's division had fared no better than Porter's own troops. General Hatch was borne wounded from the field, and when General Porter hastened (to supply his place) to that part of the line, he was met by "the evidence of disastrous repulse."

¹ *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 565.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

LEE'S (COUNTER) ATTACK.

So terminated Pope's attempts to "pursue" Lee. On his right, they had produced the feeble demonstrations of Ricketts; on his left, they had brought Reynolds to a halt before a superior and menacing force; in the centre, they had resulted in the bloody and disastrous defeat of Porter.

To Lee, on the other hand, the hour had come to reap the fruits of his skillful tactics. The Federal army, largely his superior in numbers, had been induced to attack him in a well-chosen position, and now, staggered and shaken by severe repulses, presented a fine opportunity for counter attack. No time was lost by Lee in assuming the offensive. Longstreet was ordered to throw his whole force upon the Federal centre and left, while Jackson was instructed to follow up the troops that had been driven from his front. Longstreet, as soon as he saw Porter's defeat, anticipated his chief's order, and without waiting for it ordered his troops forward at a charge. Hood's two brigades¹ led Longstreet's advance along the south side of the turnpike, supported by Evans's brigade. Evans commanded the three. R. H. Anderson's division followed them closely with Wilcox's division on his left and Kemper's division on his right. D. R. Jones's division was ordered up on the right of Kemper. Where the ground permitted, near the turnpike, artillery was advanced with the infantry.

Let us see how Pope was prepared for this onset. We have seen that, just before Fitz-John Porter's assault, Reynolds held the left of the Federal army south of the turnpike, and was

¹ Law advanced at first to Groveton, to support a battery, and it was half an hour or more after this that he was ordered to cross to the south side of the turnpike and support Hood's own brigade. (Law's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 624.)

disposing his men to resist the advance of Kemper, who threatened that flank, and that McLean's brigade had been placed by Sigel on the Bald Hill to support Reynolds. North of the turnpike, and close to it, lay Warren's brigade of Porter's corps, kept there in reserve, while the other brigades of Sykes's division had been drawn over to the support of Butterfield. Behind Warren, east of the Dogan house, was Sigel's corps. At some stage of Porter's operations,¹ General Pope ordered Reynolds to take his command north of the turnpike, and form it in rear of Porter. Evidently Pope at this time could not have realized the condition of affairs on this part of the field, though it was known to Reynolds,² for by withdrawing Reynolds's three brigades he left only McLean in position to protect that flank of his army, and his best line of retreat. Reynolds at once began to withdraw, and two of his brigades, passing across McLean's front, were transposed to the north side of the turnpike as directed. The rear one (Jackson's under Anderson) and three batteries of artillery had not got away before they were attacked by the advancing Confederates, when they were compelled to halt and fight on the ground they then held. General Porter had sent Hazlett's battery to the south of the turnpike, to a high point³ from which he might cover the left flank of Sykes and Butterfield. When Hazlett went there he was protected by Reynolds, but the withdrawal of the latter left him exposed. Captain Hazlett informed Colonel Warren of the state of affairs, and the latter, seeing the opening made by the withdrawal of Reynolds, promptly threw his brigade of about 1000 men forward to fill

¹ Porter says Reynolds was withdrawn before his assault was made. (Porter's Statement, ed. 1878, p. 67.) Reynolds says it was after Porter's repulse that he was ordered to the latter's rear to form a line behind which his troops might be rallied. (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 394.)

² Pope seems to have made up his mind from the outset that there was no large force south of the turnpike, and nothing could convince him of the contrary. (See Porter's Statement, ed. 1878, p. 65.)

³ This point was the high cleared field just west of Young's Branch and south of the turnpike, from which there was a good view towards the north and northwest.

it. At the moment, therefore, when Hood attacked, it was Warren's brigade that constituted the Federal front line next the turnpike on the south side. In Warren's rear, on the southeast side of Young's Branch, was Anderson, engaged in withdrawing Jackson's brigade in order to follow the other brigade of Reynolds's division, which in compliance with Pope's order had already moved to the north side of the turnpike. In rear of both Warren and Anderson, to their left, was McLean's brigade, on the Bald Hill near the Chinn house.

Hood's brigade struck Warren, and in a contest severe but of short duration the latter was broken and driven from the field.¹ Of the 1000 men that Warren carried into action, 431 were killed and wounded, the greater part of whom were left in the hands of the Confederates. The sacrifice, however, was not useless. It secured valuable time and gave Hazlett's battery an opportunity for escape. Hood continued forward without a halt, and, in conjunction with Kemper on his right, next attacked Jackson's brigade under Anderson. The fierce charge of the Confederates, elated with victory, again proved irresistible. Anderson was driven back with heavy loss,² one of his batteries and the caissons of another³ being taken by Hood. Though partially exhausted by their efforts, the Texans still moved forward, and were now opposed by Schenck, with McLean's brigade strongly posted near the Chinn house. On McLean's right the two brigades under Tower which McDowell had sent forward from the Henry house hill were rapidly coming up to Schenck's support. The force of Hood's charge, spent as his men were with their previous exertions, was not sufficient this time. Schenck held his own for the time, and Hood fell back on Evans's brigade under Colonel P. F. Stevens, which was closely supporting him. Stevens now became engaged in a severe conflict with Schenck, and with the troops which had rallied upon him, but he too was

¹ Davenport, in his *History of the 5th New York* (p. 286), says it was only fifteen minutes from the time the firing began until Warren was swept from the field.

² Reynolds's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 395.

³ Kerns lost his guns, Cooper his caissons. (*Ib.* p. 395.)

not strong enough to drive the Federals further, until other Confederate troops had come up. These are near at hand. Hood's impetuosity has carried him ahead of the other Confederate columns, but they soon come up.¹ Kemper's brigades are on his right, R. H. Anderson's division is in rear of Stevens's, and Law's brigade has been sent for to support his left. On Kemper's right D. R. Jones's division, which has two miles to march, is hastening forward to the battlefield.

While Schenck is still holding the Bald Hill, let us go back a little and see what disposition has been made of the heavy reserves which Pope had massed behind the Dogan house on the north of the turnpike. When Porter had found how serious was the work before him, and had learned that Reynolds had been diverted from his support on the left, he had asked for Sigel.² The order reached Sigel too late for him to participate in Porter's assault, but he promptly formed and advanced his troops. Stahel's brigade was deployed perpendicularly to the turnpike, in line with and on both sides of the Dogan house. It supported three batteries which were placed there,³ while Schurz's division was drawn up at supporting distance in rear. It was at this time that Reynolds was withdrawn from the left and was marching to the rear. Sigel had hardly gotten into position when Porter's broken troops came back in large numbers, and Sigel made ready to resist the counter attack of the Confederates, which he foresaw would follow Porter's defeat. This counter attack, as we have seen,

¹ Lieutenant-Colonel J. C. Upton, of Hood's brigade, was killed. Colonel J. B. Robertson, Captain R. Bryan, Lieutenant-Colonel Ruff, Major Griffis, and Major W. P. Townsend were wounded. In Evans's brigade Colonels J. H. Means and J. M. Godberry fell at the head of their troops. Colonel H. L. Benbow and Major F. G. Palmer were wounded.

² "General McDowell, — I fear for the result unless you push up Sigel. Our right is also attacked. — F. J. Porter." See Porter's Statement, ed. 1878, p. 68.

³ "Schirmer's battery on the crest of the hill, joining two other batteries that were already there, with the 45th [New York], 27th [Pennsylvania], 8th [New York], behind it to the right of the house, and the 41st regiment [New York] to the left of the house, and on the other side of the wood." (Chesebrough's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 282.)

had come quickly. Reynolds's division had been caught by it while changing position, and the rear brigade detained and badly beaten. Let us follow the other brigades of this division, even if we anticipate a little. Reynolds led them, as directed, to the north of the turnpike and in rear of Sigel, now in line. He continued over difficult ground until he reached the left of Heintzelman's corps, which was already formed behind Hatch's division and a part of Porter's corps. Here the retreating masses of the broken columns¹ were mingling with Heintzelman's troops and producing confusion. Finding himself "perfectly out of place,"² as soon as he could extricate his troops from the confusion, Reynolds moved, by Pope's order, "to a position to the right of the Henry house,"³ where we shall hear of him a little later.

To return to McLean and Tower.⁴ With these three brigades and the remains of Jackson's brigade of Reynolds's division, Schenck made a gallant attempt to hold the Bald Hill. But he was soon attacked in front and flank. Kemper's brigades (Jenkins and Hinton in front and Corse supporting them) promptly assailed his flank, while R. H. Anderson, replacing Hood and Stevens, attacked in front. Schenck placed McLean to the left to receive the flank attack, and for a few minutes held Kemper's advance at bay. But the respite was brief. R. H. Anderson pressed vigorously in front, Kemper sent forward Corse to add to the force of his assault,⁵ and the Federal lines were driven back, and Generals Schenck and Tower were both borne disabled from the field. Colonel Fletcher Webster⁶ (12th Massachusetts) fell mortally wounded. The determination of the Confederates beat down all resistance. The top of Bald Hill was in their possession.

¹ Reynolds's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 394.

² Reynolds's report, *Ib.* p. 395.

³ Reynolds's report, *Ib.* p. 395.

⁴ Tower commanded two brigades, the 2d and 3d, of Ricketts's division.

⁵ Of Corse's brigade, Colonel W. T. Patton, Lieutenant-Colonel C. C. Flowerree, Lieutenant-Colonel M. Marye, and Major A. A. Swindler were severely wounded. (*Ib.* p. 626.)

⁶ Son of Daniel Webster.

While Schenck was sorely pressed, Sigel had sent Milroy's brigade to his assistance, but this officer took his troops to the left and rear, between the Bald Hill and the Henry house hill, and only one of his regiments¹ went up the Bald Hill to succor McLean. A little later, seeing that Schenck was losing ground, Sigel sent one of Stahel's regiments (41st New York) to his assistance, and at the same time ordered Colonel Koltes with his brigade to the same point. These troops made a brave effort to turn the tide of battle and regain the crest of the Bald Hill, but they were borne back by the resistless force of the Confederate advance, as was also Krzyzanowski's brigade, which General Schurz sent to reinforce them. During this last struggle for Bald Hill two of D. R. Jones's brigades² reached the field, and while the greater part of his troops moved to the right of the Chinn house so as to attack the forces gathering on the Henry house hill, the left regiment of Toombs's brigade (20th Georgia, under Colonel Benning) passed to the left of the Chinn house and participated in the last charge, by which Schurz's troops were driven from the Bald Hill ridge.³ No farther attempt was made to dispute with the Confederates the possession of Bald Hill.

While these events had been taking place on Bald Hill, Law's brigade of Hood's division had advanced down the turnpike, and had attacked Stahel's brigade, drawn up at the Dogan house on the north side of that road. The contest here was not long nor sharp; for the loss of the Bald Hill soon exposed the flank of all the troops in front of the Sudley and New Market road, and Sigel ordered Stahel, as well as the remainder of his corps, to fall back to the heights in rear of the Stone house (Buck Hill).

At this time the Federal army had been driven from all the positions it had held at the opening of the battle, for, as we

¹ 5th Virginia, Colonel Zeigler. (Chesebrough's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 282.)

² Toombs's brigade under Colonel Benning, and G. T. Anderson's brigade.

³ D. R. Jones's 3d brigade (Drayton's) had been ordered to support Rosser, who was guarding the Confederate flank with two batteries and some cavalry, and who, observing some Federal movements about Manassas, detained Drayton until late in the afternoon.

shall see when we come to describe the movements north of the turnpike, Longstreet's advance was paralleled by Jackson's. Many commands had suffered fearful losses, some of them were virtually disorganized and incapable of offering farther resistance. But Pope's army was composed of troops trained to war by the experiences of the Peninsula and of the Valley, the mass of them were veterans, and the behavior of the men in the face of thickening disaster was in large part creditable. Though driven from successive positions, many of them quickly rallied and renewed the battle. Let us continue, for the sake of unity, to follow the fortunes of the day on Longstreet's front. The leading officers of the Federal army spared no efforts to check defeat. General McDowell, in command of the larger part of the Federal troops engaged, had, from the time of Porter's repulse and the beginning of Longstreet's advance, seen the absolute necessity of preventing the Confederates from so turning the left as to seize the turnpike in his rear, and had bent his best efforts to effecting this. He had repaired promptly to the Henry Hill, the strongest position in rear of the Federal left, and after sending Tower forward to aid the troops then holding the Bald Hill in front, had turned his attention to securing the Henry Hill. For in a brief time it was evident that the Confederates were gaining ground in front, while their right (the cavalry of Rosser and Robertson,¹ followed by D. R. Jones's division), having swept across the Bald Hill ridge, was already on that one which led towards the Henry house. The first Federal troops to be had were Chapman's brigade of Sykes's division, which had come back in good order from the scene of Porter's repulse, and McDowell sent them into the timber to the south of the Henry house. They arrived none too soon, for they became quickly engaged with the advancing Confederates, and succeeded for a time in holding them at bay. Reynolds with Meade's and Seymour's brigades were the next troops to reach

¹ Stuart had on the right Robertson's brigade (7th, 12th, 2d, 6th Virginia regiments of cavalry), and also Rosser's 5th Virginia. Rosser himself was now in charge of three batteries of artillery (Ryan's, Eshleman's, and Richardson's). These batteries took position about the Wheeler house, and from that point opened fire on the Henry Hill.

the plateau around the Henry house, and McDowell sent them to continue the Federal line on Chapman's right. Still farther to the right and on the slope of the Henry Hill which faced the Bald Hill ridge was Milroy's brigade.¹ When the Confederates had carried the Bald Hill and the pressure increased upon the Henry Hill, other Federal troops were brought up. Buchanan's brigade of regulars, with the remnants of other commands, was drawn up as a second line, with its right resting on the Henry house and facing towards the southwest, and Reno's division was placed about the Henry house. Severe and bloody was the struggle maintained by Chapman and Reynolds and their supports in the woods to the southwest of the Henry house, with D. R. Jones and part of R. H. Anderson's division and Rosser's batteries. The Confederates were flushed with victory, but they were exhausted by their already long advance and severe exertions. The brigades in their front had not been heavily engaged so far, and they comprised some of the best troops in the Federal army. Chapman and Reynolds kept up a spirited contest and held the woods tenaciously for a time, but were ultimately forced to yield. Chapman says the 9th New York regiment on his left "retired," exclaiming "It is too hot!" while another regiment left his right exposed before he ordered a retreat. He yielded his part of the field and fell back six hundred yards. As he was doing this, Buchanan's brigade was going forward to relieve Meade and Seymour on his right, who were also unable longer to resist the force of the Confederate assault. Buchanan took up the fight, and with great courage for a time breasted the storm. Colonel G. T. Anderson says that after the first Federal lines had been driven back, "a fresh brigade (Buchanan's) was soon brought up, and the fight resumed with all its intensity, but the men and officers stood to their posts under the most murderous fire I ever witnessed, with the resolve to fall rather than yield. Fresh troops coming up soon after, the enemy were again and finally driven from the field." Colonel Buchanan says, "At length I found the contest too unequal, my command was being cut to pieces, and

¹ Milroy was along the Sudley road in front of the Henry house, the sunken road affording protection to his men.

the ammunition of the men nearly expended. I was forced to give the order to retire." The cost of this struggle to the Confederates is indicated by the severe losses in G. T. Anderson's and Toombs's brigades. In the former brigade of five regiments but one field officer was untouched.¹

While his two brigades were heavily engaged, D. R. Jones had used every effort to bring up Drayton to extend the Confederate right and thus turn the left of the troops opposed to him. Drayton had been detached some hours before, because of a report of Rosser (whose cavalry had been observing the enemy in the direction of Bristoe and Manassas) that an attack on the Confederate extreme right was threatened,² and was too far from the battlefield to reach it in time to be of much use. It was already dusk when Drayton arrived, and the Federals withdrew and the firing ceased soon after. The vigorous resistance which had been made to Jones, and the darkness, prevented the Confederates from following up the troops of Reynolds and Sykes when they had been driven back towards the Henry house. R. H. Anderson's division³ was on Jones's left. It had aided Kemper in clearing the Bald Hill, and had then advanced against Reynolds and Milroy. The latter had not gotten up to the Bald Hill to aid McLean, but had placed his brigade in the rear along the Sudley road.⁴ Milroy gives

¹ Colonel G. T. Anderson's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 595. He commanded D. R. Jones's old brigade, while Jones now commanded the three brigades of Toombs, Anderson, and Drayton. See Buchanan's report, *Ib.* p. 488.

² Banks's corps was at Bristoe, and on August 30, "between ten and eleven o'clock in the morning, General Greene marched his whole division (Augur's) to Manassas Junction, and remained there until about two P. M., when he returned to Bristoe." (Gordon's *Army of Virginia*, p. 415.) It was this movement, no doubt, which occupied Rosser's attention and caused Drayton to be held back.

³ Anderson's division contained the brigades of Mahone, Wright, and Armistead. The two former seem to have been actively engaged, while Armistead was kept in reserve. The losses reported in Armistead's brigade in the report of Dr. Guild (Medical Director, Army of Northern Virginia) were but twenty.

⁴ Milroy says his left rested at the "woods in which the battle was raging." These were the woods to the southwest of the Henry house, and this position brought Milroy to the right and rear of Reynolds.

a frantic account of his fight at this point. The result was, however, that "shortly after sunset," as he states it, he ordered his brigade "back some one half of a mile to replenish their ammunition boxes and then await further orders,"¹ while he thenceforth seems to have devoted himself to everybody else's business except his own.² The driving of Milroy was soon followed by the yielding of Reynolds and Sykes. Meantime Reno's division had been drawn up near the Henry house, and in the deepening twilight was presenting a front towards the Confederates, — the best organized Federal line that held the Henry Hill. On the Confederate side Wilcox's brigade had some time before been ordered from the north side of the turnpike, where it was participating in Jackson's advance to reinforce Hood. Wilcox had made his way across the enemy's front at the Dogan house, and, guided by the firing, had reached the Bald Hill near dusk.³ Here they came in view of Reno's troops in front of the Henry house. The latter fired two volleys at them, though five hundred yards distant.⁴ Heavy firing was still going on in the timber on Wilcox's right, where Wright and Toombs⁵ had been engaged with the Federals. Wilcox put his men in here, taking the precaution to avoid firing into the Confederates, and it was with his assistance that Buchanan's brigade and the other Federal troops were driven from this part of the field. The darkness of the night, in which it was impossible to distinguish friend from foe, and the show of resistance which Reno had made about the Henry house, no doubt caused Wilcox to cease the pursuit when the Federals had been driven from the woods. Wilcox "bivouacked at this point of the field, which was the most advanced point reached by our (Confederate) infantry, and near the hill where Bee and Bartow fell on July 21, 1861."⁶

¹ Milroy's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 322.

² See statements of McDowell, Buchanan, and others as to the mad antics of General Milroy. (*Ib.* pp. 342, 363, 364.)

³ Wilcox says "late sundown." (*Ib.* p. 600.)

⁴ Wilcox's report, *Ib.* p. 600.

⁵ Wright's brigade of R. H. Anderson's division, Toombs's brigade of D. R. Jones's.

⁶ The Henry Hill, a little to the southeast of the Henry house. (Wilcox's report, *Ib.* p. 601.)

It was after eight o'clock,¹ and night had set in, when the firing ceased and the strife on this part of the field ended. The Federal troops were now crowded in much confusion on the plateau about the Henry house, and between that and the Robinson house. For hours a stream of stragglers and fugitives had been making their way across the Stone Bridge towards Centreville,² and disintegration was making steady progress in the whole left and centre of the Federal army. At dusk Pope ordered a general retreat, and directed McDowell to take such portions of his corps as he might find intact, and proceed with them to take position covering the bridges over Bull Run and Cub Run.³ Thus the Federal army was making its way in such order as was possible towards the crossing of Bull Run, when the last fighting was going on to the south and west of the Henry house. Had an hour or more of daylight or a few fresh brigades remained to Longstreet, it is difficult to see how the left of the Federal army could have been saved from overwhelming disaster. The Federal troops about the Henry house were in no condition to withstand a vigorous charge, and this hill once fully in possession of the Confederates, their guns would have swept the turnpike and the approaches to the Stone Bridge. As it was, McDowell withdrew in much confusion and disorder across Bull Run, but his retreat was for the most part unmolested. He sent up Gibbon's brigade, which he found on the turnpike, to hold the ground about the Henry house until all the Federal troops had withdrawn. Gibbons remained for some two hours after dark, but was not disturbed,⁴ and then followed the army across Bull Run.

¹ Wilcox says 8.30. (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 600.)

² See General Franklin's report, *Ib.* p. 536.

³ McDowell's report, *Ib.* p. 343. McDowell says he received this order about seven P. M.

⁴ There is much confusion and some conflict in the Federal reports, about the movements of the left of their army in this retreat. Schurz says that shortly before six P. M. he was ordered to send a brigade to Milroy's assistance, and sent Schimmelfennig. The latter found Milroy already driven from the field, but finding Generals Sykes and Reno near the place which had been indicated to him, formed on the right of General Sykes, ready to take part in the action whenever it became advisable. He does

To avoid confusion, we have thus followed up Lee's attack upon the Federal left wing, south of the turnpike, from four o'clock until night ended the struggle. It is time now to describe what was doing on Jackson's front north of the turnpike, while Pope's left was crumbling to pieces under the blows of Longstreet. It will be remembered that the first Confederate troops north of the turnpike and extending over to the old railroad were the three brigades under Wilcox.¹ These troops were in support of the mass of artillery which had been placed at the centre of the Confederate line and had played such havoc with Porter. Featherston was on the left, joining Jackson on the railroad, Pryor nearer the turnpike, Wilcox's old brigade in reserve behind the two. Wilcox had a fine view of Porter's charge on his left, and as soon as he saw that Porter's second and third lines could not reach the first, because of the fearful fire of Confederate artillery which swept the field, he ordered his troops forward to give the *coup de grace*. Some brief delay occurred,² but as Porter's broken

not seem to have become engaged. Schurz's other brigades had suffered so much that they were sent to the rear. Schurz was ordered to withdraw Schimmelfennig and to retreat across Young's Branch at eight P. M., and about nine P. M. he took position with the remainder of Sigel's corps on the hilly ground between Young's Branch and Bull Run, where he remained two hours, and then, "after all other troops had passed," crossed the Stone Bridge between eleven and twelve o'clock. (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 302.) This statement of Schurz is confirmed by General Heintzelman, who says that after Ricketts had been driven (after dark) from the Carter house, he found Colonel McLean (of Sigel's corps) drawn up a mile in the rear and covering the retreat across Bull Run. (Heintzelman's report, *Ib.* p. 414.)

¹ Featherston's, Wilcox's, and Pryor's own brigades.

² Wilcox says he ordered Featherston to charge while Porter's front line was still fighting at close quarters along the railroad cut, but that Featherston did not actually advance until "the front line of the enemy, sadly thinned by the close fire of Jackson's men behind the railroad bank, broke and fell back with great precipitancy and disorder, followed by a portion of Jackson's troops." (Wilcox's report, *Ib.* p. 599.) General Featherston says, "As soon as the retreat commenced, our troops were ordered to advance. One of General Jackson's brigades advanced on our left, and my brigade, General Wilcox's, and General Pryor's moved forward in line of battle on its right." (Featherston's report, *Ib.* p. 603.)

and bleeding lines fell back into the woods from which they had advanced, Featherston and Pryor sprang forward, and, in conjunction with the men of Starke's division, who had borne the brunt of the attack, followed up the beaten Federals. Wilcox says: "The fleeing enemy, under cover of the woods, endeavored to reform and contest the field with us, but our men, inspirited with their success, eagerly marched forward, scarcely halting to deliver their fire. The Federals are forced to continue their retreat. The woods through which the enemy fled (some 600 or 700 yards wide¹) are at length crossed, and a second field, three quarters of a mile wide, is in our front."² The Confederate artillery had advanced with the infantry, and contributed, by the vigorous fire it poured into the woods and fields beyond, to prevent any successful attempt by the Federals to make a stand at this point.

At the eastern side of this wood Wilcox stopped to take breath and reform, his men somewhat protected by a rise in the ground from the artillery fire that swept the field in their front. This fire proceeded from the batteries that Sigel had placed near the Dogan house, which were now on Wilcox's flank, as well as from those in front of Wilcox near the road from the Stone house to Sudley, where, under cover of Hooker's division, Hatch was reforming. Sykes, too, when driven from the first wood (which he had held in support of Butterfield) by the advancing Confederates, had fallen back in good order to the high ground along the Sudley road, carrying with him Weed's, Smead's, and Randol's batteries, and here he turned at bay for a time, until relieved by Heintzelman and ordered to the Henry Hill.³

¹ This was probably too much. The width is probably not over 500 yards.

² Wilcox's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 599.

³ Morell's division of Porter's corps was so disorganized by its fearful repulse at the railroad that it was useless for farther offense, and the remnants of it were taken by General Butterfield to the rear. Sykes says he fell back from the woods in good order. He continues: "I suggested to General Porter that my troops should occupy the plateau of the Henry and Robinson houses beyond Young's Run, and endeavor to hold it against the oncoming foe. Naturally it was the strongest position on the field. He acquiesced in my suggestion." (Sykes's report, *Ib.* p. 482.)

It was while Wilcox was resting along the eastern side of this wood ¹ that he received an order to take his own brigade to the south side of the turnpike to the support of Hood. He began at once the march of two miles or more, in which he had to make détours to avoid the artillery fire of both sides, and finally reached the woods between the Chinn and Henry houses in time, as we have seen, to take part in the final advance of the Confederates at that point. Featherston was left in charge of his own and Pryor's brigades, and in a short time Thomas's, Archer's, and Pender's brigades of A. P. Hill's division,² having advanced promptly after the repulse of Hatch, came up to his assistance.³ A line of battle was now formed, Featherston going to the left, and taking position there to outflank the Federal line, if possible, while Archer, Pender, and Pryor, in order, took position on his right. Thomas's brigade and one of Pryor's regiments were held in reserve, while Starke's division supported the movement. The field beyond the little rise near the woods, which afforded the shelter under which the Confederates formed, declined a little and then rose to the Sudley and New Market road. Towards Sudley this road ran through the wood in front of the centre of the Confederate line. There was wood only on the east side of the road. Farther to the Confederate right the country was open on both sides of the road.⁴ As soon as the Confederate line was formed, an advance was ordered. General

¹ That wood, from the west side of which Porter had advanced to his attack.

² A. P. Hill had anticipated Jackson's order for a general advance of his lines by sending these brigades and Branch's to the front to follow up the retreating enemy. Branch was on the left and rear, and did not become engaged. Gregg's and Strong's (Stafford's) brigades were retained to guard Hill's extreme left. (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 671.)

³ Featherston's line of march had been almost parallel to Jackson's front along the railroad, and in this way he had approached the part of the line held by A. P. Hill. Lawton's division was of course nearer to him than Hill, but Lawton, it seems, had not yet received orders to advance, and Featherston and these brigades of Hill, thus met, formed line in front of Lawton. Hill's troops, in following Hatch, had bent towards the right.

⁴ This road, the New Market and Sudley, is sometimes called the Manassas and Sudley road.

Featherston says: "The whole line moved forward in rapid and gallant style. The enemy fled after the first well-directed fire."¹ General Archer says: "I advanced . . . into the open field beyond, where the enemy's battalions were posted. One battery of six guns was posted about 300 yards distant from the point where we entered the open field and a little to the left of the direction of my advance. I moved on in the same direction until about half that distance was passed, then swung around to the left, and marched in double quick directly on the battery. My troops never for a moment halted in their gallant charge, although exposed to the fire of two other batteries, besides the constant fire of the one we were charging and of its infantry supports. The enemy stood to his guns and continued to fire upon us until we were within seventy-five yards, when he abandoned three of his pieces, which fell into the hands of my brigade on the same spot where they had been served so bravely. General Pender overtook and captured the other three pieces. I left the pieces I had captured to be taken care of by whomsoever might come after me, and pushed on without halt against the infantry, who still made a feeble resistance in the edge of the wood. They did not await our coming, but had retreated out of sight by the time I entered the wood."²

It is evident that the Federal artillery was well served in the effort to hold this second line, but it is no less evident that it was but feebly supported. Heintzelman's efforts with the right wing of the Federal army to retrieve the day or stem the progress of disaster were but faint and ineffectual. His corps had suffered heavily in the battle of the 29th, and in the aggressive movement made on his line early in the afternoon. Heintzelman had, as we have seen, used only the two brigades under Ricketts which had been sent to report to him. After Ricketts's repulse, Heintzelman had remained inactive during the attack of Porter and Hatch, and upon their defeat did little to retard the Confederate advance. Kearny, Ste-

¹ Featherston's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 603.

² *Ib.* p. 701. In this advance of Archer's, Colonel W. A. Forbes, 14th Tennessee, was mortally wounded.

vens, and Ricketts appear not to have seriously participated in the struggle to hold the Federal position along the Sudley road. Portions of Hooker's division¹ united with the reserves of Hatch's division and with Sykes for a time² in the attempt to hold this line. General Heintzelman says: "I was directed to retire and hold successive positions. General Hooker's division was ordered by General Pope to the left about dark, and I lost sight of it until after the whole army was in retreat, when I overtook it on the road beyond the Stone Bridge. We fell back to the Weir house³ (I believe) used as a hospital, and there established a new line of battle. I sent General Kearny's division to the left to close a gap between my left and the main body of the army, keeping General Stevens's and Ricketts's troops to hold the right."⁴

This last position about the Carter house, where Heintzelman made a stand, was three quarters of a mile in rear of the Sudley road. His right was on the open high ground near

¹ Grover's brigade had been so badly used up the day before that it was sent to the rear on the evening of the 29th, and was not engaged at all on the 30th. Carr reports that he supplied a battery on the left until ordered to march to Centreville at seven P. M. (Carr's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 455.) Regiments of Taylor's brigade seem to have been occupied in supporting batteries, but not to have been heavily engaged.

² Sykes's brigades were withdrawn before sundown and sent to the Henry Hill.

³ Pottsylvania or the Carter house. There was no other house on this part of the field. This house is called by so many names in the various reports that it has led to much confusion in the minds of many historians of the battle, General G. H. Gordon, for instance. The large estate which covered all this part of the battlefield was called Pottsylvania, and had belonged to Mr. Landon C. Carter, some of whose children then owned it. The house was large and of wood, but was painted nearly the color of brick, and hence the reference to it as the brown house, from which arose the error of calling it the Brown house. It is erroneously spoken of in some reports as the Weir house (as above) and the Lewis house. The latter house is on an entirely different part of the field, to the southeast of the Henry house. The Carter house was used as a hospital in both the first and second battles of Manassas, and was burned by the Federal army in the fall of 1862.

⁴ Heintzelman's report, *Ib.* pp. 413, 414.

the Carter house, while Kearny was sent into the woods and low grounds¹ stretching away in the direction of Buck Hill, towards which Hatch and Hooker had fallen back, where the centre of the Federal army, though greatly disordered and demoralized, still rested.

When the Confederates had driven the Federals from their position along the Sudley and New Market road and captured their guns, they halted in the woods at that point to reform, and to make their dispositions for attack on the third position, which they now discovered the Federals to have taken about the Carter house. In marching through this wood Pender and Archer exchanged places, Archer taking the right. Thomas's brigade, which had constituted the reserve, was sent to the left along the Sudley and New Market road to guard that flank of the Confederate line, while the main body² moved forward. Following the high and open ground, the Confederate advance brought them against Stevens's and Ricketts's troops at the Carter house, and not against Kearny, who was in the woods to the right of the Confederates. It was already night. General Archer says: "A little after dark, we encountered in the field to the left of the house a body of the enemy's infantry, whose numbers we could not ascertain for the darkness of the night, and with whom, after they had to our challenge answered 'For the Union,' we exchanged a single volley and then drove them from the field."³ General Heintzelman says: "I sent my artillery to the rear . . . as it was too dark to use it with effect," and "somewhat later the enemy (the Confederates) attacked General Ricketts's troops, and they gave way."⁴

¹ These low grounds are those about the heads of some small tributaries of Young's Branch. Birney's and Robinson's brigades were sent here. Poe's brigade was on the extreme Federal right stretching to Bull Run, and at this time was being driven across that stream by the Confederate cavalry and artillery.

² Featherston's, Pender's, Archer's, and Pryor's brigades.

³ Archer's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 701. General Featherston says when the Confederate lines advanced "the enemy fled precipitately, doing us no injury except with their artillery, scarcely returning the fire of our infantry." (Featherston's report, *Ib.* p. 604.)

⁴ Heintzelman's report, *Ib.* p. 414. General Robinson (one of Kearny's

Here the Confederates stopped. "Having driven them (the Federals) from their position, any further movement was prevented by the darkness of the night."¹ The advance of Jackson's troops rested about the Carter house, and the broken masses of the Federal army were allowed to make their way as best they could across Bull Run to Centreville. On Jackson's wing, as on Longstreet's, night was a godsend to Pope's army. Another hour of daylight, and it is doubtful if any organized opposition would have remained to Jackson's progress; and the two wings of the Confederate forces approaching the turnpike and the Stone Bridge from opposite quarters must have overwhelmed large portions of the Federal army.

It only remains to narrate the movements of the cavalry on both the Confederate flanks. Near Sudley was Fitz Lee's brigade, resting after its severe trip to Burke's Station, and not seriously engaged. Patrick's cavalry battalion, which had been engaged the day before, continued to guard the Confederate flank between the infantry lines and Bull Run, and Lieutenant D. R. Barton, with five guns,² was thrown out on the same flank. These troops had followed up the Federals in the afternoon, skirmishing with Poe's brigade as it retreated. The latter halted but a short time on the right of the Federal line at the Carter house, and then fell back four hundred yards farther. Here Barton obtained a fire upon the enemy's right and rear, and Poe retreated, without farther stand, towards Locke's ford³ on Bull Run, at which he crossed at

brigadiers), who was in front and to the Federal left of the Carter house and in the low ground, says: "A straggling musketry fire was heard from there (the Carter house hill), and I supposed the enemy was repulsed. It was now dark, and I was surprised to learn soon after that our troops had left the hill in possession of the enemy. I used every precaution to conceal from him the knowledge of my position, and although within speaking distance I remained there until about ten o'clock, when I withdrew my brigade silently and in perfect order." (Robinson's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 422.)

¹ Featherston's report, *Ib.* p. 604.

² Lieutenant Barton was in command of Cutshaw's battery. He had his own guns and some others temporarily assigned to him. This modest gentleman and gallant officer was subsequently killed at Fredericksburg, December 13, 1862.

³ Poplar ford in old maps.

dusk. While crossing, he repulsed a charge of Patrick's cavalry. Poe attempted to form line of battle on the east side of the Run, but finding everything in confusion there, moved on to Centreville.¹

On the Confederate right flank Stuart had placed Robertson's brigade² and Rosser's regiment.³ Under Rosser, a former artillery officer, had been placed four batteries.⁴ Stuart directed the cavalry operations on this flank in person, throwing forward his forces as Longstreet swept in, and keeping Rosser and the artillery well in front, so as to enfilade the Federal lines. Rosser took position about the Wheeler house, and kept up a vigorous artillery fire on the Federals in the direction of the Henry Hill. Rogers's battery repulsed with canister a charge made upon it, while Eshleman was actively engaged as far to the front as the Conrad house. Richardson was posted farther to the left near the Chinn house, and these aided D. R. Jones's troops most materially in holding a battery of Napoleon's which they had captured. Richardson finally turned the captured guns upon their late owners, and at night brought them from the field.⁵

Meantime, the 2d Virginia regiment (Colonel Munford) was thrown forward towards Bull Run. Near the Lewis house he became engaged with the advance of Buford's cavalry brigade, the main body of which was under the hill near Lewis's ford. Buford advanced and Munford charged. A severe fight followed for a few minutes, Buford driving the 2d Virginia back. Very soon, however, General Robertson sent forward the 7th and 12th Virginia to assist Munford, and the tide was quickly turned. Buford retreated precipitately, followed by the three regiments of Robertson's brigade, who pushed him across

¹ Poe's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 435. Poe had evidently yielded his position on the Federal right flank before the final attack upon Ricketts and Stevens at the Carter house, and this no doubt contributed to the feeble resistance made by them.

² 2d, 6th, 7th, 12th Virginia, and 17th Virginia battalion.

³ 5th Virginia.

⁴ Rogers's, Stribling's, Eshleman's, and Richardson's.

⁵ Colonel Walton's report, *Ib.* p. 571.

Bull Run at Lewis's ford. The 7th and 12th¹ crossed after Buford, and continued the pursuit to the vicinity of the turnpike. Colonel Brodhead of 1st Michigan was killed,² and Buford lost over 300 prisoners. The Confederate loss in this cavalry fight was five killed and forty wounded. These regiments of Robertson's were the only Confederate forces which crossed Bull Run on the evening of the 30th, and the darkness soon put an end to their operations.

¹ 7th Virginia, under Colonel W. E. Jones ; 12th, under Colonel A. W. Harman.

² By Lieutenant Lewis Harman, Adjutant 12th Virginia.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

THE SECOND MANASSAS. — NUMBERS. — LOSSES. — RESULTS.

NIGHT had at last settled down over the bloody field. The left of the Confederate army was at the Carter house, more than a mile in front of its position at midday, with its cavalry extending to Locke's ford on Bull Run; the right had advanced more than two miles, and was in the woods south of the Henry house, with cavalry extending to and even beyond Lewis ford on Bull Run. The Confederate lines then constituted an immense V, with its vertex near the Dogan house on the turnpike, and the arms on either side stretching to Bull Run. Embraced in its arms were such portions of the Federal army as had not already crossed Bull Run in retreat, and had not melted away in the stream of fugitives and stragglers which had for hours been filling all the roads that led to Centreville. General Franklin had been marching all day with the 6th corps to join Pope. He arrived from Centreville near Bull Run at six P. M. At that hour he found that the road was filled with fleeing men, artillery, and wagons, all leaving the field in a panic. It was a scene of terrible confusion, and he immediately formed line of battle across the road and attempted to stop and form the stragglers. It was impossible to succeed in this, the number becoming over 7000 in less than half an hour. The number continued to increase until he left the position, and fell back to Centreville.¹ It is evident that only the tenacity with which

¹ Franklin's dispatch to Halleck at 8.15 on August 30. (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 536.) This statement, as well as the report of General Schurz, gives a very different picture of the retreat of the Federal army to Centreville from that given by Mr. Ropes in his *Army under Pope*, p. 41. He says of the battle: "It was a severe defeat for General Pope, but it was nothing else. It was not a rout, nor anything like a rout. The army retired under orders, and though, of course, there were many stragglers, it retreated in good order."

McDowell protracted the contest in front of the Henry Hill until dark had saved the whole Federal army from rout. The friendly darkness prevented farther efforts on the part of the exhausted Confederates, and the broken and disordered commands of the Federal army, which had been driven from both flanks towards the Stone Bridge, now made their way as rapidly as possible across Bull Run at that point and the adjacent fords. McDowell left Kane's battalion to guard the bridge and destroy it when all had passed, and by midnight the whole of Pope's army was on the eastern side of Bull Run.

It is impossible to tell with accuracy the losses of the Federal army on August 30. General Lee says: "In the series of engagements on the plains of Manassas, more than 7000 prisoners were taken, in addition to about 2000 wounded, left in our hands. Thirty pieces of artillery, upwards of 20,000 stand of small arms, numerous colors, and a large amount of stores, besides those taken by General Jackson at Manassas Junction, were captured."¹ Pope says he cannot get at his losses of the 30th because the subordinate reports cover the losses of the entire campaign. There are some facts which indicate its severity.² Pope estimated his available forces on August 26, in a dispatch to Porter, as follows:—

¹ *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 558. Mr. Ropes doubts whether General Lee is correct about the guns and prisoners from the fact that Jackson claims only eight guns as captured on the 30th and Longstreet three batteries (eighteen guns?). On the 29th, there were at least two guns captured on Jackson's front and one taken by Hood at dark near the turnpike, left on the field, which fell into his possession when he advanced next day. There is no ground to doubt General Lee's statement about the prisoners who were paroled and released at the time. General Lee claims 20,000 stand of arms collected from the field, while Jackson claims 6250 and Longstreet 12,000. This discrepancy is no doubt due to the other reports, which have been lost, of arms collected by officers and not reporting through Longstreet or Jackson.

² Pope dispatched Halleck at 9.45 p. m. August 30, as follows (*Ib.* pp. 78, 79):—

"We have had a terrific battle again to-day. The enemy, largely reinforced, assaulted our position early to-day. We held our ground firmly until six o'clock p. m., when the enemy, massing very heavy forces on our left, forced back that wing about half a mile. At dark we held that position. Under all the circumstances, both horses and men having been two

McDowell, Sigel, and Reynolds at	34,000
Reno	8000
Banks	6000

If we add Heintzelman 10,500 and Porter 10,000, we obtain a total of 68,500. To this is to be added what cavalry he had. Banks is understated, for his official return for August shows he had 8800 instead of 6000. Thus it is plain that General Pope, the day before the battle began, had over 70,000 men.¹ On September 2, Pope put his then available force, including the 19,000 under Sumner and Franklin which had joined him after the battle, at "less than 60,000 men,"² but in his report³ he sums up his strength at 62,000 at that time. Thus, deducting Sumner and Franklin, there were, of the army that had been defeated at Manassas, from 40,000 to 43,000 men with their colors two days afterwards.⁴ Hence Pope's losses on the 27th, 28th, 29th, and 30th of August must have aggregated 30,000 men. The Federal losses before the 30th could hardly have exceeded 10,000 to 12,000 men,⁵ which would leave the loss on that day 18,000 to 20,000. Included

days without food, and the enemy greatly outnumbering us, I thought it best to move back to this place at dark. The movement has been made in perfect order and without loss. The troops are in good heart, and marched off the field without the least hurry or confusion. Their conduct was very fine.

"The battle was most furious for hours without cessation, and the losses on both sides very heavy. The enemy is badly whipped, and we shall do well enough. Do not be uneasy. We will hold our own here. The labors and hardships of the army for two or three weeks have been beyond description. We have delayed the enemy as long as possible without losing the army. We have damaged him heavily, and I think the army entitled to the gratitude of the country. Be easy ; everything will go well.

"JOHN POPE, *Major-General.*"

¹ Porter's Statement, ed. 1878, p. 14.

² Dispatch to Halleck, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 87.

³ *Ib.* p. 44.

⁴ It is impossible to say how accurate either General Pope's dispatch or his report is on this point. In his report he puts Banks at 5000, when he had 8800, and Porter at 10,000, when he had only 7356. (Porter's return, September 1.)

⁵ Pope puts those of the 29th at 8000.

in this loss, however, were, no doubt, many stragglers who rejoined their commands after September 1.

The Confederate losses were, in Jackson's command, 3501, and in Longstreet's (including R. H. Anderson), 3743; or 7244 in the infantry and artillery of the whole army. Stuart lost about 50 in the cavalry. Porter says the Federals had about 400 prisoners captured from the Confederates. The Confederate loss was thus under 8000.¹ The hard marching, insufficient and improper food, and severe fighting of the Confederate army told on its strength beyond the official report of casualties. This was seen in the large number of sick and stragglers which so depleted Lee's ranks at Sharpsburg.

As to the conduct of the battle, history can have but one verdict. In no other of his great battles do the skill and good judgment of the Confederate leader show to better advantage than in that of the 30th of August. Keeping his army in hand upon the field that had been well selected by Jackson, Lee patiently waited for the Federal army to waste its strength in an assault upon his strong position. In this way he neutralized the disparity of force which was against him. As soon as Porter was repulsed, while the Federals were yet reeling under the rebound, he threw forward his whole army and attacked with vigor. In the three hours of daylight that remained, he inflicted a fearful defeat upon Pope, driving the Federal army in confusion and dismay across Bull Run. The question has been raised, whether a supreme effort by the Confederates at dark, when they had driven Buchanan and Reynolds from the woods south of the Henry house, might not have swept away all organized resistance from the plateau about the Henry and Robinson houses, and have thus driven them across to the turnpike. Had such an attempt been successfully made, it would

¹ Mr. Ropes again falls into error by assuming that Jackson's entire loss of 4387 from the Rappahannock to the Potomac was incurred on August 28, 29, and 30. The reports of Ewell's division show that it lost 45 men at the Rappahannock, and 200 on August 26 and 27 at Bristoe, and 200 on September 2, or 445 in combats other than those known as the second battle of Manassas. A. P. Hill lost 306 at Ox Hill September 1, and a few on the Rappahannock. The reports of the other divisions, if in existence, would no doubt make up the entire difference between 4387 and 3501.

undoubtedly have added very largely to the spoils of the victors. The attempt seemed injudicious to General Lee in the darkness and confusion of the field, and it is impossible to say, even now, with all the facts before us, that the difficulties in the way of such a night attack could have been overcome.¹ On the other hand, the movements of the Federal commander on this day have been severely criticised, and justly so. General Pope, after having permitted an inferior force to dislodge him by strategy from the Rappahannock, had lost on the 28th his only opportunity of throwing the mass of his forces upon a divided enemy, and had exhausted his men by useless and tiresome marches. He resolutely refused to be convinced of the arrival of General Lee with Longstreet's troops, although he knew that Ricketts had retired before Longstreet from Thoroughfare Gap in the evening of the 28th. He would not believe that any considerable body of troops was south of the turnpike threatening his left, and therefore took but slender precautions to protect that flank. He attacked at a point where the field was swept by the Confederate artillery. These mistakes were but the consequences of the tremendous blunder in his conception of the general situation. His notion that he had beaten Jackson the day before, and had only to follow a flying enemy, was ludicrously erroneous. This led to his ill-considered assault and subsequent defeat. Twenty thousand fresh and veteran Federal troops were within half a day's march. Though he no doubt was confident in the superiority of the force he possessed without this addition, it was the plain dictate of common sense to unite these troops with his army before fighting a pitched battle. The thing above all others that Lee wanted was a battle, before any farther additions from McClellan's army could join Pope, and Pope gave his adversary exactly what he wanted. During the 30th, he allowed Banks to remain idle with 8800 men at Bristoe and Manassas to guard supplies which were all sacrificed by defeat. This strong body should have been brought to his left, where it might have given material aid to that sorely pressed wing of

¹ Stuart was anxious for such a movement. (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 737.)

his army. The only order sent to Banks was at 6.30 p. m., when the fate of the day had been decided. This order directed him to destroy all the public and railroad property at Bristoe and fall back with the trains upon Centreville at once,¹ by way of Brentsville. The order did not reach Banks until next morning, but it was then followed by a prompt destruction or abandonment of everything and a precipitate flight.²

¹ The order was as follows : "Destroy the public property at Bristoe, and fall back upon Centreville at once. Destroy all the railroad property. Your troops at Bristoe will withdraw through Brentsville. Your troops at Manassas and between there and Bristoe will withdraw to Centreville." (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 78.)

² General G. H. Gordon, commanding one of Banks's brigades, says : "The rain had fallen in torrents ; and the men had passed the night without shelter. The troops of Banks's corps were both dismal and hungry, but until the verbal order came for the destruction of everything around us, even to the ambulance, and for a precipitate flight, we were not dejected. . . . It seemed but a moment until these trains were wrapped in flames. Saddles, stationery, clothing, muskets, cars, and engines were all destroyed. . . . The troops were urged on in a headlong manner, without rest or refreshment, to the banks of Broad Run at Brentsville. . . . With men falling from exhaustion, to rise and plod on, with famished horses, falling never to rise again, the corps of General Banks crossed Bull Run at noon at Blackburn's ford, having made a circuit of twenty miles to accomplish the little more than four, *via* Manassas Junction." (*Army of Virginia*, pp. 424, 425.)

CHAPTER XXXV.

CHANTILLY (OX HILL).

SUNDAY the 31st of August broke rainy and chill upon both armies. It was wet and comfortless to the soldiers in their unsheltered bivouacs, and still more trying to the thousands of poor fellows who lay wounded on the field. Before daylight, however, Stuart and the Confederate cavalry were in the saddle and after the enemy, but they met with nothing but stragglers and some twenty or thirty ambulances until they came within range of the guns at Centreville.¹ Here the Federal forces were found in position. The situation having been reported to General Lee, he determined to move once more upon the Federal flank instead of attacking the strong position of Centreville. He says: "The prevalence of a heavy rain, which began during the night, threatened to render Bull Run impassable, and impeded our movements. Longstreet remained on the battlefield to engage the attention of the enemy and cover the burial of the dead and the removal of the wounded,² while Jackson proceeded by Sudley ford to the Little River turnpike to turn the enemy's right and intercept his retreat to Washington. Jackson's progress was retarded by the inclemency of the weather and the fatigue of his troops, who, in addition to their arduous marches, had fought three severe engagements in as many days. He reached Little River turnpike in the evening, and the next day, September 1, advanced by that road to Fairfax Court House."³ Longstreet remained on the field until midday on the 31st. "About noon

¹ Stuart's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. pp. 737, 738.

² On this day General Pope applied under flag of truce for permission to remove the Federal wounded from the battlefield. This request was granted.

³ Lee's report, *Ib.* pp. 557, 558.

General Pryor, with his brigade, was thrown across Bull Run to occupy the heights between that and Cub Run, and at two o'clock in the afternoon the balance of the command marched to cross Bull Run at Sudley ford."¹

General Pope thus describes his dispositions for the 31st of August: "I arrived at Centreville between nine and ten o'clock on the night of the 30th. On the same night I sent orders to the corps commanders to report to me in person as early after daylight as possible on the morning of the 31st, and on that morning the troops were directed to be posted as follows: Porter to occupy the intrenchments on the north or right of Centreville; Franklin on his left in the intrenchments. In rear of Centreville, between Franklin and Porter, as a support, was posted the corps of Heintzelman. Sigel occupied the intrenchments on the left and south side of the town, with Reno on his left and rear. Banks was ordered to take post as soon as he arrived, on the north side of Bull Run, and to cover the bridge on the road from Centreville to Manassas Junction. Sumner, as soon as he arrived, was ordered to take post between Centreville and Chantilly, and to occupy Chantilly in force. McDowell was posted about two miles in the rear of Centreville, on the road to Fairfax Court House.

"Ammunition trains and some provisions were gotten up on the 31st, and all corps commanders were notified, by special orders to each, that the ammunition trains were packed immediately in the rear of Centreville, and were directed to send officers to procure such ammunition as was needed in their respective corps. I directed the whole of the trains of the army to be unloaded at Centreville, and sent to Fairfax station to bring up forage and rations. We remained during the whole day of the 31st resting the men, getting up supplies of provisions, and resupplying the commands with ammunition."

During the morning General Pope received an encouraging dispatch from Halleck urging him to hold his position if

¹ Longstreet's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 566.

possible.¹ About the same time he sent one to Halleck very different in tone from that of the night before.² He had begun to realize the extent of yesterday's disaster. Under a commander who enjoyed its confidence, the condition of the Federal army was by no means desperate. The 20,000 fresh troops Pope had met at Centreville gave him a nucleus on which to reform his army. He gives his entire strength on September 1 at 62,000 men. This was far more men than the Confederates could muster. Lee's numbers on that day could hardly have exceeded 40,000, if they reached it.³ But this great superiority of force was more than neutralized by the loss of morale the Federal army had sustained, and the want of confidence in its commander which pervaded all ranks.

Thus passed the 31st, Pope resting, reorganizing, and supplying his troops, while Lee was pushing forward toward the Little River turnpike to turn his right. Stuart with his two cavalry brigades led the movement, and in the neighborhood of Chantilly each of his brigades captured a company of Federal cavalry.⁴ Crossing over toward the Centreville and Fairfax Court House road in the vicinity of Ox Hill about dark, Stuart shelled for a time with his artillery the Federal trains moving on that road, and produced some confusion. He then withdrew to the Little River turnpike for the night. The infantry did not come into contact this day, but next morning

¹ *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 79.

WASHINGTON, August 31, 1862, 11 A. M.

MY DEAR GENERAL, — You have done nobly. Don't yield another inch, if you can avoid it. All reserves are being sent forward. Couch's division goes to-day. Part of it went to Sangston station last night with Franklin and Sumner, who must now be with you. Can't you renew the attack? . . .

H. W. HALLECK.

This was in reply to Pope's dispatch, in which he said that he had retired to Centreville in "perfect order and without loss."

² *Ib.* p. 80.

³ Lee's losses in battle had been over 9000 since August 20, and the sick, broken down, and stragglers were, as a moderate estimate, half as many more. Reinforcements were hastening to Lee, D. H. Hill and McLaws and Hampton. But they did not join him until the 2d of September.

⁴ "A company of New York cavalry" and a "company of the old 2d dragoons, Captain Thomas Hight." (Stuart's report, *Ib.* p. 743.)

Jackson moved down the turnpike towards Fairfax Court House, followed at some distance by Longstreet. Pope says he ordered General Sumner to find out the movements of the Confederates, of which he had received rumors, by a reconnoissance to Chantilly very early on September 1.¹ On this morning, he dispatched to Halleck complaining of the conduct of the Peninsular officers, and advising that the army be drawn back to Washington to avoid disaster.²

The advance of Jackson along the Little River turnpike having been discovered,³ Pope issued orders for the retreat of his forces towards Fairfax Court House. Hooker⁴ was sent to collect the troops about Fairfax Court House and post them at Germantown. McDowell went to Hooker's left along Difficult Creek and Franklin to the left and rear of McDowell. "Reno was to push forward to the north of the road from Centreville to Fairfax in the direction of Chantilly."⁵ This placed him near Ox Hill, and his line formed nearly a right angle with that of McDowell. Heintzelman supported Reno. Sigel, Porter, and Sumner were placed in order to the left of Heintzelman, while Banks, in charge of the train, was to follow the old Braddock road⁶ to the rear.

It was late in the afternoon when Jackson, finding the Federals in force to the south of the Little River turnpike, threw his troops on that side of the road, pushing A. P. Hill's division forward, under Lawton. On Hill's left was placed Ewell's division, and next the turnpike was Starke with Jackson's old division.⁷ North of the turnpike was placed artillery. Hill

¹ There seems no evidence that any such reconnoissance was attempted. Sumner does not mention it, and J. E. B. Stuart's report shows that it was not made.

² See Pope's long dispatch to Halleck of September 1, 8.50 A. M. (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. pp. 82, 83.)

³ General C. F. Walcott says Pope learned this either from stragglers or in some accidental way. He says there is a tradition in the vicinity of the battlefield that a citizen conveyed the information to Pope. (*Pope's Virginia Campaign* (Mil. Hist. Soc. Mass. vol. ii.), pp. 147, 186, 187.)

⁴ Pope's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 45.

⁵ Pope's report, *Ib.* p. 45.

⁶ See Pope's orders and report, *Ib.* pp. 45, 84, 85.

⁷ Bradley Johnson's brigade of this division had been left at Chantilly to watch the road leading to that point from Centreville.

was directed to send forward the brigades on his right, under Branch, and Brockenbrough to feel and engage the enemy, who at this point consisted of Reno's corps.¹ The Confederates advanced over a field and through a piece of woods to the edge of a cornfield, where they quickly became heavily engaged, the enemy attacking. Gregg was sent up on the left of Brockenbrough,² his brigade forming in line of battle under a heavy fire and advancing rapidly with fixed bayonets to a fence, along which they took position. The right of the brigade became involved in a severe contest,³ and Thomas's brigade was sent to its assistance. The battle had but fairly begun when a terrific thunder and rain storm broke over the field, and soon drenched everything. This storm blew in the faces of the Confederates, and greatly impeded the movements of both combatants. Stevens's division made a spirited resistance against Branch and Brockenbrough, and, by threatening Branch's right flank, brought him to a halt. The 18th North Carolina was sent by Branch to check this movement, which it did. A charge was then made by General Stevens across the cornfield in front, upon the Confederates. The latter were severely pressed, and Brockenbrough asked for reinforcements. Pender's brigade was sent up.⁴ The Federal charge was repulsed with severe loss, including the death of General Stevens, who fell at the head of his men. Meantime, Kearny's division had been sent forward to reinforce the Federal troops, and Birney's brigade reached the field just in time to take the

¹ General C. F. Walcott says Stevens's division and one brigade of Reno's division.

² Farther to the left were Trimble's and Hays's brigades of Ewell's division, supported by Lawton and Early, and beyond them Starke's division.

³ Gregg's brigade had the 13th South Carolina on his extreme right, next came the 14th South Carolina, and then the 12th South Carolina in front line. Orr's rifles and 1st South Carolina were in reserve. (McGowan's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 682.) The left of the brigade was not severely engaged. See report, Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, 12th South Carolina, *Ib.* p. 693.

⁴ Pender's brigade became separated in the woods, and part went to Branch's assistance on the right, and part to Thomas on the left. Only the regiments on the right were actively engaged (16th and 34th North Carolina).

place of Stevens's division, which was retiring in some disorder.¹ These troops restored the battle at this point, and succeeded in holding the Confederates in check. Farther to the Federal right the other division of Reno's corps (Reno's division²) became engaged with Hays's and Trimble's brigades of Ewell's division. Hays's troops were attacked while changing position, and were thrown into confusion and driven back; and this confusion extended to a part of Trimble's brigade, which, however, held its position.³ A part of Early's brigade⁴ went to the assistance of Hays, and quickly repulsed the Federals, inflicting heavy loss.⁵ The contest was stubbornly continued, notwithstanding the drenching storm and the approaching darkness. Much of the ammunition was rendered useless, but the men fought with bayonets when their guns would not go off.⁶ General Kearny was especially conspicuous in his efforts to maintain the Federal position. Birney could not, of course, cover the whole distance held by Stevens's division, and the retreat of that division left a gap on his right between him and Reno's division. Kearny, riding to the latter, urged the first troops he met⁷ to take position

¹ Birney's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part ii. p. 418.

² General C. F. Walcott says only Ferrero's brigade of this division was present. The other brigade (Nagle's) having "been so severely handled at Manassas on the 29th of August that it was called on for no subsequent duty during the campaign." (*Pope's Virginia Campaign* (Mil. Hist. Soc. Mass. vol. ii.), p. 151.)

³ Captain Brown, a gallant old Georgian commanding Trimble's brigade, fell at its head on this occasion.

⁴ 13th, 25th, and 31st Virginia regiments. General Early at the moment had gone with the other regiments towards Starke's right, as there were demonstrations along the Little River turnpike, where McDowell was.

⁵ General Walcott, 21st Massachusetts, of Ferrero's brigade of Reno's division, says his regiment lost 140 men, a greater number than in any other battle. (Walcott's *History 21st Massachusetts Regiment*, p. 168.)

⁶ This was the occasion of General Jackson's reply to a message from a brigade commander (probably General Branch), stating that his ammunition was wet and he feared he could not hold on. "Tell him to hold his ground; if his guns will not go off, neither will the enemy's." (Gordon, p. 447.)

⁷ Ferrero's brigade. (General Walcott's *History 21st Massachusetts Regiment*, p. 164.)

on Birney's right. These troops had suffered severely in the repulse by Early, and, when they moved slowly, Kearny grew impatient, and again ordering the 21st Massachusetts regiment forward in a most emphatic manner, dashed out in front into the cornfield, and in the murky twilight¹ rode upon the Confederate lines before he knew it. As he turned to escape, he was shot through the body and fell dead upon the field.² The Confederates advanced, and such volleys as could be gotten out of the wet guns were exchanged. Then followed a bayonet charge of the Confederates, which bore back the Federal lines a little, but the darkness, which had settled on everything, rendered it impossible to tell friend from foe, and forced a cessation of the struggle. Soon both parties, scarcely knowing how it happened, found themselves drawing apart again, and falling back to their original positions, leaving the cornfield neutral ground.³

Thus ended the affair of Ox Hill or Chantilly. It cost the Confederates 506 men in the two divisions of A. P. Hill and Ewell.⁴ The Federal loss is not known, but fell mostly upon Reno's corps.⁵ The storm and the lateness of the hour prevented the engagement from becoming more general. Long-

¹ General Walcott's *History 21st Massachusetts Regiment*, p. 165.

² General Kearny's body and his horse and trappings remained in the hands of the Confederates. Next day General Lee sent the body into the Federal lines under a flag of truce, with the following letter:—

HEADQUARTERS A. N. V. *September 2, 1862.*

MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN POPE, U. S. A.

Sir,—The body of General Philip Kearny was brought from the field last night, and he was reported dead. I send it forward under a flag of truce, thinking the possession of his remains may be a consolation to his family.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

ROBERT E. LEE, *General.*

(*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part iii. p. 807.)

³ General Walcott's *History 21st Massachusetts Regiment*, p. 166.

⁴ Hill's loss, 306, was mainly in the brigades of Branch, Gregg, and Pender. Colonel R. H. Riddick and Lieutenant-Colonel E. H. Miller of Pender's brigade fell mortally wounded. Major J. Rivers of Thomas's brigade and Captain L. W. Stone commanding 16th North Carolina were severely wounded.

⁵ General Walcott puts the Federal loss at not less than 1000. (*Pope's Virginia Campaign* (Mil. Hist. Soc. Mass. vol. ii.), p. 161.)

street was too far behind Jackson to get up in time to participate. On the Federal side, Banks's corps was ordered up, but neither it nor Hooker's division became engaged. The Federals succeeded in holding their ground, and thus saved from interruption the trains which were moving on the road from Centreville to Fairfax and the roads to the south of it. The Confederates had struck a damaging blow to Reno's corps, which caused General Pope to retreat during the night to Fairfax Court House, but beyond this had effected nothing.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

REVIEW OF THE CAMPAIGN.

ON the morning of September 2, the Federal army was found to have withdrawn from the battlefield to Fairfax Court House and beyond. By midday an order was received from General Halleck directing its retreat (in accordance with Pope's suggestion the day before¹) to the fortified lines in front of Washington and Alexandria, and this movement was promptly begun. General Lee, having learned from his cavalry reconnoissances of these movements, gave up further pursuit. He says: "Next morning it was found that the enemy had conducted his retreat so rapidly that the attempt to intercept him was abandoned. The proximity of the fortifications around Alexandria and Washington rendered farther pursuit useless, and our army rested during the 2d near Chantilly, the enemy being followed only by the cavalry, who continued to harass him till he reached the shelter of his intrenchments."² At nightfall on the 2d of September, the Federal army, sadly demoralized and broken, was under cover of its fortified lines.

¹ McClellan had strongly urged the withdrawal of the army to the lines of Washington; and Halleck had learned, on the morning of September 2, from one of his staff (Colonel Kelton), whom he had sent to find out the condition of affairs, that it was "bad." At 7.30 A. M. on the 2d, Pope had dispatched Halleck in a more alarming strain than on the day before. He said, . . . "Unless something can be done to restore tone to this army, it will melt away before you know it. . . . The enemy is in very heavy force and must be stopped in some way. These forces under my command are not able to do so in the open field, and if again checked, I fear the force will be useless afterwards." . . . Nothing was left Halleck but to order an immediate retreat. (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part iii. pp. 796, 797.)

² Lee's report, *Ib.* part ii. p. 558.

On this same day (September 2) General McClellan was placed in command of the troops as they approached the lines of Washington, and General Pope's career as commander of the Army of Virginia came to an end.¹

Some three weeks had elapsed since General Lee had left Richmond with Longstreet for the Rapidan. At that time large portions of the State were in Federal possession, and armies aggregating over 150,000 men² threatened the Confederate capital. McClellan's army was about to leave Westover to unite with Pope and Burnside on the Rappahannock. Lee determined to strike his weaker adversary, Pope, before this junction could be effected. Moving with celerity, he designed to cross the Rapidan on August 18 and strike Pope's army while between that river and the Rappahannock, but tardy transportation and a mistake of his cavalry cost the Confederate leader two days, and lost him the best opportunity to effect his purpose. The Federal army, when once behind the Rappahannock, together with the uncertain river itself, baffled General Lee for two days more. But, rising in the boldness of his strategy as difficulties occurred and the union of the two hostile armies into an overwhelming force in his front became more imminent, he adopted a plan of campaign such as only masters in the art of war may hazard. The result proved the soundness of his judgment. He had not been able to prevent the junction of a portion of McClellan's troops with Pope's,

¹ General Pope was sent to the northwest, and General McClellan became again commander of the Army of the Potomac, into which was now incorporated what was left of the Army of Virginia. It was some days before the Federal administration fully made this change. Though McClellan had been put in command of the troops as they occupied the lines of Washington, we find Pope on September 4 submitting a plan of organization for the "forces hereafter to be placed under my (his) command." On the 5th, he protests against an order received from McClellan, and asks that the exact *status* of each commander be defined. This brought matters to a crisis, and Pope was on that day relieved, and ordered to report at the War Department. (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xii. part iii. pp. 810, 811.)

² McClellan had (omitting Dix's 10,000 men at Fortress Monroe) at Westover 91,694 present for duty (July 20). Pope had 52,000 (August 1), and Burnside at Fredericksburg about 12,000 or 13,000.

but he had defeated the latter after they had joined him, while two thirds of McClellan's army was either *in transitu* or was lying at Alexandria; the one third of it which had reached Pope was involved in his disaster. Nor had the Confederate victory been a partial or half way one. So far as the army under Pope was concerned, the victory was complete and far-reaching. That army had been driven in ten days from the Rappahannock to Washington with the loss of half its strength. It had sunk from 80,000 to about 40,000 men. It had lost heavily in killed and wounded. Some 7000 unwounded prisoners had been captured and paroled. Numerous pieces of artillery, many thousand small arms, and a quantity of ammunition had gone to replenish the scanty ordnance of the Confederates. Large amounts of quartermaster, commissary, and other stores had been appropriated by Jackson's troops, but a far larger amount had been destroyed. Pope's army was for the time incapable of farther offense. That in a week or two the Federal army under McClellan was again able to take the field was due to the fact that a Federal force greater in numbers than Lee's whole army had not been involved in Pope's defeat. This force constituted a fresh army, into which was incorporated the wrecks of Pope's command.

Among the advantages secured by the Confederates as the result of this campaign were, the removal of the contending armies from the vicinity of Richmond to that of Washington, the recovery of a large part of Northern Virginia with the supplies it contained, and the opportunity to transfer the theatre of war from Confederate to Union territory.

When the great disparity of force with which Lee had to contend is contrasted with the splendid results of the campaign, there is no room left for criticism of the audacious strategy by which these results were accomplished. The problem before the Confederate leader was one of the greatest difficulty. No successful solution was possible that did not involve immense risk. It was an inspiration of daring that conceived the movement to Pope's rear, and confided the most delicate part of its execution to the Ney of the Confederate army.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

THE INVASION OF MARYLAND.

THE discomfiture of the army under General Pope and the retreat of all the Federal forces to the lines about Washington brought to General Lee the opportunity and at the same time imposed upon him the necessity of adopting a new plan of operations. It was impossible for him to inflict serious damage upon the enemy by advancing further. The situation is well, if briefly, described in his letter of September 3 to President Davis:¹ "After the enemy had disappeared from the vicinity of Fairfax Court House, and taken the road to Alexandria and Washington, I did not think it would be advantageous to follow him further. I had no intention of attacking him in his fortifications, and am not prepared to invest them. If I possessed the necessary munitions, I should be unable to supply provisions for the troops."

General Lee therefore turned his eyes to the north side of the Potomac. His views, as given in the letter referred to, were as follows: "The present seems to be the most propitious time since the commencement of the war for the Confederate army to enter Maryland. Two grand armies of the United States which have been operating in Virginia, though now united, are much weakened and demoralized. Their new levies, of which I understand 60,000 men have already been posted in Washington, are not yet organized, and will take some time to prepare for the field. If it is ever desired to give material aid to Maryland and afford her an opportunity of throwing off the oppression to which she is now subject, this would seem the most favorable time."² After giving his reasons for not fol-

¹ *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part ii. p. 590.

² General Lee speaks of this more fully in his report. (*Ib.* part i. p. 144.)

lowing up the Federal army to Washington, he continues: "I therefore determined, while threatening the approaches to Washington, to draw the troops into Loudoun, where forage and some provisions can be obtained, menace their possession of the Shenandoah Valley,¹ and, if found practicable, to cross into Maryland. The purpose, if discovered, will have the effect of carrying the enemy north of the Potomac, and, if prevented, will not result in much evil."

In the next paragraph he states the difficulties in his way: "The army is not properly equipped for an invasion of an enemy's territory. It lacks much of the material of war, is feeble in transportation, the animals being much reduced, and the men are poorly provided with clothes, and in thousands of instances are destitute of shoes.² Still we cannot afford to be idle, and though weaker than our opponents in men and military equipments, must endeavor to harass if we cannot destroy them. I am aware that the movement is attended with much risk, yet I do not consider success impossible, and shall endeavor to guard it from loss. As long as the army of the enemy are employed on this frontier I have no fears for the safety of Richmond, yet I earnestly recommend that advantage be taken of this period of comparative safety to place its defense both by land and water in the most perfect condition." He goes on to say, "What occasions me most concern is the fear of getting out of ammunition. . . . If the quartermaster department can furnish any shoes, it would be the greatest relief."

It was under these circumstances and with these views that General Lee headed his columns toward Leesburg as soon as

¹ *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part ii. p. 590.

² General Palfrey, in his admirable account of "The Antietam and Fredricksburg," quotes similar statements from General Lee's official report, written some months later, and considers them in the light of an "excuse for failure." He thinks the captures made at Manassas should have supplied the needs of the Confederates. It is unnecessary to expose the unreasonableness of such an idea. The statement of the condition of his army made by General Lee in his report is not one whit stronger than that we have quoted from his letter of September 3, when there was no "failure" to be "excused."

he was satisfied of the retreat of Pope to Washington. The orders were issued on September 2, and the movement began next morning. The troops that General Lee had ordered up from Richmond ten days before had now arrived, and materially strengthened his force. They consisted of the infantry divisions of D. H. Hill and McLaws, of Hampton's brigade of cavalry, and of a number of batteries. These commands had numbered at Richmond about 19,000 men,¹ but they had been seriously diminished by the severe and long march they had made in order to join Lee.² It is probable that the numerical strength of the Confederate army on September 3 was not so great as it had been two weeks before at the opening of the campaign or the Rapidan. But if as strong in numbers, it was not in so good condition in many other respects. Many thousands of the men were ill clad and barefooted. The shoes, captured or supplied, had been altogether insufficient to keep the army shod, and now they were about to march through a stony country and over turnpike roads. In addition to this, the effect of the insufficient food and the green corn diet of the past week or two were telling in the large number of men weakened by diarrhœa and other similar complaints, whom a day's march would convert into stragglers. These causes were destined seriously to cripple the Confederate army in its farther operations.

On September 4, General Lee says, in a letter to President Davis :³ " I am more fully persuaded of the benefit that will result from an expedition into Maryland, and I shall proceed to make the movement at once unless you should signify your disapprobation. The only two subjects that give me any uneasiness are my supplies of ammunition and subsistence." The army continued the movement, D. H. Hill's division in the

¹ The return of July 20 gives Hill's strength as 9548 and McLaws's as 7702. Hampton had possibly some 1500.

² Hill complains of the straggling caused by "heavy marches, deficient commissariat, want of shoes, and inefficient officers." We have seen that the reduction of numbers in those corps of McClellan's army which reached Pope, though in large part transported by water and rail, was enormous. Hill and McLaws marched the whole distance overland.

³ *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part ii. p. 591.

lead, toward Leesburg and the neighboring fords of the Potomac. Here the Confederate army crossed that river between the 4th and the 7th, and moved to the vicinity of Frederick City. Lee's object in crossing the Potomac east of the Blue Ridge, instead of west of it, was the more distinctly to threaten both Washington and Baltimore, and thus insure the withdrawal of the mass of the enemy's troops north of the Potomac.¹ In this way too he covered the removal of the wounded and of the captured property from the late battlefields. He supposed also that his presence at Frederick would cause the prompt retreat of the Federal forces at Harper's Ferry and Martinsburg, thus leaving one of the most productive regions of the State available for the supply of his troops, as well as giving him an unobstructed line of communication through the Shenandoah Valley with Richmond. A singular blunder of Halleck, who refused to permit the evacuation of Harper's Ferry, as will be seen, defeated this expectation and doomed the troops there to capture.

At Leesburg steps were taken to rid the army of all unnecessary incumbrances. The transportation was reduced to a "mere sufficiency to transport cooking utensils and the absolute necessities of a regiment."² All surplus or worn-out animals and wagons were left behind. A large number of batteries were also left, and the serviceable men and horses used to increase the efficiency of the others. When the army moved forward, General L. A. Armistead was placed in command of a strong provost guard to "arrest stragglers and punish summarily all depredators." Stringent measures were authorized to keep the men in the ranks, and the most careful instructions were issued to prevent depredations upon private property. These last were in the main effectual, but it was found impossible to prevent the straggling of half sick and barefooted men.

But whatever the fatigues and privations of the Confederate army, its spirit at this time was high. A series of brilliant

¹ Letter to President Davis, September 12. (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part ii. pp. 604, 605.)

² General Order No. 102. (*Ib.* p. 592.)

successes had given it unbounded confidence in itself and in its leaders, and the ragged and dirty soldiers hailed with joy the advance to the Potomac. The weather was fine, and on those splendid September days when the crossing was effected, the broad and placid river, with the long columns of wading infantry, and the lines of artillery and wagons making their way through it, and the men shouting and singing "My Maryland" to give vent to their noisy delight, made a picturesque and animated scene. By the afternoon of September 7, the mass of the army was encamped near Frederick.

While General Lee was thus transferring the Southern army into Maryland, his opponent was not idle. The immense resources of the Federal government enabled it to recover quickly from the disasters which had overwhelmed Pope. A large part of the veteran Army of the Potomac had not been involved in the disasters, and once more under a commander in whom they had full confidence were ready to be led against the victorious Confederates. The remains of Pope's Army of Virginia, as well as Burnside's forces from Fredericksburg and Cox's from West Virginia, were absorbed in the Army of the Potomac, and some changes were made in the assignment of the troops and commanders. In anticipation of the resumption of active operations, General Banks was placed in command of the defenses of Washington, and to him were assigned Heintzelman with the 3d corps, Porter with the 5th corps, and Sigel with his corps, now called the 11th. Porter was subsequently sent forward to join McClellan, as we shall see, but for the time remained with Banks. Including all the forces on duty in and about Washington, the latter had under his command 72,500¹ men.

This left at McClellan's disposal for offensive operations the 1st corps (McDowell's old corps), now under Hooker; the 2d corps, under Sumner; one division of the 4th corps, under Couch; the 6th corps, under Franklin; the 9th corps, under Burnside; and the 12th (Banks's old corps, now so numbered),

¹ See McClellan's dispatch to Halleck, September 11. (*Report on Conduct of War*, part i. p. 481.) Cf. Banks's dispatch to Halleck, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part ii. p. 264, where the number given is 73,300.

under Mansfield. The 1st and 9th corps, under Burnside, were to constitute the right wing of the Federal army; the 2d and 12th corps, under Sumner, the centre; and the 6th corps and Couch's division, under Franklin, the left. These troops with the cavalry and artillery amounted to about 85,000 men.¹

General McClellan says: "On the 3d, the enemy had disappeared from the front of Washington, and the information which I received induced me to believe that he intended to cross the upper Potomac into Maryland. This materially changed the aspect of affairs, and enlarged the sphere of operations; for, in case of a crossing in force, an active campaign would be necessary to cover Baltimore, prevent the invasion of Pennsylvania, and clear Maryland.

"I therefore on the 3d ordered the 2d and 12th corps to Tenallytown, and the 9th corps to a point on the Seventh Street road near Washington, and sent such cavalry as was available to the fords near Poolesville, to watch and impede the enemy in any attempt to cross in that vicinity. . . . I left Washington on the 7th of September. At this time it was known that the mass of the rebel army had passed up the south side of the Potomac in the direction of Leesburg, and that a portion of that army had crossed into Maryland; but whether it was their intention to cross their whole force with a view to turn Washington by a flank movement down the north bank of the Potomac, to move on Baltimore, or to invade Pennsylvania, were questions which, at that time, we had no means of determining. This uncertainty as to the intentions of the enemy obliged me, up to the 13th of September, to march cautiously, and to advance the army in such order as continually to keep Washington and Baltimore covered, and at the same time to hold the troops well in hand so as to be able to concentrate and follow rapidly if the enemy took the direction of Pennsylvania; or to return to the defense of Washington, if, as was greatly feared by the authorities, the enemy should be merely making a feint with a small force to draw off our army, while with their main forces they stood ready to seize the first favorable opportunity to attack the capital.

¹ Palfrey, *The Antietam and Fredericksburg*, p. 7; Swinton, *The Army of the Potomac*, p. 198, footnote.

“In the mean time the process of reorganization, rendered necessary after the demoralizing effects of the disastrous campaign upon the other side of the Potomac, was rapidly progressing; the troops were regaining confidence, and their former soldierly appearance and discipline were fast returning. My cavalry was pushed out continually in all directions, and all possible steps were taken to learn the positions and movements of the enemy.”¹

The Federal army thus moved forward slowly toward Frederick City, with the left on the Potomac and its right on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. Recent defeat, the necessity of covering both Washington and Baltimore, and the fears of the Federal administration that Lee's expedition into Maryland might after all be only a feint to cover a sudden march against Washington from the south side of the Potomac, combined to make McClellan's movements extremely cautious. It was not until September 13 that the mass of the Federal army, though unopposed, reached Frederick City. Nine days were consumed in the march from Washington to that city, a distance of not quite fifty miles in a direct line. The Federal commander was impeded, however, not only by apprehension for Baltimore and Washington, but still more by the necessity for rest, and for the reorganization and reëquipment of his army, large portions of which had suffered severely in the recent campaign.

¹ *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. pp. 38, 39.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

HARPER'S FERRY.

MEANTIME, the Confederate army was engaged in important operations. When, two months before, the Federal forces which had been operating in the Shenandoah Valley were collected into Pope's army east of the Blue Ridge Mountains, General Julius White had been left with a brigade at Winchester to hold the lower valley and protect the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. During the summer a considerable body of Federal troops, under Colonel Dixon S. Miles, had been stationed at Harper's Ferry to hold this debouch of the Shenandoah Valley, and to protect the railroad and canal at that point. A small force also held Martinsburg. General White remained at Winchester until he received news of Pope's defeat and retreat upon Washington. He then evacuated the place on the night of September 2, blowing up his magazine, and burning some buildings containing stores. A few prisoners and a considerable amount of military stores fell into the possession of the Confederates the next day, when Lieutenant-Colonel Funk took possession of the town. General White fell back to Martinsburg, where for the time he remained.¹

The purpose for which these troops had been kept at Harper's Ferry and above having been nullified by the advance of the Confederate army into Maryland, and the lines of retreat threatened, General Lee supposed they would fall back to the northward until they could join some larger body of the Federal forces. General McClellan, seeing the danger to which their continuance in or about Harper's Ferry exposed

¹ White's force was about 2500 ; Miles's, at Harper's Ferry, was near 10,000.

them, advised, while still at Washington, that these troops be withdrawn through Hagerstown toward the Cumberland Valley.¹ On September 11, he suggested that they be ordered to join his army "by the most practicable route." But General Halleck had other views. He was unwilling to give up Harper's Ferry and the railroad bridge there, even temporarily, and could not bring himself to abandon the artillery and stores which had been gathered at that point. He therefore refused to withdraw the garrison, but left it a certain and easy prey to his adversary.

When Lee reached Frederick City, he issued an address to the people of Maryland, informing them of the aims of the Confederate government, and inviting them to join his standard.² Whether any considerable response would have been

¹ As an alternative he suggested that the garrison be withdrawn to the Maryland Heights and there hold on as long as possible. (See his report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 44.) Halleck says he ordered Miles to do this. (Halleck's report, *Ib.* p. 4.)

² This proclamation was as follows : * —

TO THE PEOPLE OF MARYLAND.

It is right that you should know the purpose that has brought the army under my command within the limits of your State, so far as that purpose concerns yourselves.

The people of the Confederate States have long watched with the deepest sympathy the wrongs and outrages which have been inflicted upon the citizens of a Commonwealth allied to the States of the South by the strongest social, political, and commercial ties, and reduced to the condition of a conquered province.

Under the pretense of supporting the Constitution, but in violation of its most valuable provisions, your citizens have been arrested and imprisoned, upon no charge, and contrary to all forms of law.

A faithful and manly protest against this outrage, made by a venerable and illustrious Marylander, to whom in his better days no citizen appealed for right in vain, was treated with scorn and contempt.

The government of your chief city has been usurped by armed strangers ; your Legislature has been dissolved by the unlawful arrest of its members ; freedom of the press and of speech has been suppressed ; words have been declared offenses by an arbitrary decree of the Federal executive ; and citizens ordered to be tried by military commissions for what they may dare to speak.

* *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part ii. pp. 601, 602.

made to this call is uncertain, as the period of the Confederate occupation was too brief to permit a test. The military plan of the Confederate commander, after having drawn the Federal army north of the Potomac by marching on Frederick City, was to transfer his army to the west of South Mountain (as the Blue Ridge range is called in Maryland), and thus draw his adversary away from his base of supplies and his supports. The disadvantage of fighting within reach of permanent lines of works which were entirely unassailable by the Confederate forces had been illustrated at Manassas. Lee designed to give battle where, in case of success, the distance of the Federal army from Washington and Baltimore would be too great to admit of its reaching speedy shelter. He had no design of marching on Washington or Baltimore, for, besides their large garrisons, an army of twice his numbers was ready to oppose him in open field. It was this army that he was anxious to damage or defeat, and for this purpose he desired to draw it as far as possible from Washington. Once west of the South Mountain, Lee's line of communication with Richmond, whence must come his supplies, especially ammunition, would be through the Shenandoah Valley. He learned at Frederick City that the Federal garrison still held Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry, and he determined, in dislodging

Believing that the people of Maryland possess a spirit too lofty to submit to such a government, the people of the South have long wished to aid you in throwing off this foreign yoke, to enable you again to enjoy the inalienable rights of freemen, and restore independence and sovereignty to your State.

In obedience to this wish, our army has come in among you, and is prepared to assist you with the power of its arms in regaining the rights of which you have been despoiled.

This, citizens of Maryland, is our mission as far as you are concerned. No restraint upon your free will is intended — no intimidation will be allowed within the limits of this army, at least. Marylanders shall once more enjoy their ancient freedom of thought and speech. We know no enemies among you, and will protect all of you in every opinion.

It is for you to decide your destiny freely and without constraint. This army will respect your choice, whatever it may be ; and, while the Southern people will rejoice to welcome you to your natural position among them, they will only welcome you when you come of your own free will.

R. E. LEE, *General Commanding.*

them from his rear and thus clearing his communications, to attempt their capture. The slow rate at which McClellan was advancing convinced him that this operation could be completed and the Confederate army reunited north of the Potomac, before it would be necessary or desirable to give battle. He therefore issued orders on September 9¹ for the movement of his troops next day. Jackson was sent with his divisions

¹ The order of General Lee was numbered 191, and was as follows : * —

“The army will resume its march to-morrow, taking the Hagerstown road. General Jackson’s command will form the advance, and, after passing Middletown, with such portion as he may select, take the route toward Sharpsburg, cross the Potomac at the most convenient point, and by Friday morning take possession of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and capture such of the enemy as may be at Martinsburg, and intercept such as may attempt to escape from Harper’s Ferry.

“General Longstreet’s command will pursue the same road as far as Boonesborough, where it will halt with [the] reserve, supply, and baggage trains of the army.

“General McLaws, with his own division and that of General R. H. Anderson, will follow General Longstreet. On reaching Middletown he will take the route to Harper’s Ferry, and by Friday morning possess himself of the Maryland Heights, and endeavor to capture the enemy at Harper’s Ferry and vicinity.

“General Walker, with his division, after accomplishing the object in which he is now engaged, will cross the Potomac at Cheek’s ford, ascend its right bank to Lovettsville, take possession of Loudoun Heights, if practicable, by Friday morning, Keys’s ford on his left, and the road between the end of the mountain and the Potomac on his right. He will, as far as practicable, coöperate with Generals McLaws and Jackson, and intercept the retreat of the enemy.

“General D. H. Hill’s division will form the rear-guard of the army, pursuing the road taken by the main body. The reserve artillery, ordnance, and supply trains, etc., will precede General Hill.

“General Stuart will detach a squadron of cavalry to accompany the commands of Generals Longstreet, Jackson, and McLaws, and with the main body of the cavalry will cover the route of the army, bringing up all stragglers that may have been left behind.

“The commands of Generals Jackson, McLaws, and Walker, after accomplishing the objects for which they have been detached, will join the main body of the army at Boonesborough or Hagerstown.

“Each regiment on the march will habitually carry its axes in the regimental ordnance wagons, for use of the men at their encampments, to procure wood,” etc.

* *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. pp. 603, 604.

(Ewell's, A. P. Hill's, and his own) by way of Middletown, Boonesborough, and Williamsport to Martinsburg, to capture or to drive the force there stationed toward Harper's Ferry. This he was expected to accomplish by Friday morning (12th). McLaws, with his own division¹ and that of R. H. Anderson, was to go to Middletown, and there turning off toward Harper's Ferry, was directed to seize the Maryland Heights (as the mountain on the Maryland side of the Potomac, overlooking Harper's Ferry, is called) by Friday morning. J. G. Walker, with two brigades,² was ordered to cross the Potomac at Cheek's ford (near the mouth of the Monocacy), and, ascending the right bank of the river, take possession of the Loudoun Heights, which overlook Harper's Ferry from the Virginia side of the Potomac, but are separated from the town by the Shenandoah River. This force was also to be in place by Friday morning (12th). Thus Harper's Ferry, which lies at the fork of the Shenandoah and Potomac rivers, and which is commanded by both the Maryland and Loudoun Heights, though separated from them by the Shenandoah and Potomac rivers respectively, was to be surrounded. Jackson was to intercept the garrison if it should attempt to escape in the direction of Martinsburg, and, if not, to close in upon it at Harper's Ferry. The other commands were to prevent its escape across the Potomac or the Shenandoah. While these portions of his army were engaged in the reduction of Harper's Ferry, the remainder of Longstreet's command³ and D. H. Hill's division⁴ were ordered to Boonesborough at the western base of the South Mountain, while "Stuart, with the cavalry, remained east of the mountains, to observe the enemy and retard his advance."⁵ Longstreet was,

¹ McLaws's division contained the brigades of Barksdale, Kershaw, Semmes, and Cobb. (Palfrey, *The Antietam and Fredericksburg*, p. 194.)

² Ransom's and Walker's. (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part ii. p. 914.)

³ Six brigades under D. R. Jones, Hood's two brigades, and Evans's brigade.

⁴ D. H. Hill's division contained the brigades of Garland, Anderson (G. B.), Ripley, Colquitt, and Rodas. (Palfrey, *The Antietam and Fredericksburg*, p. 198.)

⁵ Lee's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 145.

however, sent on to Hagerstown to secure some supplies at that point, and to meet a force reported to be advancing from Chambersburg, while D. H. Hill remained at Boonesborough to support the cavalry, as well as to close one of the avenues of escape from Harper's Ferry.¹ After disposing of the Federal troops at Harper's Ferry, all the troops engaged in the operations against it were to rejoin Lee at Boonesborough or Hagerstown.

Such were the movements ordered by General Lee, and they were promptly begun on September 10. Let us follow them up in succession.

Jackson, moving with his accustomed celerity, reached and crossed the Potomac at Williamsport on the 11th. Once on the south side of that river, Jackson spread out his force to prevent the escape of the Federal troops at Martinsburg. For this purpose, while A. P. Hill moved directly on that place, the divisions of Jackson and Ewell were sent toward North Mountain depot on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, seven miles northwest of Martinsburg, to intercept the Federals should they attempt to escape westward by the most feasible route still open to them. These precautions, however, were hardly necessary. The Federal commander (General Julius White) seems to have entertained no other design than to retreat to Harper's Ferry and unite his forces with the larger body there, under Colonel Miles. Consequently, when informed that Jackson had crossed the Potomac and was advancing, he evacuated Martinsburg, on the night of the 11th, and retired to Harper's Ferry, leaving behind a small amount of stores. The Confederates occupied Martinsburg on the morning of the 12th, and on the same afternoon moved towards Harper's Ferry. By midday on September 13, Jackson had come in view of the Federals drawn up upon Bolivar Heights.² He went into camp at the little village of Halltown,

¹ That through Pleasant Valley.

² These are the hills in rear of Harper's Ferry and extending across the angle from the Shenandoah to the Potomac. They present a good line of defense against an enemy advancing from the southwest (as Jackson was), but are commanded by both the Loudoun and Maryland Heights, which look down on them from beyond the Shenandoah and Potomac.

some two miles from the Federal lines, and waited to learn, before attacking, if the forces under McLaws and Walker, which were to coöperate with him from the Maryland and Loudoun Heights, were yet in position.

J. G. Walker had on the 9th been engaged in an unsuccessful attempt to destroy the canal aqueduct at the mouth of the Monocacy River. Next day, finding the enemy's artillery commanding that structure, as well as Cheek's ford, he moved up to Point of Rocks, and there crossing the Potomac reached the foot of the Blue Ridge, but not until the 13th. He found the Loudoun Heights unoccupied, and sent up two regiments to hold them, while he disposed the bulk of his force to prevent the escape of the Federals by the road down the right bank of the Potomac. On the morning of the 14th (Sunday), General Walker got five pieces of artillery into position on the heights, and was ready to contribute actively toward the reduction of Harper's Ferry.

General McLaws, with the ten brigades of his own and Anderson's division, had passed over the South Mountain at Brownsville Gap¹ on the 11th, and was ready to advance towards Harper's Ferry the next day. Some explanations of the topography are here necessary. The main South Mountain ridge in Maryland does not abut on the Potomac directly opposite the Loudoun Heights, which constitute the north end of the Blue Ridge in Virginia, but two or three miles to the east of them, at Weverton. The direct continuation of the Blue Ridge on the north of the Potomac is known as Elk Ridge, which continues some eight or ten miles northward, and then disappears. This Elk Ridge is parallel to the South Mountain at a distance of two or three miles. The little valley between the two is called Pleasant Valley. The south end of Elk Ridge rises above all the surrounding mountains, and is known as Maryland Heights. The road by which McLaws entered Pleasant Valley continues over Elk Ridge at Solomon's Gap, which, like Crampton's Gap, is about five miles north of the Potomac. Learning that the Federals held Maryland Heights in force, McLaws sent Kershaw with his

¹ This gap is one mile south of Crampton's Gap.

own and Barksdale's brigade to the top of Elk Ridge at Solomon's Gap, with instructions to move along the top of the mountain and attack the enemy at the south end of it.¹ Cobb's brigade was sent along the eastern base of Elk Ridge to support Kershaw. He also sent Wright's brigade and two guns along the South Mountain towards Weverton to hold the pass there along the Potomac. Two brigades (Semmes's and Mahone's) were left to guard the path in the South Mountain as well as that over Elk Ridge.² With the remainder of his force McLaws marched down Pleasant Valley towards Harper's Ferry, seizing Weverton before nightfall, while he held the road from Sandy Hook at the mouth of the valley on the Potomac. Kershaw had meantime come up with the Federal skirmishers on Elk Ridge, and had driven them before him until the dense woods and broken surface ended his progress at dark. Next day (13th) Kershaw pressed forward. The Federal force holding Maryland Heights consisted of some 2000 or 3000 men, under Colonel Ford. Their position was a strong one, and was made more so by some abattis and breast-works of logs and stones, and they were directed to hold it to the last. The defense was, however, not long effective against Kershaw. "After a very sharp and spirited engagement through the dense woods and over a broken surface, Kershaw succeeded in carrying the main ridge."³ The Federals then retired hastily into Harper's Ferry, and by evening McLaws had possession of the entire Maryland Heights, as well as of Sandy Hook and Weverton, which last closed the avenues of escape down the north bank of the Potomac from Harper's Ferry. The loss of Maryland Heights was fatal to the garrison of Harper's Ferry. Its importance seemed not to be appreciated by the Federal commander, and its defense was not as obstinate as the circumstances demanded. Colonel Miles was severely censured by a Court of Inquiry, which

¹ No artillery could be sent with this column, so rough was the mountain.

² These were Crampton's and Brownsville's gaps in the South Mountain and Solomon's Gap in Elk Ridge.

³ McLaws's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 853.

subsequently investigated the matter, and Colonel Ford was dismissed the service.¹ Whether the conduct of these officers deserved this severity may be doubted, but there can be no doubt that, in not making Maryland Heights the main and last point of defense, Colonel Miles committed a blunder only paralleled by General Halleck's, in retaining a garrison in an unprovisioned and almost unfortified post to be surrounded by a hostile army. The next morning was consumed by General McLaws in cutting a road practicable for artillery to the top of the Maryland Heights, and by two P. M. four guns² were in position "overlooking Bolivar Heights and the town. Fire was opened at once, driving the enemy from their works on the right of Bolivar Heights and throwing shells into the town. In the mean while General Walker . . . had opened fire from Loudoun Heights, and General Jackson's batteries were playing from several points."³

Let us now return to Jackson, whom we left at midday on the 13th at Halltown, waiting for Walker and McLaws, who were behind time, to get into position. He learned of their success during the night of the 13th, and prepared to advance as soon as they were ready to coöperate. As we have already seen, this was not the case until the afternoon of the 14th, when McLaws had gotten his artillery into place on the Maryland Heights. Walker had his guns in position by midday, and the Federals having opened fire upon him from Bolivar, he began to reply about one P. M., and in two hours silenced the opposing battery.⁴ Jackson now pushed forward. A. P. Hill advanced on the Confederate right along the west bank of the Shenandoah, with instructions to turn the enemy's flank and get into Harper's Ferry in their rear. Lawton, with Ewell's division, moved along the turnpike⁵ towards the centre of the

¹ See report of court-martial on Colonels Ford and Miles. (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. pp. 798-800.)

² Two from Read's and two from Carleton's battery, under Major Hamilton, chief of artillery to McLaws.

³ McLaws's report, *Ib.* p. 854.

⁴ Walker's report, *Ib.* p. 913.

⁵ This turnpike, from Harper's Ferry to Charlestown, passes over Bolivar Heights about midway between the two rivers, and is the principal road leading into Harper's Ferry.

Federal position on Bolivar Heights. J. R. Jones, with part of Jackson's division,¹ was sent against the Federal right near the Potomac, on which McLaws's artillery was also playing. The cavalry under Major Massie was to guard an escape of the enemy up the south bank of the Potomac.

Jones, driving off some Federal cavalry, soon seized without difficulty a commanding eminence near the Potomac, which gave his artillery an advantageous fire upon the Federal lines. Meantime, A. P. Hill was advancing on the other wing along the Shenandoah River. "Observing an eminence crowning the extreme left of the enemy's line, occupied by infantry, but without artillery, and protected only by an abattis of fallen timber, Pender, Archer, and Brockenbrough were directed to gain the crest of that hill, while Branch and Gregg were directed to march along the river, and during the night to take advantage of the ravines cutting the precipitous banks of the river, and establish themselves on the plain to the left and rear of the enemy's works."² Pender, who led the first movement, accomplished it with slight resistance, and during the night Lieutenant-Colonel R. L. Walker, Hill's chief of artillery, placed five batteries³ in the positions thus gained. Branch and Gregg also succeeded, and "daybreak (of the 15th) found them in rear of the enemy's line of defense."⁴ While Hill and Jones were thus turning both flanks, Lawton had advanced to the front of the Federal lines near the turnpike, where he lay all night under arms. During the night, batteries were placed by Colonel Crutchfield⁵ on Lawton's line on School House Hill,⁶ and ten guns⁷ were taken across the Shenandoah River

¹ This was Winder's brigade (Stonewall), under Colonel Grigsby, with Poague's and Carpenter's batteries.

² Jackson's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 954. Pender, Archer, and Brockenbrough commanded three of Hill's brigades, and Branch and Gregg two others. Hill's remaining brigade, under Thomas, acted as a reserve.

³ The batteries were those of Pegram, McIntosh, Davidson, Braxton, and Crenshaw.

⁴ Jackson's report, *Ib.* p. 954.

⁵ Jackson's chief of artillery.

⁶ School House Hill, so named from a stone house on it, was a ridge crossing the turnpike in front of Bolivar Heights.

⁷ From the batteries of Brown, Dement, Garber, and Latimer. (Crutchfield's report, *Ib.* p. 962.)

and put in position near the base of the Blue Ridge, on the east side. These guns were so placed as to enfilade the Federal lines on Bolivar Heights, and even had a reverse fire on the nearest and most formidable fortifications of the garrison.

After dark on Sunday (14th), the various batteries that were then in position, especially those from Loudoun and Maryland Heights, continued their fire on Harper's Ferry, and this, together with the Federal guns replying from Bolivar, constituted a magnificent display of fireworks, which was visible for many miles. All night were Jackson's troops making the movements above indicated, and his artillery officers placing guns in position. The devoted garrison awaited with apprehension and without hope the fearful hail of fire which the day would surely bring. The Confederates were spurred to prompt action by the important events of the 14th elsewhere. The advance on that day of McClellan, the battle of South Mountain, and the seizure of Crampton's Gap and of Pleasant Valley in rear of McLaws, which will be described hereafter, all showed the vigorous efforts making to relieve Harper's Ferry, and earnest dispatches from Lee represented to his lieutenants the necessity of speedy success and of a speedy reunion of his scattered forces, to make head against the overwhelming advance of McClellan's army.

At dawn on the 15th, Jackson ordered the attack to begin. From the guns which Crutchfield had placed east of the Shenandoah, from R. L. Walker's guns on the plateau which Hill had seized at nightfall, from the batteries on School House Hill, and from Poague's and Carpenter's guns near the Potomac, a rapid fire was poured into the enemy's lines. From Maryland and from Loudoun Heights a damaging fire was also poured upon the doomed garrison. To this last especially it was impossible for the Federal batteries to make any effective reply, so great was the elevation. All parts of Harper's Ferry and of Bolivar were covered by the Confederate fire. In an hour the Federal fire slackened, and orders were issued to the infantry to carry the place by storm. As Pender, at the head of Hill's division, was advancing for this purpose, the Federal batteries reopened. Then Hill moved forward Pegram's and

Carpenter's batteries to within 400 yards of the Federal works, and once more poured a rapid, enfilading fire into the enemy. The Federal troops were now rapidly becoming disorganized, and the Federal commander saw that further resistance meant only useless slaughter. A white flag was therefore (about eight o'clock A. M.) displayed,¹ and as soon as the Confederate batteries could be stopped, the place and garrison were surrendered.

Colonel Miles having been mortally wounded almost at the last moment, the surrender was made by General Julius White.² The terms granted by General Jackson were very liberal. The officers were allowed to go on parole with side arms and private property, and the privates with everything except equipments and guns. The Confederates captured about 11,500 prisoners,³ 13,000 stand of arms, and 73 pieces of artillery,⁴ besides a considerable quantity of quartermaster and commissary stores. The only portion of the garrison that escaped was the cavalry under Colonel Davis, consisting of 1300 men.⁵ These left Harper's Ferry on the night of the 14th, and made their way quietly along the base of Maryland Heights up the north bank of the Potomac. General McLaws had omitted to guard this road except by his troops on the mountain top, and

¹ This flag was a piece of tent waved by a horseman who rode along the Federal works, from their right towards their left. Orders were at once issued to the Confederate batteries to cease firing, but it was some minutes before these orders reached the more distant ones, and in the mean time Colonel Miles, the Federal commander, was mortally wounded by one of these last shots. General McGowan, commanding Gregg's brigade, says Hill silenced the works at 7.30 to receive the surrender. (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 987.)

² General White, though the senior officer, had declined to take command over Colonel Miles, an experienced officer of the old army, and who, besides, had been in command at Harper's Ferry for some time, while General White had only reached it on the 12th with the forces from Winchester and Martinsburg.

³ For forces surrendered, see *Ib.* p. 549.

⁴ *Ib.* p. 548.

⁵ Davis had his own regiment (8th New York), the 12th Illinois under Colonel Vass, and two companies each of Rhode Island and Maryland cavalry. (Curtin's dispatch to E. M. Stanton, September 15, *Ib.* part ii. p. 306.)

the passage of the Federal cavalry at its base was undiscovered. This cavalry, moving toward Hagerstown, came in contact with a part of Longstreet's wagon train on the 15th, as it was retiring towards Sharpsburg. They destroyed about forty wagons, when they continued their march northward and made good their escape. The capture of Harper's Ferry was attended with but trifling casualties. The losses in A. P. Hill's division were three killed and 66 wounded, which seem to have been all of Jackson's loss. Walker's command on Loudoun Heights lost one killed and three wounded. The loss in McLaws's troops was slight, but is not given. The casualties on the Federal side are said not to have exceeded 200 killed and wounded.¹

¹ *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 549.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

THE SOUTH MOUNTAIN PASSES.

THUS far the strategy of General Lee had been completely successful. All the Federal forces on the Virginia side of the Potomac had been cooped up in Harper's Ferry, and compelled to surrender in less than twenty-four hours after the Confederates had all gotten into position. McLaws and Walker were a day late, but nevertheless the capture had been made promptly and with little loss. The brilliant result had been most largely due to the celerity of Jackson's movements, the promptness with which he followed up the Federals to Harper's Ferry, and the vigor, completeness, and dispatch which marked his preparations for attack. But well conceived and promptly carried out as were the designs for the fall of Harper's Ferry, they were brought to a successful issue not an hour too soon; for most important events had taken place at no great distance, which not only threatened the relief of Harper's Ferry, but involved the Confederate army in the greatest peril. To these we must now turn.

When Lee had, on September 10, divided his army, sending the larger part of it by different and widely separated routes to envelop Harper's Ferry, and retaining the remainder to cover the rear of the troops so engaged, and to watch and impede the advance of the Federal army from Washington, there was good ground for the Confederate leader's expectation that Harper's Ferry would be reduced, and the Southern army reunited on the Maryland side of the Potomac, before it would be necessary to give battle to McClellan. The Federal army, though immensely superior in numbers, had passed through two unsuccessful campaigns, one of which was so recent and disastrous that the damaging effect must still be felt in organ-

ization and morale. The slow and cautious movements of that army as it advanced from Washington confirmed these views, and encouraged Lee to scatter his army in order to strike a telling blow while his adversary was creeping forward. Nor is there any reasonable ground for doubt that Lee's calculations would have been realized, but for one of those strange chances on which the tide of battle and the fate of nations sometimes seem to hang.

On September 13, McClellan occupied Frederick in force, and found in his front nothing but the Confederate cavalry, under Stuart. The mass of the Confederate army had moved towards the South Mountain and Hagerstown.¹ It was during the afternoon of that day that some one brought to the Federal commander a written paper picked up in one of the camps that had been recently occupied by the Confederates.² It proved to be a copy of Special Order No. 191, sent from General Lee's headquarters to General D. H. Hill, which contained in detail the directions for all the Confederate movements which were begun on September 10. This important paper had been lost or mislaid by some one, and had been picked up where it no doubt had been dropped.³ The Federal commander realized at a glance the importance of the information which a lucky accident had placed in his possession, and expressed his delight at it. Knowing exactly the plan of operations and the position

¹ Even Jackson and McLaws, when leaving Frederick, had marched on the road to Hagerstown.

² It is also said that this paper was picked up in front of a store in Frederick, at the spot where General D. H. Hill and some of his staff sat on their horses for some time as the troops marched by on the 10th.

³ General D. H. Hill says he never received this order; that his order came through General Jackson, under whose orders he had been for some days. The truth was, two orders were sent, Jackson sending one to Hill, who had been temporarily under his command for some days, but was now to be detached, and the other going out from army headquarters. Jackson was so careful that he wrote the copies he had to send out himself, and General Hill says he now has his copy in Jackson's handwriting. Whether the other one was lost through the carelessness of the courier, or of some one about Hill's headquarters, will probably never be known.

For copy of order, see *ante*, p. 332. (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part ii. pp. 603, 604; Palfrey, *The Antietam and Fredericksburg*, pp. 20, 21.)

of every division of the Confederate army, a grand opportunity was offered to McClellan. His first care must be to relieve the garrison of Harper's Ferry, which the day before had been added to his command. Though communication with it was cut off, the firing in that direction showed it was still holding out, and McClellan had no doubt that Colonel Miles could maintain himself a few days longer. The information given by the captured order made plain the best way of relieving the garrison, and at the same time of destroying one of the Confederate commands now employed against it. This was, to push a strong force after McLaws into Pleasant Valley, and, by following up vigorously, crush him while isolated. This plan, too, offered the promptest relief to Colonel Miles by way of Maryland Heights. But a much greater object than the relief of Harper's Ferry and the rescue of its garrison seemed within reach of the Federal commander. The Confederate army was widely separated. More than one third of it was on the south side of the Potomac, and could not be recalled in less than two days. Of the portion north of the river, that under McLaws might be separated completely from the remainder by throwing a force into Pleasant Valley in his rear, and the troops which Lee had retained under Longstreet and D. H. Hill were entirely inadequate to cope with the main body of the Federal army. McClellan determined to seize his opportunity, and while throwing forward his left under Franklin upon McLaws, to overwhelm with the mass of his army that portion of the Confederate force (less than half the whole) which Lee had retained to hold the passes of the South Mountain and the valley west of them until the troops engaged in the reduction of Harper's Ferry should have returned.

An immediate change was wrought in the attitude and motions of the Federal army. Instead of the slow and cautious movements of the past ten days, a comparatively rapid advance was ordered. Pleasonton had already been sent forward with the cavalry and some support toward Middletown beyond the Catoctin range.¹ Stuart had held him back at the pass over

¹ Catoctin is a mountain range parallel to the main South Mountain, and lying between it and Frederick. Middletown is in the valley between Catoctin and the South Mountain.

the Catoctin with two regiments of cavalry and two guns until after midday, when the Confederates were forced to retire. Pleasonton was directed to push on towards the South Mountain. Burnside's corps was sent forward to support him. Urgent orders were dispatched to Franklin¹ at Buckeyetown to move on Crampton's Gap by way of Burkettsville at daylight next morning (14th). Couch's division was to support him. Hooker's corps was to move early, and to follow Burnside on the Hagerstown road. Sumner, with his own and Mansfield's corps, was also to march rapidly toward Hagerstown.

The advance of the Federal army during the 13th was delayed by Stuart's successive stands as he retired across the Middletown valley, so that General D. H. Hill at Boonesborough had time to send up two brigades² to occupy Turner's Gap on the South Mountain, and to place his other brigades in reserve at Boonesborough. Pleasonton, reaching the eastern base of the mountain, could go no farther, and the operations of the day here ended.

During the day (13th) General Lee was at Hagerstown with Longstreet's command. D. H. Hill was at Boonesborough. It had not been Lee's design to dispute the passage of the South Mountain unless the Federals should advance before the fall of Harper's Ferry, and thus threaten to cut off McLaws. But this unexpected contingency was evidently about to occur. Not merely the vigor with which the Federal cavalry advanced on the afternoon of the 13th convinced Lee and Stuart of this. They received information during the night of the cause of the sudden change in the movements of the Federal army. A citizen friendly to the Confederate cause had accidentally been present when the order had been brought to McClellan, and had heard the expressions of gratification that followed, and had learned of the orders then issued. He lost no time in leaving Frederick, and, making his way through the lines, brought this information after night to Stuart, who at once forwarded it to General Lee. Thus informed before daylight on

¹ See McClellan's dispatch to Franklin at 6.20 P. M. on the 13th. (McClellan's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 45.)

² Garland's and Colquitt's.

the 14th of the impending danger, Lee, to cover McLaws, ordered D. H. Hill to hold the mountain pass, and directed Longstreet to march rapidly to the assistance of the latter. At the same time the necessity for bringing to a prompt conclusion the operations at Harper's Ferry was made known to Jackson.

The condition of affairs on the morning of the 14th was certainly one of difficulty to the Confederate leader. Of the forty infantry brigades then in his army, sixteen, under Jackson and Walker, were south of the Potomac, and ten others, under McLaws, were coöperating with these against Harper's Ferry. There remained but five brigades under D. H. Hill and nine under Longstreet. Hill was holding the Boonesborough pass in McClellan's front, but Longstreet was thirteen miles in his rear at Hagerstown. Leaving one brigade at Hagerstown, Longstreet hastened by a forced march to D. H. Hill's aid, but he could not reach him before the middle of the afternoon. Hence the brunt of the battle at the Boonesborough Gap was to be borne for the greater part of the day by D. H. Hill, whose force was about 5000 men.¹ Four or five miles south of the Boonesborough Gap were Crampton and Brownsville gaps in the South Mountain, which led directly to the rear of McLaws. The latter had left General Semmes with his own and Mahone's brigades to watch these gaps, as well as Solomon's Gap in Elk Ridge on the west side of Pleasant Valley. Semmes's brigade was in Brownsville Gap, by which McLaws had advanced, a mile to the south of Crampton's, while the defense of Crampton's Gap was confided to Colonel Munford with two small regiments of cavalry,² supported by Mahone's brigade. Munford had been gradually forced back to the gap the day before by the Federal cavalry. Late in the afternoon of the 13th, Hampton had been sent by Stuart from the Boonesborough road to Munford's assistance, and had charged and driven back

¹ D. H. Hill's division numbered over 9000 men at Richmond on July 20, but the long march, first from Richmond to Manassas, and then with hardly a halt to Frederick, had greatly depleted it. See Hill's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. pp. 1021, 1022.

² 2d and 12th Virginia.

the advancing cavalry force. But on the morning of the 14th, Stuart, seeing no sign of an attack in force on Crampton's Gap,¹ and fearing an advance of the Federals along the Potomac towards Harper's Ferry, had sent Hampton in that direction, and had left Munford with but two cavalry regiments and two of infantry at Crampton's. McLaws, having been notified of the demonstrations of the enemy in his rear, directed that the whole of Mahone's brigade should go to Crampton's Gap, and subsequently, about midday, sent Cobb's brigade also to the same point. Such were the slender means with which Lee undertook on September 14 to hold in check the Federal army at the mountain passes until the fall of Harper's Ferry could be assured.

But Lee had an adversary to deal with, whom, in spite of eminent merit and skill, nothing could make enterprising. Fully advised of the Confederate plans and the scattered condition of their forces, and knowing, too, the value of hours in securing the splendid stake he was playing for, McClellan fell far short of rising to the occasion. The Federal army, it is true, showed a decided aggressive tendency, instead of the uncertainty and hesitation of the past week. It moved with promptness and vigor against the proper points, but this was a case that demanded the most strenuous action, and neither the orders of the Federal commander nor the acts of his lieutenants can be considered of this character. The opportunity thus afforded to the boldness, skill, and energy of the Confederate leader was not thrown away. In following the movements of the Federal army we shall see how Lee extricated himself from the difficulties in which his audacious strategy had involved him.

At nightfall on the 13th, Pleasonton's cavalry was at the eastern base of the South Mountain on the turnpike, and Burnside's corps (under Reno) was near Middletown. Hooker, who was to support Reno, was on the Monocacy, two miles east of Frederick. He was ordered to move at daylight, but as he was from twelve to fifteen miles away from the scene of action, this meant that he could not par-

¹ Franklin did not reach the vicinity of Crampton's Gap until midday.

ticipate in it before the afternoon. Franklin was between Buckeyetown and Jefferson, ten miles from Crampton's Gap, and McClellan, in giving him full information of the situation and of the part the 6th corps was to take in the relief of Harper's Ferry, concluded his letter as follows: "I ask of you at this important moment all your intellect and the utmost activity that a general can exercise."¹ But instead of ordering him forward that night to Burketttsville, he was only directed to move forward at daybreak.

The two contests that took place on the 14th, the one at Crampton's and the other at Turner's or the Boonesborough Gap, were some five miles apart, and were entirely disconnected. That at Crampton's Gap, between the left wing under Franklin and some of McLaws's troops, began latest, but as it ended soonest we will describe it first.

The principal road across the mountain from the little village of Burketttsville leads through Crampton's Gap, but another road from the same place crossed at Brownsville Gap, a mile to the south. This had been the road followed by McLaws, because it led most directly to Harper's Ferry, and Semmes's brigade was sent to hold this road, while Munford, with two cavalry regiments and part of Mahone's brigade and two batteries, held Crampton's Gap. Munford posted his little force near the eastern part of the pass behind some stone fences, which then ran parallel with the mountain. He dismounted his cavalry and placed them on the flanks of the two infantry regiments, and located his artillery on higher ground in his rear, finally placing the two rifled pieces at the crest of the pass. In this position he awaited attack.

General Franklin, whose corps numbered 12,300 present for duty,² reached Burketttsville about midday.³ Some three hours were consumed⁴ in skirmishing and in placing the troops in position to attack the 600 or 800 men in his front. Slocum's division was formed in column of attack, with Bartlett's bri-

¹ McClellan's order to Franklin at 6.20 P. M. on the 13th. (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 45.)

² McClellan's report, *Ib.* p. 267.

³ Slocum's report, *Ib.* p. 380.

⁴ Slocum says the attack was made about three P. M. (*Ib.* p. 380.)

gade in front, followed by Newton and he by Torbert. Each brigade was formed in two lines. On Slocum's left Brooks's brigade of Smith's division was placed to advance through the woods on the south side of the road, and Wolcott's battery supported the movement on Slocum's right. A vigorous and annoying fire was kept up on the Federal troops from Munford's guns on the mountain as well as from the pieces which Semmes had in the Brownsville pass, but before the final attack the ammunition of the artillery had been exhausted and the guns sent to the rear. Two regiments of Mahone's brigade (6th and 12th Virginia) had been ordered from Solomon's Gap to reinforce Munford; these troops (amounting to 300 under Colonel Parham)¹ arrived before three o'clock, and took position with their command.² With numbers thus increased possibly to 1000 or 1200 men, Munford for a time held his position firmly, and resisted the advance of the 8000 troops which were being thrown against him. The Confederate position was a strong one, Colonel Parham managed his handful of infantry with great skill and courage, and Bartlett's brigade failed in their efforts to carry the position, and were compelled to seek the aid of the supporting lines.³ A new charge was then ordered, in which Brooks's brigade as well as Slocum's division participated, and the Confederate lines were carried. It was just as the Federals were advancing to the final charge that General Cobb, who had been ordered back by McLaws from the lower part of Pleasant Valley to reinforce Munford, arrived. His two front regiments were gotten into position, but the other two went forward as the Confederate line was yielding, and were themselves quickly thrown into confusion, and by their bad conduct hastened rather than de-

¹ Parham commanded Mahone's brigade, while Munford, of the cavalry, as senior, commanded all the Confederates at this point until the arrival of General Cobb, who ranked the others.

² This made four of Mahone's regiments which were at Crampton's Gap. (Munford's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 826.)

³ Franklin says: "Bartlett maintained his ground steadily under a severe fire for some time at a manifest disadvantage, until reinforced by two regiments of General Newton's brigade on his right, and the brigade of Colonel Torbert and two remaining regiments of Newton's on his left." (Franklin's report, *Ib.* p. 375.)

layed the defeat. General Cobb's efforts to rally his troops were for the most part unsuccessful. The overwhelming force of the enemy pushed on without stopping. The Confederates fell back in disorder up the mountain, and, after an ineffectual attempt at the crest to check the enemy, they continued their way in confusion and rout into Pleasant Valley. The loss of Crampton's Gap involved the retreat of Semmes; and the three brigades,¹ or what was left of them, retreated a short distance on the road towards Harper's Ferry. Here night put an end to the pursuit of the Federals, who seemed satisfied at having obtained full possession of the pass. McLaws, when informed that Cobb was pressed, had ordered back Wilcox's brigade from near Harper's Ferry, and when he found that the enemy had gained the pass, he brought back the mass of Kershaw's and Barksdale's brigades from Maryland Heights, and formed, during the night, a new line of battle across Pleasant Valley about one and one half miles south of Crampton's Gap. He placed under General Anderson the six brigades now assembled there, while with his other four brigades he continued to coöperate in the investment of Harper's Ferry, which had not yet fallen. The Federals claim 400 prisoners, one piece of artillery, and three colors as captured at Crampton's Gap. They lost 533 men killed² and wounded. The Confederate loss is unknown, but probably equaled this.

Night thus found McLaws shut up in Pleasant Valley with the Harper's Ferry garrison at one end and Franklin at the other. A quicker realization of the situation at Crampton's Gap, and a prompter movement of troops to that point, might have kept that pass in Confederate hands for the time. As it was, the spirited defense made by Munford had been sufficient to delay Franklin, so that night came before he could follow up his advantage and press upon the rear of McLaws at Maryland Heights. With the halt of Franklin at the northern end of Pleasant Valley passed away the last chance for the relief of Harper's Ferry.

¹ Semmes's, Mahone's, and Cobb's. Semmes's brigade had not been attacked. Munford thought it ought to have come to his aid, but whether this was possible is doubtful.

² Return of casualties, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 183.

It is time now to turn to the history of the day at Turner's or the Boonesborough Gap. The National road or turnpike between Frederick and Hagerstown crosses the South Mountain at this point through a depression some 400 feet below the crests on either side. At short distances on both sides of this main pass are other gaps, through which roads pass from one side of the mountain to the other. One mile south of the turnpike is Fox's Gap, through which the old Sharpsburg road goes, and three quarters of a mile beyond this in the same southerly direction another road crosses the mountain. A road running along the top of the mountain connects these two roads with the turnpike near the Mountain House at the summit of Turner's Gap. This road along the mountain top crosses the old Sharpsburg road at right angles, but, when half way between that and the next road over the mountain, bends sharply to the west in following the direction of the mountain ridge. This mountain-top road, near its crossing of the old Sharpsburg road and south of that point, runs along the western edge of open ground, some of which was then in corn and some in grass. This open ground is a plateau intersected by ravines. West of the mountain-top road the forest is dense, as it is also to the south and east of the open ground we have mentioned. To the west of the mountain-top road, after a slight depression, the mountain rises into other spurs and ridges, for the most part thickly wooded. North of the turnpike some two miles is the Hamburg pass, but more important is the configuration of the mountain on that side near Turner's Gap. Here the mountain is divided into two or three distinct ridges or spurs. At the summit of Turner's Gap a road branches off the turnpike, and, running in a northeasterly direction between the two easternmost of these two ridges, at a distance of a mile north of the turnpike, passes through a gorge which divides the most eastern spur from the ridge west of it, and curving around to the right by Mt. Tabor Church, enters the turnpike again at the eastern base of the mountain. This is known as the old Hagerstown road. Looking along this road from the Mountain House, it seems to run in a little valley between two mountain spurs, which valley disappears

as we rise towards a spur that seems to terminate it about a mile north of the turnpike. On both sides of this last spur roads branching off from the old Hagerstown road lead over the mountain to the west.

It will thus be seen that easy means of flanking a force defending Turner's Gap existed on both sides of it, and that many points would have to be occupied to hold the mountain against the advance of a large army. Two of D. H. Hill's brigades¹ had spent the night of the 13th on the mountain. The other three² were several miles in their rear. General Hill was slow to learn the character of the ground,³—slow to realize the magnitude of the task before him,—and these brigades were not promptly sent forward on the morning of the 14th. It was midday or later before the last of them was brought to the summit of the mountain. In the early morning Colquitt's brigade was disposed on both sides of the turnpike in Turner's Gap, while Garland was directed to take his brigade along the mountain-top road to the south, and defend the points where the old Sharpsburg road, and the road south of it, crossed over the mountain. A battery went with Garland, and Colonel Rosser with his cavalry regiment⁴ and a section of horse artillery was also on that flank. Artillery was placed on Colquitt's front to defend the main pass, and also to enfilade, as much as the broken surface would admit, the approaches to the gaps north and south of the main one. On the north of the turnpike, a regiment of Ripley's brigade (4th Georgia, under Colonel Doles) had been sent to the Hamburg Gap. No attempt was made upon the mountain north of the turnpike until the afternoon.

The fighting during all the fore part of the day was confined to the south of the turnpike. The Federals, in accordance with McClellan's orders, moved early. Pleasanton, with a bri-

¹ Colquitt's and Garland's.

² G. B. Anderson's, Ripley's, and Rodes's.

³ Stuart's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 817. D. H. Hill's report, *Ib.* pp. 1019, 1020.

⁴ 5th Virginia cavalry. General Palfrey gives him a brigade. Rosser had only his regiment, which he dismounted and used as sharpshooters, as the field was utterly impassable for cavalry.

gade of cavalry and some artillery, led the way, and was supported by Cox's (Kanawha) division of Reno's corps, which set out from Middletown at six A. M. After leaving a battery and some skirmishers to make a demonstration and occupy the Confederates on the main road, Pleasonton directed the head of the advancing forces along the old Sharpsburg road and the road south of it with the intention of gaining the summit of the mountain, and thence bearing down on the flank of the Confederates and Turner's Gap. Scammon, with the leading brigade of Cox's division, made his way along these roads and through the woods bordering them. Lieutenant-Colonel Hayes,¹ with the 23d Ohio regiment, was sent through the dense woods to the south of the southernmost road to gain the crest, while the remainder of the brigade advanced on his right. It was about nine A. M., and Garland was disposing his brigade along the mountain-top road, when his right regiment (5th North Carolina, Colonel McRae) came in contact with Colonel Hayes, who had made his way through the thicket to the top of the crest. Garland ordered McRae to dislodge the Federals, and sent the 12th North Carolina to aid him. The latter regiment behaved badly and McRae was repulsed, and thus the Federals secured a footing on the crest. The Federals, meantime, advancing along the old Sharpsburg road, had struck the left of Garland's brigade there placed. The Union troops were repulsed at this point for a time, but it cost the life of the brave Garland. Now ensued a stubborn contest along the mountain-top road and in the open plateau in front of it. G. B. Anderson's brigade had come up to the aid of Garland's. It was placed at Fox's Gap and just where the old Sharpsburg road crosses, while Garland's brigade, now under McRae, was concentrated in the open plateau and near the most southern pass. A large space separated these brigades, which were insufficient to hold the whole ground. On the other side, Crook's brigade came up to Scammon's aid. The Federal efforts were chiefly directed against the Confederate right, to increase the footing they had already gained there. The open plateau was for a time the scene of a sanguinary contest, the Confederates shelter-

¹ Afterwards President Hayes.

ing themselves behind some fences and stone piles, and pouring a severe fire into the Federals advancing over the open ground. A section of the 1st Ohio battery was run up on the plateau, and in a few minutes was silenced by the killing of nearly everybody engaged in serving it.¹ But in a short time the Federal infantry made a united and determined charge upon the Confederate lines, and Garland's brigade was broken and driven from its position. At Colonel Rosser's suggestion, the remains of Garland's brigade, when rallied, were placed on a height to the rear of the mountain-top road, where, in conjunction with the artillery Rosser had put there, they prevented any advance of the Federals beyond the crest. Anderson's brigade was obliged to fall back to the westward in Fox's Gap, and Cox was left in possession of the crest of the mountain.

It was now midday, and a lull took place in the battle. Both sides awaited reinforcements. The remainder of Reno's corps was coming forward to Cox's assistance, and he awaited the arrival of this large force before he attempted to press his advantage farther. Hooker's corps was also pressing forward to take part in the struggle, and was being directed by McClellan toward the pass on the north side of the turnpike along the old Hagerstown road. This delay was favorable to the Confederates. It enabled Hill to bring up from Boonesborough the brigades of Ripley and Rodes, the former of whom was sent to support McRae and G. B. Anderson, while Rodes was directed to defend the approaches by way of the old Hagerstown road. Longstreet was rapidly approaching from Hagerstown, but it was some time before he reached the field.

The divisions of Wilcox, Sturgis, and Rodman, of Reno's corps, reached the field about three P. M., and were placed to support and extend Cox's lines; the greater part of them on his right near Fox's Gap and between that point and the turnpike. On the north of the turnpike Hooker deployed his corps with Hatch's division on his left, Meade on his right, and Ricketts in reserve. Gibbon's brigade of Hatch's division

¹ This was accomplished by Captain Atwell and a company of the 20th North Carolina whom Colonel Iverson sent out to flank the battery. (McRae's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 1041.)

was to move up the turnpike itself. Hatch was to attack the spur in his front between the turnpike and the Hagerstown road, while Meade was to outflank the Confederates and seize the spur or ridge north of the last named road. When this strong body first moved forward, the Confederates had in their front but two regiments of Colquitt's brigade placed close to the turnpike and holding it, and Rodes's brigade of some 1200 men, which held the two spurs. A wide unoccupied space separated the two positions of this brigade, which was inadequate to occupy the whole line. Rodes availed himself skillfully of all the advantages of his position, and resisted Hooker's advance stubbornly and tenaciously. The contest was especially severe on the north side of the old Hagerstown road, where Meade attempted to dislodge the Confederates from the key-point of their position, for the ridge on that side was the higher and commanded the field. Here Rodes held on most tenaciously, and only yielded ground slowly before the masses of his opponent. Seymour's brigade made a vigorous effort to flank the Confederates, but he was met and foiled for the time by the 6th Alabama, Colonel J. B. Gordon, who, with the greatest skill, coolness, and courage, contested every inch of ground. Seeing the unequal nature of the contest, Rodes called urgently for reinforcements.

General Lee had been hastening forward Longstreet's troops, who, after a long, hot, and rapid march, began to reach the field soon after three o'clock. Drayton's and G. T. Anderson's brigades were in front, and they were sent to the south side of the turnpike to aid the troops opposing Reno. An hour later Longstreet reached the field, and, taking charge of affairs, sent Evans's brigade, subsequently followed by those of Kemper, Garnett, and Jenkins, to the north of the turnpike to aid Rodes. The last three of these brigades had been sent first by a road diverging at Boonesborough towards Fox's Gap, but, after reaching the foot of the mountains, had been recalled, and ordered to the north of the main road. Thus, several miles had been uselessly added to their toilsome march, and they reached the field in poor condition for the immediate and vigorous fighting demanded by the condition of affairs.

As soon as the first of Longstreet's troops under Drayton and G. T. Anderson arrived, D. H. Hill led them towards the old Sharpsburg road with the design of dislodging Cox from the position he had gained on the mountain crest. For this purpose the four brigades of G. B. Anderson, Ripley, G. T. Anderson, and Drayton were formed in this order from right to left, and General Ripley, in charge of them, was directed to advance and throw his right, if possible, against the enemy's left. The Confederates had not gotten fully into position for this purpose when Reno's three divisions,¹ which had for an hour been taking their places on the field, moved forward to the attack. Their advance, under Wilcox supported by the others, struck Drayton, and after a short and sharp struggle broke and drove back his troops in confusion. So difficult was movement in the dense forest, and so bad was the handling of the Confederates, that no adequate support was given to Drayton by the other parts of the line. G. T. Anderson found himself separated from the brigades both on his right and on his left, and after several movements finally fell back without having engaged the enemy.² Ripley's brigade attempted a diversion by moving against the enemy's left, but never came in contact with it.³ G. B. Anderson on the Confederate right moved up the mountain to the crest and charged a Federal battery in its front, but was repulsed.⁴ Rosser with his section of artillery again rendered valuable service. Quickly placing them so as to command the old Sharpsburg road, the Federals were for the time held back and prevented from pursuing far down the west side of the mountain. At this juncture, General Hood, with his own and Law's brigade,⁵ arrived from the turnpike, and

¹ Wilcox's, Sturgis's, and Rodman's.

² G. T. Anderson's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 909.

³ Ripley's report, *Ib.* p. 1032.

⁴ Colonel Grimes's report, *Ib.* p. 1049.

⁵ They had come up with Evans, but had been held in reserve at the turnpike when Evans was sent to the north of it. Hood thus describes his fight: "Major Frobel's batteries had come forward into position on top of the ridge; they opened fire, and performed excellent service in checking the enemy. The wood and undergrowth were dense, and nothing but a pig path seemed to lead in the direction in which I was ordered. Never-

meeting Drayton's broken troops, they at once advanced over very rugged ground to attack the Federals. Charging the victorious troops of Reno, Hood's men checked their advance, and forced them back from the west slope to the crest of the mountain, where a spirited contest was maintained until after dark. It was about dusk in this last contest that General Reno fell as he was directing the battle on the Union side. The Federals had gained and they continued to hold the crest at the summit of the passes south of the turnpike.

Meantime, Hooker had made even more important headway on the north side of Turner's Gap. We left him slowly but steadily working his way up the old Hagerstown road and the adjacent heights, in spite of the fierce and active opposition offered by the single brigade under Rodes. Some precious hours were gained by this opposition of the Confederates, but Hooker with 17,000 troops must soon have swept all before him, when Longstreet's brigades began to arrive and were thrown without halting across his path. Rodes was struggling to keep a foothold on the farther height, when Evans was sent up to join his right, and Kemper's brigade and Garnett's, with Jenkins in support, were ordered to fill the space between the turnpike and Evans. These brigades, except that of Jenkins, became quickly engaged with the advancing enemy. At some

theless, I conducted my troops obliquely by the right flank, and while I advanced I could hear the shouts of the Federals, as they swept down the mountain upon our side. I then bore still more obliquely to the right, with the view to get as far as possible towards the left flank of the enemy before we came in contact. We marched on through the wood as rapidly as the obstacles in our passage would admit. Each step forward brought nearer and nearer to us the heavy Federal lines, as they advanced, cheering over their success and the possession of our dead and wounded. Finally I gave instructions to General Law and Colonel Wofford, directing the two brigades to order their men to fix bayonets; and when the enemy came within seventy-five or a hundred yards I ordered the men to front and charge. They obeyed promptly, with a genuine Confederate yell, and the Federals were driven pell-mell over and beyond the mountain, at a much quicker pace than they had descended. Night closed in with not only our dead and wounded, together with those of our adversary, in our possession, but with the mountain on the right within our lines." (*Hood's Advance and Retreat*, pp. 40, 41.)

points they made a sharp and spirited resistance, at others they yielded to the weight of the Federal attack. Fatigued by a long march and hastily thrown into action, a good deal by haphazard, they retarded but did not prevent Hooker's advance, and were finally forced at heavy cost to fall back near the turnpike. It was dark, however, by the time Rodes had been compelled to yield the farther height, and Longstreet's brigades had been driven back to the vicinity of the main gap. It was impossible to do anything on this rugged field after night, and Hatch and Meade and Ricketts halted at the positions they had won. The last fighting was done on the turnpike itself on Colquitt's line, who, it will be remembered, held Turner's pass and the turnpike at the centre of the Confederate line. In the general Federal advance made about four o'clock, Colquitt had held his own. Later in the afternoon Gibbon's brigade was sent forward on the turnpike against Colquitt. The Federals advanced steadily on both sides of the road, supported by the fire of a battery, and drove back the skirmishers until they reached the Confederate line. Colquitt had two regiments (23d and 28th Georgia) on the north side of the road in a strong position, protected by a stone fence and a ravine. Against these Gibbon made his principal attack, but was received by so destructive a fire that he recoiled. The Federals promptly returned, however, to the attack, and continued their efforts until long after nightfall. These efforts were unavailing. Colquitt held his position, and thus the turnpike and the main pass continued in possession of the Confederates.¹

When welcome night had at last wrought quiet on the battlefield, the situation was as follows: the Confederates held the main pass and the turnpike, the centre of their position, but had been driven back on both wings. On the south

¹ General Palfrey contrasts McClellan's and D. H. Hill's reports of this affair of Gibbon and Colquitt, and considers it a striking instance of the unreliability of military reports. If he had taken only the reports of Gibbon and Colquitt, the commanders present, he would not have found the discrepancy so glaring. Their reports do not seriously conflict. (Palfrey, *The Antietam and Fredericksburg*, p. 40.)

side they still held strong positions, and were able to contest the farther progress of the Federals through Fox's Gap, but south of that point Cox held the crest and roads which gave access to the western base of the mountain. To the north, however, the key of their position, the farther height which Rodes had so stubbornly fought for had fallen into Hooker's hands at dark, and the Federals were in position to force their way, as soon as it was day, from this vantage ground, as well as from the other points on that flank, to the turnpike in the rear of Turner's Gap. It was evident to Lee that without large reinforcements (and there were none within his reach) he could not prevent McClellan from forcing his way over the mountain on the morrow. The Federal commander realized this too, and was well satisfied that Burnside had established himself firmly on the mountain top on both sides of the turnpike, and was ready to bear down with crushing force upon Longstreet, should the struggle be renewed on the next day. By night, too, Sumner with the centre of the Federal army had gotten up, and McClellan was confident that nothing in front could resist the force which he could bring into action on the morrow. Had he known on the night of the 14th that his adversary had secured one of the prizes of the campaign (Harper's Ferry and its garrison) by that day's defense on South Mountain, his satisfaction might have been less, but at that time McClellan certainly expected Harper's Ferry to hold out a day or two longer, and he was certain of relieving it the next day.

The battle of South Mountain cost the Federals 1813 men, almost all killed and wounded.¹ McClellan claims about 1500 prisoners. The loss of the Confederates in killed and wounded is not known, but it was probably from 1000 to 1500.²

The forces engaged at South Mountain consisted, on the Federal side, besides Pleasonton's cavalry, of the right wing of

¹ 325 killed, 1403 wounded, 85 missing. (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 204.)

² Rodes lost 218 killed and wounded, Jenkins 32. In the other reports the losses at South Mountain are combined with those at Sharpsburg.

the Federal army under Burnside, comprising the two corps of Reno and Hooker. McClellan says he carried into action about 30,000 men.¹ The Confederates engaged consisted of one cavalry regiment under Rosser, of the five brigades under D. H. Hill, and of eight brigades which came up with Longstreet. Hill's division numbered 5000. It is doubtful if Longstreet's brigades were as strong as Hill's, but averaging them at the same, the Confederates had in all some 13,000 or 14,000 men on the field.²

The conduct of the battle on both sides is open to criticism. Hill's troops were badly handled. The field was not understood, and the troops not promptly enough put into position. Though with such odds against the Confederates as demanded the services of every man, Ripley's brigade was not engaged at all,³ and the half of G. B. Anderson's very slightly. The condition of affairs was not improved after Longstreet's arrival, though of course it should be remembered that he came

¹ General Palfrey criticises this statement of McClellan, *The Antietam and Sharpsburg*, p. 39, but it must be under some misapprehension. The two corps of Hooker and Reno numbered *after Sharpsburg* (September 20) 22,971 *present for duty*. Hooker says he lost at Sharpsburg near 5000 men. We do not know Burnside's loss in that battle, but it was very considerable. If it were only half of Hooker's, the two corps must have numbered at least 30,000 men present for duty (not aggregate) at South Mountain.

² McClellan's estimate of the force opposed to him at South Mountain was 30,000 men, — as absurd as were all his estimates of the Confederates' strength. But it seems difficult for fair-minded Federal officers, like General Palfrey, to realize the depletion wrought in Lee's lines by hard marching and fighting, insufficient food, and want of shoes. We have seen the fearful depletion in some of McClellan's corps that joined Pope, caused by a comparatively easy transfer from the Peninsula to Pope's lines. Hill had marched all the way from Richmond to Manassas, and then to Maryland, in hot weather and over stony roads. Longstreet had done the same, and in addition had fought at Manassas. The rest the Confederates had obtained for a day or two in Maryland had not increased their numbers, for the stragglers were kept south of the Potomac. At South Mountain Longstreet's strength was still farther depleted by the forced march of from twelve to sixteen miles his troops had made before entering the fight.

³ Hill says "never drew trigger." (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 1021.)

hurriedly upon an unknown battlefield in the midst of a fight. Three of his brigades lost valuable time and valuable strength in marching first two or three miles towards the south side of the battlefield, and then retracing their steps. Others seemed to have been badly placed. G. T. Anderson's brigade was not engaged, and Jenkins's but slightly. It seems probable that had Hill's troops been in position in the early morning, and had Longstreet arrived some hours sooner, the Federal army would not have succeeded in taking and holding any of the Confederate positions. On the other hand, McClellan's movements were so slow that, though successful in a tactical point of view, he lost the prize for which he was contending. With the knowledge of Lee's plans McClellan possessed through the captured order, the Federal assault on the mountain passes might have been made with all of Reno's corps at the time Cox began the battle, and Hooker's corps having been moved part of the way the night before should have been thrown forward before midday, instead of at four p. m. The result of the delay was that while McClellan secured an advantage in a partial combat, and did something thereby to restore the morale of his army, Lee insured the success of his plans against Harper's Ferry

CHAPTER XL.

MCCLELLAN APPROACHES SHARPSBURG.

FINDING his position no longer tenable at Turner's Gap, and learning that Crampton's Gap in McLaws's rear had been forced, Lee withdrew Longstreet and Hill during the night of the 14th, and directed their retirement towards Sharpsburg.¹ Lee's design was thus to place himself upon the flank or rear of any force moving against McLaws, and at the same time to draw nearer to the rest of his army.² "This movement was efficiently and skillfully covered by the cavalry brigade of General Fitzhugh Lee, and was accomplished without interruption by the enemy,³ who did not appear on the west side of the pass at Boonesborough until eight P. M. on the 15th."⁴

The morning of September 15 thus found the Confederate army with its left retiring to Sharpsburg behind the Antietam; while its right, under Jackson and Walker, was investing Harper's Ferry south of the Potomac, and its centre, under McLaws, was in Pleasant Valley, hemmed in between the Harper's Ferry garrison on one side and Franklin's command on the other. The parts of Lee's army were widely separated, and pressing upon him was an immensely superior force.

¹ Fitz Lee's cavalry was left on the lines until the infantry had withdrawn, when it was to follow. Jenkins's infantry brigade on the north side of the pass did not retire until four A. M. See Colonel Walker's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 906.

² Lee's report, *Ib.* p. 147.

³ A dash was made by the advance of Pleasanton's cavalry (8th Illinois) upon Fitz Lee's rear-guard at Boonesborough, in which McClellan says the Federals captured 250 prisoners and two guns. Fitz Lee's report of this affair is not extant.

⁴ *Ib.* p. 147. General Meade says that in consequence of the fog he did not discover that the Confederates had left their position on the mountain until seven A. M. (*Ib.* p. 268.)

McClellan's first object was the relief of Harper's Ferry. At one A. M. on the 15th he sent Franklin the following:¹ "The commanding general directs that you occupy, with your command, the road from Rohrersville to Harper's Ferry, placing a sufficient force at Rohrersville to hold that position in case it should be attacked by the enemy from Boonesborough. Endeavor to open communication with Colonel Miles at Harper's Ferry, attacking and destroying such of the enemy as you may find in Pleasant Valley. Should you succeed in opening communication with Colonel Miles, direct him to join you with his whole command, with all the guns and public property that he can carry with him. The remainder of the guns will be spiked or destroyed; the rest of the public property will also be destroyed. You will then proceed to Boonesborough, which place the commanding general intends to attack to-morrow, and join the main body of the army at that place; should you find, however, that the enemy have retreated from Boonesborough towards Sharpsburg, you will endeavor to fall upon him and cut off his retreat." It was not possible for Franklin after that time to prevent the fall of Harper's Ferry, but it must be confessed that his operations were neither in accordance with McClellan's orders, nor with the exigency of the occasion. Let us follow them. As we have already seen, McLaws found himself at dark on the 14th in a critical condition. The Federals had driven his troops in confusion and with loss out of Crampton's Gap, and were pouring over into Pleasant Valley in his rear, while a force still equal to his own held Harper's Ferry. Night enabled him to make new dispositions to meet the emergency. Lee sent him orders during the night to retreat to Sharpsburg, if pressed, and reiterated them in the morning. There was but one thing to do. He must defend himself and keep Franklin at bay until Harper's Ferry should be taken, which event would open to him an easy door of escaping, if necessary. By taking advantage of the ground he believed he could hold in check the greatly superior force under Franklin, and prevent its coöperating with Colonel Miles. While four of McLaws's

¹ *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 47.

brigades were still left at the Harper's Ferry end of Pleasant Valley to guard the passes there against any movements of offense or escape on the part of the Harper's Ferry garrison, and a single regiment remained on Maryland Heights to support the batteries there placed, the remainder of his forces (nearly six brigades, including those which had suffered at Crampton's Gap) were formed in a line across Pleasant Valley south of Crampton's and Brownsville gaps. This line was a good one, and was made still stronger by a judicious disposition of artillery. Here McLaws posted his troops so well and displayed them so effectively that, though he could not have had over 6000¹ men, he completely deceived Franklin, who was advancing on him with 20,000.²

Franklin stirred early, but seems to have spent the first part of the day in looking after his rear in the direction of Rohrer'sville and Boonesborough, not knowing that Lee had fallen back from the latter point. Franklin's dispatches to McClellan give the best view of his operations. At 8.50 A. M. on the 15th, he wrote as follows:³ "My command started at

¹ McLaws had in all ten brigades (his own and Anderson's divisions), and his strength at the outside could not have exceeded 10,000 or 12,000 men. The official returns of McLaws's and Anderson's divisions for July 20 (the nearest one before the Maryland campaign to be found) make them less than 14,000 men "present for duty." These divisions had marched from Richmond, and Anderson had participated in the battle of Manassas. They entered Maryland with greatly diminished numbers. At Sharpsburg, two days after this time, Anderson could muster but between 3000 or 4000 men, while McLaws's own division numbered less than 2900, or less than 7000 in all. See reports of McLaws, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 860, and D. H. Hill, *Ib.* p. 1022. There was much straggling on the march to Sharpsburg, but the two divisions could not have exceeded the aggregate above given in Pleasant Valley. Allowing for the losses at Crampton's Gap, McLaws may have had 6000 men in Franklin's front, while 4000 were near Harper's Ferry.

² Couch's division joined Franklin on the night of the 14th. It contained by the return of September 20, 7219 for duty. Franklin's corps on the same day numbered 11,882, to which must be added his losses at Sharpsburg. These losses are not reported separately, but they must have been sufficient to raise his numbers, including Couch, to at least 20,000 on the 15th.

³ *Ib.* p. 47.

daylight this morning, and I am waiting to have it closed up here. General Couch arrived about ten o'clock last night. I have ordered one of his brigades and one battery to Rohrsersville, or to the strongest point in its vicinity. The enemy is drawn up in line of battle about two miles to our front, one brigade in sight. As soon as I am sure that Rohrsersville is occupied, I shall move forward to attack the enemy. This may be two hours from now. If Harper's Ferry has fallen, — and the cessation of firing makes me fear that it has, — it is my opinion that I should be strongly reinforced."

Again at eleven A. M. he says:¹ "I have received your dispatch by Captain O'Keefe. The enemy is in large force in my front, in two lines of battle stretching across the valley, and a large column of artillery and infantry on the right of the valley, looking toward Harper's Ferry. They outnumber me two to one. It will of course not answer to pursue the enemy under these circumstances. I shall communicate with Burnside as soon as possible. In the mean time I shall wait here until I learn what is the prospect for reinforcement. I have not the force to justify an attack on the force I see in front. I have had a very close view of it, and its position is very strong."

Thus General Franklin, who had lost his opportunity to extricate Colonel Miles by not crossing the South Mountain early on the preceding day and pressing McLaws vigorously, now threw away his chance of striking a damaging blow at a force not half his own, which was for the time out of effective help from any portion of the Confederate army. As Franklin surmised at the date of his first dispatch, Harper's Ferry had fallen. McLaws was thereby relieved of his principal difficulty, and having received orders from General Jackson "to proceed to Sharpsburg with all possible dispatch," he withdrew to Harper's Ferry, and marched thence up the Virginia side of the Potomac to Shepherdstown. The trains were first sent over to Harper's Ferry, and then the troops were gradually withdrawn during the afternoon from Franklin's front. The latter, under the delusion that he was outnumbered, made no attempt to interfere with this movement. His last dispatch

¹ *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 47.

to McClellan had brought an order "to remain where he was to watch the large force in front of him and protect the Federal left and rear."¹ Franklin did remain where he was, but he committed a great blunder in not delaying and damaging McLaws. Franklin's conduct on this day was to the last degree feeble.

While his left wing thus lay idle and paralyzed in Pleasant Valley, McClellan, with the main body of his army, was crossing the South Mountain to Boonesborough and following up Lee. The corps of Sumner (2d), Hooker (1st), and Mansfield (12th) were thrown forward after Pleasonton's cavalry on the turnpike, while Burnside's corps (9th) and Sykes's division of Porter's corps (5th) marched by the old Sharpsburg road, that they might be in position when they reached the western base of the mountain to reinforce Franklin, if necessary. The rear of the Confederates was so well covered by Fitz Lee's cavalry that Longstreet and Hill crossed the Antietam without interruption, and took position on the range of hills which, running parallel to the stream, lie between it and Sharpsburg. Lee placed Longstreet on the hills to the south of the road to Boonesborough, while Hill occupied those to the north of that road. Here, with a force of from 10,000 to 12,000 infantry and artillery, Lee turned and presented a bold front to the Federal army while he awaited the return of his other troops from Harper's Ferry by forced marches. It was not possible, however, for any of those absent divisions to join him on that day, so that for twenty-four hours, at least, Hill's and Longstreet's were the only forces available for making head against McClellan.

McClellan has been severely criticised by his own countrymen for his failure to engage Lee both on the 15th and 16th. He says that he designed doing so on the 15th, and continues: "Instructions were given that if the enemy were overtaken on the march they should be attacked at once; if found in heavy force and in position, the corps in advance should be placed in position for attack and await my arrival. On reaching the advanced position of my troops, I found but two divisions,

¹ McClellan's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 47.

Richardson's and Sykes's, in position; the other troops were halted in the road; the head of the column some distance in rear of Richardson."¹ Richardson and Sykes were deployed along the east side of the Antietam; the former on the right and the latter on the left of the Boonesborough road. McClellan says farther: "After a rapid examination of the position, I found it too late to attack that day; . . . the corps were not all in their positions until the next morning after sunrise."² McClellan's policy was plain, and he seems to have had no doubt about it. He knew positively that a large part of the Confederate army was around Harper's Ferry, the fall of which had been made known to him early in the day.³ These troops could not rejoin Lee in less than a day. Franklin's force was certainly ample to hold McLaws, if it did no more, and to check completely any movement against the Federal flank from that quarter. McClellan's instructions, therefore, for a prompt pursuit and a prompt attack upon Lee were plainly right. That they were so feebly executed appears to have been more the fault of McClellan than of any one else. It is not more than eight miles from Turner's Gap to Sharpsburg, and there was no reason why the Federal army should not, in large part, have reached the Antietam by midday or soon after. This was one of the great occasions during the war when a commander in chief might properly have been with his advance, and have personally urged forward his columns. McClellan seems only to have reached the front late in the afternoon,⁴ to find everything waiting for him and the day too far spent to admit of his joining battle. Make all the allowance possible for the skill that conducted the retreat, for the good judgment which selected a line behind the Antietam, for the tactics which made the largest possible display of force⁵ with the slim Confederate battal-

¹ McClellan's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 53.

² *Ib.* p. 54.

³ *Ib.* p. 53.

⁴ See General Palfrey, *The Antietam and Fredericksburg*, p. 56, who gives a fine description of the enthusiasm which greeted McClellan on every side as he rode to the front.

⁵ "The enemy occupied a strong position on the heights west of Antietam Creek, displaying a large force of infantry and cavalry, with numerous batteries of artillery, which opened on our columns as they appeared in sight." (McClellan's report, *Ib.* p. 54.)

ions, and it is impossible to deny that McClellan failed to seize the opportunity which this day was within his reach of hurling over 60,000 men¹ in the open field upon not more than one fourth of that number. Thus the 15th of September was marked on the Federal side by the fall of Harper's Ferry, the inaction of Franklin while McLaws quietly marched away from him, and the leisurely transfer of the main body of the Federal army from the eastern part of Turner's Gap to the banks of the Antietam opposite Sharpsburg.

Let us return to the Confederate movements. As soon as the fall of Harper's Ferry had been effected, Jackson prepared to rejoin Lee. A. P. Hill's division was left at Harper's Ferry to take charge of the captured property, and to parole and send off the prisoners; and Jackson placed the remainder of his troops on the road to Shepherdstown. As the Confederates had seen very hard service, some hours were consumed in resting and rationing the men. Orders were sent to Walker on the Loudoun Heights to cross the Shenandoah and follow Jackson, and similar instructions were given to McLaws, who, deeming it dangerous to try to reach Sharpsburg by the north side of the Potomac, was directed to cross that river into Harper's Ferry and follow the others. Having given the orders, Jackson placed himself at the head of two divisions of his command,² and, followed by Walker, made a forced march of some ten miles to Shepherdstown. Most of this march was made after night, and it added greatly to the exhaustion of Jackson's already overtaxed troops. Many broken-down men were added to the stream of stragglers which had so heavily depleted the

¹ The 1st, 2d, 9th, and 12th corps, Sykes's division, and Pleasanton's cavalry, numbered over 60,000 men.

² His own and Ewell's. Jackson's divisions left their bivouac near Halltown (where they had spent the afternoon in cooking and resting) after midnight. See reports of subordinate officers: General J. R. Jones, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 1007; Colonel E. Pendleton, *Ib.* p. 1016. From Early's report it seems that Lawton, with his own and Trimble's brigades, left in the afternoon and marched to within four miles of Shepherdstown, where they bivouacked. Early and Hays left after nightfall and marched until they overtook Lawton. "The division moved at dawn next morning, crossing the Potomac." (Early's report, *Ib.* p. 967.)

Southern ranks. The necessity for caution in retiring from Franklin's front delayed McLaws, who did not get beyond Harper's Ferry on the night of the 15th. On the morning of the 16th, Jackson and Walker crossed the Potomac near Shepherdstown,¹ and in the course of the forenoon reported to General Lee on the field of Sharpsburg. McLaws was slower in his movements. On the morning of the 16th, he moved to Halltown and there went into camp to rest and feed his men. Under urgent orders he moved at three P. M. to Shepherdstown, near which place he again camped, but starting once more at midnight on the 16th he reached Sharpsburg during the forenoon of the 17th. A. P. Hill's division remained at Harper's Ferry until the morning of the 17th, when, leaving one brigade to look after the captured stores, he marched at seven P. M., and reached the battlefield at Sharpsburg, seventeen miles distant, at three or four P. M.² By this vigorous marching Lee succeeded in concentrating his whole army, greatly thinned, it is true, by straggling, on the battlefield before the fate of the day was decided.

We have thus given in one view the movements by which the Southern leader brought his army to the battlefield he had selected, though this concentration was not completed until during the progress of the battle on the 17th. It is time to return to the movements of the Federal army, which, having failed to engage Lee on the 15th, was concentrated in his front on the night of that day opposite Sharpsburg. What were its operations on the 16th? A singular caution and deliberation marked McClellan's movements on this day. In the first place Franklin was left the entire day in Pleasant Valley to watch "a strong force of the enemy,"³ all of which had been withdrawn to Harper's Ferry and the south side of the Potomac the day before. Along the Antietam the greater part of the day was consumed in putting the Federal troops in position

¹ At Boteler's ford.

² A. P. Hill marched on the south side of the Potomac by way of Shepherdstown as Jackson had done, and not, as General Palfrey thinks, by the north side direct to Sharpsburg.

³ McLaws.

and in artillery practice with the Confederate batteries on the west side of that stream. The activity of the Confederate guns and the bold front maintained by Lee gained him precious time by imposing upon the Federal commander. The hills on the Sharpsburg side were supposed to "conceal" the "masses of his (Lee's) troops. . . . On all favorable points the enemy's artillery (Confederate) was posted, and their reserves, hidden from view by the hills, on which their line of battle was formed, could manœuvre unobserved by our army, and from the shortness of their line could rapidly reinforce any point threatened by our attack. Their position, stretching across the angle formed by the Potomac and the Antietam, their flanks and rear protected by these streams, was one of the strongest to be found in this region of country, which is well adapted to defensive warfare."¹ A long time apparently was spent in getting Burnside's corps into position on the Federal left, opposite to the lower bridge over the Antietam which was to become famous the next day.² This, with the reconnoitring, trying fords, and waiting for the supply trains³ consumed three fourths of the day, and it was the middle of the afternoon before Hooker's corps on the right wing was ordered forward to cross the Antietam on the bridge on the Williamsport road. The hours thus gained by the Confederates were of the greatest value to them. They enabled Jackson with two divisions and Walker with his division to reach the field. That McClellan should have delayed his attack throughout this day, when he knew positively of the divided condition of Lee's army, and that each hour's delay would increase the force he would have to fight, is simply inexplicable. After the fall of Harper's Ferry, McClellan's military plans could have had but one object, — to make his adversary pay dearly for that success by crushing the troops north of the Potomac. The Federal leader had realized this on the 15th, and had aimed to overhaul the retreating columns before they could get into position. In

¹ McClellan's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 54.

² There was a bridge below this "Burnside" bridge near the mouth of the Antietam, but it was not used during the battle.

³ McClellan's report, *Ib.* p. 55.

this he did not succeed. But by the morning of the 16th his troops were up, and every consideration would seem to have prompted an early and overwhelming assault upon the small force then in his front. Instead of this the Federal army remained practically idle, and Hooker's movement late in the afternoon served only to warn Lee as to the point of attack next day. McClellan's failure to attack Lee on the 15th was a serious mistake ; his failure to do so on the 16th was fatal.

CHAPTER XLI.

THE BATTLEFIELD. — DISPOSITIONS OF BOTH THE ARMIES.

THE battlefield at Sharpsburg (or Antietam) was well chosen. Its principal feature is the Antietam Creek, a tortuous stream flowing through a deep valley into the Potomac. The general course of this stream near the battlefield is a little west of south, and, parallel to it on the western side at an average distance of three miles runs the Potomac, making four great loops before resuming its course toward the southeast. The hills rise abruptly from the Antietam on both sides, on the west presenting a continuous ridge toward the creek, which ridge spreads out toward the west into an elevated and uneven plateau. The village of Sharpsburg lies between the creek and the Potomac, somewhat south of the centre of the field. A line starting some two and a half miles north of Sharpsburg, at the vertex of the eastward bend of the Potomac near the hamlet of New Industry, and running thence south of east until it has crossed the Hagerstown road, then curving southward and passing in front of Sharpsburg, and finally abutting upon the westward loop of the Antietam at Snivel's place, marks the Confederate position. This line lay on high ground, and on the centre and right overlooked the Antietam valley. It passed about half way between Sharpsburg and the creek. The principal road running north from the village is the Hagerstown turnpike, which, at the distance of about a mile, passes the little Dunker church, in front of which was to be so much hard fighting. A mile farther to the north, this road crossed the Confederate line at a point about three fourths of a mile from the Potomac. Northeastward from Sharpsburg extends the Boonesborough road, by which General Lee had retreated, which, crossing the

creek on a stone bridge one and a quarter miles from the town, passes on through Keedysville, where lay the centre of the Federal army on the 16th. Another road, leading from the southeastern limits of Sharpsburg, reaches the creek in a mile, and crosses on the bridge known ever since the battle as Burnside's bridge. Directly south runs a road to the mouth of the creek, which it crosses, and then continues down the north bank of the Potomac. From the rear of Sharpsburg the principal road leads to Boteler's ford on the Potomac near Shepherdstown. This was the road and ford by which Lee crossed into Virginia on the 19th. Another important road deserves to be noted as the avenue by which the right of the Federal army advanced to the attack. This is the road from Keedysville toward Williamsport on the Potomac above. It is crooked, but has a general northwesterly direction, crossing the Antietam on a stone bridge nearly three miles northeast of Sharpsburg, and intersecting the Hagerstown road some three and a half miles north of that village. This was the uppermost of the three bridges used during the battle; the next being that on the Boonesborough road opposite Sharpsburg, and the southernmost being Burnside's bridge on the road from the last-named village to Rohrer'sville. The line marked out as the Confederate position is some four miles in length, and was not all occupied on the 16th. The Antietam has fords between the bridges, but they are difficult of approach, and are not available for the quick movement of large bodies. The country afforded no better defensive position than that selected by Lee, placed as it was upon commanding ground, covered more or less by a difficult stream, possessing ample and easy means of communication in rear between the different parts of the field by the roads running north and south from Sharpsburg. Its great defect was the fact that a broad and unbridged river lay in the rear. Some parts of the field will be more particularly described as we follow the battle.

It was two P. M. on the 16th when Hooker was ordered to cross at the upper bridge and a contiguous ford in order to attack the Confederate left. He passed the Antietam without

opposition, and, having moved for a mile or more along the Williamsport road, turned to his left, and advanced in columns of divisions toward Sharpsburg. Doubleday's division was on the Federal right, Meade's on the centre, and Ricketts's on their left. The Confederate scouts had given notice of the crossing and the approach of this body of troops, and Lee took steps to strengthen this part of his line. Hood's two brigades had, the day before, been placed in the woods on the west side of the Hagerstown road, north of the Dunker church, with skirmishers well to the front. These troops were now ordered to advance into the open ground to the front, on the east side of the road. Jackson's two divisions, having reached Sharpsburg in the forenoon, had been resting in rear of that town for some hours, while Lee awaited the development of his adversary's plans. When the Federal movement toward the left was ascertained, Jackson was ordered toward the Dunker church, to take position to the north of it and on the left of Hood. Jackson's old division, under J. R. Jones, led the way, and by five P. M. was in position three quarters of a mile north of the church, where a crossroad from the west enters the turnpike. Ewell's division, under Lawton, followed, and Early's and Hays's brigades took position on the left of Jones along the crossroad mentioned, while Trimble's and Lawton's brigades halted in the woods around the church. It was dark when Early reached his position.¹

Meantime, Hooker's centre division, under Meade, had come in contact with Hood, who held the part of the Confederate line most convex toward the Federals. Hood had placed some guns on a rise in the open ground east of the Hagerstown turnpike, and near to it. The right of his line rested in a wood which lies east of the open ground. Here the skirmishing became brisk. The Federals advanced, and drove back the Confederate skirmishers to the western side of the wood. The Texas brigade constituted Hood's left and Law's brigade his right. The 5th Texas regiment and some troops from Law went forward to support the skirmishers, and in turn drove back the Federal advance to the farther side of the

¹ Early's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 967.

wood. The firing was quite spirited until darkness put an end to the combat. The artillery on both sides was active. Poague's (Rockbridge) battery, attached to Jackson's old division, aided Hood's batteries effectively in checking the Federals, but no infantry besides Hood's, and only a small part of his, was actively engaged. The affair was hardly more than a skirmish between the advance of the two armies. The casualties were not numerous on either side, but the Confederates lost Colonel Liddell of the 11th Mississippi, an officer of high promise.¹ After dark the Confederate skirmishers were withdrawn to their line of battle,² and the two hostile lines lay on their arms very near to each other.³ While Hooker's centre had thus placed itself within close striking distance of their opponents, his other divisions, Hatch's, under Doubleday, on his right, and Ricketts's on his left, had also taken position in connection with Meade, though not in such immediate proximity to the Confederate lines. Two of Doubleday's brigades (Hoffman's and Patrick's) extended Meade's lines to the Hagerstown road and held the woods in front of Jackson, and the other two rested a short distance in the rear in reserve. It was dark when they reached their positions, however, and they were not engaged. So Ricketts, on the other flank, without having been engaged, rested for the night in front of D. H. Hill, who held the Confederate lines on Hood's right.

Hood's troops had been sorely tried by hard service, and for three days past had received no regular rations.⁴ When the fighting had ceased, he therefore asked that they be relieved and allowed to cook. General Jackson ordered forward Trimble's and Lawton's brigades, which were at the Dunker

¹ General Longstreet speaks of Hood's losses as "severe," but the reports of Hood and his subordinates do not bear out this statement.

² Colonel Wofford's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 927.

³ The Federal reports claim that Meade slept on "ground won from the enemy," which is true in the sense that it had in the afternoon been occupied by the Confederate skirmishers, but is not true in the sense that the Confederate line had been forced back at any point. Hood says the lines were so close at night that he could distinctly hear the enemy massing his troops in front. (*Advance and Retreat*, p. 42.)

⁴ Colonel Wofford's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 928.

church, to relieve them, and about eleven P. M. Hood's men were withdrawn to that point to cook and eat. Before this had been completed, however, as we shall see, they were summoned back to the line of battle.¹ Trimble took the place of Law, and Lawton that of the Texas brigade. Twice during the remainder of the night did the opposing lines get to firing, with no result, however, save to break the rest of the troops. On the Federal side Mansfield's corps (12th) followed Hooker across the Antietam during the night, and camped about a mile in his rear, on or near the farm of J. Puffenberger.

The disposition of the Confederate forces in the early morning of the 17th of September was as follows: Lee rested his right at the Burnside bridge. Here General Toombs was posted, with two regiments of his own and one from Drayton's brigade.² These troops extended along the bank of the stream from a short way above the bridge to a point some distance below, so as to cover the bridge on the left and two fords of the Antietam on their right. They also commanded a stretch of some three hundred yards of the road which bordered the stream on the opposite side, and by which an attacking force must approach the bridge. Higher up on the steep hillside which here rises on the west side of the Antietam was Eubank's battery, the guns so placed as to bear directly upon the bridge. Farther back, on top of the hill, was Richardson's battery. Beyond Toombs's right, and occupying the heights in his right rear, was J. G. Walker, with the two brigades³

¹ Hood says he obtained this assistance from Jackson on condition that he would come at once to his support when called for; that some hours were consumed in getting the flour up (they had no meat), and that he was called for early in the morning before many of his men had had time to cook their dough. (*Advance and Retreat*, p. 42.)

² The 2d, 20th, and 50th Georgia. He also had a single company from Jenkins's brigade. These troops numbered between 500 and 600 men. (Toombs's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. pp. 888, 889.) The two other regiments of Toombs's brigade (15th and 17th Georgia) came up later in the day from Williamsport, but did not join General Toombs until the passage of the Antietam had been forced.

³ His own brigade, under Colonel Van H. Manning, and Ransom's brigade. His batteries were French's and Branch's.

he had brought the day before from Harper's Ferry. These troops were designed to guard the Antietam below Toombs, and to support him in case of need, but, as we shall see, they were withdrawn "soon after nine A. M." and sent to the Dunker church to reinforce Jackson. They numbered about 3200. Munford's cavalry guarded the Confederate right flank between the infantry and the Potomac. Four other¹ brigades of D. R. Jones's division, Garnett's, Kemper's, Drayton's, and Jenkins's (under Colonel Joseph Walker), extended the Confederate line from Toombs's left to the turnpike leading from Sharpsburg to Boonesborough. Garnett's brigade was thrown forward on this turnpike about half way between the town and the bridge which carries that road over the creek, in support of the Washington artillery, which was there located, while D. R. Jones held with the other three brigades the heights to the southward, extending to the Burnside bridge. Thus the five brigades under D. R. Jones constituted Lee's right wing and held a line of something over a mile in extent, from the Boonesborough road to Toombs's position at the bridge. To this part of the line was assigned the Washington battalions of artillery and part of that of S. D. Lee. D. R. Jones reports the entire infantry force of his six brigades on the morning of the 17th of September as 2430. His dispositions were made mainly in reference to the two bridges which crossed the Antietam on his right and left respectively. Between these two bridges the Antietam presented a secure barrier to the passage of any considerable body of troops, but the whole distance was open to the fire of the Federal batteries from the heights on the eastern side of the stream.

The Confederate line north of the Boonesborough road was parallel to the Sharpsburg and Hagerstown turnpike for about one and a half miles, and was located about half way between this last-named road and the Antietam. This line was occupied at the south end next to the Boonesborough turnpike by General

¹ Toombs's brigade was one of D. R. Jones's. G. T. Anderson's brigade of this division was on the Hagerstown road, and acting in support of Hood.

N. G. Evans, with his own and G. T. Anderson's¹ brigades. He had Boyce's South Carolina battery and some other guns from S. D. Lee's and Walton's battalions.² Evans's brigade numbered about 1500 men. On the left of Evans was the division of D. H. Hill, whose five brigades were, in order from right to left, G. B. Anderson's, Rodes's, Garland's (under McRae), Colquitt's, and Ripley's. These troops extended from Evans's left to the road which leads northeast from the Hagerstown turnpike at the Dunker church. The left centre of their position was not far in rear of the houses of Clipp, Rullet, and Mume.³ Hill, though his infantry had been reduced⁴ below what was adequate for the defense of so long a line, was well supplied with artillery. He had twenty-six guns belonging properly to his command,⁵ and in addition to this, Cutts's reserve battalion, containing on that day either twenty-four or twenty-eight guns.⁶

¹ G. T. Anderson's brigade was D. R. Jones's old brigade, and belonged to his division, but had been detached on the 15th and sent to Evans, who commanded the rear-guard on the retreat to Sharpsburg, consisting of Hood's brigades, his own, and this one of Anderson's. On the morning of the 16th, Hood was sent to the left, and about noon on the 17th, as we shall see, Anderson was sent to support him, leaving Evans with only his own brigade (and some fragments from D. H. Hill's which he collected near the town), to hold the Confederate line north of and near the Boonesborough road.

² Evans's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 939.

³ Mume's house, barn, etc., were burned on the morning of the battle (the 17th), and are spoken of in many of the reports as the burning or burnt buildings.

⁴ He had but "3000 infantry" on the morning of the 17th. See his report, *Ib.* p. 1022.

⁵ These embraced H. P. Jones's battalion of 14 guns, and the batteries of Carter, Bondurant, and Hardaway, containing 12 guns.

⁶ An error (probably typographical) in D. H. Hill's report makes him say that Cutts had nearly 60 pieces (Richmond edition), or nearly 50 pieces (*Ib.* p. 1022). Cutts had the four batteries of Ross, Patterson, Blackshear, and Lane, which contained, by report of Major Pierson (chief of artillery to D. H. Hill), dated September 22, 20 pieces. He had also with him Lloyd's battery of four guns. Colonel Cutts, in a letter in *Southern Historical Papers*, vol. x. p. 430, says his own four batteries numbered 24 guns at Sharpsburg. This error in Hill's report has been generally copied in Northern accounts of the battle.

On D. H. Hill's left were Jackson's two divisions. Next to Hill were the two brigades under Lawton¹ who had relieved Hood the night before. The right of these troops held the western edge of the timber north of Mume's house, while the left of the line was curved back and rested near the Hagerstown turnpike in the vicinity of D. R. Miller's house and orchard. The left of Lawton's line thus faced the northeast. It ran through a cornfield which covered a good deal of the space between the timber and the Hagerstown road. To the left of Lawton, and on the left of the Hagerstown road, was J. R. Jones's division, his four small brigades drawn up in two lines.² The first one was in the open ground, extending from the turnpike past the Nicodemus house and a strip of woods in front, and the second a short distance in the rear in the woods south of Nicodemus's. Jones's division faced nearly north, or was nearly at right angles to the centre and right of the Confederate army. Early's and Hays's brigades of Lawton's division had been sent the night before to take position on the left of Jones towards the Potomac. The strength of Jackson's two infantry divisions was 5000. Beyond Early, Stuart with Fitz Lee's brigade of cavalry occupied the left flank of the Confederate army between the infantry and the river. Besides his own battery of horse artillery, Stuart had, under Pelham, other batteries borrowed from Jackson, who was always well supplied with artillery. In rear of Jackson, Hood's two brigades, numbering about 2300, rested at the Dunker church, ready to support him under the attack which McClellan's movements of the day before left no doubt was about to fall on the Confederate left.

Such were Lee's dispositions. Longstreet was in command of the right wing and Jackson of the left. A very important part of the Confederate forces were still absent from the field. McLaws and Anderson, with their division (amounting together to some 6500 men), had bivouacked some distance from

¹ These brigades were Trimble's, under Colonel J. H. Walker, and Lawton's, under Colonel Douglas.

² Jones's and Winder's brigades were in front, Taliaferro's and Starke's in the second line.

the Potomac on the south side the night before, but at midnight had been hurried forward, and at sunrise were crossing the river at Boteler's ford. They reached the field on the left about ten A. M., after much of the heavy fighting there was over, but in time, as we shall see, to change the fortune of the day. A. P. Hill was at Harper's Ferry, but leaving there with five of his brigades at an early hour, and making a forced march of seventeen miles, he reached the Confederate right at the middle of the afternoon, in time to put a decisive stop to Burnside's progress. His strength was about 3400. Lee's entire infantry force was under 30,000, to which should be added his cavalry and artillery, commonly estimated at 8000. The battle was thus fought by the Confederates "with less than 40,000 men."¹

McClellan thus states his plan of attack: "My plan for the impending general engagement was to attack the enemy's left with the corps of Hooker and Mansfield, supported by Sumner's and if necessary by Franklin's, and, as soon as the matters looked favorably there, to move the corps of Burnside against the enemy's extreme right, upon the ridge running to the south and rear of Sharpsburg, and having carried their positions, to press along the crest toward our right; and whenever either of these flank movements should be successful, to advance our centre with all the forces disposable."² On the afternoon of the 16th, the Federal commander had taken the first steps toward executing his plan. Hooker's corps (1st) had been thrown across the Antietam, as we have seen, above the Confederate left, and after a brisk skirmish had bivouacked in close proximity to all that part of the Confederate line occupied by Jackson. Here Hooker was ready, as soon as it was light enough, to renew the battle. Mansfield's corps (12th) was but a mile behind Hooker, ready to support him, while Sumner's (2d) was ordered at seven in the morning of the 17th to cross the Antietam and support Hooker and Mansfield. Burnside, with the 9th corps, had been placed during the 16th on the Federal left, opposite the bridge now known

¹ Lee's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 151.

² McClellan's report, *Ib.* p. 55.

by his name. At an early hour on the 17th, he was ordered to form his troops and hold them in readiness to assault the bridge in his front. Porter, with two divisions of the 5th corps, held both sides of the Sharpsburg and Boonesborough roads, and guarded the bridge by which that road crossed the Antietam opposite the Federal centre. Pleasonton, with his cavalry division and his horse batteries,¹ was on the morning of the 17th ordered across at the bridge, to advance directly towards Sharpsburg and support the left of General Sumner.

The heights on the eastern side of the Antietam opposite the whole centre of the Confederate line from near Burnside's bridge to Fry's house were covered with heavy batteries. "On the ridge of the first line of hills overlooking the Antietam, and between the turnpike and Fry's house on the right of the road, were placed Captain Taft's, Langner's, Von Kleiser's, and Lieutenant Wever's batteries of twenty-pounder Parrott guns. On the crest of the hill, in rear and on the right of bridge No. 3, Captain Weed's three-inch and Lieutenant Benjamin's twenty-pounder batteries."²

Franklin's corps and Couch's division had remained during the 16th in Pleasant Valley near Crampton's Gap. Franklin was ordered to leave Couch to occupy Maryland Heights, and to move with his own corps to the battlefield. He left his camp at six A. M., and arrived about midday.

McClellan's plan was thus to throw three of his corps (some 40,000 men, according to General Sumner) against his opponent's left, then to follow up promptly by sending Burnside with 13,000 men against Lee's right, and then to push the Confederate centre with the 25,000 men under Porter and Franklin. The Federal troops concerned in the battle numbered, according to General McClellan 87,164,³ a number which General Palfrey, in his admirable work on this campaign, thinks is an overstatement of the troops actually engaged.

¹ Pleasonton's batteries were those of Captain Robertson, Tidball, and Lieutenant Haines of the 2d artillery, and Captain Gibson of the 3d artillery. (McClellan's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 62.)

² McClellan's report, *Ib.* p. 55.

³ Report, *Ib.* p. 67.

We shall see that the battle was fought upon the plan marked out by the Federal commander, but that the execution was unequal and without coherence. Hooker attacked early and with great vigor. He was promptly supported by Mansfield, but it was only after these corps had failed and were exhausted that Sumner reached the field. His divisions were separated, and fought in a disjointed and desultory way, accomplishing nothing. It was not till after noon, and after all attempts upon the left wing of the Confederate army had failed, that Burnside forced a crossing of the Antietam and attacked the Confederate right. In the centre, it was found necessary to send Franklin upon his arrival to support Sumner, and Porter's operations, exclusive of his long range batteries, which did effective service against the Confederates, were reduced to an unimportant demonstration. Let us now try to follow in detail the operations of the day.

CHAPTER XLII.

SHARPSBURG. — HOOKER'S ATTACK.

THE battle opened, according to some of the reports, as early as three A. M. The harvest of death had certainly begun by daylight. Hooker advanced. The troops first to come in contact with the Confederates were Seymour's brigade of Meade's division, which was in and near the northwest corner of the woods which lie east of D. R. Miller's house. They attacked Trimble's brigade (under Colonel J. A. Walker), which was the right of Lawton's brigade. These two Confederate brigades held the line from the Hagerstown turnpike eastward to the woods above named, at which point the line was curved so as to face the east instead of the north. Meade's other two brigades were to the west of Seymour.¹ The second (Colonel Magilton) was soon sent to aid Seymour, the other (3d, under Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson) went to support Doubleday, whose division was advancing southward on both sides of the Hagerstown road. Doubleday threw forward Gibbon's brigade on both sides of the turnpike, supporting it with Patrick's brigade on the west of that road, and with Phelps's brigade on the east. Hoffman's brigade was still held farther to the east and in reserve.² Campbell's battery (Company B, 4th United States Artillery) was sent forward with Gibbon, and was placed first on the east side of the road, and then in a more advanced position in the road and on the west side of it. The other batteries of the division were on the ridge extending from the turnpike towards the woods where Seymour was posted, and to their left were the batteries of Meade's division. General Hooker ordered Ricketts's division to support Sey-

¹ *3d Pennsylvania Reserve*, Major E. M. Woodward, p. 184.

² Doubleday's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 224.

mour's left, and to extend the Federal line in that direction. Thus the whole of Hooker's corps was thrown forward vigorously, with the parts in close supporting distance. Doubleday and Meade advanced southward with lines nearly perpendicular to the Hagerstown road and extending westward from the point of woods held by Seymour to and beyond that road. Ricketts's division, constituting Hooker's left wing, upon entering the woods south of Seymour, made a part wheel to the right, so as to face southwest towards the Dunker church. This was necessary to bring them to face with the Confederates, whose line then ran southwardly.

The troops upon whom Hooker's attack was to fall consisted of Jones's¹ division and part of Lawton's.² Jones's troops were all west of the turnpike, facing northward. They were drawn up in two lines. The first extended from the turnpike westward past the Nicodemus house; the other was in the edge of the woods south of Nicodemus's, ready to support the first. One of Poague's guns and two of Raine's³ were on or near the turnpike in the front line. Jones placed other batteries farther to his left. Opposite Jones's right, on the east side of the turnpike, was Lawton's brigade, under Colonel Douglas, and to the right of that, as already stated, was Trimble's brigade, under General J. A. Walker.⁴ Some distance to

¹ Jackson's old division, under Brigadier-General J. R. Jones. It contained the brigades of Winder, Jones, Starke, and Taliaferro, and numbered only 1600 effectives on this day.*

² Lawton was in command of Ewell's division, and was wounded early in the action.

³ See Poague's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. pp. 1009, 1010.

⁴ The difficulty of locating exactly the various commands engaged in this battle is almost incredible. Though the official reports, which are pretty full, have been supplemented by many narratives, so few and uncertain are the topographical details, that only the most careful collation of numerous accounts renders it possible to locate the different brigades, and in some cases this cannot be done with exactness. The map published by the War Department locates the left of the Confederate line some distance north of the Nicodemus house, where a road leads off from the turnpike to the river, but a careful comparison of the reports of both sides leads one to the conclusion that only the Confederate skirmishers were so far north

the left and in front of Jones, was Stuart, with Fitz Lee's cavalry brigade and some artillery. At a very early hour, Early's brigade, which had passed the night near Jones, was sent to support Stuart, while Hays's brigade (which had been with Early) was ordered to the Confederate right to aid Lawton.

The Federals opened a heavy fire of artillery, not only from the batteries with Hooker's corps, but also from a number of long range guns placed on the east side of the Antietam, in Porter's front. These guns had a good view of the Confederate lines, though two and a half miles distant, and kept up a constant fire on the flank and rear of Jackson's troops.

As the Federal infantry advanced, the Confederate skirmishers were gradually forced back to their line of battle. This, on Jones's front, was to some extent protected and concealed from the Federals by the rocky ledges which there crossed the field. On Lawton's front the Confederate line of battle was in a cornfield. Gibbon pushed forward his left into the cornfield, while his right¹ was ordered across to the west side of the turnpike, where Campbell's battery had been already sent. As Gibbon's right regiments came up to Jones's front line,² a sanguinary contest began between these veteran soldiers, who had met on other fields. The fire both from artillery³ and infantry was severe and the carnage fearful.⁴ General Jones was disabled by the explosion of a shell, and the command fell to General Starke of Louisiana. The left of Gibbon's brigade

as that. Jones's first line of battle passed near the Nicodemus buildings. So on the east side of the turnpike the Confederate line was probably between Mill's orchard and the wood north of it.

¹ 19th Indiana and 7th Wisconsin.

² Winder's and Jones's brigades. The artillery in this battle seems to have done its full share. Both sides make frequent mention of the severity of the fire. Lieutenant-Colonel Bragg, commanding 6th Wisconsin regiment, — the advance of Gibbon's brigade — says, "No sooner was the column in motion than the enemy opened fire on us with their artillery, and so accurate was his aim, that the second shell exploded in the ranks, disabling thirteen men, including Captain Noyes, Company A." (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 254.)

³ General Patrick speaks of this fire as "most galling" (*Ib.* p. 244); General Jones calls it an unprecedented iron storm (*Ib.* p. 1008).

⁴ Gibbon's and Patrick's reports, *Ib.* pp. 243, 248.

recoiled from the fire it met in the cornfield, and for a few minutes Campbell's battery was in danger of being taken.¹ But the right regiments, reinforced by General Patrick's brigade, were thrown forward so as to strike the Confederate left, which in turn yielded, and Starke's line was thrown back to the edge of the woods south of the Nicodemus house, where his second line had been originally posted. The gallant Starke fell in this fierce struggle,² and Colonel A. J. Grigsby, of the 27th Virginia regiment, succeeded to the command of the division. During this onset, one of Phelps's regiments and some of Meade's troops³ protected the Federal right flank from the Confederate cavalry and artillery under Stuart, who was doing what was possible to impede and paralyze the Federal advance. The troops of Jackson's old division, tried in a score of battles, quickly recovered from the loss of two division commanders, and, advancing under Grigsby, who had gathered up all his reserves, they again grappled with the Federals in the open near Nicodemus's house. After a vigorous struggle, the Federal lines, though reinforced by Phelps's brigade and also by the third brigade of Meade's division, were driven back, and the Confederates held the ground they had occupied in the morning.⁴

While this fierce action was going on along and to the west

¹ Gibbon's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 249.

² General W. E. Starke fell, pierced by three musket balls, and survived but an hour. He was greatly beloved by his men as a brave and chivalrous leader.

³ See Patrick's report (*Ib.* p. 244), and Phelps's report (*Ib.* p. 233). The latter sent the 2d United States sharpshooters to this flank. Meade's third brigade was acting in support of Doubleday.

⁴ Major H. J. Williams, of the 5th Virginia regiment, says: "Our line advanced into the open field and encountered the enemy upon the ground which we had previously held. The firing was fierce and incessant, the enemy standing firm for a time. Unable to stand the resolute valor of our troops, he retired in considerable disorder." (*Ib.* p. 1012.) General Patrick says: "Rallying once more, the enemy drove us back to the rocky ledge, which we held until, our ammunition being almost exhausted, and the line attacked in flank and rear on the right, I directed my command to fall back on a line of rock at right angles to the road, and about fifteen rods from the woods, to hold there until ammunition and reinforcements could be obtained." (*Ib.* p. 244.)

of the turnpike, a not less furious one was taking place to the east of that road. Here, as already stated, Seymour's brigade had opened the battle at the corner of the woods to the east of Miller's house, and it quickly spread to Seymour's right and left. Lawton's two brigades¹ offered a firm front to the Federal advance. Soon, Meade's second brigade, under Colonel Magilton, was sent to support Seymour's right, while Ricketts's division of three brigades was sent to his left. Ricketts placed Hartsuff's brigade in advance, and supported it by Duryea's (1st) on its right, and Christian's (2d) on its left. Under this accumulation of forces, strengthened by well-served artillery in the front, as well as reinforced by the severe enfilade fire upon the Confederates from the heavy batteries east of the Antietam, Lawton's brave troops began to yield. Hays's brigade had been ordered up, and reached the field in the midst of the fighting. Under a storm of fire it went in to the support of Lawton's brigade. Most determined were the efforts made by these troops to hold the cornfield and the edge of the east woods,² and fearful was the loss inflicted upon the attacking force as well as that borne by themselves. Lawton called Hood, whom he had relieved the night before, to his assistance. Hood's men,³ leaving their breakfast uncooked in the woods about the Dunker church, went forward to the assistance of their comrades. Meantime the Confederates, after having driven back the assaulting lines, were in turn being driven. Colonel Douglas had met the death of a gallant soldier at the head of his brigade. General Lawton, sorely wounded, was borne from the field as Hood advanced. The Federals had advanced into both the cornfields from the north and east when Hood's men met them. Another stern wrestle followed between the determined veterans of both armies, and this time the advantage remained with the Confederates. Ripley's, Colquitt's, and Garland's brigades of D.

¹ His own, under Colonel Douglas, and Trimble's, under Colonel J. A. Walker.

² The woods east of the turnpike are so called by General Palfrey. Those west of the road extending north from the Dunker church are called by him the west woods.

³ Two brigades, under Colonels Wofford and Law.

H. Hill's division had been ordered to support Hood on his right. They were in the order named, Ripley being in advance and next to Hood. These troops struck the left of Ricketts's division, and contributed materially to his repulse.¹ Meade's troops were borne back to the north, and Ricketts's to the northeast. With terribly thinned ranks, Hood's old brigade forced the Federal infantry back upon the line of artillery, and the supports in front of which it had advanced,² while Law, supported by Ripley and Colquitt, drove Ricketts into the east woods and even to the northern end of them.³ But Hood was not able to do more. It was not possible for him to press farther the Federals, who had rallied on their artillery and were

¹ It is very difficult to locate the time and place of the first entrance of these brigades into action. Ripley says that, though in line and exposed to a heavy fire from the Federal batteries east of the Antietam, he did not go forward until about eight A. M., and then states that the burning buildings (Mume's house, etc.) were in his path. Colquitt says he followed Ripley, but went forward at seven. If Ripley be correct, he must have joined Hood after Mansfield's corps had reinforced Hooker. It is possible that Colquitt is more nearly correct, and that these brigades aided in defeating Ricketts before Greene's division of Mansfield's corps came up. They no doubt entered the southwest corner of the east woods.

² See Hood's report (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 923) and Wofford's (*Ib.* p. 928.)

³ Law says: "The 5th Texas regiment (which had been sent over to my right) and the 4th Alabama pushed into the woods in which the skirmishing had taken place the evening previous, and drove the enemy through and beyond it. The other regiments of my command continued steadily to advance in the open ground, driving the enemy in confusion from and beyond his guns." (*Ib.* pp. 937, 938.) Colonel Lyle, 90th Pennsylvania (Ricketts's division), says: "We passed through the woods into a ploughed field, where we engaged the enemy until our forces on the right and left gave way, when, having but about one hundred men left, we fell back slowly and in good order under cover of the woods, and then, being hard pressed by the enemy, we fell to the rear, finding that fresh troops were coming up to our relief." (*Ib.* p. 266.) The reports of Ricketts's division are meagre. It seems probable that the centre and left of the division were badly worsted, but that Duryea's brigade still maintained some hold near the northwest corner of the woods, for Major Gould in his history of the 10th Maine says (*History of the 1st, 10th, 29th Maine Regiments*, p. 238, note) that some of Duryea's troops were there when his regiment came up.

pouring a furious fire into his advancing lines. Hooker's troops, encouraged by the proximity of Mansfield's corps now hastening to their relief, held on tenaciously to their artillery. Jackson had no available reinforcements at hand. Lawton's three brigades had suffered too severely¹ to do much now. Early had been ordered to bring his brigade over from the left and support Ewell's division, of which, after Lawton, he was the ranking officer; but this movement required time. Of D. H. Hill's troops three brigades were already engaged. G. T. Anderson's brigade² had been ordered from Sharpsburg to reinforce Hood, but was not yet on the ground. The two brigades under J. G. Walker had also been ordered over from the extreme right, but were behind G. T. Anderson. The divisions of McLaws and R. H. Anderson, under General Lee's urgent orders, were hastening toward the field, but, having only crossed the Potomac at daylight, were not yet within Jackson's reach.

It was now 7.30 A. M. Mansfield's corps was coming forward rapidly to Hooker's assistance, having been informed that the latter was "hard pressed." As the strong body of fresh troops are moving up in rear of Hooker's shattered and exhausted lines, let us take a look at the general condition of things. On the Federal side, Hooker, aided by the heavy fire of the batteries on Porter's front on the east side of the Antietam, has

¹ General Early, who commanded the division after Lawton was wounded, thus reports the losses of the day in the three brigades under Lawton, almost the whole of which occurred before this stage of the battle:—

"Colonel Douglas, commanding Lawton's brigade, had been killed, and the brigade had sustained a loss of 554 killed and wounded out of 1150, losing 5 regimental commanders out of 6; Hays's brigade had sustained a loss of 323 out of 550, including every regimental commander and all of his staff; and Colonel Walker and one of his staff had been disabled, and the brigade he was commanding had sustained a loss of 228 out of less than 700 present, including 3 out of 4 regimental commanders." (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 968.)

² This brigade belonged properly to D. R. Jones, but had been detached and placed under Hood during the retreat from South Mountain. It had remained in position in front of Sharpsburg on the Boonesborough road until the morning of September 17, when Colonel Anderson says he was ordered at 7.30 A. M. to go to Hood's support.

made a prompt and vigorous assault upon the left of the Confederate army. He has inflicted serious losses upon Jackson, but has not been able to make any permanent impression upon the Confederate lines. He has thrown his whole strength into the attack, and the repulse has about exhausted him. In addition to his terrible list of casualties, his troops are much scattered as the result of their unsuccessful efforts, and his corps is no longer capable of any offensive action. Mansfield is, however, at hand, and, at a greater distance, Sumner is coming forward to Hooker's aid. So far no serious movements have been made by McClellan's centre and left beyond the fire of the long-range batteries already mentioned. On the Confederate side Jackson has maintained his position and thrown back the assaulting lines. But this has cost him heavily in men. Of his own two divisions present, only Early's brigade (which had been sent the night before to support Stuart's cavalry and artillery on the extreme left) has not been engaged. Half the others are *hors de combat*. By the aid of Hood and D. H. Hill, he has driven back Hooker, but these troops too have suffered. Lee has already stripped his centre and right to the utmost limit in ordering G. T. Anderson and J. G. Walker to the extreme left. He depends for the further reinforcement of that wing upon McLaws and R. H. Anderson, whom he has been hurrying forward from Harper's Ferry by forced marches for twenty-four hours past. They are approaching, but are yet from one to two hours distant.

CHAPTER XLIII.

SHARPSBURG. — MANSFIELD'S ATTACK.

MANSFIELD had left his bivouac, one and a half miles in rear of Hooker's position, at the opening of the battle. Says General A. S. Williams:¹ "At the first sound of cannon at daylight on the morning of the 17th instant, the command was put in movement, each regiment, by order of General Mansfield, marching in column of companies, closed in mass. In this order the corps moved to the front by battalion in mass, the 1st brigade,² 1st division, leading, over ground of intermingled woods, ploughed fields, and cornfields. Before reaching the position of General Hooker's corps, information was brought that his reserves were all engaged, and that he was hard pressed by the enemy. The columns were hastened up, and deployed in line of battle with all the rapidity that circumstances would permit. Five of the regiments of the 1st division were new and wholly without drill.

"The massed battalions had been moved with such haste that the proper intervals for deployment had not been carefully attended to. The old regiments, however, deployed promptly, and the new regiments (both officers and men of which behaved with marked coolness) soon got into line of battle, with more promptitude than could have been expected.

"While the deployment was going on and before the leading regiments were fairly engaged, it was reported to me that the veteran and distinguished commander of the corps³ was mortally wounded. I at once reported to Major-General Hooker on the field; took from him such directions as the

¹ Report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 475. General Williams succeeded to the command of the corps upon the fall of Mansfield.

² Crawford's.

³ Brigadier-General Mansfield.

pressing exigencies would permit, and hastened to make a disposition of the corps to meet them. Crawford's brigade was directed to deploy to the right, its right regiment extending to the Williamsport and Sharpsburg stone pike.¹ Gordon held the centre, while Brigadier-General Greene's division, following the first division in column, was directed to the ridge on the left, extending its line from the lane on Gordon's left to the burning buildings.²

"While General Greene was moving into position, I was strongly solicited by Brigadier-General Gibbon to send reinforcements to the right to support General Doubleday's position. I accordingly detached the third brigade (Goodrich's) of General Greene's division, with orders to report to any general officer found on the field indicated. At the same time I ordered the 124th Pennsylvania volunteers (Crawford brigade) to push forward past the farmhouse of Mr. Miller,³ cross the pike into the woods beyond, and hold the ridge as long as practicable.

"In the mean time the whole line had formed into good order, and were pushing the enemy from the woods and open fields. The requisitions made upon the corps would permit of no reserves, and it may be truly stated that, to cover the points threatened or pressed, every regiment (save 13th New Jersey, held in reserve for a while by General Gordon) was as early as 6.30 to seven o'clock A. M.⁴ engaged with the enemy."

Let us follow these movements and their results in detail from the Federal right to left. Goodrich's brigade, having been detached for the purpose from Greene's division, went to the support of Gibbon and Patrick on the extreme Federal right. They fought for the most part west of the turnpike,

¹ The Hagerstown and Sharpsburg turnpike.

² Mume's house and other buildings on D. H. Hill's line, nearly due east of the Dunker church.

³ D. R. Miller's house, on the east side of the turnpike and near it.

⁴ Major J. M. Gould, of the 10th Maine (see *History of 10th Maine Regiment*, p. 235), says he looked at his watch as his regiment was going forward (it was one of Crawford's, — the brigade in advance) and found it 7.30 A. M. So that General Williams's statement here should no doubt be 7.30 to eight o'clock.

and seem not to have made any important change in that quarter. General Patrick says they "came in succession and at considerable intervals;"¹ their commander, Colonel Goodrich, of the 60th New York, was soon killed after getting into action; and the official reports of the commanding officers indicate that they attempted no more than to strengthen Doubleday's right and enable it to hold its own. Though an active fire was kept up for some time, neither of the combatants on this part of the line was capable of taking a strong offensive. Doubleday had been badly crippled, and the brigade sent him had not been enough to place him on his feet again, while on the Confederate side, Jones's division, terribly reduced in numbers, was glad to maintain the advantage it had gained. Jones's left was skillfully guarded by Stuart, who, now that Early's brigade had been ordered away,² withdrew his artillery to a high and commanding position nearer the Confederate infantry. This height was on the immediate left of Jones and somewhat to his rear. It commanded the whole country west of the turnpike from Nicodemus's to the Dunker church, and was thus the key to the whole of Jackson's position. Its retention was vital to the Confederates.

On the east of the turnpike, from the neighborhood of Miller's house round to the burning buildings (Mume's), the fury of the battle grew in violence as Mansfield's corps entered into it. The regiments of Crawford's brigade went in to assist the remnants of Meade's division and Duryea's brigade, which with their well-served artillery were trying to stop Hood's advance. Crawford's left regiment (10th Maine) was in the north end of the east woods, and just east of the road from Smoketown to the Dunker church. Another of his regiments (124th Pennsylvania) was sent past Miller's house into the skirt of woods across the turnpike. The others were between these, and were all soon firmly engaged. Gordon's brigade was to support Crawford's left and to constitute the centre of the corps. It really came in for the most part behind Craw-

¹ Patrick's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 244.

² Early left the 13th Virginia containing less than a hundred men with Stuart when he moved away with the remainder of his brigade.

ford, and fought over the same ground.¹ Met by these fresh troops, Hood's men were unable to push their success farther, but they made a most stubborn and sanguinary struggle to hold the ground they had gained. Crawford's brigade, which was partly composed of new troops,² suffered heavily in this struggle. It lost more than one thousand men, and until reinforced by Gordon was not able to make headway against Hood. But Gordon's brigade turned the scale on this part of the field. The famous cornfield in which the Confederates had stood became a scene of dreadful carnage. Mowed down by the fearful fire, Hood's line staggered and yielded. Back from the woods, back through the cornfield, were they forced by the advancing Federals. Hood was not able to make a new stand short of the Dunker church.

While Williams's division³ was thus fighting and finally driving Hood, Greene, with two brigades of his division,⁴ had been sent to Williams's left, and, moving into the southern part of the east woods, attacked Ripley and Colquitt, who had followed up Ricketts into these woods. Here, too, with this accession of forces, the Federals soon gained ground. Greene's troops were well handled. They forced the Confederates to the edge of the wood, and then advanced along the Smoketown road toward the Dunker church. Greene's left was as far

¹ The 2d Massachusetts was on Gordon's right and went forward to an orchard (Lientenant-Colonel Andrew's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 500), which was doubtless that near Miller's house. Next on the left of this regiment was the 3d Wisconsin. Then came the 27th Indiana, which, from Colonel Knipe's report, p. 487, came in behind the 46th Pennsylvania (of the 1st brigade, 1st division). The 107th New York, the next regiment, was in rear of the 10th Maine. (See *History of 10th Maine Regiment*, p. 249.) The 13th New Jersey was in reserve.

² The 124th, the 125th, and the 128th Pennsylvania. This last regiment was brought under fire before being deployed, and its colonel (Crossdale) was killed.

³ Crawford's and Gordon's brigades constituted the division of General A. S. Williams, who had taken command of the corps upon the death of General Mansfield.

⁴ 1st, under Lieutenant-Colonel Tyndale, and 2d, under Colonel Stainrook. The 3d brigade of this division (Colonel Goodrich) had gone to the extreme Federal right, as we have seen.

south as Mume's burning buildings¹ and even beyond. Ripley and Colquitt fought bravely,² and held them in check for an hour or more. Garland's brigade, under McRae,³ had been sent up to support the Confederate right, but it had hardly gotten under fire before some extension of Greene's lines to its right caused a panic and the brigade broke in disorder.⁴ This exposed Colquitt's flank, and he and Ripley were both forced back. The attempt of these commands to regain the ground lost was repulsed. Knap's guns had come up to the aid of Greene,⁵ and materially aided him in effecting this repulse. Hood had yielded on their left, and Ripley and Colquitt⁶ were finally driven into the woods about the Dunker church. Greene effected a lodgment in these woods where they abut on the turnpike just north of the church. He had made frequent calls for reinforcements, which he now repeated, but few were available.⁷ The remnants of Ripley's and Colquitt's brigades retired towards Sharpsburg until they came upon the left of the remainder of D. H. Hill's division, now in position along the "bloody lane,"⁸ while Hood's troops and Lawton's held the woods to the south and west of the church.

¹ See report of Colonel Sudsbury, 3d Maryland (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 511) and Colonel Lane, 102d New York (*Ib.* p. 512).

² Major Crane, commanding 1st brigade of Greene's division, speaks of this engagement as "an hour and a half of severe fighting, with great slaughter to the enemy." (Report, *Ib.* p. 506.)

³ This brigade had lost General Garland, and had suffered very heavily on the 14th at South Mountain.

⁴ See Colonel McRae's letter to Major Gould, *History of 10th Maine Regiment*, p. 250.

⁵ See report of General A. S. Williams, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 477.

⁶ Colquitt says his brigade held on until half his men and every field officer except one had fallen. (Colquitt's reports, *Ib.* p. 1054.)

⁷ General Williams sent him the Purnell legion, the 27th Indiana and the 13th New Jersey, the only troops he could spare, and these participated in his operations.

⁸ Rodes had been ordered about nine A. M. to the assistance of Ripley, Colquitt, and McRae, but, finding that they were being driven, he had, with D. H. Hill's approval, taken up a position in the "bloody lane" at right angles to the Hagerstown road and east of it, and G. B. Anderson was on his right in the same lane.

Thus closed the second stage of the battle. For an hour or more the fighting had been of the most destructive character, and both sides were too much exhausted to continue the struggle without the advent of fresh troops. A comparative lull now succeeded the furious storm of the morning, while the exhausted troops of both sides awaited the arrival of approaching reinforcements. The results of the battle, so far, had been at first sight favorable to the Federals. The Confederates had been forced from their hold on the east woods, had been driven, indeed, out of the cornfield and all the open ground east of the turnpike and north of the church. Their line from the Dunker church northward now ran parallel with the turnpike, and lay in the woods to the west of it. The Federals had possession of everything east of the turnpike. They also held the woods north of Miller's house through which they had advanced early in the morning, and now Greene had some hold on the woods on the west side, just north of the church. Between these two points, however, where the ground is open on both sides of the road, the Federal line did not advance beyond the fence bordering the turnpike, and seems to have been soon withdrawn to the east woods.¹ At the north end, near Miller's, the Federal line faced to the south, while its centre, in the east woods, and its left, under Greene, near the Dunker church, faced westward.

¹ General Williams says : " At nearly nine o'clock A. M., it being reported that a portion of the 2d corps (Major-General Sumner's) was advancing to our support, I dispatched a staff officer to apprise him of our position, and the situation of affairs. Soon after, the firing on both sides wholly ceased. Some of the old regiments had emptied their boxes of ammunition, and all were greatly exhausted by the labors of the day and of the preceding night. As the line of General Sedgwick's division appeared, the regiments of the first division of this corps were withdrawn to the first line of woods in the rear, within supporting distance of several batteries, and directed to replenish their cartridge boxes and to rest the men. A portion of the 124th Pennsylvania volunteers continued, however, to hold the woods near Miller's house until it was ordered, without my knowledge, to withdraw, by some officer unknown to the commanding officer of the regiment. Greene's command had also the possession of the woods at the other end near the church." (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 476.)

But if Jackson had lost ground, and men too, he had exacted a fearful price from his opponents for the advantage they had won. Though his troops were badly crippled, and only one (Early's) brigade was yet fresh, Jackson showed a bold front. He now held a position which, thanks to the ledges of rock which run parallel to the turnpike on the west side, and to the inequalities of the ground, was far stronger than that on the east side of the road. His left flank and rear were admirably covered by Stuart's guns. Though too weak for offense, his position could only be carried at heavy cost. The two Federal corps of Hooker and Mansfield, on the other hand, had been literally fought to pieces. Not only had their casualties been very great, but many of the commands were dispersed. This was especially true of Hooker's corps, which had been thoroughly beaten before Mansfield came up. General Sumner testifies¹ that when he came on the field, "General Hooker's corps was dispersed; there is no question about that. I sent one of my own staff officers to find where they were, and General Ricketts, the only officer we could find, said that he could not raise 300 men of the corps." Mansfield's corps was of course better off, but it is evident from the official reports² that Williams's division of this corps was not fit for any more offensive work, while Greene was holding to his position near the church simply through the weakness at that point of his adversary.

So far the troops engaged on the Confederate side had consisted of Jones's division of 1600 men,³ three brigades of Ewell's division, 2400 men,⁴ and Hood's two brigades, probably about 1800 men;⁵ Ripley's, Colquitt's, and Garland's bri-

¹ *Report of Committee on Conduct of War*, vol. i. p. 368.

² See reports of Generals Williams, Crawford, and Gordon. (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. pp. 476, 485, 494.)

³ See Jones's report, *Ib.* p. 1008.

⁴ Early reports that Lawton's brigade had 1150, Hays's 550, and Lawton's "less than 700." Early's brigade had not so far been engaged. (*Ib.* p. 968.)

⁵ Wofford (*Ib.* p. 929) gives the strength of Hood's old brigade as 854. Law had probably not more.

gades of D. H. Hill's division, about 1800 men ;¹ in all less than 8000 men, a number which the artillery may have increased to 9000. The Federal strength, by General McClellan's report,² of the two corps of Hooker and Mansfield was 14,856 and 10,126 respectively, or nearly 25,000 men in all. But this is probably from the morning reports, and is in excess of the men actually taken into battle. Ricketts³ says his three brigades numbered 3158. Phelps⁴ says the strength of his brigade was but 425. To judge from these, Hooker's corps brought on the field between 9000 and 10,000 infantry. In Mansfield's corps there were present about 7000 infantry.⁵ In the two corps (including artillery) there may have been present some 18,000 or 19,000 men,⁶ or double the number Lee was able up to this time to oppose to them.

¹ D. H. Hill (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 1022) says that he had but 3000 infantry in his five brigades. Three fifths of this would make the number assigned to Ripley's, Colquitt's, and Garland's brigades.

² *Ib.* p. 67.

³ *Ib.* p. 259.

⁴ *Ib.* p. 234.

⁵ Greene says his division numbered 2504. (*Ib.* p. 504.) Gordon's brigade had 2210 (*Ib.* p. 498), and if Crawford had about the same, we have about 7000 men for the corps.

⁶ General Palfrey (*The Antietam and Fredericksburg*, p. 63 *et seq.*) has discussed this matter fully, and with great fairness. . Even he, however, is unable to realize the meagreness of the Confederate numbers, which he puts too high.

CHAPTER XLIV.

SHARPSBURG. — SEDGWICK'S ATTACK.

SUMNER's corps (2d) consisted of the divisions of Sedgwick, French, and Richardson, and numbered, according to General McClellan, 18,813 men. Leaving camp at 7.30 A. M., it had passed the Antietam at the crossing used by Hooker, and between nine and ten A. M. Sedgwick's division, which was in advance, reached the field. French was close behind Sedgwick, but when near to the battlefield kept to the left, and, as will appear later, went into action far to the left of Sedgwick, and after the latter had been repulsed. Richardson did not move until an hour after the others, but followed the same route across the creek.¹ It was only Sedgwick's division which fought over the ground that, up to this time, had constituted the battlefield, and it is necessary first to follow its movements. The advance of these troops, led on as they were by the gallant old soldier who commanded the corps, is vividly and admirably described by General Palfrey: "Sedgwick's division,² . . . moving by the flank in three columns, entered the east woods. These were a grove of noble trees almost entirely clear of underbrush. There were sorry sights to be seen in them, but the worst sight of all was the liberal supply of unwounded men helping wounded men to the rear. When good Samaritans so abound, it is a strong indication that the discipline of the troops in front is not good, and that the battle is not going on so as to encour-

¹ General Palfrey (*The Antietam and Fredericksburg*, p. 82) says he was probably delayed by waiting for the troops that were to relieve him in his position east of the creek.

² Sedgwick's division consisted of the brigades of Gorman, Dana, and Howard, which advanced in the order named.

age the half-hearted. The brigades entered these woods from the south, and marched northward, and then were faced to the left, and thus formed a column of three deployed brigades, Gorman's leading, next Dana's, next Burns's, commanded that day by Howard. The column was now facing west, parallel to the Hagerstown pike, and separated from it by the famous cornfield. The corn was very high and very strong. There was a short halt while a fence, which formed the eastern boundary of the cornfield, was thrown down. Then the column marched straight forward, through the corn, and into the open ground beyond. Few troops were in sight. So far as the men of Sedgwick's division could see, they were to have the fighting all to themselves. As they advanced, Crawford's division retired, so Crawford says, but Knipe, of his division, claims to have advanced with Sedgwick; if he did, Sedgwick's men did not know it.¹ Accidents of the ground hid from their view such of Greene's and Ricketts's men as remained at the left front. So far as they could see, their advance, at least from the pike, was made all alone. Williams himself reports that soon after news of Sumner's advance was received, the firing on both sides wholly ceased."²

Let us see how the Confederates met Sumner's advance. The woods which we have called west were broadest at their south end around the Dunker church. They bordered the west side of the turnpike for some 300 yards north of the church, when they turned off at a right angle, leaving an open field some 200 yards wide next to the turnpike. The woods continued northward and on the west side of this field some 400 or 500 yards farther, when they made another offset, leaving a still wider field between them and the turnpike, while they made it up by extending much farther to the west

¹ The Federal reports are conflicting about this. It seems probable that some fragments of Crawford's brigade went forward with Sedgwick's division. Thus Colonel Sniter (34th New York), whose regiment was the left one of Gorman's brigade, says (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 316) that the 125th Pennsylvania was on his right, and this agrees pretty well with Colonel Higgins's report (*Ib.* p. 491) of the doings of that regiment.

² *The Antietam and Fredericksburg*, pp. 82, 83.

at this point. Some 300 yards farther to the north these woods terminated, and from there to Nicodemus's house the ground was open. The open field along the turnpike is a plateau, intersected, especially towards its northern end, by ledges of rock running parallel to the turnpike. In the woods west of this field the ground falls off rapidly to a hollow at their western edge, where runs a farm lane or road, which after passing the farm buildings of Hauser turns, and runs southeastwardly to the church. The woods are intersected by many ledges of rock parallel to the turnpike, affording fine cover for troops, and this is especially the case with that southern end of the woods west of the church. It was in the north end of these woods that Jones's second line had been placed at the opening of the battle, and it was here now that the remnants of the division under Colonel Grigsby¹ were showing front to the enemy. His flank and rear were covered by his own artillery and the guns which Stuart had on the heights on the northwest of his position. Hood's troops were holding the south end of these woods in rear of the church. Between Grigsby and Hood there was a gap, held, if at all, only by some skirmishers, but as the Federal right advanced, Grigsby was forced southward, and the gap became less.

Early, as we have seen, had been ordered to reunite his brigade with the remainder of Ewell's division, and to take command of it. He was leading his brigade from the height occupied by Stuart² toward the Dunker church, when he came up with Colonels Grigsby and Stafford,³ who were about to advance on the Federals in their front in the west woods. It appears that Grigsby could not have been far from the Hauser farm buildings at this time. Early formed his brigade in the rear of Grigsby, and joined in the movement by which the force in their immediate front was driven back, but the Federals seem to have held not only the open field along

¹ General Early says that there were only 200 or 300. (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 969.)

² He left the 13th Virginia with Stuart, containing less than 100 men, Early says. (*Ib.* p. 969.)

³ Colonel L. A. Stafford, 9th Louisiana, commanding Starke's brigade after the fall of General Starke.

the turnpike, but the northern part of the woods, where they were subjected to a heavy fire from the Confederate artillery. These Federal troops were no doubt the advance of Sedgwick's division. Early then formed his brigade in a line perpendicular to the turnpike, his right resting near the southwest corner of the open field, which lies on the west side of that road. On his left, extending his line in a northwest direction, Grigsby took position not far from the Hauser buildings. Leaving his brigade here under Colonel William Smith¹ of the 49th Virginia, with instructions to hold the enemy, Early went to hunt up the other brigades of the division, to the command of which he had succeeded. These troops were not available at the moment, and it was evident that the whole of the Confederate left was in danger of being swept away. When Early reported this condition of affairs to Jackson, the latter directed him to hold on, while he sent to hasten the reinforcements which were coming. Early returned to his brigade,—the only Confederate troops intact on this part of the field,—to do what was possible to skill and courage to check the enemy until McLaws and J. G. Walker could arrive. The Federals became more threatening in Early's front, and soon a Federal battery took position on the turnpike just opposite his right flank. This battery faced towards Sharpsburg and was no doubt one of Greene's, whose troops were still engaged with some of Hood's men about the Dunker church and to the south of it. Early's brigade was concealed by the broken ground and the ledges of rock, and its presence was unknown to the Federals. As Greene's men pushed back the Confederates down the turnpike and followed them up, Early threw back his right regiments parallel to the turnpike so as to protect his flank in case of his being discovered. But the continued advance of Greene's right along the turnpike threatened to cut Early off entirely from the remainder of the Confederate line, and the latter, leaving Grigsby and one of his own regiments (31st Virginia) to face Sedgwick and hold him in check, moved the remainder of his brigade by the right flank parallel to Greene's movement down the turnpike.

¹ Twice governor of Virginia.

Early says,¹ "I moved back along the rear of the woods until I caught up with the enemy, who had the start of me. I was, however, concealed from his view, and it was evident that my presence where I was, was not suspected. Passing from behind a ridge that concealed my brigade from the enemy, we came in full view of his flankers, who, however, were made aware of my presence by a fire which I directed the leading regiment to pour into them. They immediately ran into the main body, which halted, and I continued to move by the flank until my whole force was disclosed.

"Just at this time I observed the promised reinforcements coming up toward the woods at the farther end. I ordered the brigade to face to the front and open fire, which was done in handsome style and responded to by the enemy. I did not intend to advance to the front, as I observed some of the troops which had come up to reinforce me preparing to advance into the woods from the direction of my right flank, and was afraid of exposing my brigade to their fire, and that the two movements would throw us into confusion, as they would have been at right angles. Moreover the other column was advancing on my flank,² held in check, however, by Colonels Grigsby and Stafford with their men, and by the 31st Virginia regiment, which was on my left. The enemy in front, however, commenced giving way, and the brigade, which I have always found difficult to retain, commenced pursuing, driving the enemy in front entirely out of the woods.³ Notwithstanding my efforts to stop the men, they advanced until my left flank and rear became exposed to a fire from the column on the left,⁴ which had advanced past my former position. I also discovered another body of the enemy moving across the plateau on my left flank in double-quick time⁵ to the

¹ *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. pp. 970, 971.

² Sedgwick's division.

³ Early's brigade, with its right near the south end of the west woods, did not extend far enough north to sweep the Federals from the corner of the woods north of the church and on the turnpike. This corner Greene held on to for some time even after Sedgwick's defeat.

⁴ Sedgwick's division.

⁵ Sedgwick's division advanced in three lines. It was probably the third line (Howard's brigade) which Early now saw.

same position, and I succeeded in arresting my command and ordered it to retire, so that I might change front and advance upon this force. Just as I reformed my line, Semmes's, G. T. Anderson's, and part of Barksdale's brigades of McLaws's division came up, and the whole, including Grigsby's command, advanced upon this body of the enemy, driving it with great slaughter entirely from and beyond the woods, and leaving us in possession of my former position. As soon as this was accomplished, I caused the regiments of the brigade to be reformed and placed in position as before."

While Early was engaged in attacking Greene, the fierce resistance made by Grigsby with his handful of men near the Hauser farm, added to that of Stuart on his left, was holding the advance of Sedgwick in check. The Federal line reached the west side of the west woods, but did not go farther.¹ Sedgwick had advanced without other protection for his left flank than that afforded by Greene. His line passed to the westward of Greene, and, now that the latter had been overthrown, was completely exposed to the attack made from the south by Early and McLaws.² Semmes's brigade was sent northward to aid Stuart and Grigsby, and they struck the front of Sedgwick's division. Barksdale's brigade was next, and, in conjunction with Early and Anderson, struck the Federals on their flank.³ Beyond Early's right and near the turnpike, Kershaw's brigade of McLaws's division went in,

¹ See General Palfrey's *The Antietam and Fredericksburg*, p. 84.

² McLaws's division consisted of the brigades of Semmes, Barksdale, Kershaw, and Cobb, and numbered about 2900 men in all. (See McLaws's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 860.) G. T. Anderson's brigade belonged to D. R. Jones's division.

³ The Anderson here spoken of was Colonel G. T. Anderson of the 11th Georgia regiment, commanding one of the brigades of D. R. Jones's division. This brigade had been sent up from Sharpsburg to aid Hood, and arriving about the same time that McLaws reached the scene of action, was sent on by General Hood to support Early. Some confusion has arisen from the fact that there were three Andersons who were general officers at Sharpsburg. They were, in addition to the above named, Major-General R. H. Anderson, commanding a division which came up with General McLaws from Harper's Ferry, and Brigadier-General G. B. Anderson, commanding a North Carolina brigade in D. H. Hill's division.

sweeping before it some of Greene's troops.¹ Read's and Carleton's batteries advanced with the infantry. Cobb's brigade by some mistake moved to the east, across the turnpike, and an hour later became engaged on the left of Rodes, who was in the "bloody lane." The two brigades under General Walker² were close behind McLaws, and went forward at the same time to support Hood, who was trying to hold the end of the woods south of the church against Greene. Two of Manning's regiments³ took position east of the turnpike to hold, in some sort, the gap between the church and D. H. Hill,⁴ while the rest of J. G. Walker's troops participated in the general movement against Sedgwick and Greene.

The vigorous assault made upon Sedgwick quickly changed the complexion of the battle. For the first time this day the Confederates did not have to struggle against superior forces. In the assault upon Sedgwick the advantage of numbers was with the Confederates.⁵ Like a whirlwind did Jackson hurl

¹ Greene seems to have held a position crossing the turnpike north of the church in a diagonal direction, his right in the corner of the woods north of the church, and his left extending into the open fields to the southeast. In these open fields and near the Smoketown road he had batteries.

² His own, under Colonel Manning, and that of General Ransom.

³ 27th North Carolina and 3d Arkansas, under Colonel J. R. Cooke.

⁴ Cobb seems to have been in contact with Hill, while the 27th North Carolina and the 3d Arkansas were farther north, to the eastward of the church.

⁵ General Palfrey, we think, overstates the discrepancy. He makes Sedgwick's forces only 5000, though the only one of his three brigades reported was 2000 strong. Sedgwick had probably nearer 6000 men. Nor does General Palfrey credit him with any part of Greene's force, which fought so tenaciously for the woods about the church. On the other hand he doubles Grigsby's force (300), makes McLaws's 3000 when it should be 2550, since Cobb's brigades did not join in the advance, and credits Stuart and D. H. Hill with 1600 men. Stuart had only 100 infantry (13th Virginia), and the brigades of D. H. Hill heretofore engaged (Ripley's, Colquitt's, and McRae's) took no more part than did Hooker's corps. The troops of Stuart, Grigsby, and D. H. Hill participating in this contest were fully offset by the troops of Ricketts and Greene, which leaves, to be counted against Sedgwick, Early's brigade, 1000; three of McLaws's brigades, 2550; Anderson's brigade, not over 500 or 600, and Walker's two brigades, some 3000; in all some 7000 men. But of these, Manning's

Early, McLaws, and Walker upon Sedgwick. Charging from the cover of the woods and the rocky ledges which had concealed them, they poured a storm of fire upon the unprotected flank and even rear of Sedgwick's three lines. General Palfrey well says: "The result was not doubtful. His fine division, containing such sterling regiments as the 1st Minnesota, and the 15th, 19th, and 20th Massachusetts, was at the mercy of the enemy. The fire came upon them from front to flank, and presently from the rear. Change of front was impossible. The only fire delivered by the 20th Massachusetts regiment of the second line was delivered faced by the rear rank. In less time than it takes to tell it, the ground was strewn with the bodies of the dead and wounded, while the unwounded were moving off rapidly to the north. So completely did the enemy circle around them, that a strong body of Confederates marched straight up northward through the open fields between the west woods and the Hagerstown pike. Nearly two thousand men were disabled in a moment.

"The third line, the Philadelphia brigade,¹ so called, was the first to go. Sumner tried to face it about, preparatory to a change of front, but, under a fire from the left, it moved off in a body to the right, in spite of all efforts to restrain it. The first and second lines held on a little longer, but their left soon crumbled away, and then the whole of the two brigades moved off to the right, where a new line was presently formed. Federal batteries proved very serviceable in checking the Confederates at this juncture. The new line was formed, facing south, at no very great distance northward of the point where the right of the lines had rested. As disaster fell upon Sedgwick, Williams was ordered by Sumner to send forward all of his command immediately available. He sent forward Gordon. Gordon advanced, but it was too late. The troops for whom his support was intended were no longer in position.

brigade of Walker's division was mainly engaged against French, and Armistead's brigade, sent up to reinforce McLaws, did not participate in the advance upon Sedgwick. It came later (see Early's report), and its losses show that it was but slightly engaged.

¹ O. O. Howard's brigade.

He reached the fence by the turnpike, and suffered heavy loss, but was forced to retire after a stubborn contest.”¹

The general direction of the Confederate advance was towards the northeast, as Sedgwick's troops fled toward the line of batteries which crowned the high ground from the east woods round to the turnpike near D. R. Miller's house. Here were some of Mansfield's men in reserve, and, rallying on them and the batteries, the Federals checked the advance of the Confederates, who then retired toward the west woods. The subsequent advance of Gordon was, as General Palfrey states, repulsed. But though the Confederates thus reëstablished themselves in the open ground west of the turnpike and in the woods behind it, Greene held on for a time to the corner of the woods just north of the church. Kershaw, with his own and a part of Manning's brigade,² had a severe contest with his troops in the open ground east of the turnpike, while Ransom's brigade attacked those in the corner of the woods. Greene clung stubbornly to his foothold. He was well supported by artillery, which was well served,³ but no adequate infantry support at the moment could be obtained. His right flank was exposed by the overthrow of Sedgwick. General Gordon sent him the 13th New Jersey to strengthen this flank, but Greene was unable to bear the pressure brought upon him, and after a gallant struggle he was forced across the turnpike and retired, greatly exhausted,⁴ toward the east wood.

Though by this hour the battle had fully opened on other parts of the line, we will, for the sake of unity, complete the narrative of operations near the Dunker church. As Greene's men were driven back to the east woods, and the Confederates followed up and were about to capture Knap's battery and battery A, 4th United States artillery, under Lieutenant

¹ Palfrey, *The Antietam and Fredericksburg*, p. 87.

² The reports are so indefinite that it is very difficult to say what troops Manning fought with. He seems certainly to have struck the right of French's troops, but his left probably engaged Greene.

³ Knap's battery was one of those that did efficient service on this line.

⁴ Greene's loss was 651 men in his division, far the greater part of which occurred in the two brigades he had near the Dunker church.

Thomas, the arrival of W. F. Smith's division of Franklin's corps saved them. These batteries were at the southwest corner of the east woods, on the Smoketown road,¹ and at Crawford's request Smith hurried forward² and checked the advancing Confederates. He threw Irwin's brigade against them,³ and forced the Confederates to fall back to the woods about the church,⁴ where they in turn repulsed Irwin. The latter now placed his troops in the open between the church and the east woods under the shelter of a rise in the ground, and the fighting at this point was for some time reduced to an active artillery duel.

Franklin's corps had left camp in Pleasant Valley at half past five o'clock, and had reached the vicinity of the field about ten A. M. It had soon been ordered across the Antietam to Sumner's assistance, and it was probably about mid-day⁵ when the advance division commanded by General W. F. Smith reached the field. Smith's first brigade, under General Hancock, was sent to the right to support three batteries⁶

¹ See General Crawford's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 485.

² Lieutenant Thomas says his battery would certainly have been lost but for the arrival of Franklin. See his report, *Ib.* p. 284.

³ From McClellan's report it appears that some of Hancock's brigade was first hurried up to save the batteries, and when this brigade was sent to the right, Irwin was sent to push back the Confederates toward the church.

⁴ See Kershaw's report (*Ib.* p. 865), also J. G. Walker's (*Ib.* p. 915), and Ransom's (*Ib.* p. 920). Thomas's battery seems to have been the one referred to by Kershaw as having been nearly taken by Colonel Aiken with the 7th North Carolina regiment. The repulse of Irwin seems to have been mainly effected by Ransom's brigade.

⁵ It is very difficult to fix the hours exactly, so conflicting are the reports. Greene says he held on to the woods near the church until half past one o'clock, but this seems surely an error, as all the other accounts indicate that the Confederates had possession before that. Greene had certainly lost them before Irwin became engaged. This was "at noon," according to General Crawford. Colonel Lane, commanding one of Greene's brigades, states that they fell back about twelve M. (*Ib.* p. 510.)

⁶ Cowan's, Frank's, and Cothran's. This last battery had been engaged all the morning, and was not far from the northwest corner of the east woods.

which occupied the high ground in rear of Miller's house. Hancock threw forward detachments into the houses and inclosures of the Miller homestead, and his skirmishers engaged those of the Confederates while the opposing batteries kept up a heavy fire. No farther attack at this point was made by either side. It was while Hancock was thus strengthening the Federal right against a Confederate advance that Irwin became engaged, as we have seen, on the left. Smith's third brigade, under General Brooks, was detached and sent to the assistance of General French, where we shall hear of it later on.

The serious fighting on the line from the Dunker church northward was now over, though a severe fire of artillery was maintained for some time between the opposing forces. Their excellent artillery and the arrival of Franklin enabled the Federals to make a strong show of force, but they were not able to resume the offensive. Of Hooker's and Mansfield's corps and of Sedgwick's division there was nothing left available for farther operations. On the other hand, the Confederates were satisfied for the time to hold the territory west of the turnpike, of which they had now repossessed themselves. They reformed and rearranged their line from the Dunker church northward, placing it under cover of the west woods.¹

¹ J. G. Walker's brigades were on the right of this line near the church. Then came Armistead's brigade (under Colonel Hodges), which had reported to General Early just after the repulse of Sedgwick. Next, towards the left, were Kershaw, Barksdale, and Early. Semmes was in reserve. G. T. Anderson had retired toward Sharpsburg, and took position on the left of D. H. Hill. See official reports.

CHAPTER XLV.

SHARPSBURG. — THE ATTACKS OF FRENCH AND RICHARDSON. — THE “BLOODY LANE.”

It is time to turn to the operations on the Confederate left centre, southeast of the Dunker church, where for an hour or more the roar of battle had indicated an angry conflict. At a point about one third of the way from the church to Sharpsburg, a road or lane leaves the east side of the Hagerstown turnpike, and, pursuing for a mile a zigzag course of no less than six different directions, enters the Boonesborough turnpike half way between Sharpsburg and the Antietam. This obscure road witnessed on this day such preëminence of slaughter that it has ever since been known as the “bloody lane.” Its course from the Hagerstown road, at first nearly east, is a declining one, the ground rising on both sides of it, until it meets a hollow where the lane to Clipp’s house branches off to the northeast. The bloody lane then takes a southeast course and ascends quite rapidly to a high plateau, along which it pursues its next course to the southwest. Then zigzagging three more times it descends rapidly to the Boonesborough road. For considerable portions of its length, this road had, from wear and washing, become sunk below the level of the adjoining fields, and it afforded a cover to troops almost as good as a ditch or rifle-pit.

North of this and between it and the east woods were the houses of Clipp, Rullet, and Mume, the last being the “burning buildings” spoken of in many of the reports. In the open fields, between these houses and the Hagerstown turnpike, D. H. Hill’s division, or the greater part of it, passed the night of September 16.¹ As we have already seen, his three left bri-

¹ G. B. Anderson’s brigade seems to have been on the south side of the bloody lane toward Sharpsburg.

gades (Ripley's, Colquitt's, and McRae's) had been ordered on the morning of the 17th to the assistance of Lawton and Hood, and had gone forward from the vicinity of the burning buildings into the east woods. When Mansfield's corps had been thrown into the fight on the Federal side, these troops had shared in the repulse of Hood's line, and left the field very much disorganized. General Hill, seeing them hard pressed, had ordered his remaining brigades, those of Rodes and G. B. Anderson, to their assistance, but before these reinforcements reached the scene, the brigades that had been engaged were broken. Hill and Rodes saw that the best thing to do was to form a line in rear, on which the broken troops might be rallied, and with this purpose Rodes¹ was directed to take position in the bloody lane, his left resting about 150 yards east of the Hagerstown road. G. B. Anderson² was brought up and placed on the right of Rodes, his line extending to the top of the hill up which the second part of the bloody lane ascends. On the left of Rodes a few of Colquitt's men rallied, and extended the line to the Hagerstown turnpike.³ In McLaws's advance against Sedgwick and Greene, Cobb's brigade by mistake kept too far to the right and came up on the left of Rodes, where it took position and participated in the fighting we are to describe.⁴

¹ Rodes's brigade comprised the 3d, 5th, 6th, 12th, and 26th Alabama regiments.

² Anderson's brigade comprised the 2d, 4th, 14th, and 30th North Carolina.

³ Ripley's and McRae's men were more scattered. Some of them were gathered together farther in the rear near Sharpsburg. So says General Rodes. General Palfrey argues that because Rodes says that Colquitt's men occupied the 150 yards from the left to the turnpike, there must have been over 400 of them, since that number would have been required to fill up the distance with "the usual two rank formation." (*The Antietam and Fredericksburg*, p. 93.) General Palfrey fails to realize that the Confederates were often during the battle of Sharpsburg (as on other occasions) obliged to hold position with a single line, and that sometimes a widespread one. In this case, however, it is altogether possible that some of Cobb's brigade were in the road.

⁴ See Colonel William McRae's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 871. He says the separation of Cobb's brigade from its own division was due to a failure of its commander to hear an order. He speaks of taking position behind a fence and not being actively engaged for an hour. Cobb's brigade numbered less than 400.

Cobb's troops must have been either at the western extremity of the bloody lane, or along the turnpike just north of it, — possibly both. Between Cobb and the southern end of the west woods two regiments of Manning's brigade¹ were soon after placed, under Colonel J. R. Cooke of the 27th North Carolina, to fill the gap between the troops about the Dunker church and those of D. H. Hill's line. Such were the Confederate dispositions when French's division advanced to the attack of this part of their line, perhaps an hour after Sedgwick had gone into action.

French's division had followed Sedgwick's to the rear of the east woods, but when the latter then faced to the west and advanced directly towards the Hagerstown turnpike, French had continued his march to the southward, and coming in contact with Confederate skirmishers near Rullet's house, had there formed his division into three lines of battle and pushed forward to the attack. Max Weber's brigade² constituted his front line, which seems to have been all, or nearly all, on the right of the lane leading from Rullet's and Clipp's houses into the bloody lane. His second line consisted of the brigade under Colonel Dwight Morris,³ and his third line of General Nathan Kimball's brigade.⁴ Weber was advancing in a southerly direction toward the crest which looks down on the bloody lane, driving back the Confederate skirmishers, when his right was vigorously assaulted by Manning's brigade. These latter troops had charged through the south end of the west woods in a direction perpendicular to the Hagerstown road, and finding there no enemy,⁵ continued straight forward and struck Weber's flank. Their "sudden and terrible fire"⁶ soon disordered and drove Weber back with heavy loss. General Weber was wounded in trying to rally the 5th Maryland, which was put to

¹ 27th North Carolina (Colonel Cooke) and 3d Arkansas (Captain J. W. Reedy).

² 1st Delaware, 4th New York, and 5th Maryland, — the last on the right.

³ 14th Connecticut, 108th New York, and 130th Pennsylvania.

⁴ 14th Indiana, 8th Ohio, 132d Pennsylvania, and 7th West Virginia.

⁵ See Colonel Hall's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 918. Greene's men had been driven out of the south end of these woods before Manning entered them.

⁶ General French thus characterizes it. (*Ib.* pp. 323, 324.)

flight. French's second line went promptly to the support of the first, and Tompkins's battery rendered efficient service in checking the Confederates. Manning was much hampered, too, by a double line of post-and-rail fence,¹ which he could not cross without greatly exposing his men.

While his right was thus in a critical state, French became aware of the movements which threatened his left,² and at the same moment received orders from General Sumner to press forward as a diversion in favor of Sedgwick, who was being severely handled. French at once threw forward his third line (Kimball's brigade), one half of it on the right of the lane from Clipp's house, and the other half of it on the left of that lane, to oppose G. B. Anderson. Kimball advanced with ardor, being joined as he went forward by the second and first lines, and soon reached the crest overlooking the bloody lane. In his advance his right drove back Manning, with severe loss in some of his regiments,³ to the west woods. Arriving in full view of the bloody lane, Kimball became exposed to the fire of Rodes and G. B. Anderson. He was not able to go farther, but he kept up the fight with great spirit. General Rodes says, "The enemy came to the crest of the hill overlooking my position, and for five minutes boldly stood a telling fire at about eighty yards, which my whole brigade delivered. They then fell back a short distance, rallied, were driven back again and again, and finally lay down just back of the crest, keeping up a steady fire, however."⁴ Similarly on the Confederate right, Kimball's men advanced within fifty yards of G. B. Anderson's line, and, when repulsed, rallied again and again to the attack.⁵ General Kimball says of his whole front, "My advance farther was checked, and for three hours and thirty minutes the battle raged incessantly without either side giving way."⁶

¹ This appears to have been the lane leading from Mume's house south-westwardly to the bloody lane.

² These were no doubt due to G. B. Anderson's troops, then on Rodes's left.

³ 48th North Carolina and 30th Virginia.

⁴ Rodes, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 1037.

⁵ Report of Colonel Bennett of Anderson's brigade, *Ib.* p. 1047.

⁶ Kimball's report, *Ib.* p. 327. He no doubt overestimates the time. Rodes makes it "more than an hour."

This stubborn but ineffective contest was carried on at a very unequal cost. The Confederates were protected by the sunken road (the "bloody lane"), and, though largely inferior in numbers, had greatly the advantage in position, and so lost but slightly.¹ French's losses, on the other hand, were very severe,² and the aggressive force of his troops was about exhausted³ when Richardson reached the field. Had the issue remained between French and Hill, the result can hardly be a matter of question.

But this was not to be. R. H. Anderson's division had accompanied McLaws from Harper's Ferry, and soon after the latter had gone to reinforce Jackson about the Dunker church, Anderson, with five brigades,⁴ had been sent to aid D. H. Hill. In Hill's rear was a cornfield, which from the first course of the sunken road and part of the second rose to a crest half way between that road and Piper's house. From this crest the land descends toward Piper's, and part of it was covered by a large orchard. To the east, however, of the second angle of the sunken road, the country is a high plateau, along which runs the third course of this road. This high ground overlooks Piper's, and on its extension northward rested the left of French's division, and along it Richardson advanced. R. H. Anderson's division came by way of Piper's into the orchard and the cornfield behind D. H. Hill. Two of his brigades, Pryor's and Featherston's, and perhaps others,⁵ were sent to reinforce G. B. Anderson's right on the high ground.

¹ Rodas says his brigade "sustained almost no loss until the retrograde movement began."

² French reports the loss of his division on this day, most of which had been incurred at this time, as 1817. (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 324.)

³ Colonel Bennett says a good deal of disorder began to show itself in French's left just before the reinforcements joined him.

⁴ Armistead's brigade of Anderson's division was sent to Jackson.

⁵ No report of R. H. Anderson, nor of any of his subordinates except Colonel A. M. Feltus, commanding the 16th Mississippi regiment, is to be found, and it is very difficult to follow his brigades. D. H. Hill says he directed Anderson to form directly behind his men. We know from Feltus's report that Pryor and Featherston were on G. B. Anderson's right. Probably most of his other troops went in that direction, as there is no mention of them in the rear of Rodas after the latter's brigade broke.

Richardson's division had crossed the Antietam about 9.30 A. M., and having followed French to the vicinity of Rullet's house, there formed line of battle. Meagher's brigade was on the right, Caldwell's on the left, and Brooke's in support. At this time French's left was staggering and yielding under the destructive fire of the Confederates, and Richardson hastened Meagher forward to support it. The latter advanced boldly and steadily, and the presence of so strong a body of new troops prevented G. B. Anderson from charging Kimball's partly disordered line.¹ G. B. Anderson continued, however, to hold his part of the bloody lane, while Meagher, in attempting to charge the Confederates, was brought to a halt by their murderous fire. Meagher's men then stood their ground and maintained the conflict at close quarters,² though at a fearful cost. When these brave Irishmen had been reduced to 500, Caldwell's brigade was brought from the Federal left to the rear of Meagher's men, who were then withdrawn, while Caldwell took their places³ and renewed the attack upon the stubborn Confederates. General Hancock says: "Caldwell's brigade immediately advanced to the crest overlooking the sunken road and about thirty yards from it, and became engaged in a most desperate conflict, the enemy then occupying that position in great strength, supported by other troops in their rear toward Piper's house."⁴ It was at this time that Rodes and the other troops on his left made a charge upon the troops of French's division, whom for an hour or more he had held in check. In this advance the troops of Cobb and the regiments under Cooke (27th North Carolina and 3d Arkansas) seem to have joined, the latter coming from the direction of the turnpike upon the right flank of the Federals. These flanking Confederates made considerable headway, for General Hancock speaks of the troops on the right of Rullet's house "as having been pierced."⁵ Colonel Brooke says they reached

¹ Colonel Bennett's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 1048.

² Meagher says at thirty paces. (*Ib.* p. 294.)

³ Meagher and Hancock say that Meagher's brigade broke by companies to the rear and Caldwell's by companies to the front.

⁴ Hancock's report, *Ib.* pp. 277, 278.

⁵ Hancock's report, *Ib.* p. 278.

a "cornfield in rear of Rullet's farmhouse." Brooke's brigade, which so far had been in reserve, now went toward the Federal right, and three of his regiments were at once thrown in to restore French's losses on that flank. W. H. T. Brooks's brigade of Smith's division was also ordered to the support of French, but arrived on his right after the Confederates had been repulsed. This repulse seems to have been effected by the three regiments of Brooks, with some help from Kimball.¹ It was soon effected.² Rodes's own brigade had meantime been driven back in front,³ and under the personal direction of Rodes himself again took position in the bloody lane. This gallant attempt to drive French⁴ was thus foiled through the promptness of Brooks and a want of concert on the part of Rodes's men, and the repulse no doubt prepared the way for the falling back of Rodes before the counter charge of Kimball, made soon after. This counter charge was made by Kimball's whole line. It was first successful on Rodes's right, where the 6th Alabama, in addition to pressure in front, was subjected to a terrible enfilade fire from some of the Federal troops who were gaining on G. B. Anderson. This regiment yielded, and the whole brigade soon followed. Rodes puts the blame for this disaster upon the commander of the 6th Alabama,⁵ who by mistake ordered a retreat, — Rodes himself being detained for a moment in the rear by a wounded staff officer, and subsequently from a blow from a piece of shell. Rodes's men retreated in confusion into the cornfield,

¹ 52d New York, 2d Delaware, and 53d Pennsylvania.

² It seems probable that only two Confederate regiments (those of Cooke), aided of course by artillery from about the turnpike, made this inroad on the Federal right, which at the time threatened serious consequences to French's division. Kimball claims that the repulse of the Confederates in the cornfield was due to the 13th Indiana and 8th Ohio of his brigade. No doubt they participated.

³ Rodes attributes his failure in this attack to the failure of one of his regiments (6th Alabama) to advance at the proper time, and to the failure of Colquitt's men immediately on his left to go far enough.

⁴ Rodes was greatly inferior in numbers to the troops before him.

⁵ Lieutenant-Colonel Lightfoot. (Rodes's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 1037.)

and he was able to rally but a few of them some 150 yards in his rear, on the ridge extending from the turnpike toward Piper's orchard. Cobb fell back more directly by the Hagerstown road, and joined Cooke, who was on that road. Kimball did not push his success beyond driving Rodes completely from the sunken road "some distance into the cornfield."¹ The heavy losses he had suffered, together with the fire of Confederate batteries from several directions to which he was exposed, probably caused him to be satisfied with the advantage he had gained.

Now let us turn to the right of D. H. Hill's line. Here, about the time of Kimball's successful charge, G. B. Anderson, though worn by long fighting, was holding firmly the second part of the sunken road, while Pryor and Featherston were coming up on his right. These new troops enabled the Confederates to extend their right, and an attempt was made to turn Caldwell's left. The latter sent his left regiment (5th New Hampshire, Colonel Cross) to meet it, leaving a gap between it and the remainder of his troops. Cross handled his regiment with skill and courage, and succeeded in checking the Confederates. Having been reinforced by the 81st Pennsylvania, he held them at bay when they advanced again. Meantime Colonel Brooke led his two remaining regiments² to aid Caldwell, who was hard pressed. These regiments took position in the gap left between the 5th New Hampshire and the left of Caldwell's brigade. A vigorous attack being now made upon the Confederates, they yielded, and were driven in confusion. It was the troops of R. H. Anderson³ on the Confederate right that first gave way, though the part of G. B. Anderson's brigade nearest them was involved in their defeat.⁴ Caldwell advanced his left, and pressing forward to the crest along which runs the third course of the bloody lane, drove

¹ Kimball's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 327.

² These had gone into battle on French's right. The two Brooke had with him now were the 57th and 66th New York. (*Ib.* p. 299.)

³ Pryor's and Featherston's brigades.

⁴ 4th and 30th North Carolina. The colors of the 4th North Carolina were captured by the 5th New Hampshire.

R. H. Anderson's troops toward Piper's house. The defeat of these troops completely exposed the flank of the part of G. B. Anderson's brigade which still bravely held its place in the sunken road. Colonel F. C. Barlow, in command of the two regiments¹ that constituted the right of Caldwell's brigade, was quick to see and seize the opportunity thus offered, and pouring an enfilading fire down the road, he soon drove G. B. Anderson from it, and captured some 300 prisoners. G. B. Anderson's brigade had fought with rare determination. They had repulsed all the attacks of Kimball's left and Meagher's brigade upon them. They had kept Caldwell and Brooke at bay, till the troops on their right had been swept away and had carried half their own men with them. Their commanding officer had fallen mortally wounded, Rodes's brigade on their left had finally yielded, and yet these two North Carolina regiments forming the left of G. B. Anderson's brigade (2d and 14th) held on to their section of the sunken road until Kimball's advance past the one flank and Barlow's direct assault on the other left no alternative but death or surrender. General Richardson, having now driven the whole right of the line held by D. H. Hill and R. H. Anderson, followed the Confederates in the direction of Piper's orchard and house. R. H. Anderson's division, now under Pryor,² made several efforts to check the Federal advance. Two guns³ planted in the orchard aided Pryor, as did Carter's and some other batteries from the west of the Hagerstown road. But these efforts were ineffectual. Richardson continued to advance till he gained the orchard, and pushing the now broken and scattered Confederates still farther, he seized Piper's house and outbuildings.

At this time the Confederate left centre under D. H. Hill was pretty thoroughly broken up. But a few scattered handfuls of D. H. Hill's division were left, and R. H. Anderson's was hopelessly confused and broken. The Confederate artil-

¹ 61st and 64th New York.

² R. H. Anderson had been wounded, and so had General Wright, one of his brigade commanders.

³ I do not know what battery these guns belonged to.

lery, however, kept up a vigorous fire upon the right, left, and centre of the Federals, and Hill, seeing that the centre of Lee's position was in danger of being carried, exerted himself to the utmost, and successfully, to stop any farther progress. He brought forward Boyce's South Carolina battery and made it open vigorously, though itself exposed to a fierce, direct, and reverse fire.¹ Hill placed himself at the head of the fragments of Rodes's brigade and charged on the troops in the orchard, and sent some 200 men, the remains of Garland's brigade, to strike the other flank of Richardson near Piper's house. These two attacks were repulsed, but, aided by the fire of the Confederate artillery, they probably convinced Richardson that his position was too much exposed. He therefore drew back his lines through the orchard and the fields east of it to the crest of the hill, and there rested. Some Federal guns² were brought up to reply to the Confederate artillery, but after severe firing these Federal batteries were forced to retire. General Richardson was desperately wounded about this time and borne from the field.³ No farther aggressive movements were made by his troops. When informed of Richardson's fall, General Sumner sent General Hancock to command the division, which meanwhile had been in charge of Caldwell.

It was about one P. M. when the serious infantry fighting ceased on this part of the field. French had not advanced beyond the sunken road, and, when the battle had concentrated on Richardson, had withdrawn to reform. Richardson's division held the crest in the orchard and fields above Piper's house, but the Confederates had repossessed themselves of that house and the adjoining buildings. There was no body of Confederate infantry in this part of the field that could

¹ Either from the Federal artillery in Porter's front beyond the Antietam, or from the guns under Pleasonton near the Boonesborough turnpike.

² A section of Robertson's horse battery of the 2d artillery, and Graham's battery of the 1st artillery.

³ General Richardson was wounded while ordering Graham's battery to the rear. See Graham's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. pp. 343, 344.

have resisted a serious advance, but batteries at different points from the south end of the west woods round to the Boonesborough turnpike swept the country in Richardson's front with their fire.

The Federal troops engaged in the struggle for the bloody lane were the divisions of French and Richardson, two thirds of Sumner's corps, and they probably numbered from 10,000 to 12,000 men.¹ The Confederate forces opposed to them were the brigades of G. B. Anderson and Rodes, numbering probably 1500 men, Cobb's brigade and a fragment of Colquitt's, numbering together about 500 men, a part of Manning's brigade, amounting to perhaps 1000 men, and five brigades of R. H. Anderson's division, containing probably 3500, — in all, with the artillery, not more than 7000 men. These troops, however, differed greatly in the effectiveness with which they were used ; as Kimball's, Caldwell's, and Brooke's brigades were best handled on the Federal side, so the brigades of Rodes and G. B. Anderson made the best defense of their position on the Confederate side. The division of R. H. Anderson seems to have been handled badly and to have accomplished little. The loss in French's division was 1817,² in Richardson's 1163.³ The Confederate losses it is impossible to determine, as they are not reported separately from those on the 14th.

¹ Sumner's corps, by McClellan's report, contained over 18,000 men for duty. General Palfrey thinks Sedgwick's division had not over 5000 on the field. If the other divisions were as strong, they probably had at least 10,000.

² French's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 324 ; but given in the revised statement, on p. 193, as 1750.

³ Hancock's report, *Ib.* p. 281 ; but given on p. 192 as 1165.

CHAPTER XLVI.

SHARPSBURG. — REVIEW OF THE BATTLE ON THE LEFT AND CENTRE.

WHEN General Hancock came over in the early afternoon from his brigade on the right of Smith's division to assume command of Richardson's division, he found that there were but 2100 men of this division in the field, and that it had no artillery. With this small force, enfiladed as it was by the fire from the Confederate batteries near the church, he thought it impossible to attempt an advance, unless the Federal troops on his right should be thrown forward against Jackson, and therefore he remained quiet on the crest in Piper's fields to the east of the orchard.

The subsequent operations of the day on the lines north of Sharpsburg led to no important results. Hooker's and Mansfield's corps had been completely used up, and Sedgwick's division of Sumner's corps was in like condition. Richardson's division, with French at his right rear, held the advanced position they had won at such heavy cost, but were incapable, as Hancock's report shows, of renewing the struggle. Franklin's corps had, as we have seen, reached the field about noon, and Smith's division had at once been sent forward. Hancock's brigade of this division had taken position near Miller's house to support the batteries on the Federal right,¹ while Irwin, after driving back the Confederate advance from the southwest point of the east woods to the vicinity of the church, had remained in the open fields between the two. Brooks was on Irwin's left, facing the west woods, and covering the flank of French's division. Thus one division (Smith's) of Franklin's

¹ General Franklin says Hancock's brigade saved certainly two batteries from capture. (Report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. pp. 376, 377.)

corps was holding the whole of the Federal front from French's position near the bloody lane to the north end of the field of battle. Slocum's division of Franklin's corps reached the field soon after Smith had gotten into position, and two of the brigades (Newton's and Torbert's) were at once sent forward in column of attack in front of the church to carry the woods about it.¹ The third brigade (Bartlett's) had been diverted by General Sumner to his right, and Franklin waited for its return. When General Sumner brought it back, he forbade the attack designed by Franklin, as too hazardous, a course which was subsequently approved of by General McClellan when he reached the field.² Hence Slocum remained in support of Smith, his infantry not engaged, but subjected to the heavy fire of the Confederate batteries in the west woods. One of his batteries (Hexamer's) was sent to Hancock, and it, as well as the other batteries of his division, was actively at work.

About four or five P. M. a dash was made by the 7th Maine regiment of Irwin's brigade against the Confederate skirmishers. This regiment, unsupported, continued its advance southward, until it reached the space between Piper's orchard and the turnpike, and opened fire upon the troops about the Piper building, those on its left in the orchard having fallen back as it advanced. A volley in flank from fences along the turnpike compelled the 7th Maine to take shelter in the orchard, from

¹ These brigades must have been formed near the south point of the east woods, or perhaps in advance of this in rear of Irwin and across the Smoketown road.

² Franklin says he wanted to attack, but Sumner took the responsibility of forbidding it, because "if I were defeated, the right would have been entirely routed, mine being the only troops left on the right that had any life in them." (*Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, vol. ii. p. 597.) McClellan says, "General Sumner expressed the most decided opinion against another attempt during that day to assault the enemy's position in front, as portions of our troops were so much scattered and demoralized. In view of these circumstances, after making changes in the position of some of the troops, I directed the different commanders to hold their positions, and, being satisfied that this could be done without the assistance of the two brigades from the centre, I countermanded the order, which was in course of execution." (McClellan's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 62.) The brigades from the centre were two of Porter's.

which it was quickly driven back to the Federal lines with the loss of half its strength.

General McClellan has been often censured for not renewing the assault upon Jackson with the 10,000 or 12,000 fresh men of Franklin's corps,¹ but we think unjustly. Lee's centre had withstood the attacks of some 40,000 men, of whom five sixths were probably *hors de combat*. To renew this struggle with a fresh corps must have seemed to the Federal commander as most likely to add another disastrous repulse to those which had preceded it. Nor is it probable that he was mistaken. Severe as had been their losses, and exhausted as were the Confederates by the unequal struggle, they were in better plight at its close than their opponents. A single fact establishes this, and throws more light on the condition of the combatants on this part of the field than any amount of general speculation. At the hour when McClellan and Sumner were deciding it to be reckless for Franklin's 10,000 or 12,000 fresh men to try what Hooker, Mansfield, and Sumner had attempted at immense cost and in vain, Lee, who had no reserves, whose last man had been sent into the battle, was ordering an attack by Jackson on the Federal right, in order to relieve his centre so sorely pressed by Richardson. Jackson sent forward Stuart with his cavalry and a number of guns to open a way for the advance of his infantry. These guns, under Major Pelham, moved forward, and opened on the Federal artillery that had been massed near J. Poffenberger's house to guard that flank. These Federal batteries replied so promptly and so vigorously as to silence the Confederate guns in a short time,² and to convince Stuart and Jackson that they were too weak to carry out this movement. Longstreet also ordered J. G. Walker's troops near the church to advance and charge the batteries in their front,³ but this was given up when Jack-

¹ Franklin, in his testimony (*Report of Committee on Conduct of War*, vol. i. p. 627), puts his effective force next day at from 13,000 to 15,000 old soldiers, besides some new regiments. This included Couch's division. His strength in the two divisions present on the 17th was by McClellan's report 12,300. (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 67.)

² See Captain Poague's report, *Ib.* p. 1010.

³ See Ransom's report, *Ib.* p. 920.

son's advance was abandoned. That the Confederate commanders thought such a movement possible without fresh troops and with no reserves, while McClellan felt compelled to keep a fresh corps on the defensive to cover his shattered divisions and to guard against an advance of his adversary, shows very plainly the comparative condition of the combatants at the close of the serious fighting on this part of the field.

It is with more justice that McClellan is blamed for not uniting what he could spare of Franklin's corps to Porter's, and supporting Burnside's attack by a movement along the Boonesborough turnpike directly toward Sharpsburg. But to understand this question, it is necessary first to follow the assault made on Lee's position southeast of Sharpsburg by the left wing of the Federal army.

CHAPTER XLVII.

SHARPSBURG. — BURNSIDE'S ATTACK.

IN point of time, the Federal advance over the bridge on the Boonesborough and Sharpsburg road preceded that over the Burnside bridge. Porter had been instructed to take possession of the former bridge, and he had done it without opposition the day before.¹ After the battle had been raging for some time on the Federal right, General Pleasonton, with his division of cavalry and four light batteries,² was ordered to cross and support Sumner's left. The Confederates had posted on the hills between the town and the bridge several batteries, which were supported by Evans's brigade. Squires's company of the Washington artillery was on the south side of the turnpike, Moody's of S. D. Lee's battalion on the north side. Boyce's battery of Evans's brigade and Garden's battery were also present. Garnett's brigade, the left of D. R. Jones's line, was in advance of the town and near the south side of the turnpike, but it was mainly occupied with Burnside's column. The Confederate batteries had a plunging fire on the bridge, and, together with the infantry skirmishers, for some time kept Pleasonton in check. He, however, drove back the skirmishers with canister from Tidball's battery, and, crossing the bridge, placed his battery in position in advance of it, so as to

¹ The bridge was occupied on the 16th by Captain Dryer with the 4th United States infantry, and four companies were thrown over to the west side to hold it. Later in the day the first battalion of the 12th infantry relieved the 4th. (Blunt's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 358.)

² Pleasonton had Farnsworth's brigade (8th Illinois, 3d Indiana, 1st Massachusetts, and 8th Pennsylvania), Rush's brigade (4th and 6th Pennsylvania), Davis's brigade (8th New York and 3d Pennsylvania), and the 5th regular cavalry. The batteries were Tidball's, Gibson's, Robertson's, and Harris's.

enfilade the Confederate forces to his right and left as well as to have a direct fire on the troops between him and Sharpsburg. It was twelve o'clock when Pleasonton got over,¹ and he confined himself for some hours to an artillery fire, his guns being protected by his cavalry division and by a battalion of Sykes's division loaned to him for that purpose.² After Pleasonton's batteries had exhausted their ammunition, Sykes sent two of his own (Randol's and Van Reed's) to relieve them, and also accompanied his guns with four additional battalions of infantry to protect them.³ An active fire was kept up upon these guns by the Confederate skirmishers as well as by their batteries, and the Federals made no progress. Randol, indeed, was soon compelled to leave the field. Later in the afternoon⁴ Pleasonton's batteries returned, and a vigorous fire was reopened upon the Confederates, and some of his infantry was pushed forward. But they were held in check by Evans, with some assistance from Garnett's brigade on his right and from some of Colonel Colquitt's and Iverson's men on his left. Colonel S. D. Lee also brought up at this time some of his guns, which he had refitted after the morning's struggle, and opened a heavy fire with four pieces from Parker's and Jordan's batteries upon Pleasonton. The latter made no headway until the progress of Burnside threatened the right flank and rear of the Confederate centre, when he attempted to push forward, and sent to Porter for reinforcements. Pleasonton was repulsed, and as Burnside had met with disaster before Porter received the message, the latter deemed it inexpedient to risk any more of his then small force⁵ on the west side of the

¹ See report of Captain Blunt, 1st battalion 12th United States infantry, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 358.

² Battalion of 2d and 10th infantry, under Captain J. S. Poland.

³ Under Captain Dryer, 4th United States infantry.

⁴ After three P. M. (Pleasonton's report, *Ib.* p. 211.)

⁵ Porter says he had less than 4000 men then with him holding the centre of the army and guarding its trains. Two of Morell's brigades had been sent to Sumner's aid, and Warren's brigade had gone to help Burnside, while five battalions of Sykes's men were already with Pleasonton. Warren's brigade took position on the east side of the creek near the Burnside bridge, and remained there.

Antietam. Thus the efforts of Pleasonton amounted to little, and at night his forces withdrew to the east side of the stream.

It will be remembered that General McClellan's plan of battle was to follow up the grand assault of his right upon the Confederates near the Dunker church with a vigorous advance of his left, under Burnside. The latter was to cross the Antietam at or near the bridge now known by his name, and assail Lee's right. For this purpose the 9th corps, under the immediate command of Cox,¹ had been massed under the cover of the hills near the bridge the day before, and Benjamin's battery of twenty-pounder Parrotts had been placed on the heights on the eastern side of the stream and opposite the bridge, to facilitate the crossing.² At an early hour on the 17th, Burnside was directed to form his command, and at eight A. M.³ he was ordered to carry the bridge and advance upon Sharpsburg. His troops were disposed as follows: "General Crook's brigade and General Sturgis's division immediately in front of the bridge and the ford a short distance above, their front covered by the 11th Connecticut, Colonel H. W. Kingsbury, thrown out as skirmishers; General Rodman's division with Scammon's brigade in support, opposite the ford, some three quarters of a mile below the bridge; General Wilcox's division in the woods at the left of Benjamin's battery, in rear of the other lines. Benjamin's battery retained its original position, and the following batteries were placed in advance on his right and left, those on the left overlooking the bridge and the heights above it: Clark's and Durell's on the right, Muhlenberg's, Cook's, and McMullin's on the left, and one section of Simmonds's with Crook's brigade, and one section with Ben-

¹ Burnside had some days before been placed in command of the right wing, consisting of the 1st corps (Hooker's) and of his own corps (9th). Hooker was on this day on the right of the Federal army, but Burnside was sent with the 9th corps to the other wing. He did not resume direct command of the 9th corps, but left it to Cox, being himself merely the channel through which orders from headquarters reached the corps commander.

² Benjamin's battery was E, 2d United States artillery.

³ McClellan says he sent the order at this hour. Burnside says he received it at ten A. M. Cox says at nine, which is probably most correct.

jamin's battery. The battery of Dahlgren boat howitzers, attached to the 9th New York, covered the crossing of Rodman's division at the ford below."¹

The troops opposed to Burnside were the three regiments (20th, 2d, and 50th Georgia), and a "company from Jenkins's brigade," under General Toombs. Eubank's battery was in position to sweep the bridge and the approaches to it, and Richardson's battery was higher up and farther to the rear. The withdrawal of J. G. Walker's division to reinforce Jackson had left only this small force of 500 or 600 men to block the way which led almost directly to the Confederate rear. One company of the 20th Georgia held a good position among some trees on the bank of the creek above the bridge; the remainder of Toombs's force was stretched along the straight bank of the stream, which extended for three hundred yards below the bridge to the first of the lower fords. Below this point the creek curves sharply, making a loop with convexity toward the east. At the lower end of this loop was another ford, some six hundred yards from the bridge in a straight line, but more than twice that distance by the east bank of the creek. The ground rose in Toombs's rear to a high crest, and this was succeeded by others in the direction of Sharpsburg. The road from the bridge to Sharpsburg follows up the west bank of the creek some distance, and then ascends to the town through a deep ravine made by a little stream, which, rising at the town itself, enters the Antietam about a quarter of a mile above the bridge. It was at a point on the road above the bridge that the single company of the 20th Georgia was posted. Near this point also the creek was fordable, but the Federals were ignorant of the fact. The main part of Toombs's force (20th and 2d Georgia) occupied the space of 300 yards next below the bridge, and commanded by their fire the road on the east side by which the Federals must approach. This road runs for that distance along the left bank of the stream south of the bridge, and was the avenue by which the assailants must approach it. The 50th Georgia was placed to guard the first ford below, and the company from Jenkins was divided, part being sent to

¹ Burnside's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 419.

watch the second lower ford, and part to fill the gap between the 50th Georgia and the 2d Georgia. The Confederates availed themselves of whatever cover the brush on the margin of the stream and the fences along the slope afforded.

According to General Toombs, his skirmishers were driven in before eight o'clock, and the first assault was made upon his position between nine and ten A. M. This assault was made by Sturgis. Crook's brigade, which was to have led,¹ seems to have been badly handled. They reached the vicinity of the bridge by a different route from Sturgis, and so heavy was the Confederate fire that they were "forced to halt and open fire in return," while "Sturgis's division, passing by the rear, came first to the bridge, and was ordered to cross under the protection of the artillery fire."² Crook then transferred his troops above the bridge, and after many hours' delay succeeded in getting a part of one of his regiments³ across at the ford above, but before he was ready to attack, Sturgis had gained the bridge.

There was no part of the bloody field of Sharpsburg which witnessed more gallant deeds both of attack and defense than did the Burnside bridge. For four hours a fierce contest was waged for its possession. Nagle's brigade of Sturgis's division was in advance. The right of this brigade was posted on the bluff overlooking the bridge, while the left of it was converted into a storming party, which, under cover of a tremendous fire from the Federal batteries, attempted to carry the bridge at the point of the bayonet. The effort failed. The withering fire of Toombs's Georgians on the assaulting column as it charged up the east side of the creek was unbearable. The column recoiled bleeding and broken before it reached the end of the bridge. General Sturgis says: ⁴ "The importance of carrying it without delay was impressed upon me by General Burnside, and I went in person to the vicinity of the bridge, and ordered the 2d Maryland, Colonel Duryea, and Colonel Griffin, 6th New Hampshire, to move over at a

¹ Crook says he was to follow Sturgis, but his superiors all say he was to lead.

² Cox's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 425.

³ Five companies, 28th Ohio.

⁴ *Ib.* p. 444.

double quick, and with bayonets fixed. They made a handsome effort to execute this order, but the fire was so heavy on them before they could reach the bridge that they were forced to give way and fall back." Failure, however, did not deter Sturgis's brave troops from other efforts. His second brigade under Ferrero came up to the aid of the first. Four times between ten and one o'clock the charge was renewed with the same result. The 500 Federal soldiers who lay bleeding or dead along the eastern approach to the bridge were witnesses to the courage of the assaults. On the Confederate side of the stream Toombs's two small regiments¹ held their ground, and threw back assault after assault with a coolness and tenacity unsurpassed in history. A furious artillery fire rained down upon them, a not less formidable fire of musketry came from every part of the opposite cliff and bank and from greatly superior numbers; column after column of assault dashed up to the very bridge; but still Toombs and his Georgians held on,—held on with no means of replying to the terrible artillery fire, held on after Eubank's guns had been forced from the face of the hill, held on till one half of their 400 muskets were silenced by wound or death.² Nor were they then driven from their position by direct assault.

While Sturgis was engaged in unsuccessful attacks on the bridge itself, and Crook was slowly making his way to the ford above the bridge, Rodman's division, supported by Ewing's brigade, had been sent down to the fords below. Rodman had passed the night near the creek, and found himself exposed to the Confederate fire in the morning.³ He moved back into

¹ The troops to the right of the 2d Georgia hardly participated in the defense of the bridge. See General Toombs's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 890.

² Lieutenant-Colonel Holmes of the 2d Georgia was killed, and Major Harris wounded. Colonel Holmes's gallantry was praised alike by friends and foes. See General Walcott's *History of the 21st Massachusetts Regiment*, p. 201, note.

³ Colonel Fairchild, commanding one of Rodman's brigades, says he lost thirty-six men wounded by the fire of sharpshooters and of artillery (Eubank's and Richardson's batteries). (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 451.)

the gorge which the road enters after leaving the creek, and there spent two hours in resting and refreshing his men. He subsequently moved toward the lower ford, and placing a battery¹ in position, soon after midday forced a crossing.² He was opposed principally by Eshleman's battery of the Washington artillery, which, in a position between Blackford's house and the ford, kept up a vigorous shelling for some time. Eshleman was finally forced to withdraw by the enfilading fire of the long range Federal guns near and above the bridge, but he reopened a harassing fire on Rodman's flank after the latter had crossed.

Toombs, knowing the weakness of his right flank, beheld the movement of a division of the Federal army in that direction with apprehension. On his left, too, Crook had found the ford above the bridge, and was preparing to cross. The Federals once over at the fords, Toombs's position was no longer tenable, and his handful of brave men must have been all sacrificed. The only troops to whom he might look for succor were D. R. Jones's division, and they were on the hills in his rear, near the town, and entirely out of his reach. In the event of being forced to yield the bridge, his orders were to move to his right and take position before the lower fords. Toombs saw that the moment had come for him to retire, if he would save the remnant of his command. He acted with judgment and coolness. Sturgis, who had received reiterated orders to carry the bridge, regardless of cost, was preparing a final assault on it. He had selected the 51st Pennsylvania and the 51st New York for the perilous and bloody task. But while they were advancing, Toombs withdrew his men, and by a well-executed movement threw them to the right in front of Rodman, and left the bridge he had held so bravely for hours to fall into the hands of his enemies. As Toombs moved to his new position, he was joined by two and a half regiments³

¹ Fairchild calls it the 9th battery.

² He speaks of driving back the Confederate skirmishers with his battery, but as these were only the part of one company of infantry, this could not have been difficult.

³ 15th Georgia, Colonel Williams, and 17th Georgia, Captain McGregor,

which had just reached the field from the rear, where they had been guarding ammunition. With these fresh troops he took the position to which he had been ordered, and sent back the 2d and 20th regiments to replenish their cartridge boxes.

It was one o'clock when the 51st New York and the 51st Pennsylvania thus obtained possession of the bridge. The other portion of Sturgis's division and Crook's brigade promptly crossed and took possession of the crest, at the foot of which Toombs had fought. Rodman's division and Ewing's brigade moved slowly up from the fords below, and took their places an hour later on Sturgis's left.

The splendid defense made by Toombs had thwarted any concert of action between the right and left assaults of the Federal army, for when Burnside's troops reached the cliffs on the west side of the Antietam, the serious fighting on the Federal right was over. But Burnside was directed to push his advantage, and he prepared to do so. The fight of the morning had been an exhausting one on Sturgis's division, which had lost very heavily and was now nearly out of ammunition. It was not fit to do more, and Cox therefore sent back for Wilcox's division to take its place. Wilcox was sent up, and, crossing the bridge, took the advance on the road towards Sharpsburg, while Sturgis was left in reserve at the bridge. Two hours were consumed in this way, and it was about three p. m. when Burnside's corps moved forward in force against Sharpsburg.

Wilcox's division, on Burnside's right, advanced by the road which, as we have seen, after going up the right bank of the Antietam for several hundred yards, follows a ravine from that point to Sharpsburg. Wilcox formed his troops across this ravine near its mouth, Christ's brigade on the right, and Welsh's on the left, and advanced over the hills towards the village. Two pieces of Cook's battery were left on a hill near the bridge and two pieces accompanied Wilcox's division, and were placed in position on the left of the

of his own brigade, which had come up from Williamsport, and five companies of the 11th Georgia, of G. T. Anderson's brigade, under Major Littell, which had come from Shepherdstown.

ravine after the infantry had made some progress. Crook's brigade followed Wilcox in support. As Wilcox progressed, his troops gradually passed almost entirely to the right of the ravine and the road to Sharpsburg. On his left was Rodman's division, in support of whom came Ewing's brigade.

To resist this formidable advance of Burnside's corps of 10,000 or 12,000 men¹ Lee had at hand at first but meagre resources. They consisted of four skeleton brigades, under D. R. Jones, in addition to Toombs's brigade, which had been engaged at the bridge. Of Jones's division, Garnett's brigade had been placed in advance of the town on the south side on the turnpike, and was concerned in protecting Confederate guns engaged with Pleasonton as well as in resisting Burnside's advance. It consisted of only two or three hundred men, and when Wilcox advanced, took position in a cornfield in front of two guns of Moody's battery. This was to the east and somewhat to the south of where the National Cemetery now is. To the right of Garnett and in support of the remainder of Moody's guns and one of Squires's² was Jenkins's brigade, which was thrown forward into an orchard to meet Wilcox when the latter's infantry advanced in force. On the right of these brigades and on the south side of the ravine was Drayton's brigade, and then Kemper's. Toombs's brigade was some distance farther to Jones's right, in front of the ford at which Rodman had crossed, and upon the flank of the Federal columns advancing from the bridge toward Sharpsburg. The strength of these five brigades together with G. T. Anderson's (which had been sent to another part of the field) is reported by D. R. Jones as only 2430 on the morning of the 17th. Even with the addition of the two and

¹ Burnside's strength by McClellan's report was 13,819. (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 67.)

² Captain Squires had the first company of Washington artillery. After repulsing, by the aid of Garnett's brigade, the attack of the regular infantry, under Pleasonton, on the Boonesborough turnpike, this company had but one gun (a 10-pounder Parrott, under Lieutenant Galbraith) in service. See Walton's report, *Ib.* p. 849.

a half regiments which had joined Toombs's brigade, Jones had probably less than 2000 men at three P. M.¹

But, fortunately for the Confederates, the fate of the day was not to depend upon the issue of the unequal struggle between Burnside and Jones. Like Desaix at Marengo, A. P. Hill was to restore the battle. When Jackson had hastened away from Harper's Ferry on the night of the 15th, he left A. P. Hill with his division to parole the prisoners and dispose of the captured property. When the development of McClellan's plans on the 16th made it evident to Lee that the shock of battle would fall on him the next day, he ordered A. P. Hill to rejoin the army at Sharpsburg as soon as possible. Hill received this order at 6.30 on the morning of the 17th, and, leaving one brigade to complete the work at Harper's Ferry, was in motion with the others at half past seven. Marching to Shepherdstown, and crossing the Potomac at Boteler's ford, he was now, about three P. M., approaching the field. The long and exhausting march of seventeen miles on a warm day had greatly worn his troops and diminished his numbers, but he was able to bring to the field between 3000 and 3500 men.²

Before A. P. Hill arrived, however, the storm had burst upon Jones. As soon as Wilcox's troops left the banks of the Antietam, and began to reach high ground, they came under the Confederate fire. Pressing forward in the face of a heavy artillery fire, they soon drove back the skirmishers and became engaged with Garnett and Jenkins on the right of the road ascending to the town. The Confederates made a stout resistance. Garnett's men were in a cornfield with Moody's two guns, under the immediate supervision of Colonel S. D.

¹ General Palfrey thinks Jones omits his officers in this enumeration, but even if this be the case we are estimating his numbers liberally when we put them at 2000. The reports of the officers of Garnett's brigade, that of Colonel Corse of Kemper's brigade, and that of General Toombs show conclusively to what mere handfuls of men these commands were reduced.

² Hill says the three brigades of Archer, Gregg, and Branch numbered not over 2000. Pender's and Brockenbrough's are to be added, the latter a very small command.

Lee, and kept back the right of Christ's brigade for more than an hour,¹ while Jenkins's brigade, under Colonel Joseph Walker, with the aid of the artillery, held its position in the orchard against the efforts of the bulk of Wilcox's division. Meantime Rodman, on Wilcox's left, had advanced on the south side of the road leading up to Sharpsburg, and had become engaged with Drayton and Kemper. McIntosh's battery from the head of A. P. Hill's column had been sent over to aid Drayton, and poured a heavy fire into the advancing troops. Before long, however, victory at this point sided with the Federals. A charge of Fairchild's brigade, aided perhaps by a part of Welsh's, broke Drayton's line. Kemper's troops were involved in the disaster. McIntosh's guns were run over, and the victorious Federals made their way to the very outskirts of the town. This success secured that of Wilcox farther to the Federal right. Garnett's handful of men were forced from the field. Jenkins's brigade, exposed on both flanks, was no longer able to hold the orchard, but took a position higher up the ravine and parallel to it, where they aided in the subsequent repulse of the Federals.

At this moment the tide of Federal success reached its highest point. D. R. Jones was defeated, and incapable of further effective resistance to the overwhelming advance of Burnside. Sharpsburg, the centre of Lee's position, was almost in the grasp of the 9th corps. But the Confederate leaders exerted themselves to the utmost to stay the further progress of the enemy. A number of guns were placed near the town, and opened a vigorous fire on the advancing lines.² Jones had ordered up Toombs from his right when he found Kemper and Drayton hard pressed, and Toombs was now near the town. But, above all, A. P. Hill had rapidly deployed his division with its front parallel to the road and ravine leading

¹ Garnett's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 897. Christ says, "in about one hour" he "succeeded in driving the artillery from their position." (*Ib.* p. 438.)

² Brown's, Moody's, and Richardson's batteries, and part of Squires's were the most prominent ones at first. They greatly distinguished themselves.

from Sharpsburg to the Burnside bridge, and was thus ready to throw himself upon the flank of Rodman's troops. Of Hill's brigades, Pender's and Brockenbrough's were placed on the right to watch the road which crosses the Antietam near its mouth. They were subsequently brought up to the centre, but were not actively engaged. Following Hill's line to the left were Gregg, Branch, and Archer, the last-named connecting with Toombs on the road leading south from the town. Braxton's battery (under Lieutenant Marye) was on Gregg's right, while Crenshaw's and Pegram's batteries occupied a fine position on the left of the division. Toombs, when he found Kemper's and Drayton's brigades driven back, had formed his men in the road, and was prepared to dispute the Federal advance. A portion of Kemper's men rallied on his left, while Archer on his right united in checking Fairchild's progress. While this was doing, Gregg and Branch attacked the flank of Harland's brigade, which was moving up to Fairchild's support. Rodman did not realize till too late the blow impending on his flank. Indeed, neither General Cox nor any of his subordinates seem to have been aware of the presence and design of A. P. Hill. Harland's brigade was soon badly cut up¹ and completely routed.² General Rodman himself fell mortally wounded; Ewing's brigade changed front to receive Hill's attack, but was involved in Harland's overthrow and driven toward the bridge. Fairchild, seeing the trouble on his left, yielded to the pressure upon him in front, and under a vigorous charge of Toombs and Archer, was broken and forced backward. McIntosh's guns were recaptured, and Rodman's whole division and Ewing's brigade were driven with very heavy loss and in much confusion to the protection of the Federal batteries near the bridge, and of Sturgis's division, which was ordered forward to cover the retreat. In this repulse the Confederate artillery took a most efficient part.

¹ Gregg struck the 16th Connecticut and 4th Rhode Island regiments of Harland.

² This brigade did not rally until they had recrossed the bridge to the east side. (Colonel Harland's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 454.) They bivouacked near Warren's brigade there stationed.

In addition to the batteries which have been mentioned, Carter's battery¹ and the Donaldsonville artillery under Lieutenant Elliot were brought from the north side of the town, and poured a rapid and effective fire upon the Federal columns.

The defeat of Rodman left Wilcox's division, which was mainly on the north side of the ravine,² in a critical position. With flank exposed and supports gone, and half encircled by the Confederate artillery fire, his position was not tenable, and he promptly withdrew to the crest nearest the creek. Here Burnside's troops took position to cover the bridge, being themselves under cover of the batteries on the east side of the Antietam.³ The Confederates did not attempt to push their success farther, content that the fast growing darkness should end the bloody and exhausting struggle. Cox reports⁴ the losses of the 9th corps for the day as 2222, three fourths of which probably took place on the west side of the Antietam. A. P. Hill's losses were 346. D. R. Jones's, which was heavy, is not separated in his report from that incurred on September 14.

¹ King William artillery, Captain F. H. Carter.

² Extending from the town to the creek along which runs the road from Sharpsburg.

³ Cox says, "I ordered the troops withdrawn from the exposed ground in front to the cover of the curved hill above the bridge, which had been taken from the enemy early in the afternoon. The line, as then constituted, was formed by Sturgis's division in front on the left, supported by Fairchild's brigade of Rodman's division; the Kanawha division, under Colonel Scammon, in the centre and Wilcox's division on the right." (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 426.)

⁴ *Ib.* p. 427. The revised statement, on p. 198, makes the loss 2349.

CHAPTER XLVIII.

REVIEW OF THE CAMPAIGN AND BATTLE.

THUS ended the battle of Sharpsburg. In no battle of our war was there harder fighting and more of it. Twenty thousand men lay wounded or dead to attest the courage with which McClellan's assaults had been made and the stubbornness with which they had been repelled. So far as numbers and resources go, the struggle had been most unequal. It was the assault of an army of about 80,000 troops upon one of 35,000. It was not an attack upon a fortified position, it was a pitched battle in an open field. Want of food and shoes and severe marching had greatly diminished the Confederate numbers, and greatly tried the endurance of many of those Confederates who participated in the battle. The losses in actual numbers were greater in the Federal army, but the comparative loss was no doubt greater in the Confederate. Thus McClellan reports his total loss as 12,469, or between one sixth and one seventh of his strength. The Confederate reports do not separate their losses at Boonesborough and Crampton's Gap from those at Sharpsburg. They probably amounted to 8000 men or more, which was equal to one fourth of their strength.

As regards results, they were more equally divided. We do not concur in the opinion of General Palfrey¹ that, tactically, this was a drawn battle. It is true that at the centre of the Confederate line the Federals had gained and continued to hold some ground, and that they also retained possession of the Burnside bridge at nightfall, but with these very slight exceptions the field on which they had been attacked remained in possession of the Confederates, while two thirds of the Federal army was so broken and crippled from its unsuccessful

¹ *The Antietam and Fredericksburg*, p. 119.

assaults as to be virtually *hors de combat*. Lee had held his ground, and felt confident of his ability to continue to do so, for he remained in position the next day. Tactically, Lee had defeated his antagonist. This, however, is a narrow view of the matter.

It is when we take a wider view that the results of Sharpsburg seem indecisive. Considered as an attempt on the part of McClellan to use the rare piece of good fortune which had revealed to him Lee's plans, it was a costly and not very creditable failure. So far from crushing Lee in part or in whole, the Federal army had been so crippled as to be powerless for offense for months to come. On the other hand, the Confederates were greatly exhausted by the struggle, and Lee was unable to continue his hold on the north side of the Potomac. This battle terminated the occupation of Maryland. After the terrible strife of September 17, both armies were glad to rest for many weeks, each in its own territory.

We have already noted the error of the Federal commander in not attacking on the 15th or 16th. His conduct of the battle when he did deliver it is open to criticism. The plan of attack was good enough, but the execution was disjointed and infirm. The Federal army was so handled that its immense preponderance of force was at no time effective. Hooker and Mansfield on the right were beaten, and terribly beaten, before Sumner moved against the Confederate line. Sumner's attack was too late, and, when made, instead of being concentrated, as Hooker's and Mansfield's had been, upon Jackson, it was divided, and was directed against the centre as well as the left of Lee's position. The great mistake, however, of the day was the delay of Burnside's attack until the afternoon. It should have been made, as was designed, in conjunction with the assaults on the Federal right. It is true that the delay at the bridge was not the fault of McClellan or Burnside. The blame for this rests upon the handful of Georgians who so gallantly held it. But Toombs's force was finally turned by means of the fords, and this might have been done as easily at nine o'clock as at one. Probably if Pleasonton's cavalry, which wasted the day at the centre of the army near the bridge on

the Boonesborough road, had been thrown forward on the Federal left flank, it would have secured Burnside a more prompt and less costly crossing. It would certainly have discovered the approach of A. P. Hill. The latter would not have been a factor in the problem, however, if Burnside's corps had moved against Sharpsburg in the forenoon, as Hill's troops were then on the south side of the Potomac. We shall not attempt to settle the controversy between the friends of McClellan and Burnside as to who was most responsible for this delay. McClellan's headquarters were within fifteen minutes' ride of the Burnside bridge, and the progress or the want of progress of affairs there was well known to the commander-in-chief, but it does not appear that at any time he visited this part of the field, or made any special effort to push forward his lieutenant. The truth is, that, though a master of the science of war, McClellan was not conspicuous for his energy and skill in handling large bodies of troops. He directed the strategy of his campaigns, but left the tactics of his battles almost entirely to his subordinates.

The contrast between McClellan and Lee at Sharpsburg is very striking. Lee's conduct of the campaign has been sharply criticised. He had crossed the Potomac with a victorious but much worn army. In the face of largely superior forces he had sent half of them to invest Harper's Ferry, and thus took the risk of an attack of the whole Federal army upon the other half. A rapid advance of the Federal army had placed him in a critical position. With heavy loss he had held the South Mountain passes barely long enough to secure the capture of Harper's Ferry, and then had succeeded in concentrating his troops in time to fight McClellan only by exhausting efforts and the utmost energy. But, on the other hand, it is evident that Lee did not misjudge the task before him. McClellan's operations after the 13th of September, no less than those before it, render it certain that, but for the chance that revealed Lee's movements to McClellan, the former would have carried out his bold strategy without serious risk or interruption, and would have been ready, a few days later than the 17th, not to receive, but to deliver battle. Lee's plan of campaign did not

contemplate the defense of the South Mountain passes.¹ He did hold them for a day, but that was done to save McLaws and insure the fall of Harper's Ferry. Had Harper's Ferry fallen as he expected, before McClellan moved forward to Turner's Gap, the design of Lee was to retire into the Hagerstown valley and then concentrate his army. He wished to draw the Federal army as far as possible from Washington, and then he purposed to attack McClellan at the first favorable opportunity. The captured dispatch changed the whole character of the campaign. Lee was thrown upon the defensive, but by an unusual display of boldness, skill, and courage, he snatched the flower, safety, from the nettle, danger. The Federal army was kept back at the South Mountain passes long enough to secure the fall of Harper's Ferry with the 11,000 prisoners and large material of war, and then the position of Sharpsburg was taken, and so held that Lee was able to bring upon the field his whole force in the final struggle with McClellan. It is difficult for a commander, struggling always against odds more or less great, to avoid the charge of rashness, and the great masters of the art of war are those against whom this charge has been most frequently made. General Longstreet says² that Lee should have recrossed the Potomac after South Mountain and the fall of Harper's Ferry, and not fought at Sharpsburg. This would have been to yield all the moral results of a victory to his adversary without a battle. In the light of subsequent events, however, there is much to be said in favor of this course.

But whatever may be thought or said of the strategy which led to the battle of Sharpsburg, the conduct of that battle itself by Lee and his principal subordinates seems absolutely above criticism.³ Had Lee known all that we know now of the Federal plans and forces, it is difficult to see how he could

¹ In a conversation with the author, General Lee stated that his purpose was as above given.

² *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, vol. ii. p. 666.

³ Longstreet commanded on the Confederate right and Jackson on the left, while Stuart, with Fitz Lee's brigade of cavalry and several batteries, was on Jackson's left.

have more wisely disposed or more effectually used the means he had at hand. The utmost tension existed at different points of his lines during the day. He had no reserves, but so judiciously were the Confederate troops handled that their obstinate courage was sufficient everywhere to prevent any serious loss of position. Had all the Confederate troops been on the field at sunrise, it is probable that the losses of the Federal army would have been more severe. In the case of McLaws and R. H. Anderson, a marching energy equal to that of Jackson on the night of the 15th, or to that of A. P. Hill on the 17th, would have placed them at Sharpsburg on the night of the 16th. In that case the effective blows dealt by these commanders, and especially by McLaws after ten A. M. on the day of battle, might have been delivered some hours earlier. Lee omitted nothing to hasten their arrival, and, when they came, he sent them, as he did A. P. Hill in the afternoon, to the decisive points, where the weight just added to the Confederate side turned the scale.

It is to be regretted that it is not possible to chronicle more specifically the services of the Confederate artillery at Sharpsburg. Though making an indifferent figure while engaged with the heavy Federal batteries on the east side of the Antietam (as General D. H. Hill says¹), there is no doubt but that the Confederate batteries contributed their full share to the results of the day. Though inferior in guns and ammunition, they were used most effectively upon the attacking lines, as is shown by the Federal reports. This was especially the case with the batteries on the left, under J. E. B. Stuart, who, with little besides these guns and a brigade of cavalry, all day covered Jackson's flank; with those under D. H. Hill,² which checked Richardson's and French's assaults when the infantry had yielded before them; and with those batteries on the south and east of the town, which stopped Burnside, and aided the infantry so effectually in repulsing him.

Grateful to both armies was the night which put an end to the carnage and gave an opportunity for rest. The darkness,

¹ *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 1026.

² The battalions of Pierson, Cutts, and Jones.

however, could not blot out the horrors which mark the field after a great battle. The groans of the wounded and dying filled the air. For hours were friends and ambulance parties busy in removing the wounded and assuaging suffering. Gradually the moving ceased, the sounds died away, and the weary soldiers of both sides sank to rest.

When the sun arose again it was not to look upon a renewal of the strife. General McClellan, "after a night of anxious deliberation,"¹ had concluded not to renew the attack. His reasons were two: first, the condition of the Federal army and the strength and position of the Confederates were such as to render his success uncertain. Secondly, fourteen thousand fresh troops, consisting of Couch's division from Maryland Heights and Humphreys's new division were hastening to join him. He deemed it wisest to rest, and wait for these reinforcements, before renewing the contest. The two armies remained quiet, therefore, all day in each other's presence. Burnside asked for reinforcements to enable him to hold his position at the bridgehead. Morell's division was sent to his assistance. It was placed on the crest at the west end of the bridge, and the 9th corps was withdrawn to the east side of the creek. On the fields about the Dunker church and the bloody lane, the burying of the dead and the removal of the wounded went on all day, interrupted now and then by some firing between the sharpshooters, and facilitated at others by the informal truces of the opposing pickets.²

Perhaps no part of General McClellan's management of this campaign has been more severely censured than his failure to renew the assault on the 18th, and we believe that in no case has he been more unjustly criticised. McClellan's decision was approved by his principal subordinates; it was entirely in accordance with the conviction of Lee, who all day awaited without apprehension a renewal of the attack;³ and we believe it was fully justified by the comparative condition of the two armies. The Federal army had suffered as much in morale as

¹ See his report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 65.

² See General Hancock's report, *Ib.* pp. 280, 281.

³ Lee's report, *Ib.* p. 151.

in men, on the 17th. Hooker's and Mansfield's corps and Sedgwick's division were not in condition to attack, as is plain from General Meade's report of the state of Hooker's corps on the afternoon of the 18th.¹ Burnside was in no better condition. He felt unable even to hold the bridge which had cost him so heavily, without reinforcements. Only Porter and Franklin were ready for a new contest. The Confederates had been sorely weakened too, but they were now all in position, and they had successfully withstood the assaults of the preceding day. Two Federal corps could not have driven them from the lines which four corps had attacked in vain the day before. There is no reason to doubt the correctness of the judgments of both Lee and McClellan. An attack on the 18th would have resulted disastrously to the Federal arms.

¹ Meade reported but 6729 men present of Hooker's corps on the 18th. (McClellan's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 66.)

CHAPTER XLIX.

LEE RECROSSES THE POTOMAC.

THE relative condition of the two armies was subject to rapid change. As already stated, 14,000 fresh troops joined McClellan on the 18th, and other reinforcements were expected. The Confederates had nothing to hope in this way except from the arrival of stragglers. They were too weak to undertake the offensive. The Federal army would rapidly grow in their front, — the Potomac was at their backs. As McClellan was plainly gathering strength before again offering battle, Lee deemed it prudent to withdraw to the south side of the Potomac. Orders were given to this effect late in the afternoon of the 18th, and during the night the Confederate army recrossed the Potomac at Boteler's ford, with all its trains and material, "without loss or molestation."¹ Such of the wounded as could be transported were brought back with the army. No attempt was made by the Federals to follow until the next day, when Pleasonton's cavalry, followed by Porter's corps, advanced. Fitz Lee's cavalry kept them in check until the crossing was completed, when the Federals advanced to the ford and engaged the rear-guard, which had been left to defend it. This guard consisted of about 600 infantry² and a number of batteries placed on the heights,³

¹ Lee's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 151. The successful crossing of the trains over a wide river, from which only a narrow road debouched, was largely due to the energy of Major J. A. Harman, chief quartermaster to General Jackson. Harman had charge of this crossing, which went on for the greater part of the night under the immediate supervision of both Lee and Jackson.

² Portions of the brigades of Armistead and Lawton, under Colonels Hodges and Lamar.

³ There were over forty pieces in General Pendleton's charge at this time, of which a large number were placed in battery.

all under General Pendleton, Lee's chief of artillery. The Federals kept up a heavy artillery fire, and, subsequently placing infantry in the canal which runs along the north bank of the river, greatly annoyed the Confederate gunners. Late in the afternoon an attacking party from Griffin's and Barnes's brigades was thrown over, which drove away the 200 or 300 Confederate infantry stationed at the point of crossing,¹ and compelled the abandonment of several of the Confederate guns. Night was at hand, the Confederates retired, and the Federal troops, without pushing far, returned to their own side of the river. Next morning four pieces of artillery were secured by the Federals.

On the same morning (20th) Porter sent over a force of about 3500 men,² consisting of the brigades of Lovell, Warren, and Barnes, under Sykes, which advanced on the Shepherdstown and Charlestown road. They were at first unopposed, but soon encountered A. P. Hill's division, which General Lee, when informed of Pendleton's repulse, had ordered back to the ford. Finding the Confederates advancing upon them, Sykes fell back to the crest near the river, where, under cover of a tremendous fire of artillery from the north side, he attempted to hold his position. Lovell was in the centre of the line, Barnes on the right, and Warren on the left. When A. P. Hill found the Federals in position, he formed his division into lines and advanced upon them. Pender, Gregg, and Thomas, in order from left to right, formed his first line. Lane (commanding Branch's brigade), Archer, and Brockenbrough in the same order composed his second. Thomas was so far to the right as not to be seriously engaged, but Pender and Gregg advanced into the face of a severe artillery fire. Archer moved up the second line to Pender's left, and a charge was made upon the opposing forces. Mean-

¹ Pendleton had sent part of his infantry force to threaten points above and below the ford. The forces of Griffin were volunteers from the 14th Michigan, 118th Pennsylvania, 18th and 22d Massachusetts.

² Barnes had 1711, Lovell 1060 (see their reports). Warren's brigade was small, and probably did not exceed 800. (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. pp. 346, 361.)

time, however, General Porter had ordered Sykes to recross, and the Federals attempted to withdraw under cover of their artillery. They were driven into the river pell-mell, and the Confederates followed to the edge of the stream and poured a heavy fire of musketry into them as they were crossing. Barnes's brigade lost 326 men.¹ The loss of the other Federal brigades is not given. Hill's total loss was 261. This brilliant charge of Hill, in which, without the aid of a single piece of artillery and under the fire of numerous well-served guns, he defeated one of the best divisions of the Federal army, deserves to be ranked with his operations against Burnside three days before.² The Federal army desisted from further attempts for the time.

¹ The principal part of this fell upon the 118th Pennsylvania, which, according to General Palfrey, lost 282 men out of 800 present. (Palfrey, *The Antietam and Fredericksburg*, p. 128.)

² The strength of Hill's whole division was probably not greater than that of the infantry he attacked.

CHAPTER L.

LEE AND MCCLELLAN.

A LONG rest followed the battle of Sharpsburg, — a rest demanded by the condition of both armies. The operations of the year had been active and exhausting to both combatants, and little time had been allowed since the opening of the campaign in the spring for rest and recuperation. The two Federal armies which were combined under General McClellan on the 1st of September had each seen severe and disheartening service. The Army of the Potomac had been taken to the Peninsula in March, and, after a tedious and fatiguing campaign, had reached the Chickahominy and fought the bloody though indecisive battles at Seven Pines and Fair Oaks at the end of May. Less than a month later came the Seven Days' struggle, from which, worn, bleeding, demoralized, shorn of many men and immense supplies, the Federal army had found refuge at Westover. Here it had been for a month exposed to a broiling sun on a sickly river bank, and had then been hurried back from its position, from the Peninsula itself, to interpose its defensive shield between the enemy and Washington. Part reached the field which it had left in March in time to share in Pope's defeat, all, in time to feel the despondency, the despair, which forced the recall of McClellan to command. The Army of Virginia, as Pope's command was called, comprising the bodies which under Fremont, Banks, and McDowell had been so roughly handled in the spring by Jackson, had passed through a far more disastrous campaign, in which defeat upon the battlefield had been but the continuation of their fatigues and privations. Rapidly merging with these armies Burnside's and Cox's troops, as well as new levies, McClellan had moved out to oppose Lee, and had de-

livered battle at Sharpsburg. His bloody and futile assaults here had been to some degree compensated by Lee's final withdrawal to the south side of the Potomac, but this great effort in addition to its previous exertions left the Federal army very much exhausted. Now, in a fine country, with communications safe and supplies readily accessible, his front covered by the Potomac, and his position in consequence not easily assailable, McClellan determined to rest. Much reorganization was necessary. New levies needed to be drilled, and inured to camp; large numbers of men must be clothed and equipped; the transportation of his army needed refitting; his cavalry was in large part unserviceable from want of horses. Rest and attention to these things would improve the morale of his troops, and bring them up to a high standard of efficiency. Spreading his army from Hagerstown to Harper's Ferry, McClellan therefore devoted the six weeks after Sharpsburg to putting it in prime condition for another aggressive campaign in Virginia.

The Federal commander has been much criticised by Northern writers for the length of time consumed in this way, and it has been often asserted that he should have resumed the aggressive more promptly. Such certainly was the opinion of his superiors at the time, for, after a visit of some days to the army about the 1st of October, President Lincoln, on his return to Washington, issued orders (October 6) that McClellan should cross the Potomac and advance against the Confederates. The fact, however, that President Lincoln, under the inspiration of General Halleck and Secretary Stanton, issued such an order, is not conclusive proof that so early a move was wise or even practicable. McClellan had not the confidence nor good-will of his immediate superiors, and from the embarrassments he suffered in obtaining even the necessary clothing, shoes, and still more the horses required by his army, it would seem that this feeling must have extended through the supply bureaus at Washington. It seems almost incredible that, a month after Sharpsburg, the Federal army should have needed thousands of shoes and suits of clothing, and yet McClellan's repeated and urgent letters in regard to

the matter leave no doubt of it.¹ More inexplicable still is the fact that McClellan reports that on October 11 he had but 800 efficiently mounted cavalry, and on October 21 but 1000 (after leaving out those needed to picket the river), and asks for horses, and yet up to the end of the month not enough horses had been sent him to replace current losses.² Inattention or indifference to his requisitions certainly prevailed to a greater or less extent. On the other hand, this state of things was in no small degree due to McClellan himself. The tone of his correspondence was exasperating. "He was," as General Palfrey says,³ "far more ready to seek excuses for doing nothing than to make what he had go as far as possible. It never seems to occur to him that the wants he felt were felt by Lee in a greater degree. . . . There was in McClellan a sort of incapacity of doing anything till an ideal completeness of preparation was reached." In short, he wore out the patience of his superiors by his complaints, his exaggeration of small difficulties, his disinclination to do the best he could with the means on hand, and his grotesque overestimate of the forces opposed to him. In the case before us, with the Federal preponderance of force, a more energetic commander would probably have crossed the Potomac some weeks sooner and advanced against Lee in the Shenandoah Valley, a course, however, it should be said, which would have been in accordance with the expectations and desires of his adversary.

The quiet that was so necessary to the Union army was not less advantageous to the Confederates. If the morale and organization of Lee's army were better, the labors and privations it had undergone had been greater than those of its adversary. The severer toils, the more exhausting efforts, had fallen to the lot of the ragged and ill-fed Confederates. Thousands of barefooted men had fought at Sharpsburg. Many more that had broken down and straggled from their commands filled the country on the south side of the Potomac. For some time after the battle Lee dwelt most earnestly in his

¹ McClellan's report, letters of October 11, etc. (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 75.)

² McClellan's report, letters of October 11, etc. (*Ib.* p. 79.)

³ *The Antietam and Fredericksburg*, pp. 130, 134.

correspondence upon this subject. He urged that more stringent regulations from the War Department, and, if necessary, more stringent legislation, should be adopted to cure this evil. He says of his army on September 21:¹ "Its present efficiency is greatly paralyzed by the loss to its ranks of the numerous stragglers." This straggling was the main cause of its retiring from Maryland, as it was unable to cope with advantage with the host of the enemy. On September 25, he says:² "When I withdrew from Sharpsburg into Virginia, it was my intention to recross the Potomac at Williamsport and move upon Hagerstown; but the condition of the army prevented; nor is it yet strong enough to advance advantageously. . . . In a military point of view, the best move in my opinion the army could make would be to advance upon Hagerstown and endeavor to defeat the enemy at that point. I would not hesitate to make it even with our diminished numbers, did the army exhibit its former temper and condition; but as far as I am able to judge, the hazard would be great and a reverse disastrous." General Lee took energetic measures meantime to gather in stragglers and refit his troops, and with such success that he reports to President Davis on October 2 that, though his ranks were still thin, all the stragglers within his reach had been restored to them,³ and adds that the shoes arrived, or on the way, would supply the barefooted men. Some conscripts were also sent forward, and helped to increase his numbers. The returns show that the effective strength of Longstreet's and Jackson's corps had increased from 36,187 on September 22 to 55,843 by October 1. Such reorganization as was needed was actively pushed forward at the same time. The artillery was thoroughly overhauled, and a large number of batteries consolidated with others. The best officers were kept, and the others were relieved from duty. The stores captured at Harper's Ferry, together with the supplies obtained from Richmond, furnished the needed arms and ammunition. All the captured stores not

¹ Letter to President Davis, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 143.

² *Ib.* part ii. pp. 626, 627.

³ Lee's letter to President Davis, October 2, 1862, *Ib.* p. 643.

needed at once were sent back to Staunton. Lee's view of the military situation at that time is given in the letter above referred to, October 2: "My great anxiety is lest with other troops General McClellan may move upon Richmond. As at present there is no way in which I can endanger his safety, I have been in hopes that he would cross the river and move up the valley, where I wish to get him, but he does not seem so disposed."

The Confederate army camped for a short time near Martinsburg, and then moved to pleasant camps on the waters of the Opequon, north and northeast of Winchester, where the health of the troops, which had been seriously impaired by the hardships of the campaign and especially by the scanty and improper food, gradually recuperated. By the 20th of October, Lee was at the head of 68,000 men, but in view of the disparity of force he decided to await the advance of the enemy.

In order to learn something of McClellan's movements as well as to disarrange his plans, Lee on October 9 sent Stuart with a body of 1800 cavalry across the Potomac to make a reconnoissance. This expedition, which Stuart converted into one of his bold raids completely around the Union army, was managed with singular skill and success. Stuart selected for this service 600 men from each of three cavalry brigades.¹ Brigadier-General Hampton and Colonels W. H. F. Lee and W. E. Jones were the officers in command. He also took Major John Pelham and four guns. The troops rendezvoused on the 9th of October at Darksville, and moved towards the Potomac, which they crossed at McCoy's ford above Williamsport at daylight on the 10th, and at once marched north by way of Mercersburg to Chambersburg. They passed the night of the 10th at the latter point, and, having destroyed whatever military supplies they found, and collected such cavalry horses as they could obtain in the country, they moved next morning across the mountains to Cashtown, and there turned southward to Emmittsburg, and thence toward the

¹ The brigades of Hampton, Fitz Lee, and Robertson. (McClellan's *Life of Stuart*, p. 137.)

Potomac on the left flank of the Union army. Stuart rightly judged it safer to make the entire circuit of McClellan's army rather than to return from Chambersburg toward the point at which he had crossed the Potomac. Passing Emmittsburg after sunset, he pushed on at a rapid rate all night. The capture of a courier with a dispatch served to put him on his guard as to the forces sent to intercept him, and, taking his course through the Woodsborough and Newmarket road, he reached Hyattsville early on the 12th without interruption. Then, going between the hostile forces placed at Poolesville and the mouth of the Monocacy to intercept him, he sent the head of his column towards White's ford, while, with the rear-guard, he kept Pleasonton, who was advancing from the Monocacy, at bay.¹ Colonel Lee, who was in advance, found the ford guarded by half a regiment² of infantry, strongly posted. For the instant it seemed as if the way were barred, and Stuart almost caught, for an hour or two's delay would bring down upon him forces from every quarter. Lee boldly summoned the infantry to surrender, and though they refused, he was greatly relieved, as he sent forward his troops to attack, to see them in full retreat. His bluff thus won an undisputed passage, which was promptly used, and in a short time Stuart had recrossed the river safely with his prisoners and captures, and with the loss of but one man wounded and two captured. The Federals were gathering in heavy force upon his rear-guard, and it was only by skill and courage that Colonel Butler, commanding it, succeeded in getting over without damage. From the time of leaving Chambersburg on the morning of the 11th until he reached the Virginia shore by midday on the 12th, Stuart had marched eighty miles.³ He brought over some prisoners and a large number of horses.

¹ Stuart's column had been guided all night by Captain B. S. White, and the scouts Logan and Harbaugh. As it approached Poolesville, Captain White, whose home had long been in that vicinity, took sole charge, and by his skill and courage contributed very largely to the successful crossing. (McClellan's *Life of Stuart*, p. 154.)

² 99th Pennsylvania, Lieutenant-Colonel Biles. Probably five companies, certainly four of it, were at White's ford.

³ *Ib.* p. 160, note.

General McClellan had been promptly informed of the crossing of Stuart on the morning of the 10th, and took what seemed to him thoroughly adequate measures to prevent his safe return, by guarding all the fords above and below Harper's Ferry with infantry, and by throwing Pleasonton with such effective cavalry as he had across his path. Burnside was to keep two brigades on cars with steam up at the railroad crossing of the Monocacy near Frederick, ready to move instantly to the point where Stuart might strike the railroad on his return. Pleasonton on the 11th was brought to Hagerstown, and, under false information which represented Stuart as returning toward the upper Potomac, started westward. He was soon recalled, and sent eastward to intercept Stuart between Emmittsburg and the Potomac, and actually reached Mechanicstown when Stuart was passing but four miles east of that place. Stuart learned from the captured dispatch that Frederick was securely held, and that Pleasonton was after him, and hence he bent his course eastward so as to avoid these dangers. Pleasonton marched for the mouth of the Monocacy as soon as he learned that Stuart was moving in that direction, and, as already stated, arrived there in time to skirmish with Stuart's rear-guard while the main body of the Confederate cavalry was crossing at White's ford three miles below. Burnside's troops were out of place and did nothing, and Stuart was too quick for Stoneman, who with his reserve at Poolesville had charge of the neighboring fords. As we have seen, there was but a half regiment of infantry at White's ford when the head of the Confederate column reached that point. These were promptly frightened away by Colonel W. H. F. Lee, and the Confederates lost no time in crossing. Pleasonton's ride on the day and night of the 11th was hardly less than Stuart's. It amounted to seventy-eight miles. His force of 800 men was much diminished thereby, and he was far too weak in himself successfully to resist Stuart, but it was expected that the infantry would hold the fords, and delay and embarrass the Confederate troopers, until an overwhelming force could be poured upon them from neigh-

boring points. As it was, Stoneman's reserve¹ from Poolesville, as well as troops from below, reached the river as Stuart's rear-guard was crossing, — too late to effect anything.²

The result of this raid was as inspiring to the Confederate as it was depressing to the Federal cavalry. Other effects also flowed from it. The movement of the Federal army was delayed. General McClellan says of the efforts made to intercept Stuart: "This exhausting service completely broke down nearly all the cavalry horses, and rendered a remount absolutely indispensable before we could advance on the enemy."³ The dissatisfaction of the Federal administration at McClellan's slowness was much aggravated, and President Lincoln took no pains to conceal his chagrin at Stuart's successful return to Virginia.

Two weeks of quiet followed, which McClellan spent in refitting his cavalry and clothing his men, and then on October 23 he began to move. Lee, who had decided to await the adversary's movements, had meantime used most energetically all the means within reach to swell his numbers and increase their efficiency. The Confederate army was now regularly organized in two corps, to which Longstreet and Jackson were assigned with the new rank of Lieutenant-General. McClellan chose for his line of advance the country east of the Blue Ridge rather than the Shenandoah Valley. He did this because from the lateness of the season he no longer feared a counter move by Lee across the upper Potomac, and because this route was in accordance with the President's wishes and would secure him the largest reinforcements.⁴

McClellan crossed at Harper's Ferry and at Berlin, and moved along the eastern side of the Blue Ridge, seizing and holding the gaps in that ridge as he advanced to guard his flank from attack, and to be ready to pour into the Shenan-

¹ Three regiments of infantry, General McClellan says (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 73): Stoneman had the 38th and 101st New York, 57th Pennsylvania infantry, and 1st Rhode Island cavalry.

² Pleasanton's report, quoted by General McClellan. (McClellan's report, *Ib.* p. 73.)

³ McClellan's report, *Ib.* p. 72.

⁴ McClellan's report, *Ib.* p. 83.

doah Valley, if a division of the Confederate forces should invite a blow. When he reached the Manassas and Orange railroads, he abandoned his line of communication with Harper's Ferry, and concentrated his army about Warrenton, using the railroads named as avenues of supply. Lee, when he found that his adversary had crossed the Potomac and was moving east of the mountains, ordered Longstreet on the 28th to Culpeper Court House, to which point his own headquarters were also transferred, while Jackson was left in the Valley to watch the enemy, threaten his flank, and take advantage of any unwary exposure of his advancing columns. The cavalry was for the most part kept east of the mountains to observe and embarrass as much as possible the Federal movements. Stuart executed his orders with his usual skill and boldness, and had many skirmishes with Pleasonton as he fell back before the Federal advance, but no important conflict took place. Jackson was cautioned against any attempt of the Federal army to interpose between him and Longstreet, and was directed, in case of such a movement, to fall back up the Valley to Swift Run Gap, toward which point Longstreet was also to march from Culpeper through Madison Court House. By November 6, McClellan's advance held Warrenton, and his right was thrown forward to the upper Rappahannock, as if to carry out the movement just referred to, while Lee was closely watching his designs.¹

Whether McClellan would have carried out this plan which he says he purposed,² and thus given battle upon the upper waters of the Rappahannock, we shall never know. In such a case, the mountainous country would certainly have been a great advantage to the less numerous and defensive army. But before the feasibility of McClellan's strategy could be tested, his military career came to a close. On the night of November 7, orders arrived from Washington displacing him and putting General Burnside in command of the Army of the Potomac. The latter, however, did not assume command

¹ McClellan's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part i. p. 88 ; Lee's letter to Stuart, November 7, *Ib.* part ii. p. 703.

² McClellan's report, *Ib.* part i. pp. 87, 89.

until November 9, by which time the mass of the Federal army was concentrated in the neighborhood of Warrenton.¹

We have not space to go fully into the question of McClellan's merits as a commander and of the justice of the treatment accorded him by his government. Some things seem clear. McClellan's organizing power was great. The Army of the Potomac was in an important sense his creation, and its devotion to him is proof of high capacity for leadership. He was a thoroughly trained soldier, too, and never handled his men like a tyro or a blockhead. General Palfrey of Massachusetts — well qualified, both as soldier and critic, to judge — deems McClellan on the whole the ablest commander the Army of the Potomac ever had, and his opinion, based upon a careful review of the history of that army, seems to us correct. But McClellan's faults were many and glaring. He was slow, cautious, timid, to an inordinate degree. He lived under a perpetual hallucination as to the strength of his enemy. He based his plans upon overestimates of his foes that no other sensible man, with reasonable means of information, would have believed. His correspondence with his superiors was excessively exasperating, while it lacked true spirit. He was always finding difficulties in his way, and he dwelt far more on these than on the advantages which might flow from a vigorous and skillful use of the immense resources he had at hand.

And yet the course of his government was unjust. It is difficult and useless to speculate as to the probable result of the Peninsular campaign had McClellan been heartily supported, but it is certain that his plans were fearfully disordered by his superiors, and that at least one fourth of the troops under his command at the beginning were withdrawn. There is no doubt at all as to what would have been the result of such a course pursued toward Grant in May and June, 1864. The transfer, later on, of McClellan's army to such a blockhead as Pope had a fitting sequel in the earnestness

¹ Burnside requested McClellan to continue in command until the orders he had already given for the concentration of the army could be carried out.

with which McClellan was asked to resume command and save the capital from capture. Laying aside his private grievances, he responded heartily to this call made upon him in the midst of panic and dismay; he restored public confidence, brought order out of chaos, and in two weeks forced the invading army to the south side of the Potomac with such loss as to paralyze its power of offense for the remainder of the year. That when, six weeks later, he had brought his army to a high pitch of efficiency, and had transferred the scene of operations from the Potomac to the Rappahannock, he should have been deposed, was unwise and unfair, and could hardly have been due to military reasons alone. McClellan was not in accord politically with the administration, and could not have approved of some of the war measures in contemplation, and this no doubt had much to do with his downfall. The lack of judgment that dictated it is well illustrated in the choice of his successor, whose service at the head of the Federal army was not out of keeping with his previous record.

CHAPTER LI.

BURNSIDE MOVES TOWARD FREDERICKSBURG.

ACCOMPANYING the order placing Burnside in command was one directing him to report the positions of his troops and what he purposed doing with them.¹ In reply to this, Burnside submitted on November 9² a carefully prepared plan of campaign, the cardinal point of which was that instead of continuing that movement which McClellan had initiated toward Culpeper and Gordonsville, the Federal army should be rapidly transferred to Fredericksburg, and, having received the necessary supplies at that point, should push rapidly toward Richmond. This was the shortest route to Richmond, the real objective point of the campaign; it was nearest his base, and by it his communications, as well as the city of Washington, would be best covered. Such were General Burnside's views and those of his chief subordinates. General Halleck visited Burnside on the 12th and urged a continuation of the move toward Culpeper, but finally agreed to refer the matter to Mr. Lincoln, who, on November 14, agreed to Burnside's plan and urged a rapid movement. Halleck undertook to have supplies, pontoons, and teams sent to Fredericksburg. Burnside organized his army into three grand divisions, under Sumner, Franklin, and Hooker. He issued orders of march promptly, and, on November 15, Sumner's grand division moved toward Fredericksburg, his advance reaching Falmouth, just opposite that city on the north side of the Rappahannock, on November 17. The remainder of the Federal army moved on the 16th, Franklin concentrating at Stafford Court House, and Hooker at Hartwood, on the 19th.

¹ Halleck's letter, November 5. (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part ii. p. 546.)

² *Ib.* p. 552.

And now General Burnside met with his first difficulty. The pontoons which were to be forwarded from Washington had not yet arrived. They reached that city from the upper Potomac by the 14th, but were not ordered away till the 15th or 16th, and then the matter was so managed¹ that they did not reach Fredericksburg until the 25th. Burnside puts all the blame for this delay, and for the consequent failure of his first plan, on the Washington authorities, but as the pontoons, even at Washington, were by either "land or water not over twenty-four hours distant," and a day and night's march could have brought them up, it is hard to see why General Burnside did not send a staff officer after them rather than keep 100,000 men for eight days supinely awaiting their arrival.

General Lee had kept Jackson in the Valley to retard the operations of the Federal army as much as possible by threatening its flank through the gaps in the Blue Ridge. In case of an attempt to interpose between him and Longstreet, prompt measures were to be taken by both to prevent it, and when Jackson found he could no longer delay or embarrass the Federal army by remaining in the Valley, he was to rejoin Lee on the Rappahannock. Lee's policy at that time is stated in a letter to Secretary Randolph on November 10:² "The enemy is apparently so strong in numbers that I think it preferable to attempt to baffle his designs by manœuvring rather than to resist his advance by main force. To accomplish the latter without too great risk or loss would require more than double our present numbers." A few days later, the non-action of his enemy revealed to Lee the design of moving toward Fredericksburg, and on the 14th of November, the very day on which this plan was approved by President Lincoln, we find Lee writing³ to Secretary Randolph that he had anticipated this movement, and had given orders to break up the railroad from Aquia Creek to Fredericksburg, and also informing Jackson⁴ that he could not hope to effect much more by remaining in the Valley. The Confederate leader did not expect at this

¹ The pontoons were in charge of Colonel Spaulding.

² *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xix. part ii. p. 711.

³ *Ib.* p. 717.

⁴ *Ib.* p. 720.

time to be able to prevent Burnside's crossing of the Rappahannock. He designed to oppose his progress at the North Anna, where, while part of the Confederate forces should resist the crossing of the river, the remainder were to be thrown upon the flank and rear of the invading army.¹

In Stafford County and on the lower Rappahannock Lee had three regiments of cavalry,² under Colonel J. R. Chambliss of the 13th Virginia. Of this force, the 15th Virginia, Colonel Ball, was guarding the river at Fredericksburg. On November 15, Lee ordered a Mississippi regiment of infantry and Lewis's battery from some of the railroad bridges near Richmond to reinforce Colonel Ball. "This force reached Fredericksburg on the 17th, a short time before the arrival at Falmouth of the head of the Federal column, under Major-General Sumner, and a small artillery duel occurred between Lewis's battery and a Federal rifle battery under a Captain Petitt, the latter having decidedly the best of it, as Lewis carried but four very inferior guns."³ Burnside's orders prevented Sumner from crossing and occupying the town, which orders were reiterated when Sumner asked for permission to cross on the night of the 17th. General Burnside was unwilling to expose a part of his forces to attack on the south side of the river while he had no means of communication with them except uncertain fords. Meantime General Lee had on the same day learned from his indefatigable cavalry of the movement southward from Catlett's Station of Sumner's corps, as well as of the arrival of some Federal gunboats and transports at Aquia Creek, and he at once ordered Longstreet with McLaws's and Ransom's divisions of infantry,⁴ W. H. F. Lee's brigade of cavalry, and Lane's rifle battery of reserve artillery to Fredericksburg. At the same time, in order to "ascertain more fully the movements of the enemy," General Stuart

¹ Long's *Memoirs of Lee*, p. 234.

² 13th Virginia, Colonel Chambliss, 15th Virginia, Colonel Ball, and the 2d North Carolina cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. Payne. (McClellan's *Life of Stuart*, p. 186.)

³ General E. P. Alexander on the battle of Fredericksburg, *Southern Historical Papers*, vol. x. p. 382.

⁴ McLaws and Ransom had their division artillery with them.

was directed to cross the Rappahannock. He forced a passage at Warrenton Springs on the morning of the 18th, and found at Warrenton that the last of Burnside's forces had but recently left. Lee, no longer in doubt that the whole of the hostile army was in motion for Fredericksburg, ordered the remainder of Longstreet's corps to that place on the 19th,¹ and at the same time ordered Jackson from the Valley to Orange Court House.

On the 20th, Burnside's whole army was near Fredericksburg. Longstreet, on the day before, reached the town, and rapidly disposed the two divisions with him for battle on the hills to the west and southwest of the place. On the 21st, General Sumner summoned the town to surrender by five P. M., under penalty of a bombardment to begin the succeeding morning at nine. In regard to this General Lee says:² "The weather had been tempestuous for two days, and a storm was raging at the time of the summons. It was impossible to prevent the execution of the threat to shell the city, as it was completely exposed to the batteries on the Stafford hills, which were beyond our reach. The city authorities were informed that while our forces would not use the place for military purposes, its occupation by the enemy would be resisted, and directions were given for the removal of the women and children as rapidly as possible. The threatened bombardment did not take place; but in view of the imminence of a collision between the two armies, the inhabitants were advised to leave the city, and almost the entire population, without a murmur, abandoned their homes. History presents no instance of a people exhibiting a purer and more unselfish patriotism, or a higher spirit of fortitude and courage, than was evinced by the citizens of Fredericksburg. They cheerfully incurred great hardships and privations, and surrendered their homes and property to destruction, rather than yield them into the hands of the enemies of their country."³

¹ Via Raccoon and Morton's fords, says General E. P. Alexander.

² Lee's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xxi. p. 551.

³ General Alexander says: "Although the weather was most inclement, the thermometer being near zero, almost the whole population removed

To the credit of the Federal commander, it should be stated that no bombardment was made until December 11, "when," as General E. P. Alexander says, "the desperate resistance of Barksdale's Mississippians from the cover of the houses induced and justified" it.¹

By November 22, the whole of Longstreet's corps had reached the field and taken position on the heights which fringe the plain of Fredericksburg, extending from Banks's ford on the left to Hamilton's crossing on the right. But, as we have seen, Burnside's pontoons had not yet reached him, and he had refused to make any attempt at crossing without them. He was also unwilling to act until the railroad from Aquia Creek to Fredericksburg, as well as the needed facilities at the former point for landing supplies, — all of which the Confederates had destroyed, — should be reestablished. This work was not completed until November 28.

Thus Burnside's plan of a rapid push forward toward Richmond on the Fredericksburg route had come to nothing. He had merely brought about the concentration of his opponent's forces in his front. After serving notice of his design, he had granted Lee ample time and opportunity to checkmate it. The latter, finding that the Federal commander did not cross the river promptly and advance towards the North Anna as he had expected, decided to use the opportunity thus given of contesting the passage of the Rappahannock. The south side of the Rappahannock afforded better positions for defense than did the North Anna, and if the enemy could be kept on the former stream, a considerable territory could be saved from the Federal occupation. Hence Lee seized the opportunity which his adversary's slowness had placed within reach, and offered him battle on the Rappahannock.

and found the best shelters they could, cheerfully giving their homes to be a battlefield. The neighboring country houses and churches were filled, sometimes with dozens of families, to whom rations were issued by the commissaries, and many women and children encamped in the forest in brush and blanket shelters, where the sight of their cheerfully borne sufferings nerved many a heart for the coming struggle." (*Southern Historical Papers*, vol. x. p. 383.)

Ib. p. 383.

When Burnside found that the Confederate army in strong position was ready to contest his crossing at Fredericksburg, he determined to try to seize a crossing by surprise at Skinker's Neck, some fourteen or fifteen miles below. Preparations were made for this purpose, but with such deliberation that again the Federal commander was baffled. The appearance of some gunboats near Port Royal put Lee on his guard, and Jackson's troops, which had reached Orange Court House on November 27, were ordered to Fredericksburg,¹ and two divisions (D. H. Hill's and Early's) were sent to guard the crossing at Skinker's Neck. The remainder of the corps was so placed as to be ready to support either Longstreet on the left, or D. H. Hill on the right. D. H. Hill reached Port Royal on December 3, and when, two days later, Burnside was about to cross, he found a strong force ready to oppose him. His gunboats were driven down the river by Hill's and Stuart's artillery. Finding his ubiquitous enemy ready to receive him, Burnside once more changed his plans, and determined to make only a demonstration at Skinker's Neck and force his main crossing at Fredericksburg. General Burnside says: "I concluded that the enemy would be more surprised at a crossing at or near Fredericksburg, where we were making no preparations, than by crossing at Skinker's Neck, and I determined to make the attempt at the former place. It was decided to throw four or five pontoon bridges across the river, two at a point near the Lacy house, opposite the upper part of the town, one near the steamboat landing at the lower part of the town, one about a mile below, and, if there were pontoons sufficient, two at the latter point."² General Burnside does not tell us why at this time he did not consider the advisability of crossing the river above Fredericksburg. This was the only chance left him of obtaining an unopposed crossing, and Hooker's success the following spring seems to show what might have been done. But a crossing could not have been accomplished in the face of

¹ Jackson, marching by way of Strasburg on November 25, had reached Madison Court House on the 26th, and Orange Court House the next day. (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xxi. p. 1035.)

² Burnside's report, *Ib.* p. 87.

Lee's vigilant cavalry without much greater quickness of movement than Burnside had shown so far, and, if accomplished, it is more than questionable, in the light of Hooker's and Grant's experiences in the Wilderness, whether the results would have been more favorable to the Federal army than they were at Fredericksburg.

CHAPTER LII.

FREDERICKSBURG. — THE FEDERALS CROSS THE RAPPAHANNOCK.

THE route of the Federal army having been finally settled upon and the battlefield thus fixed, it is time to describe the principal features of the field, and to consider the numbers and condition of the armies that were again about to grapple in fierce conflict.

The Rappahannock is navigable to Fredericksburg, and is about 140 yards wide at that place.¹ Its left bank is lined by the Stafford Heights, which run close to the river, are about 150 feet in elevation, and completely command the southern side. On the right bank, at a point one and a half miles above Falmouth, high ground (Taylor's hill) exists close to the river, but the irregular ridge that extends from that point southeastward, in the general direction of the river, leaves between it and the stream an intervening plain, which gradually widens to a mile and a half by the time it reaches the Massaponax four miles below Fredericksburg. This plain is about thirty feet above the river, and is intersected by Hazel and Deep Runs and by the Massaponax, all of which streams make their way through deep ravine-like banks across it to the Rappahannock. Lengthwise, the plain is divided near the middle by the old stage road to Richmond, a broad, unpaved road, hollowed out by use, and bordered by ditches and low cedar hedges, which served for fences. It thus afforded good cover for infantry. Nearer the southwestern edge of the plain, and not far from the foothills of the ridge just described, runs the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad, which, turn-

¹ The pontoon bridges thrown over at Fredericksburg were about four hundred feet long.

ing south at Hamilton's crossing, seeks a passage toward Richmond through the hills south of the Massaponax. This railroad runs through the plain for the most part, on an embankment about three feet high. The ridge we are describing is much intersected by the head-waters of Hazel and Deep Runs. Its northern end, consisting of Taylor's, Stansbury's, and Marye's hills, was for the most part open, but the centre and southern end were heavily wooded. This wood nowhere extended into the plain except at a point between Hamilton's crossing and Deep Run, where the swampy sources of a small stream were covered with brush and timber to a point about half way between the railroad and the old stage road. The ridge is low in front, not rising more than 40 or 50 feet from the plain. It gradually rises higher as it ascends to the plateau that constitutes the watershed between the Rappahannock and Massaponax, but does not reach the elevation of the Stafford Heights on the opposite side of the river. Fredericksburg, an ancient town of some 4000 or 5000 inhabitants, lies along the river in the upper part of the plain. In rear of it and parallel to the river there is a race or ditch, carrying the waste water from a mill above, which is supplied by a canal from the river. This ditch lies in a depression, the south bank of which is sufficiently abrupt to cover troops. Besides the Richmond stage road already mentioned, two other important roads lead from the rear centre of the town. The more northerly of these was the Plank road to Orange Court House, which, continuing the direction of Hanover Street perpendicularly to the river, ascends Marye's hill in a straight line, and there bends to the right toward Orange. The other, known as the Telegraph road, leaving the town two squares south of the Orange road, continues parallel with it until it strikes the side of Marye's hill, when it bends in a curve to the left around the base of the hill, till at the end of half a mile it reaches the valley of Hazel Run. Crossing this stream, it ascends Lee's hill, and takes a southeasterly course toward Richmond. Around the base at Marye's hill this road had been hollowed out by use, and was bounded by stone fences.

The Confederate position was well taken along the ridge to the south and west of Fredericksburg, from the Rappahannock at Taylor's hill, to the point where the ridge is cut by the Massaponax near Hamilton's crossing. Guns had been carefully placed in position by General Pendleton, chief of artillery, and by other infantry and artillery officers, and some earthworks thrown up to defend them. Lack of tools and the hard frost made this last slow work, and (General E. P. Alexander says) when the battle took place, pits for not more than forty guns had been dug, and these were without shelter for ammunition or infantry supports.¹ Some slight earthworks were made at various points. Along the Telegraph road at the base of Marye's hill, a ditch had been dug on the lower side of the road, and the dirt had been thrown over the stone fence and banked against it. A shelter trench extended this defense westward to the Orange road. At other points toward the Confederate right, log breastworks and abattis had been constructed, but the defensive works were slightly and hastily made. A battery² was placed near the mouth of the Massaponax, to stop any gunboats that might pass D. H. Hill, who was lower down the river. Barksdale's brigade of Mississippians and the 8th Florida and the 3d Georgia regiments occupied the town, and guarded the river to the mouth of Deep Run.

During the week before the battle the Confederate army was distributed as follows: Longstreet's corps, consisting of five divisions of Anderson, McLaws, Ransom, Hood, and Pickett, and numbering 34,806 for duty, held the ridge in rear of Fredericksburg. Of Jackson's corps, which contained the four divisions of A. P. Hill, D. H. Hill, Early, and Taliaferro, and numbered 33,595 for duty, A. P. Hill was near Yearly's house, five miles south of Fredericksburg; Taliaferro at Guinea's Station, nine miles south of Fredericksburg; Early at Skinker's Neck on the Rappahannock, twelve miles south-

¹ E. P. Alexander on the battle of Fredericksburg, *Southern Historical Papers*, vol. x. p. 384.

² Captain Ross's, placed in position by Major Talcott, of General Lee's staff.

east of Fredericksburg, and D. H. Hill at Port Royal, eighteen miles southeast of Fredericksburg. Of the cavalry, which numbered 9114, Rosser's brigade was near the Wilderness Tavern, watching the left flank and the upper fords; Hampton's was immediately on the left of the infantry, between Banks and United States fords, keeping close guard on that part of the river; Fitz Lee's was with Longstreet; and W. H. F. Lee's was on the right flank at Port Royal and below. The reserve artillery, under General Pendleton, was on and in rear of Longstreet's line. Lee's total force was 78,228 for duty, December 10, with about 250 guns. Says an English writer: "This distribution is an excellent example of the most judicious method of guarding a line of river, that is, a series of strong detachments so placed as to be able to concentrate rapidly and to anticipate the enemy at any threatened point."¹

The Federal army was encamped opposite Fredericksburg. A small force kept up the threat of a crossing at Skinker's Neck, but the mass of the army was so placed as to be convenient to the points of crossing which had been selected. This army was divided into three grand divisions, namely, Sumner's, consisting of the 2d and 9th corps, and containing 31,000 men for duty; Hooker's, consisting of the 3d and 5th corps and numbering 36,000; and Franklin's, consisting of the 1st and 6th corps, and numbering 42,500. Bayard's cavalry numbered 3500; Burnside's artillery comprised about 350 guns. His total force amounted to 113,000 men.² Besides this army the 12th corps was guarding the Potomac, and the 11th corps was about Manassas. These troops, amounting to near 30,000 men, were thus kept idle at a distance from the critical point, in order to guard against an attack on Washington, though it was known that the Confederate army was concentrated at Fredericksburg, and was confronted at that point by largely superior forces.

To cover the passage of the river, 143 guns were posted upon the Stafford Heights from Falmouth to Pollock's mill, some three and a half miles below. Among these were six

¹ *Campaign of Fredericksburg*, p. 11.

² Burnside's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xxi. p. 90.

20-pounders, and seven four and a half inch siege guns. These guns completely swept the town and plain, and could bring to bear a formidable fire upon the most distant heights on which the Confederate line was placed.

General Burnside trusted for far the greater part of his information about the location of his enemy to balloons, which were sent up almost daily. No Federal cavalry attempted to reconnoitre on the south side of the river, and the country occupied by Lee being wooded, the positions of the Confederates were to be seen but imperfectly by balloons. The Federal commander was in consequence led into the error of supposing that a large portion of Lee's army was at Port Royal, and that he might cross and "seize some point on the enemy's line near the Massaponax, and thereby separate his forces on the river below from those occupying the crest or ridge in rear of the town."¹

On December 10, Burnside issued final orders for crossing the river. Sumner's grand division was massed opposite Fredericksburg and Franklin opposite the mouth of Deep Run, while Hooker was placed in the centre. Three days' rations and sixty rounds of ammunition were issued to the whole army, while an immense wagon train with rations for twelve days was held in readiness to follow the advance. "During the night of the 10th, the bridge material was taken to the proper points on the river, and soon after three o'clock on the morning of the 11th, the working parties commenced throwing the bridges, protected by infantry under cover of the banks, and by artillery on the bluffs above."²

Lee committed the task of resisting the crossing to General Barksdale of Mississippi and his brigade, supported by a regiment or two from Anderson's division. In pursuance of Lee's design of giving battle after the enemy had crossed, "the river was guarded only by a force sufficient to impede his (Burnside's) movements until the army could be concentrated."³ The 17th Mississippi, supported by the 8th Flor-

¹ Burnside's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xxi. p. 88.

² Burnside's report, *Ib.* pp. 88, 89.

³ Lee's report, *Ib.* p. 552.

ida,¹ was stationed along the river in the town, while the 18th Mississippi guarded the approaches to the south bank at Deep Run. The remainder of Barksdale's brigade and the 3d Georgia regiment were held in reserve in the town. At Deep Run the Confederates had little or no shelter from the Federal fire, and though they at first drove back the bridge builders, the latter, under cover of a hot fire, renewed their efforts, and before noon had succeeded in driving away the Confederates, and placing two bridges.² The Confederates fell back a short distance, when, having been joined by the 16th Georgia and 15th South Carolina regiments, they remained in observation until late in the day. The Federals made no crossing at this point, though their bridges³ were ready; waiting, no doubt, until Sumner should have cleared his way opposite the town.

At the town the resistance was more prolonged. Taking advantage of the houses and other cover to be found along the river bank, Barksdale waited until the pontoniers had progressed far enough in their work to be discernible through the fog from the south side, when he poured so destructive a fire into them from the 17th Mississippi and 8th Florida, that the workmen fled.⁴ Several times was the attempt renewed, with like result. The Federals then opened a heavy artillery fire upon the town, which did much damage to property but very little execution among the brave Mississippians, who sheltered themselves in cellars, and renewed the fire whenever an attempt was made to resume work upon the bridges. About ten A. M., General Woodbury led eighty volunteers from the 8th Connecticut to the scene of operations, placing one half of these under cover as a reserve. Before the other half had touched the bridge, several of them were shot down and the

¹ Of Perry's brigade, Anderson's division.

² One of these was put down by Major Magruder of the 15th New York volunteers, one of the regiments of the Engineer brigade, and the other by Lieutenant C. E. Cross of the regular sappers and miners. See General Woodbury's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xxi. pp. 170, 171.

³ A third bridge was laid at the crossing the next day.

⁴ Major Spaulding and the 50th New York volunteers, Engineer brigade, had the task of laying the bridges at the town.

others refused to work.¹ The handful of Confederates in the town repulsed, it is said, nine attempts to lay the bridge, and continued masters of the situation until the middle of the afternoon. Then, at the suggestion of General Hunt, chief of artillery of the Army of the Potomac, it was determined to send over men on the free pontoons to take possession of the south bank. As preparatory to this, the artillery opened with unusual severity, and finally forced most of the Confederates away. Then 120 volunteers of the 7th Michigan were thrown across at the upper bridge, and 100 from the 89th New York at the lower. They met with no great loss in crossing, as the artillery had in large part silenced the Confederate fire, and upon landing seized the buildings along the river and captured some prisoners.² It was about half past four when the Federals thus gained possession of the south bank, and were enabled to complete their bridges at the town. Barksdale continued the contest, however, retiring from street to street, until seven P. M. In the effort to drive him back, the 20th Massachusetts, moving up the street leading from the bridgehead, lost 97 men killed and wounded in a space of about fifty yards.³ Having most gallantly and admirably effected the purpose for which he had been placed in Fredericksburg, Barksdale was withdrawn by General McLaws at nightfall.

The first movements of the Federals to lay pontoons had been signaled by the firing of two guns early on the morning of the 11th. Longstreet's corps then rose from their bivouacs, and took the positions allotted them, namely, Anderson's division, stretching from Taylor's hill to the Orange road; Ransom's and McLaws's, occupying Marye's and Lee's hills, and the defile between them; and Pickett and Hood, holding the remainder of the ridge as far as Hamilton's crossing. Late in the day, when the Federals had secured a

¹ Woodbury's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xxi. p. 170.

² Over eighty, says General Hunt in his report. When the Federal regiments named had crossed, the 19th and 20th Massachusetts were also thrown over in pontoons, and when the bridge was laid, the 42d and 59th New York and the 127th Pennsylvania crossed. (Hall's report, *Ib.* p. 283.)

³ Report of Colonel N. J. Hall, *Ib.* p. 283.

crossing, Lee ordered A. P. Hill and Taliaferro to come up from the rear and relieve Hood and Pickett by holding the ridge from Hamilton's to Deep Run. Hood and Pickett were to close on the centre and hold the ground between Deep and Hazel Runs. But Lee did not think the enemy's plans as yet sufficiently developed to recall Jackson's other divisions from Skinker's Neck and Port Royal. A. P. Hill and Taliaferro moved early on the 12th, and reached the field about noon.

If Lee had gained, Burnside had lost a day by Barksdale's stubborn defense of Fredericksburg. The success of the Federal commander's strategy depended upon the rapidity of his movements. Yet he made no haste to use the bridges which had cost so much time and blood. One brigade of Franklin's was thrown over at Deep Run, and Howard's division and a brigade from the 9th corps crossed at the town during the night and occupied it. With these exceptions the Federal army still stood on the north bank of the Rappahannock on the morning of the 12th, twenty-six hours after it had given notice of its intentions.

During this day, however, Sumner at the town and Franklin at Deep Run took over their grand divisions. Hooker's grand division remained on the north side, "in readiness to support either the right or the left, or to press the enemy in case the other commands succeeded in moving him."¹ The troops on the south side were stationed as follows: the 2d corps occupied the centre and right of the town of Fredericksburg; the 9th corps extended from the left of the 2d to Deep Run, where it connected with the right of Franklin's grand division, and then came the 6th corps upon the left of the 9th. These troops were practically parallel to the river and the Richmond road. On the left of the 6th corps came the 1st, "nearly at right angles with it, its left resting on the river."² Gibbon's division of the 1st corps was really in line with the 6th corps. Meade's division was bent back, extending to the river, and Doubleday's was on the river's bank in support of Meade's left. Late in the day, two divisions of the 3d corps³ were placed near the

¹ Burnside's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xxi. p. 89.

² Burnside's report, *Ib.* p. 89.

³ Sickles's and Birney's.

lower bridges, and ordered to hold themselves ready to support Franklin when necessary. The entire day was consumed in making these dispositions. No attempt was made by Burnside that day upon the Confederate position, nor did Lee attempt serious opposition to the crossing. The latter says the Federals were "secured from material interruption by a dense fog. Our artillery could only be used with effect when the occasional clearing of the mist rendered his columns visible. His batteries upon the Stafford Heights fired at intervals upon our position."¹ At noon Lee saw that there was no longer room to doubt his adversary's purpose of making his main attack at Fredericksburg, and he therefore sent to recall Jackson from the lower Rappahannock. Beginning their march after dark on the 12th, the two divisions with Jackson reached Hamilton's crossing shortly after dawn on the 13th.² Thus the entire Confederate army was without difficulty concentrated in Burnside's front before he was ready to attack.

¹ Lee's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xxi. p. 552.

² D. H. Hill had about eighteen miles and Early about twelve miles to march.

CHAPTER LIII.

FREDERICKSBURG. — FRANKLIN'S ATTACK.

BURNSIDE has been severely but justly criticised, not more for his plan of battle than for the hesitation and vagueness of his orders for its execution. He seems to have realized that the delay in crossing had destroyed all hope of surprising Lee and thus fighting the Confederate army in detail, for he says that this delay "had rendered some change in the plan of attack necessary,"¹ and on the afternoon of the 12th he "visited the different commands with a view to determining as to future movements." He reached Franklin's headquarters at five P. M., where he met, besides Franklin, his two corps commanders, Reynolds and Smith. Burnside had placed 60,000 men, or rather more than half his army, under Franklin's orders, and the latter strongly advised an attack on the Confederate right with a column of at least 30,000 men, at daylight in the morning. Franklin also asked that the two divisions from Hooker, which had been ordered to report to him, should be brought to the south side of the river during the night, and requested that his orders should be given as promptly as possible to enable him to make the necessary disposition of troops before daylight.² At midnight he sent another request for orders, but none reached him until 7.30 A. M. on the 13th. Thus no dispositions were made during the night, and Hooker's division remained on the north side of the river.

General Burnside says: ³ "Positive information had reached me that the enemy had built a new road in the rear of the

¹ Burnside's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xxi. pp. 89, 90.

² Palfrey's *Antietam and Fredericksburg*, p. 150; Reply of Major-General Franklin, New York, 1863, p. 6.

³ *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xxi. pp. 90, 91.

ridge or crest, from near Hamilton's to the Telegraph road, along which road they communicated from one part of their line to the other. I decided to seize, if possible, a point on this road near Hamilton's, which would not divide the enemy's forces by breaking their line, but would place our forces in position to enable us to move in rear of the crest, and either force its evacuation or the capitulation of the forces occupying it.

"It was my intention, in case this point should have been gained, to push Generals Hooker and Sumner against the left of the crest, and prevent at least the removal of the artillery of the enemy, in case they attempted a retreat."

In order to carry out these views the following order¹ was sent to Franklin : —

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
December 13, 1862, 5.55 A. M.

MAJOR-GENERAL FRANKLIN,

Commanding Left Grand Division, Army of the Potomac : —

General Hardie will carry this dispatch to you, and remain with you during the day. The general commanding directs that you keep your whole command in position for a rapid movement down the old Richmond road, and you will send out at once a division, at least, to pass below Smithfield to seize, if possible, the heights near Captain Hamilton's, on this side of the Massaponax, taking care to keep it well supported, and its line of retreat open. He has ordered another column of a division or more to be moved from General Sumner's command up the Plank road, to its intersection with the Telegraph road, where they will divide with a view to seizing the heights on both of these roads. Holding these two heights, with the heights near Captain Hamilton's, will, he hopes, compel the enemy to evacuate the whole ridge between these points. I make these moves by columns distant from each other with a view of avoiding the possibility of a collision of our own forces, which might occur in a general movement during the fog. Two of General Hooker's divisions are in your rear, at the bridges, and will remain there as supports.

¹ *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xxi. p. 71.

Copies of instructions given to Generals Hooker and Sumner will be forwarded to you by an orderly very soon.

You will keep your whole command in readiness to move at once, as soon as the fog lifts. The watchword, which, if possible, should be given to every company, will be "Scott."

I have the honor to be, general, your obedient servant,

JOHN G. PARKE,

Chief of Staff.

Orders as herein indicated were sent to Sumner, while Hooker was to hold four divisions ready to support Sumner and send two to Franklin.

Let us see how Lee was prepared to meet the attack thus ordered. The disposition of his troops, who were all up at the hour when Burnside issued his orders, is well described by the British line officer who has been already quoted. He says: "On the extreme right, 200 yards in rear of Hamilton's crossing, fourteen guns, under Colonel Walker, were stationed on the spur called Prospect Hill. Supported by two regiments of Field's brigade, these pieces were held back for the present within the thickets.

"The massive foundation of the railroad, though it formed a tempting breastwork, was only utilized as such by the skirmishers of the defense. The border of the woods, 150 to 200 yards in the rear, looked down upon an open and gentle slope, and along the brow of the natural glacis, covered by the thickest timber, Jackson posted the main body of his fighting line. To that position it was easy to move supports, unperceived and unexposed, and if the assailants were to seize the embankment, he relied upon the deadly rifles of his infantry to bar their further advance upon the bare ascent beyond.

"The light division, under Ambrose Hill, formed the first line of Jackson's corps. To the left of Walker's batteries, posted in a trench within the skirt of the wood, was Archer's brigade, of seven regiments, including two of Field's, the left resting on a coppice that projected beyond the general line of forest. On the further side of this coppice, but nearer the embankment, lay Lane's brigade, an unoccupied space of 600

yards intervening between his right and Archer's left. Between Lane's right and the edge of the coppice there was a stretch of open field 200 yards in breadth. Both of these brigades had a strong skirmish line pushed forward along and beyond the railroad. Five hundred yards in rear, along a military road, Gregg's brigade covered the interval between Archer and Lane. On Lane's left rear was Pender's brigade. In front of Lane, twelve guns under Captain Brockenbrough had been placed north of the railroad, and these guns were supported by the 17th and 18th North Carolina regiments of Law's brigade. In Pender's front, at the Bernard cabin, but south of the railroad, were nine guns, under Captain Davidson. Four hundred yards in rear of Lane's left and Pender's right, Thomas's brigade of four regiments was stationed in support.

"The first line of Jackson's corps was thus held by one division, three brigades in front and two in support; fourteen guns were massed on the right and thirty-three on the left.

"It is necessary to notice particularly the shape, size, and position of the projecting tongue of woodland which broke the continuity of Hill's line, as it influenced greatly the conduct of the ensuing battle. A German officer on Stuart's staff had the day previous, while riding along the position, remarked its existence and suggested the propriety of razing it; but, though Jackson himself predicted that there would be the scene of the severest fighting, the ground was so marshy within its recesses, and the undergrowth so dense and tangled, that it was judged impenetrable and left intact and unoccupied, an error of judgment which cost the Confederates dear. General Lane had also recognized the danger of leaving so wide a gap between Archer and himself, and had so reported to his divisional commander, but without effect.

"This salient of the wood was triangular in shape, extending nearly 600 yards beyond the railway embankment. The base which faced the Federals was 500 yards in length. Beyond the apex the ground was swampy and covered with scrub, and the ridge, sinking to a level with the plain, afforded no position from which artillery could command the approach to or issue from this patch of jungle. A space of 700 yards along the front was thus left undefended by direct fire.

“His right resting on the railroad at Hamilton's crossing, and his line extending in a semi-circle behind Archer's and Gregg's, Early had drawn up his division in support of Hill. Three brigades, Hays, Atkinson, and Walker, were deployed in front; Hoke's brigade on the right flank along the railroad.

“Five hundred yards in rear of Gregg, Paxton's, the right brigade of Taliaferro's division, connected with Early's left; Branch's brigade was immediately behind Thomas; Warren and Jones in second line. The division of D. H. Hill and several batteries formed the reserve, and a portion of Early's artillery was parked about half a mile in rear of his division; in readiness, if necessary, to relieve the guns on Prospect hill.

“Jackson's infantry mustered 30,000 strong, and his line covered 2600 yards; about eleven men to a yard, including reserve; a deep formation, but this was the weakest flank of the position.

“Opposite Deep Run on Jackson's left, Hood's division was stationed, and next in order came Pickett's, prolonging the line to Hazel Run. Fourteen guns were massed before each of these divisions, and the level plain in front of them was covered with skirmishers. This portion of Lee's line, 3000 yards long, was held by three men to the yard; it was flanked by Jackson's left brigades, and the salient of Marye's hill. Three batteries were held in reserve behind both Hood and Pickett.

“Kershaw's brigade of McLaws's division covered the wooded ravine of Hazel Run, with Barksdale's and Semmes's in support. One company was pushed forward along the right bank of the creek, and Howison's mill was held by a battalion. Three regiments of Cobb's brigade occupied the stone wall at the base of Marye's hill, the 18th Georgia on the right, the 24th Georgia in the centre, and the Phillips's legion on the left. On the reverse slope, 200 yards behind the crest, Cooke's brigade of Ransom's division was stationed, with the 16th Georgia of Cobb's brigade on the right. In the trench between the Telegraph and Orange plank roads lay the 24th North Carolina of Ransom's brigade of Ransom's division, the

remainder of this brigade being intrenched 600 yards in rear, on the slope of the further ridge.

“The gun-pits on Marye’s hill were occupied by nine guns, under Colonel Walton, manned by the Louisiana Washington artillery ; in pits to the left of the Plank road was Maurin’s battery of four pieces, and six guns were placed in immediate support in the depression behind the right shoulder of Marye’s hill. This important section, covering the roads, was thus held by three brigades, in the first line, twelve regiments ; three brigades, fifteen regiments, in the second line ; in all, 11,000 infantry and nineteen guns. The actual fighting line was composed of one brigade in front and three (including Kershaw) in close support ; about 7400 infantry ;¹ all of whom took part in the engagement.

“Furthermore, on Lee’s hill were twenty-one guns, eight of which commanded the Telegraph road and enfiladed the embankment of the unfinished railway ;² and three heavy batteries (two under Rhett), on the slope of the farther ridge, were ready to sweep the exposed plateau of Marye’s hill, should it be carried by the enemy. In general reserve, seventeen smooth-bore guns were stationed in a gully behind Lee’s hill. The left flank of the position was intrusted to Anderson’s division, five batteries in gun-pits on the ridge covered the front, one was held in reserve near Stansbury’s hill, and six pieces stood on Taylor’s hill. It was unlikely that this flank would be seriously attacked ; it was held, therefore, but by 7000 infantry, and thirty-four guns, three men to the yard. One battery, occupying the earthwork on the level ground, covered the ford below Falmouth, and at the same time flanked the Plank road. Stuart’s cavalry and horse artillery, two brigades, 4000 strong, and eighteen guns, on the right flank of the army and well to the front, filled the interval between Hamilton’s crossing and the Massaponax ; the skirmish line (dismounted) being pushed

¹ General E. P. Alexander makes the four engaged at this point 6000 muskets.

² The unfinished railroad to Orange Court House which, leaving the town at the depot of the Richmond Railroad, runs up the Hazel Run ravine.

forward beyond the old stage road, and, on the right flank, vedettes occupied a hillock near the mouth of the creek. One Whitworth gun was posted on the heights beyond the Massaponax, northeast of Yerby's house.

"The entire length of Lee's line was about 11,500 yards, and his combatant strength being probably about 68,000, the proportion of men to space was 11,000 to the mile, nearly six to the yard. His left was naturally strong, and the fords above Falmouth were watched by cavalry; this portion of the position, therefore, was held by one division only. The salient of Marye's hill, commanding the two roads, was manned by two divisions, and its natural defensive capabilities artificially improved. The reëntrant of the centre, flanked as it was by bastion-like spurs, was thoroughly occupied by 13,000 men. On the right, the weaker flank, where the greater width of the plain gave the enemy room to deploy, and where defeat would cut the army off from the railroad, and perhaps from the Telegraph road, was massed a whole army corps, with a strong cavalry division operating on the flank."

Burnside, after giving Lee ample time for concentrating, was about to assault the two points in his enemy's line which were best prepared to receive him. He seems to have possessed no information of value as to Lee's position or movements, save that obtained by his balloons. No scouts, no cavalry reconnoissances, seem to have been resorted to. The presence of Stuart in force upon the Federal left flank appears to have been unknown. The inactivity of the Federal cavalry is in striking contrast with the activity of the Confederates. At this very time Hampton was raiding completely in the rear of the Federal army, and on the day before the battle of Fredericksburg was capturing provisions and destroying supplies at Dumfries.

Burnside's order to Franklin has been looked upon as indicating a change of his purpose of attacking Lee's right in force, and as restricting his lieutenant to an assaulting column of one division. We think, without entering into the discussion of this matter, that such a view is extreme. But there can be no doubt that his orders were obscure, uncertain, hesitating. He did not give definite instructions, nor did he com-

mit the matter to Franklin's discretion. By dividing his forces, and making two attacks at distant points against an army whose position made it practically equal in force to his own, he ran immense risks, and had success crowned his first efforts, the result would have been the greater concentration of a powerful enemy between the two widely separated wings of his own army.

According to Burnside's official report, Franklin had under his command about 60,000 men and 116 guns, Sumner about 27,000 men and 104 guns, and Hooker about 26,000 men, including the two divisions he was to hold ready to support Sumner. On the Stafford Heights, as already stated, were 147 guns. As soon as his orders were received, Franklin directed Reynolds to prepare to make the attack, and Reynolds assigned the duty to Meade's division, supported by Gibbon's.

Meade at once moved forward, crossed the ravine that intersects the plain near the Smithfield house, and, having advanced down the river some 700 or 800 yards, turned sharp to the right. Crossing the old Richmond road, he formed his column of attack facing the low place in the bridge held by the Confederates, from which the wooded point projected farthest into the plain. The ground between the stage road and the railroad here rises to a low crest, parallel to the direction of the road. On the north slope of this crest, Meade formed his troops, his 1st and 2d brigades forming two lines of battle, 300 paces apart, while his 3d brigade was formed in flank on the left of these to protect their advance.

And now it was, just as the Federals were making ready to advance, that the daring of a young Confederate artillery officer gave them pause and rendered himself famous. As above stated, Stuart's cavalry covered Jackson's right flank near Hamilton's crossing, and extended the Confederate line from that point on the north side of the Massaponax toward the river. Major John Pelham, Stuart's chief of artillery, taking one gun¹ down the road which led from Hamilton's crossing

¹ General Lee says a section, but it appears from Major McClellan's *Life of Stuart* (see Lieutenant Price's letter, p. 193), that only one, a 12-pounder Napoleon, was actually engaged. The other, if there were two, must have been quickly disabled.

to the Richmond road, placed it at the intersection of these roads, where he was really in front of Jackson's line, and using such cover as the ground and fence hedges and ditches afforded, opened a brisk fire at close quarters directly on the flank of the column of assault.¹ He was without support except some dismounted cavalry sharpshooters, and he quickly drew upon himself the fire of a number of guns of Meade's and Doubleday's artillery, but by frequent changes of position and rare daring managed to keep up for an hour² an animated contest, and to retire from it when ordered without serious loss. This fire diverted Meade's attention and checked his movement, and no doubt contributed to that sensitiveness as to his flank which caused Franklin to keep Doubleday with a whole division all day guarding it.

Pelham now took position to the Confederate right of Hamilton's crossing and east of the railroad, where fifteen guns from Jackson's artillery, so placed as to give a cross fire upon A. P. Hill's front, had been put under his charge.³

The Federal batteries, as preparatory to Meade's attack, now opened a heavy fire upon A. P. Hill's position. From every direction the storm of shot and shell beat upon the woods in which lay the Confederates.

The part of their position next west of Hamilton's, occupied by Walker's fourteen guns, was especially tried by this fire, as the ground there offered but little cover, and the earthworks were of the slightest. In order to keep the Federals in doubt, as well as to husband strength for the struggle with the infantry, Walker was directed to make no reply to this artillery fire.

Meantime Meade had changed the front of his 3d brigade, which so far had been on his flank, and, facing down the river,

¹ Jackson's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xxi. p. 631.

² General Jackson says "about an hour." General Meade says his batteries (and those of Doubleday) compelled Pelham to withdraw "after twenty minutes' firing." General Hardee's dispatches from Franklin's headquarters to Burnside show that it must have been at least ten A. M. before Meade advanced.

³ From Poague's, Watson's, Smith's, Garber's, and Dance's batteries and the Louisiana guard artillery.

he now formed it "in line of battle on the left of the 1st brigade, its left extending very nearly opposite to the end of the ridge to be attacked."¹ The Federal line now advanced, the 3d brigade of Meade (C. F. Jackson's) against the position held by Walker's artillery and part of Brockenbrough's (Confederate) brigade,² and his 1st brigade (Sinclair's) toward the projecting piece of woodland already mentioned. When Meade's left had gotten within 800 yards of Walker's pieces, he opened a destructive fire, and was reinforced effectually by Pelham on his right. This artillery fire soon caused the advancing lines to halt, waver, and break,³ and the fire swept the open part of the field so completely that the assault was not renewed at this point. Stuart even advanced two guns⁴ under Colonel Rosser to about the point which Pelham had occupied in the earlier morning, and reopened the flank fire which had there proved so annoying. After suffering considerably in men and horses, these guns were withdrawn. General Franklin had already ordered Hooker's two divisions,⁵ which had been placed at his disposal, to cross the river to the support of Reynolds, and, after the repulse of Meade's left just described, there was another halt until Birney could get in position. On Meade's left was Gibbon's division, and this had been ordered forward at the same time with Meade. The division, formed in three lines, had advanced into the open ground between the stage road and the railroad, where they were subjected to a heavy artillery fire from the guns under Brockenbrough,⁶ which were close at hand, as well as from those under Davidson, nearer Deep Run.

Taking advantage of a rise in the ground, Gibbon sheltered

¹ Meade's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xxi. p. 511.

² Colonel J. M. Brockenbrough commanded Field's brigade.

³ Jackson's report, *Ib.* p. 631. General Meade speaks of the fire as "destructive." (*Ib.* p. 512.) He sent orders to these troops to move to the right into the woods; but their commander, General C. F. Jackson, was killed, and it is evident from General Meade's report that this brigade was badly used up.

⁴ One from the 2d Richmond howitzers under Lieutenant Pleasants and another from Dance's battery.

⁵ Birney's and Sickles's.

⁶ Captain J. B. Brockenbrough.

his division here, while his artillery actively engaged the Confederate batteries, and his sharpshooters made persistent efforts to drive away the nearest pieces. Lane's brigade supported these guns and held the railroad embankment in Gibbon's front. Brockenbrough's guns, after several times driving back the Federal sharpshooters, were finally forced to retire¹ from their exposed position north of the railroad.

But Lane still held the railroad, which here runs through the woods, and Davidson's guns, farther to the Confederate left, kept up an active fire, and Gibbon's infantry, sheltering themselves as well as they could, remained quiet until one P. M., when they were ordered forward to unite in Meade's main assault.

Thus at midday, and after Franklin's attempt upon the right of the Confederate army had produced no results, Doubleday's whole division had been occupied in guarding the Federal left from Stuart's cavalry, and in an artillery duel with Pelham. Meade, having moved to the attack after various delays, had met with a check on his left that disarranged his plans and delayed his main blow, while Gibbon had for hours waited in position and under a demoralizing fire for the moment when he should move to Meade's assistance. This was the record, so far, for Reynolds's corps. On Reynolds's right, Smith was in line of battle in the stage road and opposite the Confederate centre, but had been kept there to observe, not to attack. Birney and Sickles, from Hooker's grand division, had been ordered up within close supporting distance by General Franklin, who was now awaiting Meade's movement against what seemed the most vulnerable point in the hostile line. Meantime General Burnside, in order to make a diversion in Franklin's favor, had by eleven A. M. issued orders to Sumner to attack Lee's left from Fredericksburg, and the first of the assaults upon Marye's hill already had been made. But as the attacks made by Franklin and Sumner were entirely separate, and had no interdependence, either in the manner in which they were made, or in the way in which they were de-

¹ See General Taylor's report (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xxi. p. 503), for account of the fight of the 88th Pennsylvania with these guns.

feated, we prefer to complete the narrative of Franklin's operations before turning to the other part of the field.

As above stated, the ridge on which A. P. Hill's right was placed receded at the centre of the line. Here the heading of a little stream converted the low ground into a swampy, wooded thicket, the timber projecting half way between the railroad and the stage road, and affording good cover for an advancing force. The approach through this thicket was deemed so difficult by the Confederate generals that it was left but feebly guarded where the front line crossed it. Between Archer's brigade on the right of it and Lane on the left was a space of about 600 yards without troops.

Gregg's brigade was opposite this interval, but was 500 yards in the rear, where the ground once more became elevated. His troops were near the military road which had been cut along the rear of the Confederate lines to give means of easy communication. Behind Lane's left and Pender's right, at nearly the same distance to the rear, was Thomas's brigade. Early's and Taliaferro's divisions were ready to support A. P. Hill, if necessary. It was about one o'clock¹ that Meade's 1st brigade, under Colonel Sinclair, supported by the 2d, under Colonel Magilton, moved forward. Portions of his 3d brigade, which had been driven back some time earlier, deflected to their right and joined in the advance of the main body of the division. Where the attacking party overlapped Archer on one side or Lane on the other, it was held in check, but the principal part of it, moving through the low wood we have several times mentioned, soon reached and crossed the railroad, without serious difficulty except from the nature of the ground, and inserted itself between Archer and Lane. The latter officers did what they could to ward off the danger from their flanks. Both sent messages for Gregg's brigade to come up and hold the gap.² Archer also sent the 5th Alabama battal-

¹ Colonel McCandless, who succeeded Colonel Sinclair, says two P. M., but nearly all the other reports put the time earlier.

² Archer says he sent directly to Gregg. Lane says he sent for Gregg and Thomas, and also informed General A. P. Hill of the enemy's advance.

ion to delay the advance of the Federals, and the regiment of Lane nearest to the gap (33d North Carolina, Colonel Barber) "refused" its three right companies, and, thus protected, held its ground. The advancing column (which was nearer Archer than Lane) swept on, however, and, turning upon Archer's flank, quickly defeated the 19th Georgia and the 14th Tennessee of his brigade, taking 160 prisoners from them, and drove from their trenches the greater part of the 7th Tennessee. Archer held on with his right regiment (1st Tennessee) and part of the 7th Tennessee, but was powerless to stay the rapid progress of the Federal troops through the gap. These swept on vigorously, leaving Lane upon their right, until they reached the ground where Gregg was stationed. So quick had been the Federal advance that Gregg was taken by surprise.

The veteran Gregg, whose name will ever be associated with the splendid resistance of A. P. Hill's division to Pope at Manassas on the 29th of the preceding August, could not believe that the troops he saw coming rapidly toward him could be the Federals, and as his first rank was about to fire, he stepped in front of them and told them not to fire on their friends. A moment later he paid the penalty of his mistake with his life, as he fell mortally wounded by the Federal volley. The blow fell with crushing force upon his men, who were thus struck unexpectedly, and part of the brigade was thrown into some confusion and driven back with loss. But Colonel Hamilton, to whom the command now fell, quickly brought his own regiment (1st South Carolina) as well as Orr's rifle regiment to bear on the victorious Federals, and poured in a heavy fire. At the same time Brockenbrough's reserve regiments were coming forward, and both Taliaferro and Early, whom Jackson had ordered to the rescue, were hastening troops to the threatened point. Paxton, of Taliaferro's division, came up soon enough for the 2d Virginia regiment to get into the fight; Lawton's brigade, under Atkinson, with Walker on the left and Hoke on the right, all of Early's division, quickly followed. But the momentum of the Federal attack was exhausted. Sinclair's brigade had outstripped its supports, and, checked by the fire of Hamilton's regiment, it ceased to advance. The Con-

federates were seen to be gathering from every side, already a destructive fire assailed it; a few minutes more it must have been overwhelmed from flanks as well as front. It was swept back with heavy loss and in great confusion¹ toward the gap by which it had entered the Confederate line. The 2d brigade (Magilton's), coming to the assistance of Sinclair's, was met and carried back with it. Hoke, who was on Early's right, struck the Federals that had entered Archer's trenches, and soon the whole of Meade's division was driven to the railroad and then across it.

Early pursued the broken division into the open plain, until Lawton's brigade, which was in advance, had gone so far as to expose its flank to Birney's troops now advancing to Meade's assistance, and was in turn driven back; Early then held the line of the railroad.

While Meade's division was thus successfully piercing A. P. Hill's centre and being disastrously driven out, Gibbon was engaged in a stubborn contest with Lane. Gibbon had been ordered forward at the same time as Meade, but the latter, striking the gap in the Confederate line, had pushed on, while Gibbon was held in check by Lane along the railroad, and thus the Federal assault became disjointed. The Confederates² suffered severely from the fire of Hill's, Thompson's, and other Federal batteries, and, as stated above, Meade's troops had already pushed past Lane's right flank. But he held on to his ground, and when Gibbon's infantry advanced in three lines, received it at close quarters with so galling a fire that he quickly broke the first and second lines and sent them back in confusion.³ General Gibbon then brought forward his third line under Root, and finally carried Lane's position at the point of the bayonet, taking some prisoners⁴ and driving Lane

¹ Colonel William McCandless's report (commanding Sinclair's brigade). (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xxi. p. 519.)

² Both Lane and Pender speak of the destructive character of the artillery fire.

³ See Lane's (*Ib.* p. 654) and Gibbon's (*Ib.* p. 480) reports. Taylor's brigade was the first line, and Lyle's the second. Root's brigade constituted the third line.

⁴ Gibbon claims 180, principally from the 33d North Carolina regiment. (*Ib.* p. 480.)

back into the woods. But Thomas's brigade had already been called to his assistance, and, coming quickly forward, struck and checked Root. The remainder of Gibbon's division could give little or no help to Root, there were no other supports at hand, and Meade's division was giving way on the left. So after a stubborn resistance¹ Root's men yielded to Thomas's charge, and were driven in confusion and rout back to the old stage road from which they had advanced.

During the attacks of Meade and Gibbon, Smith's corps (6th) kept up a vigorous artillery fire and an active and angry skirmish with the Confederates on their front, but did not attack in force. About three P. M., however, after Reynolds's assault had failed, a contest occurred for the possession of a piece of railroad, which involved several regiments on both sides. The left of Brooks's Federal division rested on Deep Run, his skirmish line on his right was advanced to the railroad, but not so on the left. On the south side of Deep Run was Pender's Confederate brigade, his skirmish line (16th North Carolina, Colonel McElroy) holding the railroad and protecting Latimer's guns, which that young officer had handled with great daring and skill for some hours. General Brooks ordered Colonel Torbert to advance his skirmishers and seize and hold the railroad. Colonel Torbert moved forward the left of his skirmish line, supporting it by another regiment.² Moving under cover of the Deep Run ravine, they came upon the flank of the 16th North Carolina, capturing some fifteen or twenty men, and by a flank fire drove it back from the railroad. General Law of Hood's division was in Torbert's front, and having been instructed to support Pender if necessary, promptly sent out two regiments³ to cover his left. Torbert, seeing more force in his front than he had expected, ordered up three regiments in support of those in advance, but his superiors, not being desirous of bringing on a general engagement at this point, directed him to withdraw, leaving only a picket line on the railroad. Before he had time to effect this, Law's regi-

¹ Thomas's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xxi. p. 653.

² 4th New Jersey.

³ 54th and 57th North Carolina.

ments, in conjunction with the 16th North Carolina, made a dashing charge, which drove Torbert's men in confusion, and with "severe loss,"¹ from the railroad, and back to their old position on the old Richmond road. The Confederates then resumed their position along the railroad.

The failure of the assault made by the two divisions of Reynolds's corps had been thorough and disastrous. General Stoneman, who commanded the 3d Federal corps, thus² describes the position after he arrived on the field: —

"Shortly afterward, Meade's division began to retire, soon followed by Gibbon's, and both in no little confusion and disorder. Every effort was made to rally them, but all to no purpose. Regardless of threat and force, and deaf to all entreaties, they sullenly and persistently moved to the rear, and were reformed near the bank of the river by their officers, many of whom used every endeavor in their power to stay their weary and overpowered troops. A portion of Ward's brigade, under its general, was sent by General Birney to the support of Meade, and they, in their turn, were driven back, but immediately reformed in the rear of Robinson's brigade, which had arrived, and was just then deploying in line of battle in front of the batteries of Livingston and Randolph. The enemy was now advancing in strong force, but the two brigades of Berry and Robinson, together with three regiments of Ward's brigade, on the extreme right, by a well-directed fire, first checked the advancing foe, and then drove him back into the wood beyond the railroad, taking a considerable number of prisoners."

The Confederate advance he speaks of checking was the charge of Early's division, led by Lawton's brigade, already referred to. After this repulse the Confederates held the line of the railroad. General Stoneman states that for a time a complete gap existed in the Federal line where Gibbon had been.

Sickles's division was hastening up, however, and the Federal line, taking position on Birney's right, once more held the position from which Reynolds's had moved forward to the

¹ General Brooks's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xxi. p. 526.

² *Ib.* pp. 359, 360.

attack. There can be no doubt that the arrival of Stoneman's division saved the Federal artillery from capture and prevented the defeat of Franklin from becoming far more serious. During the crisis of affairs on the Federal left wing, Doubleday's division had been fully occupied by the Confederate cavalry and the guns under Pelham, so that it rendered no assistance to Meade and Gibbon. Desultory fire was kept up on this part of the field until nightfall, but Doubleday effected nothing except to keep the cavalry at bay, and, late in the afternoon, he drew in his lines to what he considered a safer position in the rear.

It was about 2.30 P. M. when the serious fighting on Franklin's front was over.

Before discussing more fully the results of it, we must turn to the other flank of the contending hosts and describe the fearful struggle which at this time had already been some hours in progress at Marye's hill.

CHAPTER LIV.

FREDERICKSBURG. — THE ASSAULT ON MARYE'S HILL.

IT was about eleven A. M. when General Burnside ordered Sumner to attack the heights in his front nearest to the town. Here again the Federal plan showed the want of knowledge of the Confederate position which a careful reconnoissance might have given. The point selected for the attack was a very strong one in itself ; its flanks were strongly supported, and it was commanded by batteries in the rear. In approaching from the town, the assaulting troops had to pass a mill-race or canal heretofore mentioned. This stream, which was about twenty feet wide and four feet deep,¹ had to be crossed by the bridges on the two roads, which prevented the Federal troops from deploying until they had passed it. There was an offset or sudden rise in the ground near the south bank of this ditch, which afforded good cover to the troops, and which was used by the Federals for deploying their forces. From the edge of this offset the ground was open, and rose gently toward the Telegraph road that skirted the base of the heights. This slope was not smooth, however, and at places afforded some cover to troops lying down, especially near the middle of the slope, where there is a slight but terrace-like rise of the ground, nearly parallel to the bluff along the mill-race or canal itself. The slope was crossed by fences, and there were some buildings, particularly along the Telegraph road near the western side. Of the two roads debouching from the centre of the town toward the southwest, the Plank, or Orange road, goes straight up and over the Marye heights, while the Telegraph road² bends to the south at the base of the hill and proceeds

¹ General Alexander, *Southern Historical Papers*, vol. x. p. 447.

² The old turnpike and the Telegraph road are identical from the town

in that direction until it nears the Hazel Run ravine, where it bends again to the west, and makes its way toward Lee's hill. Up this same ravine ran at this time the unfinished roadbed of the Fredericksburg and Orange Railroad, which diverged from the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad near the southern end of the town. Between this old railroad bed and the Plank road was the section of the Confederate line against which Burnside directed his right attack.

At the time of the assault, the Confederates had in the road at the base of Marye's hill three regiments, under General T. R. R. Cobb of Georgia, an officer distinguished both in civil and military life. These regiments were, beginning on the right, the 18th Georgia, 24th Georgia, and Phillips's legion, the last reaching to the point where the Telegraph road, coming from the town, strikes the base of the hill and is deflected. The Confederate line was prolonged from this point northward to the Plank road by a ditch or rifle-pit, which was held by the 24th North Carolina,¹ now under General Cobb's orders. The Telegraph road was far better for defense, however, than any rifle-pit. It was twenty-five feet wide, sunk about four feet below the level of the ground on the lower side, and lined with stone fences. Troops could be readily transferred from one point in it to another, and several ranks of infantry could stand in it without crowding or confusion. In the rear of this sunken road, "on the crest of the hill, at intervals on a front of about four hundred yards, were the nine guns of the Washington artillery, under Colonel Walton.² Two hundred yards behind the guns, and sheltered by the slope of the hill, was Cooke's brigade of Ransom's division. Four hundred yards in the rear of this lay the remaining three regiments of Ransom's brigade, under General Ransom, who was specially charged to the foot of the hill, where the Telegraph road deflects to the left. These roads go out of Hanover Street. The Plank road goes out of Commerce Street.

¹ The 24th North Carolina belonged to Ransom's brigade.

² These guns were four light 12-pounders, three 10-pounder rifles, and two 12-pounder howitzers, composing the 1st company, Captain Squires; the 3d company, Captain Miller; and the 4th company, Captain Eschleman.

with the care of the position, and, behind the infantry, Moseley's battery of six guns was held in reserve. The whole force numbered about 6000 muskets, of which about 2000 were in the front line."¹ Besides Walton's guns on Marye's heights, two guns of Maurin's battery near the Plank road bore directly upon the approaches to the position. Such was the condition of things when Sumner moved to the attack.

General Burnside, whose plan of battle was an attack on the Federal left by Franklin, to be followed up by an attack of his right under Sumner, thought soon after eleven A. M. that the time had come to put in Sumner. True, Franklin had as yet made no impression, he had not gotten fairly to work, indeed, but he was engaged, with orders to assault, and if Sumner was to make a diversion in his favor, it was time that he moved. The Federal commander-in-chief remained at his headquarters at the Phillips house on the north side of the river all day, and his distance from the scene of operations deprived him of any personal knowledge of the condition of affairs in Franklin's front, some four miles distant. Hence he was dependent upon dispatches, and it is probable that he misconceived the state of the battle on Franklin's lines, and overrated the outlook there. Under the orders of the morning, Sumner's troops in Fredericksburg were in readiness, French's division of the 2d corps in the lead, and they only awaited the word to issue from the cover of the town. French's division was to attack in column by brigades, Kimball's brigade leading, followed by Andrew and Palmer. Three regiments (4th and 8th Ohio and 1st Delaware), under Colonel J. S. Mason of the 4th Ohio, were to go forward as skirmishers. The 8th Ohio moved out the Plank road until it crossed the bridge over the mill-race, and then deploying to the left, joined the 1st Delaware and 4th Ohio, which had passed the race at the railroad crossing, and had deployed to the right. Kimball led his brigade after the latter regiments, and was followed by the remainder of French's division.

Just before the Federals issued from the town, General Longstreet had ordered Colonel Alexander, commanding the

¹ General E. P. Alexander, *Southern Historical Papers*, vol. x. p. 449.

artillery on and near Stansbury's hill, "to throw a hundred shells down the streets of the city and towards the (pontoon) bridges,"¹ and this fire had hardly begun when French moved forward. In addition to this cross fire, as soon as his troops were clear of the town they received a murderous front fire from the eleven guns of the Washington artillery and Maurin's battery, which occupied the crest of Marye's hill, as well as from the artillery of McLaws's division, under Colonel Cabell, which from Lee's hill swept the line of the old railroad, the approach by which the main body of French's troops had moved out.² The Federals faced this fire steadily, however, until they had crossed the canal and gained the shelter of the bluff under which they deployed. Meantime a number of Federal guns³ were advanced to the edge of the town, and opened a severe cannonade upon Marye's hill. A tremendous fire from the Stafford Heights was also concentrated upon this spot, but the Confederate gunners, protected by their slight earthworks, paid little attention to this, and devoted their energies to the assaulting column. When deployed, Colonel Mason moved forward with his three regiments of skirmishers, who were received with a most galling fire from Cobb's line as well as from the artillery behind it. With rapidly thinning ranks Mason kept on half way across the open, until his men reached the little terrace or ridge in the ground, which offered some protection. Here they planted their flags, and lay down to shelter themselves until supports should come. On the Federal right, Mason's line seized and occupied some of the houses along the Telegraph road. The remainder of Kimball's brigade quickly came forward, but by the time it had reached Mason's skirmishers it had suffered too severely to attempt a further advance. Andrews's brigade then came up, but, after delivering their fire, were quickly broken and driven in confusion. Palmer's brigade next advanced, but they were too shriveled and dissolved by the intolerable Confederate fire. Some threw

¹ *Southern Historical Papers*, vol. x. p. 449.

² Colonel Palmer speaks of the Confederate fire on and near the railroad depot as "very severe."

³ Arnold's battery, six guns.

themselves on the ground among Kimball's men, where there was any shelter, and the remainder fled to the protection of the bluff near the canal, and even to the town.

French's division had thus been badly crippled, and no impression at all had been made upon the opposing line. Hancock's division had been held in readiness to support French, and it was now ordered forward. A lull in the fighting of about twenty minutes' duration¹ took place while Hancock was preparing for the attack, and it was during this interval that General Cobb, commanding the Confederates in the sunken road, was killed by a sharpshooter from one of the houses occupied by the Federals along the Telegraph road. Colonel Miller of the 18th Georgia succeeded General Cobb. General Ransom, seeing the fierceness of the Federal attack, had already ordered up Cooke's brigade to the crest of the hill. It arrived just as Hancock's assault began. Three of Cooke's regiments² remained near the guns on the crest, while his right regiment (27th North Carolina) ran down the face of the hill into the sunken road, and took its place in line with Cobb's men. Hancock's division came forward in the same formation as French's, "brigade front, intervals between the brigades of two hundred paces." Zook's brigade led, followed by Meagher, and he by Caldwell. These troops issued from the town along the railroad, and having formed along the canal, dashed up the slope. General Couch had ordered the works to be carried by storm, and Hancock's men, uniting as they went forward with such fragments of French's as were still left on the field, made a bold effort to do so. They were delayed somewhat by the fences which crossed the open, and their ranks were torn by the fearful fire to which they had been subjected from the moment of leaving the town, but they made their way to the little ridge where Kimball's flags stood, and where some of French's men were still lying on the ground, and, advancing beyond this, attempted to carry the Confederate line. But Cooke's fire from the face of the hill, and Walton's artillery, became at each step more deadly. Colonel Miller coolly held back the

¹ Colonel Anderson.

² 15th, 46th, and 48th North Carolina.

fire of the Confederates in the sunken road until Hancock's line had gotten within one hundred paces, and then opened with terrible effect. Hancock's veteran troops fell like leaves before the murderous storm, and though some brave fellows got within twenty or thirty yards of the stone fence behind which lay the Confederates, Hancock's men were driven back to the little ridge which had marked the limit of French's advance. Here, mingled with French's men, some held on, but Meagher's brigade, which had been fearfully cut up, and parts of the others, sought refuge in the town. Two men out of every five that Hancock had led forward were dead or wounded.¹

As soon as General Couch saw that the result of Hancock's assault was doubtful, he ordered ² Howard to move out on the Plank road, and, deploying to the right, to strike the Confederate line to the north of Marye's hill. But this order had had hardly been given before the urgent calls from Hancock and French induced him to send Howard directly to their sup-

¹ General Alexander says of the assaults of French and Hancock (*Southern Historical Papers*, vol. x. p. 451): "In these attacks the Confederate loss was slight, while the loss of the Federals was very severe. French lost nearly fifty per cent. of his command, and Hancock lost 2013 out of 5006 led into action. The body of one man, supposed to have been an officer, was found after the battle within twenty yards of the Confederate line. Others were scattered at various distances up to one hundred yards, at and beyond which the ground was so thickly strewn that from the base of the hill it seemed in places to be carpeted with blue. The failure of this assault is, in the first place, probably entirely due to the fact that the assaulting column stopped to fire, for its numbers were certainly four times as great as the numbers of those who drew trigger against them. The stopping to fire may have been partly the device of the division commanders, but the very disposition of the bodies left on the field indicated the evil influence of the intervening houses and fences on the morale of the advance. At the corners of every house lay a group of bodies, and probably the spot most thickly strewn on the field was a small space behind a high board fence, through which the rebel bullets passed easily, and from behind which the enemy could not fire in reply. The wounded had been removed from the place, but the dead left on the spot would have nearly formed a double rank of the length of the fence."

² General Howard says it was at 12.55 P. M. (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xxi. p. 263.)

port. Howard, who had been relieved from the duty of guarding the northern approach to the town by Whipple's division of the third corps, moved out by the Plank road, and, after crossing the canal, deployed Owen's brigade on the left and Hall's on the right of this road. His other brigade, Sully's, was kept in reserve near the town. His centre thus rested where the right of Hancock and French had been placed.

Hancock had been repulsed, and while Howard was moving up, another lull took place. The artillery from the Stafford Heights had ceased firing on Marye's hill from fear of injuring the attacking force, and only the batteries near the town kept up the cannonade upon this point. Sharpshooting, however, was actively kept up between the hostile lines, and the Confederates were reinforcing the troops which so far had borne the brunt of the battle. On hearing of the wounding of General Cobb, General McLaws, his division commander, had ordered General Kershaw to reinforce the line in the road and to take command in Cobb's place. This officer, leading the 2d and 8th South Carolina regiments of his brigade, placed them in the road in support of the Confederate left just before Howard's assault began. The 46th North Carolina of Cooke's brigade was also brought down from the crest into the road at this time.¹ General Ransom also brought up the three regiments of his brigade, up to this time in reserve, to a point near the crest, and the 25th North Carolina was pushed forward to the crest and took part in repulsing Howard's attack. Thus to the four regiments which had occupied the road and rifle-pits at the beginning of the fight, there had been now added two of Cooke's, and two of Kershaw's, while two of Cooke's and one of Ransom's constituted a second line on the brow of the hill, and two of Ransom's were in reserve near, but behind, the crest of the hill. When Kershaw's men entered the road, they were doubled on the Phillips's legion and the 24th Georgia, so that the Confederates stood four ranks deep.

¹ General Cooke had been wounded, and Colonel Hall of the 46th North Carolina took command of the brigade. He moved his own regiment down to join the 27th North Carolina already in the road, and left the other two regiments on the crest.

Against this array Howard charged as boldly and as helplessly as his predecessors. Two of Sully's regiments were sent to Hall's assistance, and one to Owen's, but all of Howard's efforts to reach the Confederate position were futile. He was bloodily repulsed, and but fragments of his command held on here and there to such shelter as the ground and buildings afforded. Fearing a counter attack, General Couch sent out Hazard's battery to take position beyond the canal, and encourage the fragmentary line which was lying down along the middle of the plateau. These guns were gallantly served.

Thus the whole of Couch's corps had failed to make any impression on the position attacked, and the failure was one of the most exhaustive and bloody of the war. On the other hand, the Confederates had suffered comparatively little. The men in the road and the adjoining rifle-pits, as well as the artillery above, were adequately protected. Not so, however, the infantry on the brow of the hill. These were exposed and were suffering severely, mainly from the Federal sharpshooters. It was about the time of Howard's repulse that the Confederates were reinforced by the remainder of Kershaw's brigade. Three of his regiments (3d, 7th, and 15th South Carolina) were posted near the crest of the hill,¹ while the 3d South Carolina battalion was left at Harrison's mill in the Hazel Run ravine, to guard the right. The 16th Georgia of Cobb's brigade had been brought up and posted with reference to the same duty. At the same time, the 25th North Carolina of Ransom's brigade went down from the crest into the road, and Ransom's two remaining regiments were placed close to the crest in support of Kershaw.²

The lull at this time was short. Sumner had the 9th corps as well as the 2d in his grand division. He had been instructed to put the left division (Burns's) of this corps, which was near

¹ The 3d South Carolina took position in front of the Marye house, the 7th behind it, and the 15th behind the graveyard. (Alexander, *Southern Historical Papers*, vol. x. p. 453.)

² There were now nine regiments in the road and seven on the crest, besides the 16th Georgia and 3d South Carolina battalions guarding the right flank of the position.

Deep Run, at Franklin's disposal, but the other two divisions, those of Sturgis and Getty, under General Wilcox, were in the south end of Fredericksburg, and General Sturgis had been directed at the opening of the battle to support Couch. When Sturgis perceived that Couch's left was being broken and beaten, he had placed Dickenson's battery in position¹ and sent Ferrero's brigade forward. His other brigade, under Nagle, followed. But Kershaw and his supports received this as they had done preceding assaults. Dickenson was killed and his battery driven away "in less than a quarter of an hour,"² and Sturgis's infantry was broken and beaten before reaching the Confederate line. Fragments of his command did as many others had done: they sheltered themselves as well as they could behind the inequalities of the ground in front of the Confederates, and in conjunction with Couch's men, who were holding on to the little ridge we have spoken of all the way to the houses on the Telegraph road and beyond it, kept up a fire which caused heavy loss in some of the Confederate regiments on the crest of the hill. The 3d South Carolina, for instance, lost in a short time six commanding officers and one hundred and sixty-seven out of four hundred men present.³

The movements that were taking place at the time when Sturgis's assault had spent its force were as follows: Whipple, who had been brought over the river in the morning to relieve Howard in guarding the bridges and the north approaches to the town, had sent Carroll's brigade to reinforce Sturgis, but these troops were not yet ready, and they went in subsequently with Griffin. Getty's division had also been ordered to advance, but it was an hour or more later before they entered the fight. At 1.30 Hooker had been directed to take the 5th corps across the river, and attack. It was while he was crossing some time later that Sturgis was repulsed and Hooker was directed to send a division to support him. Griffin's division, which was in the lead of the 5th corps, was sent, and one of its brigades⁴

¹ General Ferrero says "on the left of the railroad near the brickkilns."

² General Sturgis's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xxi. p. 316.

³ E. P. Alexander, *Southern Historical Papers*, vol. x. p. 454.

⁴ Barnes's (1st).

struggled forward promptly to the place where Sturgis's men were lying down.

It was now between two and three P. M. Franklin's attack on Jackson had failed, and two of his divisions were *hors de combat*. Sumner's efforts on the Federal right had been more extensive and more exhausting, his failure far more disastrous and bloody, and much less costly to the Confederates, than had been Franklin's. Four of the five divisions under Sumner's command, torn and bleeding, intermingled and in much confusion, were clinging to the ground in front of the Confederate position, or seeking shelter under the bluff along the canal, or crowding the streets of the town. But General Burnside did not or would not realize the condition of affairs. His determination to drive Lee from his position by main force increased as the day wore on. He had, between one and two P. M., dispatched to Franklin to "make a vigorous attack with his whole force — our right is hard pressed;" and though he knew by three P. M. that Meade and Gibbon had failed, Burnside evidently expected Franklin to renew the attack in stronger force. When Hooker had crossed at Fredericksburg and found the bad condition of things in Sumner's front, he sent a dispatch to Burnside advising against any further attack, and when the order was reiterated, Hooker, hopeless as to any good result, rode back himself to the Federal headquarters and tried to dissuade Burnside from a further expenditure of blood. But the Federal commander wavered not in his decision, and Hooker recrossed the river to renew the struggle. As has already been stated, General Franklin, convinced that his wing was not in condition successfully to renew the battle, took the responsibility of remaining quiet. His failure to obey Burnside's order led to his subsequent removal from command, and has given rise to a sharp controversy as to his conduct. Without entering into this, it is enough to say that his action had no effect upon the result of the operations on Sumner's front, and it is most probable that any attack made by him after 2.30 P. M. would only have added to the disaster which that day brought to the Federal army.

Let us turn to the final assaults upon Marye's hill. A

longer lull than usual had occurred in the fighting after the repulse of Sturgis, while Hooker's men were preparing to attack.¹ Of Griffin's division, which had hastened forward to help Sturgis, only Barnes's brigade had so far gotten into the advanced Federal line.² The remainder were getting ready for an advance from the vicinity of the railroad depot, while Hooker was forming Humphreys's division for assault by way of the Telegraph road, with Sykes in support. Carroll's brigade was near the main body of Griffin's, and Getty's division was behind Griffin, its pickets holding the Richmond Railroad cut from Hazel Run to the depot. These troops were more or less exposed to the Confederate artillery from Lee's and Howison's hills, from which they suffered severely, and this impeded their advance.

The Confederates used the lull to strengthen themselves somewhat. The 15th South Carolina was brought down from the top of Marye's hill to the sunken road and placed in the rear of the Phillips's legion and the 2d South Carolina regiment, and the 16th Georgia was brought up and placed on the right of Cobb's brigade. A short time before the last attack was made, Kemper's brigade reported to General Ransom, who

¹ General F. A. Walker says of the field in front of the stone wall : "There, prone on the ground, the living mingled with the dead, are three or four thousand men, the remains of twenty regiments. The line zigzags as the fortunes of the several charges have left it, at some points fifty, at others one hundred or two hundred, yards from the stone wall. Except for those who cluster for shelter at the rear of the few huts or houses on the line, not a man is erect. With rifle or sword tightly clutched, the private and the colonel alike lie hugging the ground, while now and then strange shelter is found. Here is a horse of the staff, which has fallen near the point of the farthest advance ; it lies with its back to the enemy, and between its legs is a very nest of men, who press their heads against its belly. Here two or three stones have been dragged together to make a pile somewhat bigger than a hat, there a lifeless body serves as a partial cover for the living. The firing has almost ceased. Enough of our men are sheltered behind the brick house, the huts, and the blacksmith's shop, to make it hot for any one who raises his head above the wall ; the Confederates have been gorged with slaughter, or are waiting the appearance of fresh columns of assault." (*History of the 2d Corps*, p. 180.)

² Griffin says the remainder of his troops were ordered forward "after about the lapse of an hour."

sent two of his regiments to relieve the 24th North Carolina on the Confederate left, and kept the other two on the crest.¹ This change, however, was not effected until the last assault had been repulsed.²

There were thus eleven regiments in the sunken road and rifle-pits, and one battalion gaarding the right at Howison's mill, while six regiments remained on the crest of the hill.³ Of these latter the 3d South Carolina regiment, which had suffered severely, was put in a less exposed position and resupplied with ammunition by direction of its wounded commander, Colonel Nance. The Washington artillery (nine guns), which had been engaged all day, had exhausted its ammunition, and was relieved at this time by nine guns from Colonel Alexander's battalion.⁴ An overturned gun delayed Alexander for a few moments in getting into position, and when he was ready to open fire, Hooker's lines were already pushing forward with great determination toward the sunken road.

Hooker prepared for his attack by concentrating all the artillery fire he could upon the Confederate position,⁵ and then directed Humphreys's division, consisting of Allabach's and Tyler's brigades, to move to the assault by way of the Telegraph road. Sykes's division was moved "on its right to assault *en echelon* and support." Just as Humphreys was moving forward, Griffin was also advancing from the direction of the railroad depot,⁶ and in a few minutes a struggle not less fierce and bloody than any of its predecessors raged along the

¹ Ransom's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xxi. p. 626.

² See Alexander, *Southern Historical Papers*, vol. x. p. 456.

³ In the road : of Cobb's brigade, 16th, 18th, 24th Georgia, Phillips's legion (4) ; of Ransom's brigade, 24th, 25th North Carolina (2) ; of Cooke's brigade, 27th, 46th North Carolina (2) ; of Kershaw's, 2d, 8th, 15th South Carolina (3). On crest : of Kershaw's, 3d, 2d South Carolina (2) ; of Ransom's, 35th, 49th North Carolina (2) ; of Cooke's, 15th, 48th North Carolina (2). At Howison's mill, 3d South Carolina battalion (1).

⁴ "Woolfolk's battery of four guns, with a section of Jordan's under Lieutenant Smith (two guns), and three guns under Captain Moody." (Alexander, *Southern Historical Papers*, vol. x. p. 455.)

⁵ Randall's and Hazard's guns were especially active.

⁶ See Humphreys's report, *War Records*, Ser. I. xxi. p. 430.

whole base of Marye's hill. Humphreys, feeling the impossibility of competing with the Confederate fire, ordered his men to carry the stone fence with the bayonet, and gallantly led forward Allabach's brigade. When these troops reached the Federal front line, lying down some 200 yards from the Confederates, they, too, lay down and began to fire. With great difficulty did General Humphreys stop this firing and induce the men to go forward at a charge. They were received with a steady sheet of fire from the stone fence that bordered the sunken road as well as from Alexander's guns above, and, after advancing some eighty yards, the men broke and went to the rear, some stopping at the first Federal line lying on the ground, and the remainder seeking shelter under the bluff along the canal. Tyler's brigade was hastening up, and Humphreys, after stopping the Federal artillery that endangered his own troops, placed himself at the head of this brigade, and essayed again to reach the stone fence. Again the line of men lying down impeded his progress, and this time did what they could to dissuade his men from pressing on. In spite of this he carried his men over those who were lying down, and, in the face of the fearful fire that was poured upon him, advanced toward the stone fence. Officers and men fell by hundreds, and after going some distance, notwithstanding all his efforts, Humphreys's column first halted and began to fire, and in a few minutes was swept away by the intolerable storm that Ransom and Kershaw and Alexander poured upon them. Tyler's men could not be stopped at the line of the men lying down, but continued their flight to the rear. Brief, indeed, had been the time occupied by Humphreys's charge, but more than a thousand men, killed and wounded, lay upon the field to attest the lantry with which it had been led and made.¹ But it had inflicted little loss upon the Confederate line, which coolly and with the utmost regularity and order² kept up the fire that

¹ General Humphreys had two horses killed under him. He had led Allabach's and Tyler's brigades in succession, and was conspicuous for his gallantry.

² Kershaw says the men in the road were four ranks deep, and that such coolness was maintained that no accident occurred in the firing of the rear

shriveled everything that came within its focus. The repulse of Humphreys was so complete and disastrous that Hooker recalled Sykes from any further efforts, that he might cover the withdrawal of Humphreys. The latter was directed to bring back the portions of Allabach's men on the front line, and to reform all in the ravine along the canal.

While Humphreys was thus dashing his division against the north end of the stone fence and the adjacent rifle-pits, Griffin's troops had moved from near the depot toward the south end of the same line of defense. These troops and those that supported them seem to have lost time, and to have been more or less uncertain in their advance. The severe fire to which they were subjected during their longer approach to the Confederate position may have had its effect. At any rate, when Griffin's last two brigades went forward, Carroll's brigade came in contact with them. Griffin went on working to the left, leaving Carroll for the time in the railroad cut. A little later, Carroll, by Wilcox's orders, went forward directly for the crest. These troops (Griffin's and Carroll's) moved forward under the Confederate fire until they reached the line of men clinging to the ground in front of the Confederates. One of Getty's brigades (Hawkins's) followed them closely, and they seem to have been the last troops to go forward. These troops, in conjunction with those they found on the front line, opened a furious fire upon the Confederates, but they did not make any clearly defined effort (as did Humphreys to their right) to carry the works by the bayonet. General Kershaw says:¹ "Under cover of their artillery fire the most formidable column of attack was formed, which about five o'clock emerged from the ravine, and, no longer impeded by our artillery,² impetuously assailed our whole front. From this time to six o'clock the attack was continuous, and the fire on both sides terrific." Griffin and Hum-

ranks over the front ones, a fact that testifies no less to admirable leadership than to the patient, calm courage of the men.

¹ *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xxi. p. 590.

² At the moment of the first attack, Alexander's guns were just taking the place of Walton's, and for a little while, as stated above, there was no Confederate artillery fire from the crest of the hill.

phreys seem to have assaulted about the same time, but the latter's attack, if most formidable, was soonest over. "It was already growing dusky," says Humphreys, as he led forward Tyler's brigade to the last charge, "but the night had set in before the firing at the other end ceased." Colonel Hawkins, commanding the 1st brigade of Getty's division, says it was quite dark when he moved forward from the railroad. His brigade, after some confusion caused by the Confederate artillery fire, seems to have passed Stockton's brigade of Griffin's division, and to have pressed forward on the left to the front Federal line. Here, in addition to the storm of fire they met in front, they received a fire from the left of Stockton's brigade,¹ which had dropped behind and gotten partly in their rear in some way. This seems to have completed the discomfiture of the Federals. Colonel Hawkins thus² describes the absolute disorder that existed in the darkness. "This firing from all parties and from all directions, I should think lasted about seven minutes, when I succeeded in stopping it, and then discovered that the greatest confusion existed. Everybody, from the smallest drummer boy up, seemed to be shouting to the full extent of his capacity. After considerable exertion, comparative quiet and order were restored, and the command reformed along the bank of the canal cut."³ After this re-

¹ From the 83d Pennsylvania and the 20th Maine, says Colonel Hawkins. (*War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xxi. p. 336.) Colonel Vincent, commanding the 83d Pennsylvania, says: "Moving toward the extreme left, which was subjected to an enfilading fire, for the purpose of withdrawing it under cover, I observed the flash of guns in front issuing toward the enemy's instead of toward our lines. I endeavored to ascertain from the commanding officer of the regiment we relieved whether there were any more troops in front. He was entirely unable to say. I directed the firing to cease. In a few minutes a brigade came rushing in through my regiment from a ravine a few hundred yards in front, and formed in my rear." (*Ib.* p. 413.) From this it appears that Stockton had not reached the little ravine, or depression, where the Federals in front had sheltered themselves all day.

² *Ib.* p. 336.

³ It is no doubt to this noise and confusion that General Ransom refers when he says that the Federal troops, after the last attack, "were sent, actually howling, back to their beaten comrades in the town." (*Ib.* p. 626.)

pulse, Getty's 2d brigade (Colonel Ed. Harland) was stopped at the Richmond Railroad, which it picketed until morning.

The firing gradually stopped, and both armies ceased from their bloody work. During the night Sykes's division was sent forward to relieve the Federal troops on the front line, and the broken divisions rested as well as they could in the streets of the town. On the Confederate side, Kemper's brigade had come up to the assistance of Ransom just before the fighting ceased. Two of his regiments were brought down and placed in the ditch, or rifle-pits, to the left of the sunken road to relieve the 24th North Carolina, which had fought gallantly all day.¹ The two remaining regiments of Kemper were placed on the crest of the hill. Kershaw drew down all of his brigade into the road,² and when it was proposed to relieve Cobb's brigade, these brave fellows begged to be allowed to remain and hold the spot they had done so much to immortalize. During the night Kershaw strengthened his position as far as he could, and arranged his command with reference to the renewal of the assault the next day, which he fully expected.

And so ended the short winter's day at Fredericksburg. Seven divisions,³ numbering over 30,000 men, had with the greatest gallantry and determination thrown themselves against the strong position held by the Confederates. But about 7000 of the latter had been engaged in the course of the six hours during which these Federal divisions had, one after another, been broken and driven back by the brave sons of Georgia and the Carolinas. At no time had a Federal soldier been able to touch the stone wall that formed the Confederate rampart,⁴ and at the end of the day the assaults on Marye's hill

¹ This latter regiment, after forty-eight hours in the ditch, was relieved, and sent to the rear to rest.

² Except the 3d South Carolina, which was sent back because of its heavy losses.

³ French's, Hancock's, Howard's, Sturgis's, Griffin's, Humphreys's, and Getty's.

⁴ Men were found dead as close as twenty-five paces. When parties went to gather the Federal dead on the following Saturday, the dead who were found nearest the Confederate line were from the 69th New York, 5th New Hampshire, and 53d Pennsylvania, showing that it was Hancock's division that had most nearly reached the goal.

had cost General Burnside near 8000 men, while in its defense not more than 1500 Confederates had fallen. But little needs to be added to what has already been said of Franklin's operations on the Federal left. After the repulse and rout of Meade and Gibbon, though in possession of Burnside's order to renew the attack, Franklin thought it inexpedient to do so, and stood simply on the defensive during the remaining hours of the afternoon, while the disastrous attacks were being continued upon Marye's hill. There is no doubt that he disappointed Burnside's expectations by this course, nor can there be any doubt that an attack by Franklin was fully as feasible as was the attack by Hooker, which Burnside insisted should be carried out. Franklin had under his command nine of the eighteen divisions of the Federal army. Of these but two were *hors de combat*. He had seven practically intact.¹ When Hooker went forward on the other wing, four divisions had been terribly shattered, and portions of the others had been engaged. Nor does Franklin seem to have informed Burnside promptly of his judgment, as did Hooker. Franklin was embarrassed by the vagueness of Burnside's previous orders, was hopeless of any good results from front attacks to be made from the then position of his troops, and deemed the time too short to admit of any important changes in the disposition of them. He therefore took the responsibility of not making attacks which he thought would be bloody and useless, if not disastrous, and he subsequently bore the consequences of his action ; but it is probable that his course diminished the losses of the Federal army that day. For though Franklin's attack had been more successful than that of Sumner, in that he had actually penetrated the Confederate line, and, though repulsed, had inflicted a loss of some 3400 men on Jackson at a cost of 5000 to himself, there is no good reason to think that subsequent efforts to carry any part of Jackson's position from the front would have met with any success. Jackson's corps was all in hand in a good position, and might have been strengthened if necessary from Hood and Pickett of Long-

¹ Birney had lost a good many men, but was in excellent condition ; so, too, Brooks.

street's corps, who were not engaged. It is not true that Franklin's failure had any effect upon the struggle at Marye's hill, for but a small part of Longstreet's troops was engaged in defeating Sumner and Hooker at that point, and a force fully equal to Franklin's was available to resist the latter.

CHAPTER LV.

FREDERICKSBURG. — BURNSIDE RECROSSES THE RIVER.

ON the Confederate side the day had been a very successful one. Lee had selected a strong position, had admirably located his troops with reference to holding it, and had delayed the Federal army on the Rappahannock long enough to concentrate his forces. From a hill at the centre of his lines he had watched the progress of the battle. The enemy had attacked where he was most strongly concentrated to oppose him, and as assault after assault was hurled back with comparatively little effort on the part of the Confederates, the great soldier must have enjoyed the complete success of his plans. The mass of Longstreet's corps, though subjected at times to a heavy artillery fire, had remained spectators of the repulses which a small part of their number was inflicting upon the enemy at Marye's hill. Jackson's corps, on the Confederate right, had been more extensively engaged, and had suffered most. But they had punished severely the audacity of Meade and Gibbon, and during the afternoon longed for a renewal of the attack. Jackson finally determined to take the offensive, but found the Federal guns so numerous and so well posted that he desisted. After mentioning the repulse (at three P. M.) of Torbert by Law's men and the 16th North Carolina, Jackson says in his report: "Repulsed on the right, left, and centre, the enemy soon after reformed his lines, and gave some indications of a purpose to renew the attack. I waited some time to receive it, but he making no forward movement, I determined, if prudent, to do so myself. The artillery of the enemy was so judiciously posted as to make an advance of our troops across the plain very hazardous; yet it was so promising of good results, if successfully executed, as to induce me to

make preparations for the attempt. In order to guard against disaster, the infantry was to be preceded by cavalry, and the movement postponed until late in the afternoon, so that if compelled to retire, it would be under cover of the night. Owing to unexpected delay, the movement could not be gotten ready until late in the afternoon. The first gun hardly moved forward from the wood a hundred yards, when the enemy's artillery reopened, and so completely swept our front as to satisfy me that the proposed movement should be abandoned." ¹

The Confederates rested in position during the night. At exposed points they strengthened their earthworks or formed abattis, and prepared themselves as well as they could for a renewal of the assault in the morning. They fully expected a renewal of the battle with the return of day. The partial character of the Federal attack and the ease with which they had been repulsed; the persistency with which those on Marye's hill had been kept up until after dark; and the numbers of the Federal army, a large part of which had not yet been engaged, led to the conviction that the Federal army was not ready to give up the contest without a further and more general effort. The Confederates did not know how severely Burnside's army had already suffered, both in men and morale.

The expectations of the Confederates were not unfounded, for they accorded with the designs of the Federal commander. General Burnside spent the night in and about Fredericksburg, inspecting the condition of his right. He says ² (in his testimony): "That night I went all over the field on our right; in fact, I was with the officers and men until nearly daylight." He found them opposed to further attacks, but nevertheless, upon his return to headquarters, he directed General Sumner to order the 9th corps (Burnside's old corps) to form the next morning a column of attack by regiments.³ He intended to try again to carry Marye's hill. Franklin, deeming his efforts on the first day as tentative, was in favor of renewing the at-

¹ *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xxi. p. 634.

² *Report on Conduct of War*, vol. i. p. 653.

³ It is said that General Burnside designed to direct the assault in person.

tack, but no definite orders for that purpose seem to have been given him.

Sumner, the next morning, formed the column of attack as ordered. But before moving the troops forward, he went to General Burnside and urged him to abandon his purpose, saying that he did not know of any general officer who approved it, and he feared a disastrous result.¹ Burnside therefore halted the troops, and after an extensive conference with the general officers, not only of the 9th corps, but of the whole army, finding them practically unanimous in opposition to the assault, he countermanded it.

The Federal army remained during that day and the next quietly within the lines. A good deal was done in the way of temporary works as a defense against a counter attack, and from time to time artillery duels and angry skirmishing took place, but the Federal army made no further aggressive movement. For twenty-four hours more Burnside seems to have considered the situation. He does not appear to have thought of any other plan of attack save the one on Marye's hill, which he abandoned, and finally, on the afternoon of Monday the 15th, he announced to a council of war that he had decided to withdraw all the army to the north side of the Rappahannock,² leaving only enough force on the south side to hold the town and the bridgeheads. Hooker was to conduct the withdrawal of the right and Franklin of the left of the army. This withdrawal was effected under cover of a storm on the night of the 15th, and was managed with such skill, order, and dispatch, that it was not discovered until virtually completed. At General Hooker's suggestion, the purpose of holding the town and bridgeheads was abandoned, and at an early hour on the 16th the entire Federal army had recrossed the Rappahannock without loss, and the pontoons were taken up.

Let us turn for a moment to the Confederate camp. Lee's army remained in position during these two days, ready to repel

¹ Burnside's testimony, *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xxi. p. 653.

² This course was in accordance with the advice of almost all his higher officers.

any further attacks from Burnside, and impatient to receive them. The impression made by the first day's battle that the Federal army had put forth but a small part of its strength, and contemplated further assaults, was confirmed on the morning of the 14th by the firm front of the enemy and the active skirmishing of Sykes's men from the little terrace in front of the Confederate lines. The day wore on ; the attack was not made, but Lee believed it would be, and was unwilling to give up the immense advantage he possessed in position. Under the influence of the same conviction he waited quietly through another day. His alternative was a counter attack upon the Federal army in the plain below him, where all the approaches to it were swept not merely by the Federal artillery with the troops, but by the 147 guns on Stafford's heights. Such an assault was sure to be costly, and had in Lee's opinion slight promise of success. He deemed it better, therefore, to hold his defensive position against an army which, having assumed the initiative, must either continue to attack, or confess defeat by recrossing the river. The Federal army kept up a bold front all day on the 15th, and did not begin to retire until the night concealed all its movements. Lee awoke on the third morning to find that his adversary had slipped away.

On the afternoon of the 15th, a request was sent in from Franklin's lines for permission to remove the wounded who lay between the lines. When this request was properly authenticated by General Burnside, it was granted. But no similar request was made in reference to the wounded at Marye's hill, and in consequence very many wounded Federal soldiers suffered, during the two days after the battle, untold agonies, and many perished. Active skirmishing was kept up all day on the 14th and 15th between the lines at this point, a fire which on the 14th cost Sykes's division nearly 200 men, while Kershaw says he lost but one. Under cover of the night the Federals carried back such of their wounded as were inside their pickets, but many lay between the pickets and could not be reached, whose piteous groans and cries were plainly audible to both sides. A flag of truce from General Burnside would have prevented this suffering, but it was not sent. An act of

splendid and heroic humanity relieves the dark picture. Sergeant Kirkland, of the 2d South Carolina regiment of Kershaw's brigade, who was afterwards killed at Chickamauga, was touched by the sad cries of the wounded Federals lying in front, and "begged permission from General Kershaw to show a white handkerchief and go out on the field with some canteens of water and at least relieve the thirst of a few. This, General Kershaw was compelled to refuse, lest it should be interpreted as a flag of truce. The sergeant then begged so earnestly for permission to go without showing any signal and run the risk of being shot, that, honoring his noble motives, General Kershaw at length consented, though fully expecting to see him killed as soon as he showed himself in front of the wall, for the sharpshooters were so prompt and accurate in their fire that there was great danger that he would be shot before the enemy could perceive his motive. Collecting some canteens of water from his comrades, however, he boldly stepped over the walls and advanced toward the nearest group of prostrate forms which strewn the ground. Two or three shots were fired, which narrowly missed him, but he did not hesitate, and, walking quietly on, soon commenced to distribute the water to all who were yet alive. Seeing the un hoped-for succor, many who were lying in silent despair beckoned and cried to him from all directions, and he, collecting their canteens, made several returns to the road to get them filled by his comrades before ceasing his humane task. During the following night some of the cannoneers from Jordan's battery also carried water to the nearest wounded, but the slight relief which these efforts afforded availed but little, even to those whom it reached. When, on the 16th, the enemy retreated across the river, and the Confederate surgeons were able to examine the ground, but one of the wounded was still alive."¹ The Confederates continued to strengthen their positions and to improve the location of their guns on the night of the 14th, but when the fog lifted on the 15th, there were no signs of attack, and the situation was unchanged, save that the Federal rifle-pits and fortifications in the suburbs of the town had considerably increased. The Confederate batteries, having

¹ General Alexander in *Southern Historical Papers*, vol. x. pp. 460, 461.

received a new supply of ammunition from Richmond, were somewhat more active this day,¹ and by their cross fire drove some of the Federal troops from the face of Marye's hill to seek such shelter as they could find. Of the Confederate operations during the 15th, General E. P. Alexander says: ² "A large force of the enemy appeared during the day on the plateau near the Phillips house, and it was supposed to be, and probably was, the newly arrived 11th corps under Sigel. It was still expected, therefore, that Burnside would renew the offensive on the next day, and work upon the Confederate position was accordingly continued all night. The night was cloudy, intensely dark, and windy, and the wind blew directly toward the Federal lines so that no noise within them could be heard by the Confederate pickets, and during the latter hours of the night it rained. Providentially favored by this weather, General Burnside during the night crossed his whole army to the Stafford side."

Such was the battle of Fredericksburg. At the head of 113,000 men, Burnside had forced a passage of the Rappahannock in the presence of his foe, and had then attacked 78,000 Confederates well placed upon the hills south of the river. He utterly failed, and his failure cost him 12,653 ³ men, while the Confederates lost but 5322.⁴ Burnside's losses in killed and wounded were not, however, in proportion to the loss of morale in his army, which rendered it for months incapable of resuming the aggressive.

¹ These were Moody's guns near the Stausbury house. The narrowness of Confederate supplies is shown by the fact that the supplies of ammunition in the ordnance trains were not sufficient to replenish the expenditures of the 13th, and ammunition had to be hastened up from Richmond. It did not arrive till Sunday night.

² Alexander, *ubi supra*, p. 462.

³ *War Records*, Ser. I. vol. xxi. p. 142.

⁴ Alexander, *ubi supra*, p. 463, says 5311.

CHAPTER LVI.

FREDERICKSBURG. — REVIEW OF THE BATTLE.

No campaign of the war has been more severely and more justly criticised than this of Burnside's. Burnside delayed his crossing until Lee had collected his whole army in front. He then selected for crossing the place where his foe was best prepared to delay and oppose him. This cost him a day in laying his pontoons. He then spent another day in deciding upon a plan of action, — a matter that ought to have been settled before he set out. When he had thus given Lee full time to concentrate and place his troops, Burnside made two front attacks at widely separated points. These assaults were not conjoined, and they resulted in the separate defeat of both wings of his army. Franklin's attack was made with too small a force, was not properly supported, and lacked a clearly defined aim and purpose. Sumner's assault, though not feeble like Franklin's, was badly managed. It was made by divisions in succession, each of which was torn in pieces before the next took its place. It was all aimed at a short line of some 500 or 600 yards, which constituted one of the very strongest points in the Confederate position. The Federals came forward by brigades with several minutes' interval between, and were allowed to halt and fire. Every moment they remained at a halt added heavily to their losses without producing any considerable effect upon the Confederates, and in consequence they were swept away in detail by a veteran and well posted mass of riflemen firing at close quarters. Their only prospect of success lay in a quick and well supported dash with the bayonet. No attempt was made to aid the attack by diversions to the right or left of Marye's hill. Finally, after his first day's failure, Burnside seemed incapable of any other plan. He desired to renew the

desperate contest at Marye's hill, and when overruled in this by his whole army, could devise no alternative but to confess defeat by withdrawing 100,000 brave and well disciplined troops from the presence of 70,000 Confederates.

Nor has the successful commander escaped criticism. Lee's movements before the battle, the promptness with which he divined the plans of his opponent and disposed his army to checkmate them, his choice of position and manner of disposing his troops to hold it, were most admirable. In the conduct of the battle itself but one serious oversight seems to have been committed, and that was the failure of A. P. Hill to guard well the gap through which Meade penetrated the Confederate lines. This mistake was gallantly corrected, but it cost many men, and might have had serious consequences but for the manner in which Jackson's reserves were massed close at hand. But it is the failure of Lee to assume the aggressive and attack the Federal army in the plain on the 14th and 15th that has been laid to his charge as a grievous fault. It is said by his critics that he lost a great victory by permitting Burnside to recross unembarrassed after the first day's fight, that if he had thrown his army upon the Federal army while it was on the south side, crippled and dispirited, he might have overwhelmed it. Lee's action is by such writers spoken of as a failure to appreciate the victory he had gained and the splendid possibilities within his reach.

We must content ourselves with a statement in regard to this. It is probable that Lee did not recognize the extent of the damage he had inflicted upon the Federal army, so great was the ease and so little the loss with which its attacks had been repulsed. And he could not, of course, know the extent of the distrust in Burnside. He therefore undoubtedly expected further offensive efforts on his adversary's part. At the same time it is certain that had he known that Burnside would not attack again, Lee would not have made a counter attack upon the Federal army under the guns on the Stafford heights. He believed that such an assault would have been a very costly one to his army, and of very doubtful success. Surely one of the boldest soldiers of modern times, whose genius was aggres-

sive; who was ready and willing to take immense risks in attacks, as on the Chickahominy, at Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, the Wilderness, should not be considered over-cautious because he hesitated to throw his army into an open plain against 100,000 splendidly equipped and veteran soldiers, whose position was at the same time covered by 150 guns that he could neither reach nor neutralize. His judgment on this question was reiterated next spring, when he declined to attack Sedgwick in the same position, though the mass of the Federal army was then out of reach and he might have thrown Jackson with superior numbers upon Sedgwick. It must be remembered that the question was not of following up a repulsed and broken enemy by a prompt counter charge. The Federals kept up their assaults on Marye's hill until dark, and by the next morning would have been glad to have received a counter attack. Opposite Jackson's line, Franklin was so well prepared to receive attack two hours after the repulse of Meade and Gibbon that Jackson desisted from the attempt. No evidence yet produced is in our opinion strong enough to show that Lee and Jackson were in error. Burnside placed his forces in a false position, found his adversary ready and able to meet him at every point, made partial and unsuccessful attacks that did not compromise the safety of his army, and then, having realized his position, without risking more, while fully able to do so, withdrew to his former camp. That is about the whole of it.

Both armies now went into winter-quarters. Burnside, perhaps smarting under his failure, planned another crossing ten days later, but the President would not assent to it,¹ and no further Federal movement was made until the "mud campaign," as it is called, or Burnside's last effort, toward the end of January, 1863, to cross again above Fredericksburg. The

¹ Burnside issued orders, December 26, for the preparations to be made. He had selected as a place of crossing a point six miles below Fredericksburg, opposite the Seddon house, and had actually started his cavalry on a raid to break Lee's communications, when, on December 30, President Lincoln stopped him. The President was moved to this course by the urgent representations of numerous officers of the Army of the Potomac, that the movement would only result in disaster. (*Report on Conduct of War*, vol. i. p. 716.)

fearful condition of the roads forced him to give up this attempt, and he then resigned and was succeeded by Hooker.

Lee remained quiet, but his cavalry continued active. Hampton, with his brigade, had been raiding in Burnside's rear during the battle, having surprised and captured the town of Dumfries on the 12th of December and taken some prisoners and wagons. He made another dashing reconnoissance a few days later, capturing Occoquan on December 18, and bringing off 150 prisoners and a number of wagons. The year was closed by a larger expedition of Stuart, who, on December 26, led 1800 cavalry under Hampton and the Lees to the Federal rear. After doing a good deal of damage about Occoquan and Dumfries, Stuart moved northward to the Alexandria Railroad, which he struck at Burke's Station, but fifteen miles from Alexandria. After doing some damage and having his joke with the Federal quartermaster-general,¹ this bold raider made a circuit through Loudoun County, and returned to Culpeper on December 31. His presence within a few miles of Washington probably emphasized President Lincoln's opposition to a forward movement of Burnside at this time.

¹ When about to leave Burke's Station, Stuart, who had a telegraph operator with him, telegraphed to General Meigs, quartermaster-general at Washington, complaining of the quality of mules that had been recently furnished to Burnside's army, and saying that he (Stuart) was much embarrassed, in consequence, in getting the wagons he had captured back into the Confederate lines !



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